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THE

WORKS

OF

THOMAS PAINE:

VOL. I.

THE

WORKS

OF

THOMAS PAINE,

SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

TO THE

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,

IN THE LATE WAR.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

PHILADELPHIA:
PRINTED BY JAMES CAREY,
No. 83, North Second-street.

1797.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THIS firſt volume of T. PAINE's WORKS contains that author's publications during his reſidence in America.—Of theſe, ſome have never appeared in any former edition of his Works; particularly Diſſertations on Government, on the Affairs of the Bank, and on Paper Money, two numbers of The Criſis, and the Miſcellaneous Pieces at the cloſe of the volume.—The editor thinks it incumbent on him to account for the introduction and arrangement of ſome of theſe productions.

Having ſeen but one edition of Mr. Paine's Works in which it was attempted to give THE CRISIS, and that one being imperfect, as it wanted No. X. and No. XII. exertions were made to ſupply the deficiency, by a recurrence to contemporary newſpapers and other publications:—In this reſearch, the piece which is here introduced as No. X. was found in the Pennſylvania Gazette. It appears to have been written in a hurry, or, at leaſt, for inſtant publication; for although it was publiſhed in three parts, viz. in the papers of the 20th and 27th of February, and 6th of March, 1782, it bears date not from the appearance of the firſt part, but from that of the laſt.—This hurry may ſerve to account for the omiſſion of the title and number, without which it was originally publiſhed.

The letter to the Earl of Shelburne, which has hitherto been detached from The Criſis, is, evidently, No. XII of that work, which can no otherwiſe be ſupplied.—Its date, ſignature, and mode of publication (in the newſpapers), leave no doubt of this on the editor's mind.

The numbers of The Criſis being thus completed, the editor had ſtill left two pieces ſigned Common Senſe, which, appearing to be of the ſame family, he has claſſed under the general head, as ſupernume-

raries, according to their dates.—The latter of theſe never appeared but in the newſpapers of the day.

At a time when conſiderable progreſs had been made in printing this volume, the editor was informed that Mr. Paine had ſent ſome contributions to the Pennſylvania Magazine.—On which application was made to Mr. R. Aitken, the publiſher of that work, who very obligingly pointed out the pieces written by Mr. P. It was then too late to give them their chronological precedence, and they were neceſſarily placed at the end of the volume, under the head Miſcellaneous Pieces. It is neceſſary to add, that two of thoſe eſſays, namely, a deſcription of a new electrical machine, then not known in America, and a method of building frame houſes in England, are omitted; the former being uſeleſs at preſent, when electricity is ſo much better underſtood—and the latter inapplicable in this country.

A few other articles, which (Mr. Aitken ſays) were merely *handed* by Mr. P. for publication, have not, on ſo doubtful a claim, obtained a place here. Theſe were hiſtoric facts, and he could therefore, at moſt, have only furniſhed the language with which they are clothed.

Philadelphia, December 24, 1796.

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COMMON SENSE:

ADDRESSED TO THE

INHABITANTS OF AMERICA,

ON THE FOLLOWING

INTERESTING SUBJECTS,

VIZ.

I. Of the Origin and Design of Government in general: with concise Remarks on the English Constitution.

II. Of Monarchy and Hereditary Succession.

III. Thoughts on the present State of American Affairs.

IV. Of the present Ability of America: with some miscellaneous Reflections.

To which is added,

AN APPENDIX.

MAN KNOWS NO MASTER SAVE CREATING HEAVEN,
OR THOSE WHOM CHOICE AND COMMON GOOD ORDAIN.
THOMSON.

PHILADELPHIA:
PRINTED BY JAMES CAREY,
No. 83, *North Second-Street.*

1796.

INTRODUCTION.

PERHAPS the sentiments contained in the following pages, are not *yet* sufficiently fashionable to procure them general favour; a long habit of not thinking a thing *wrong*, gives it a superficial appearance of being *right*, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defence of custom. But the tumult soon subsides. Time makes more converts than reason.

As a long and violent abuse of power, is generally the means of calling the right of it in question (and in matters too which might never have been thought of, had not the sufferers been aggravated into the inquiry) and as the King of England hath undertaken in his *own right*, to support the Parliament in what he calls *theirs*, and as the good people of this country are grievously oppressed by the combination, they have an undoubted privilege to enquire into the pretensions of both, and equally to reject the usurpation of either.

In the following sheets, the author hath studiously avoided every thing which is personal among ourselves. Compliments as well as censure to individuals make no part thereof. The wise, and the worthy, need not the triumph of a pamphlet; and those whose sentiments are injudicious, or unfriendly, will cease of themselves unless too much pains are bestowed upon their conversion.

The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind. Many circumstances have, and will arise, which are not local, but universal, and through which the principles of all lovers of mankind are affected, and in the event of which, their affections are interested. The laying a country desolate with fire and sword, declaring war against the natural rights of all mankind, and extirpating the defenders thereof from the face of the earth, is the concern of every man to whom nature hath given the power of feeling; of which class, regardless of party censure, is

THE AUTHOR.

Philadelphia, February 14, 1776.

COMMON SENSE.

Of the origin and design of government in general: with concise remarks on the English constitution.

SOME writers have so confounded society with government, as to leave little or no distinction between them; whereas they are not only different, but have different origins. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness *positively* by uniting our affections, the latter *negatively* by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last is a punisher.

Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one; for when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries by *a government*, which we might expect in a country *without government*, our calamity is heightened by reflecting that we furnish the means by which we suffer. Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence; the palaces of kings are built on the ruins of the bowers of paradise. For were the impulses of conscience clear, uniform and irresistibly obeyed, man would need no other lawgiver; but that not being the case, he finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his property to furnish means for the protection of the rest; and this he is induced to do by the same prudence which in every other case advises him out of two evils to choose the least. *Wherefore*, security being the true design and end of government, it unanswerably follows, that whatever *form* thereof appears most likely to ensure it to us, with the least expence and greatest benefit, is preferable to all others.

In order to gain a clear and just idea of the design and end of government, let us suppose a small number of persons settled in some sequestered part of the earth, unconnected with the rest, they will then represent the first peopling of any country, or of the world.

In this ſtate of natural liberty, ſociety will be their firſt thought. A thouſand motives will excite them thereto ; the ſtrength of one man is ſo unequal to his wants, and his mind ſo unfitted for perpetual ſolitude, that he is ſoon obliged to ſeek aſſiſtance and relief of another, who in his turn requires the ſame. Four or five united would be able to raiſe a tolerable dwelling in the midſt of a wilderneſs, but *one* man might labour out the common period of life without accompliſhing any thing; when he had felled his timber he could not remove it, nor erect it after it was removed ; hunger in the mean time would urge him from his work, and every different want call him a different way. Diſeaſe, nay even misfortune, would be death, for though neither might be mortal, yet either would diſable him from living, and reduce him to a ſtate in which he might rather be ſaid to periſh than to die.

Thus neceſſity, like a gravitating power, would ſoon form our newly arrived emigrants into ſociety, the reciprocal bleſſings of which would ſuperſede, and render the obligations of law and government unneceſſary while they remained perfectly juſt to each other; but as nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice, it will unavoidably happen, that in proportion as they ſurmount the firſt difficulties of emigration, which bound them together in a common cauſe, they will begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each other; and this remiſſneſs will point out the neceſſity of eſtabliſhing ſome form of government to ſupply the defect of moral virtue.

Some convenient tree will afford them a ſtate-houſe, under the branches of which the whole colony may aſſemble to deliberate on public matters. It is more than probable that their firſt laws will have the title only of *Regulations*, and be enforced by no other penalty than public diſeſteem. In this firſt parliament every man, by natural right, will have a ſeat.

But as the colony increaſes, the public concerns will increaſe likewiſe, and the diſtance at which the members may be ſeparated, will render it too inconvenient for all of them to meet on every occaſion as at firſt, when their number was ſmall, their habitations near, and the public concerns few and trifling. This will point out the convenience of their conſenting to leave the legiſlative part to be managed by a ſelect number choſen from the whole body, who are ſuppoſed to have the ſame concerns at ſtake which thoſe have who appointed them, and who will act in the ſame manner as the whole body would act were they preſent. If the colony continue encreaſing, it will become neceſſary to augment the number of the repreſentatives, and

that the intereſt of every part of the colony may be attended to, it will be found beſt to divide the whole into convenient parts, each part ſending its proper number; and that the *elected* might never form to themſelves an intereſt ſeparate from the *electors*, prudence will point out the propriety of having elections often; becauſe as the *elected* might by that means return and mix again with the general body of the *electors*, in a few months their fidelity to the public will be ſecured by the prudent reflection of not making a rod for themſelves. And as this frequent interchange will eſtabliſh a common intereſt with every part of the community, they will mutually and naturally ſupport each other, and on this (not on the unmeaning name of King) depends the *ſtrength of government, and the happineſs of the governed.*

Here then is the origin and riſe of government; namely, a mode rendered neceſſary by the inability of moral virtue to govern the world; here too is the deſign and end of government, viz. freedom and ſecurity. And however our eyes may be dazzled with ſhow, or our ears deceived by ſound; however prejudice may warp our wills, or intereſt darken our underſtanding, the ſimple voice of nature and reaſon will ſay, it is right.

I draw my idea of the form of government from a principle in nature, which no art can overturn, viz. that the more ſimple any thing is, the leſs liable it is to be diſordered, and the eaſier repaired when diſordered; and with this maxim in view, I offer a few remarks on the ſo-much-boaſted conſtitution of England. That it was noble for the dark and ſlaviſh times in which it was erected, is granted. When the world was over-run with tyranny, the leaſt remove therefrom was a glorious reſcue. But that it is imperfect, ſubject to convulſions, and incapable of producing what it ſeems to promiſe, is eaſily demonſtrated.

Abſolute governments (though the diſgrace of human nature) have this advantage with them, that they are ſimple; if the people ſuffer, they know the head from which their ſuffering ſprings, know likewiſe the remedy, and are not bewildered by a variety of cauſes and cures. But the conſtitution of England is ſo exceedingly complex, that the nation may ſuffer for years together without being able to diſcover in which part the fault lies; ſome will ſay in one and ſome in another, and every political phyſician will adviſe a different medicine.

I know it is difficult to get over local or long ſtanding prejudices, yet if we will ſuffer ourſelves to examine the component parts of the Engliſh conſtitution, we ſhall find them to be the baſe remains of two ancient tyrannies, compounded with ſome new republican materials.

Firſt.—The remains of monarchical tyranny in the perſon of the king.

Secondly —The remains of ariſtocratical tyranny in the perſons of the peers.

Thirdly.—The new republican materials, in the perſons of the commons, on whoſe virtue depends the freedom of England.

The two firſt, by being hereditary, are independent of the people; wherefore in a *conſtitutional ſenſe* they contribute nothing towards the freedom of the ſtate.

To ſay that the conſtitution of England is a union of three powers, reciprocally checking each other, is farcical; either the words have no meaning, or they are flat contradictions.

To ſay that the commons is a check upon the king, preſuppoſes two things:

Firſt.—That the king is not to be truſted without being looked after; or in other words, that a thirſt for abſolute power is the natural diſeaſe of monarchy.

Secondly.—That the commons, by being appointed for that purpoſe, are either wiſer or more worthy of confidence than the crown.

But as the ſame conſtitution which gives the commons a power to check the king by withholding the ſupplies, gives afterwards the king a power to check the commons, by empowering him to reject their other bills; it again ſuppoſes that the king is wiſer than thoſe whom it has already ſuppoſed to be wiſer than him. A mere abſurdity!

There is ſomething exceedingly ridiculous in the compoſition of monarchy; it firſt excludes a man from the means of information, yet empowers him to act in caſes where the higheſt judgment is required. The ſtate of a king ſhuts him from the world, yet the buſineſs of a king requires him to know it thoroughly; wherefore the different parts, by unnaturally oppoſing and deſtroying each other, prove the whole character to be abſurd and uſeleſs.

Some writers have explained the Engliſh conſtitution thus; the king, ſay they, is one, the people another; the peers are an houſe in behalf of the king; the commons in behalf of the people; but this hath all the diſtinctions of an houſe divided againſt itſelf; and though the expreſſions be pleaſantly arranged, yet when examined they appear idle and ambiguous; and it will always happen, that the niceſt conſtruction that words are capable of, when applied to the deſcription of ſomething which either cannot exiſt, or is too incomprehenſible to be

within the compaſs of deſcription, will be words of ſound only, and though they may amuſe the ear, they cannot inform the mind, for this explanation includes a previous queſtion, viz. *How came the king by a power which the people are afraid to truſt, and always obliged to check?* Such a power could not be the gift of a wiſe people, neither can any power, *which needs checking*, be from God; yet the proviſion, which the conſtitution makes, ſuppoſes ſuch a power to exiſt.

But the proviſion is unequal to the taſk; the means either cannot or will not accompliſh the end, and the whole affair is a *felo de ſe;* for as the greater weight will always carry up the leſs, and as all the wheels of a machine are put in motion by one, it only remains to know which power in the conſtitution has the moſt weight, for that will govern; and though the others, or a part of them, may clog, or, as the phraſe is, check the rapidity of its motion, yet ſo long as they cannot ſtop it, their endeavours will be ineffectual; the firſt moving power will at laſt have its way, and what it wants in ſpeed is ſupplied by time.

That the crown is this overbearing part in the Engliſh conſtitution needs not be mentioned, and that it derives its whole conſequence merely from being the giver of places and penſions is ſelf-evident, wherefore, though we have been wiſe enough to ſhut and lock a door againſt abſolute monarchy, we at the ſame time have been fooliſh enough to put the crown in poſſeſſion of the key.

The prejudice of Engliſhmen, in favour of their own government by king, lords and commons, ariſes as much or more from national pride than reaſon. Individuals are undoubtedly ſafer in England than in ſome other countries, but the *will* of the king is as much the *law* of the land in Britain as in France, with this difference, that inſtead of proceeding directly from his mouth, it is handed to the people under the more formidable ſhape of an act of parliament. For the fate of Charles the Firſt, hath only made kings more ſubtle—not more juſt.

Wherefore, laying aſide all national pride and prejudice in favour of modes and forms, the plain truth is, that *it is wholly owing to the conſtitution of the people, and not the conſtitution of the government*, that the crown is not as oppreſſive in England as in Turkey.

An enquiry into the *conſtitutional errors* in the Engliſh form of government is at this time highly neceſſary; for as we are never in a proper condition of doing juſtice to others, while we continue under the influence of ſome leading partiality, ſo neither are we capable of doing

it to ourſelves while we remain fettered by an obſtinate prejudice. And as a man who is attached to a proſtitute is unfitted to chooſe or judge of a wife, ſo any prepoſſeſſion in favour of a rotten conſtitution of government will diſable us from diſcerning a good one.

Of monarchy and hereditary ſucceſſion.

MANKIND being originally equals in the order of creation, the equality could only be deſtroyed by ſome ſubſequent circumſtance; the diſtinctions of rich and poor, may in a great meaſure be accounted for, and that without having recourſe to the harſh ill-ſounding names of oppreſſion and avarice. Oppreſſion is often the *conſequence*, but ſeldom or never the *means* of riches; and though avarice will preſerve a man from being neceſſitouſly poor, it generally makes him too timorous to be wealthy.

But there is another and greater diſtinction for which no truly natural or religious reaſon can be aſſigned, and that is, the diſtinction of men into KINGS and SUBJECTS. Male and female are the diſtinctions of nature; good and bad the diſtinctions of heaven: but how a race of men came into the world ſo exalted above the reſt, and diſtinguiſhed like ſome new ſpecies, is worth enquiring into, and whether they are the means of happineſs or of miſery to mankind.

In the early ages of the world, according to the ſcripture chronology, there were no kings; the conſequence of which was there were no wars; it is the pride of kings which throws mankind into confuſion. Holland without a king hath enjoyed more peace for this laſt century than any of the monarchical governments in Europe. Antiquity favours the ſame remark; for the quiet and rural lives of the firſt patriarchs hath a happy ſomething in them, which vaniſhes away when we come to the hiſtory of Jewiſh royalty.

Government by kings was firſt introduced into the world by the Heathens, from whom the children of Iſrael copied the cuſtom. It was the moſt proſperous invention the devil ever ſet on foot for the promotion of idolatry. The Heathens paid divine honours to their deceaſed kings, and the Chriſtian world hath improved on the plan by doing the ſame to their living ones. How impious is the title of *ſacred majeſty*, applied to a worm, who in the midſt of his ſplendour is crumbling into duſt!

As the exalting one man ſo greatly above the reſt, cannot be juſti-

fied on the equal rights of nature, ſo neither can it be defended on the authority of Scripture; for the will of the Almighty, as declared by Gideon and the prophet Samuel, expreſsly diſapproves of government by kings. All anti-monarchical parts of Scripture, have been very ſmoothly gloſſed over in monarchical governments, but they undoubtedly merit the attention of countries, which have their governments yet to form. "*Render unto Cæſar the things which are Cæſar's,*" is the Scripture doctrine of courts, yet it is no ſupport of monarchical government, for the Jews at that time were without a king, and in a ſtate of vaſſalage to the Romans.

Near three thouſand years paſſed away from the Moſaic account of the creation, till the Jews under a national deluſion requeſted a king. Till then their form of government (except in extraordinary caſes, where the Almighty interpoſed) was a kind of republic, adminiſtered by a judge and the elders of the tribes. Kings they had none, and it was held ſinful to acknowledge any being under that title but the Lord of Hoſts. And when a man ſeriouſly reflects on the idolatrous homage which is paid to the perſons of kings, he need not wonder, that the Almighty, ever jealous of his honour, ſhould diſapprove of a form of government which ſo impiouſly invades the prerogative of heaven.

Monarchy is ranked in ſcripture as one of the ſins of the Jews, for which a curſe in reſerve is denounced againſt them. The hiſtory of that tranſaction is worth attending to.

The children of Iſrael being oppreſſed by the Midianites, Gideon marched againſt them with a ſmall army, and victory, through the divine interpoſition, decided in his favour. The Jews elate with ſucceſs, and attributing it to the generalſhip of Gideon, propoſed making him a king, ſaying, *Rule thou over us, thou and thy ſon, and thy ſon's ſon.* Here was temptation in its fulleſt extent; not a kingdom only, but an hereditary one; but Gideon in the piety of his ſoul replied, *I will not rule over you, neither ſhall my ſon rule over you.* THE LORD SHALL RULE OVER YOU. Words need not be more explicit; Gideon doth not *decline* the honour, but denieth their right to give it; neither doth he compliment them with invented declarations of his thanks, but in the poſitive ſtyle of a Prophet charges them with diſaffection to their proper Sovereign, the King of Heaven.

About one hundred and thirty years after this, they fell again into the ſame error. The hankering which the Jews had for the idolatrous

cuſtoms of the Heathens, is ſomething exceedingly unaccountable; but ſo it was, that laying hold of the miſconduct of Samuel's two ſons, who were entruſted with ſome ſecular concerns, they came in an abrupt and clamorous manner to Samuel, ſaying, *Behold thou art old, and thy ſons walk not in thy ways, now make us a king to judge us like all the other nations.* And here we cannot but obſerve that their motives were bad, viz. that they might be *like* unto other nations, *i. e.* the Heathens, whereas their true glory lay in being as much *unlike* them as poſſible. *But the thing diſpleaſed Samuel when they ſaid, Give us a king to judge us; and Samuel prayed unto the Lord, and the Lord ſaid unto Samuel, Hearken unto the voice of the people in all that they ſay unto thee, for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me,* THAT I SHOULD NOT REIGN OVER THEM. *According to all the works which they have done ſince the day that I brought them out of Egypt, even unto this day; wherewith they have forſaken me and ſerved other Gods; ſo do they alſo unto thee. Now therefore hearken unto their voice, howbeit, proteſt ſolemnly unto them and ſhew them the manner of the king that ſhall reign over them, i. e.* not of any particular king, but the general manner of the kings of the earth, whom Iſrael was ſo eagerly copying after. And notwithſtanding the great diſtance of time and difference of manners, the character is ſtill in faſhion. *And Samuel told all the words of the Lord unto the people, that aſked of him a king. And he ſaid, this ſhall be the manner of the king that ſhall reign over you; he will take your ſons and appoint them for himſelf, for his chariots, and to be his horſemen, and ſome ſhall run before his chariots* (this deſcription agrees with the preſent mode of impreſſing men) *and he will appoint him captains over thouſands, and captains over fifties, and will ſet them to ear his ground and to reap his harveſt, and to make his inſtruments of war, and inſtruments of his chariots; and he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, and to be cooks and to be bakers* (this deſcribes the expence and luxury as well as the oppreſſion of kings) *and he will take your fields and your olive yards, even the beſt of them, and give them to his ſervants; and he will take the tenth of your ſeed, and of your vineyards, and give them to his officers and to his ſervants* (by which we ſee that bribery, corruption and favouritiſm are the ſtanding vices of kings) *and he will take the tenth of your men ſervants, and your maid ſervants, and your goodlieſt young men, and your aſſes, and put them to his work; and he will take the tenth of your ſheep, and ye ſhall be his ſervants, and ye ſhall cry out in that day becauſe of your king which ye ſhall have choſen,* AND THE LORD WILL NOT HEAR YOU IN THAT DAY. This

accounts for the continuation of monarchy ; neither do the characters of the few good kings which have lived ſince, either ſanctify the title, or blot out the ſinfulneſs of the origin ; the high encomium given of David takes no notice of him *officially as a king*, but only as a *man* after God's own heart. *Nevertheleſs the people refuſed to obey the voice of Samuel, and they ſaid, Nay, but we will have a king over us, that we may be like all the nations, and that our king may judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles.* Samuel continued to reaſon with them, but to no purpoſe ; he ſet before them their ingratitude, but all would not avail ; and ſeeing them fully bent on their folly, he cried out, *I will call unto the Lord, and he ſhall ſend thunder and rain* (which then was a puniſhment, being in the time of wheat harveſt) *that ye may perceive and ſee that your wickedneſs is great which ye have done in the ſight of the Lord,* IN ASKING YOU A KING. *So Samuel called unto the Lord, and the Lord ſent thunder and rain that day, and all the people greatly feared the Lord and Samuel. And all the people ſaid unto Samuel, Pray for thy ſervants unto the Lord thy God that we die not, for* WE HAVE ADDED UNTO OUR SINS THIS EVIL, TO ASK A KING. Theſe portions of ſcripture are direct and poſitive. They admit of no equivocal conſtruction. That the Almighty hath here entered his proteſt againſt monarchical government is true, or the ſcripture is falſe. And a man hath good reaſon to believe, that there is as much of king-craft, as prieſt-craft, in withholding the ſcripture from the public in Popiſh countries. For monarchy in every inſtance is the Popery of government.

To the evil of monarchy we have added, that of hereditary ſucceſſion ; and as the firſt is a degradation and leſſening of ourſelves, ſo the ſecond, claimed as a matter of right, is an inſult and impoſition on poſterity. For all men being originally equals, no *one* by *birth*, could have a right to ſet up his own family, in perpetual preference to all others for ever, and though himſelf might deſerve *ſome* decent degree of honours of his contemporaries, yet his deſcendants might be far too unworthy to inherit them. One of the ſtrongeſt *natural* proofs of the folly of hereditary right in Kings, is, that nature diſapproves it, otherwiſe ſhe would not ſo frequently turn it into ridicule, by giving mankind an *Aſs for a Lion.*

Secondly, as no man at firſt could poſſeſs any other public honours than were beſtowed upon him, ſo the givers of thoſe honours could have no power to give away the right of poſterity, and though they

might fay, "We chooſe you for *our* head," they could not, without manifeſt injuſtice to their children, fay "that your children and your children's children ſhall reign over *ours* for ever." Becauſe ſuch an unwiſe, unjuſt, unnatural compact might (perhaps) in the next ſucceſſion put them under the government of a rogue, or a fool. Moſt wiſe men in their private ſentiments, have ever treated hereditary right with contempt; yet it is one of thoſe evils, which when once eſtabliſhed is not eaſily removed; many ſubmit from fear, others from ſuperſtition, and the more powerful part ſhares with the king, the plunder of the reſt.

This is ſuppoſing the preſent race of kings in the world to have had an honourable origin; whereas it is more than probable, that, could we take off the dark covering of antiquity, and trace them to their firſt riſe, we ſhould find the firſt of them nothing better than the principal ruffian of ſome reſtleſs gang, whoſe ſavage manners, or pre-eminence in ſubtilty obtained him the title of chief among plunderers; and who by increaſing in power, and extending his depredations, over-awed the quiet and defenceleſs to purchaſe their ſafety by frequent contributions. Yet his electors could have no idea of giving hereditary right to his deſcendants, becauſe ſuch a perpetual excluſion of themſelves was incompatible with the free and unreſtrained principles they profeſſed to live by. Wherefore, hereditary ſucceſſion in the early ages of monarchy could not take place as a matter of claim, but as ſomething caſual or complimental; but as few or no records were extant in thoſe days, and traditionary hiſtory ſtuffed with fables, it was very eaſy, after the lapſe of a few generations, to trump up ſome ſuperſtitious tale, conveniently timed, Mahomet like, to cram hereditary right down the throats of the vulgar. Perhaps the diſorders which threatened, or ſeemed to threaten, on the deceaſe of a leader and the choice of a new one (for elections among ruffians could not be very orderly) induced many at firſt to favour hereditary pretenſions; by which means it happened, as it hath happened ſince, that what at firſt was ſubmitted to as a convenience, was afterwards claimed as a right.

England, ſince the conqueſt, hath known ſome few good monarchs, but groaned beneath a much larger number of bad ones; yet no man in his ſenſes can ſay that their claim under William the Conqueror is a very honourable one. A French baſtard, landing with an armed banditti, and eſtabliſhing himſelf king of England againſt the conſent of the natives, is in plain terms a very paltry, raſcally original.—

It certainly hath no divinity in it. However, it is needleſs to ſpend much time in expoſing the folly of hereditary right; if there are any ſo weak as to believe it, let them promiſcuouſly worſhip the aſs and lion, and welcome. I ſhall neither copy their humility, nor diſturb their devotion.

Yet I ſhould be glad to aſk, how they ſuppoſe kings came at firſt? The queſtion admits but of three anſwers, viz. either by lot, by election, or by uſurpation If the firſt king was taken by lot, it eſtabliſhes a precedent for the next, which excludes hereditary ſucceſſion. Saul was by lot, yet the ſucceſſion wa not hereditary, neither does it appear from that tranſaction there was any intention it ever ſhould. If the firſt king of any country was by election, that likewiſe eſtabliſhes a precedent for the next; for to ſay, that the right of all future generations is taken away, by the act of the firſt electors, in their choice not only of a king, but of a family of kings for ever, hath no parallel in or out of ſcripture but the doctrine of original ſin, which ſuppoſes the free will of all men loſt in Adam; and from ſuch compariſon, and it will admit of no other, hereditary ſucceſſion can derive no glory. For as in Adam all ſinned, and as in the firſt electors all men obeyed; as in the one all mankind were ſubjected to ſatan, and in the other to ſovereignty; as our innocence was loſt in the firſt, and our authority in the laſt; and as both diſable us from re-aſſuming ſome former ſtate and privilege, it unanſwerably follows that original ſin and hereditary ſucceſſion are parallels. Diſhonourable rank! Inglorious connexion! Yet the moſt ſubtile ſophiſt cannot produce a juſter ſimile.

As to uſurpation, no man will be ſo hardy as to defend it; and that William the Conqueror was an uſurper is a fact not to be contradicted. The plain truth is, that the antiquity of Engliſh monarchy will not bear looking into.

But it is not ſo much the abſurdity as the evil of hereditary ſucceſſion which concerns mankind. Did it enſure a race of good and wiſe men, it would have the ſeal of divine authority, but as it opens a door to the *fooliſh*, the *wicked*, and the *improper*, it hath in it the nature of oppreſſion. Men who look upon themſelves born to reign, and others to obey, ſoon grow inſolent; ſelected from the reſt of mankind, their minds are early poiſoned by importance; and the world they act in differs ſo materially from the world at large, that they have but little opportunity of knowing its true intereſts, and when they ſucceed to the government, are frequently the moſt ignorant and unfit of any throughout the dominions.

Another evil which attends hereditary ſucceſſion is, that the throne is ſubject to be poſſeſſed by a minor at any age; all which time the regency, acting under the cover of a king, have every opportunity and inducement to betray their truſt. The ſame national misfortune happens, when a king, worn out with age and infirmity, enters the laſt ſtage of human weakneſs. In both theſe caſes the public becomes a prey to every miſcreant, who can tamper ſucceſsfully with the follies either of age or infancy.

The moſt plauſible plea, which hath ever been offered in favour of hereditary ſucceſſion, is, that it preſerves a nation from civil wars; and were this true, it would be weighty; whereas, it is the moſt barefaced falſity ever impoſed upon mankind. The whole hiſtory of England diſowns the fact. Thirty kings and two minors have reigned in that diſtracted kingdom ſince the conqueſt, in which time there have been (including the revolution) no leſs than eight civil wars and nineteen rebellions. Wherefore inſtead of making for peace, it makes againſt it, and deſtroys the very foundation it ſeems to ſtand on.

The conteſt for monarchy and ſucceſſion, between the houſes of York and Lancaſter, laid England in a ſcene of blood for many years. Twelve pitched battles, beſides ſkirmiſhes and ſieges, were fought between Henry and Edward, twice was Henry priſoner to Edward, who in his turn was priſoner to Henry. And ſo uncertain is the fate of war and the temper of a nation, when nothing but perſonal matters are the ground of a quarrel, that Henry was taken in triumph from a priſon to a palace, and Edward obliged to fly from a palace to a foreign land; yet, as ſudden tranſitions of temper are ſeldom laſting, Henry in his turn was driven from the throne, and Edward re-called to ſucceed him. The parliament always following the ſtrongeſt ſide.

This conteſt began in the reign of Henry the Sixth, and was not entirely extinguiſhed till Henry the Seventh, in whom the families were united. Including a period of 67 years, viz. from 1422 to 1489.

In ſhort, monarchy and ſucceſſion have laid (not this or that kingdom only, but) the world in blood and aſhes. 'Tis a form of government which the word of God bears teſtimony againſt, and blood will attend it.

If we enquire into the buſineſs of a king, we ſhall find (and in ome countries they have none) that after ſauntering away their lives

without pleaſure to themſelves or advantage to the nation, they withdraw from the ſcene, and leave their ſucceſſors to tread the ſame idle round. In abſolute monarchies the whole weight of buſineſs, civil and military, lies on the king; the children of Iſrael in their requeſt for a king urged this plea, "that he may judge us, and go out before us and fight our battles." But in countries where he is neither a judge nor a general, as in England, a man would be puzzled to know what *is* his buſineſs.

The nearer any government approaches to a republic, the leſs buſineſs there is for a king. It is ſomewhat difficult to find a proper name for the government of England. Sir William Meredith calls it a republic; but in its preſent ſtate it is unworthy of the name, becauſe the corrupt influence of the crown, by having all the places in its diſpoſal, hath ſo effectually ſwallowed up the power, and eaten out the virtue of the houſe of commons (the republican part in the conſtitution) that the government of England is nearly as monarchical as that of France or Spain. Men fall out with names without underſtanding them. For it is the republican and not the monarchical part of the conſtitution of England which Engliſhmen glory in, viz. the liberty of chooſing an houſe of commons from out of their own body—and it is eaſy to ſee that when republican virtue fails, ſlavery enſues. Why is the conſtitution of England ſickly, but becauſe monarchy hath poiſoned the republic, the crown hath engroſſed the commons?

In England a king hath little more to do than to make war and give away places; which, in plain terms, is to impoveriſh the nation and ſet it together by the ears. A pretty buſineſs indeed for a man to be allowed eight hundred thouſand ſterling a-year for, and worſhipped into the bargain! Of more worth is one honeſt man to ſociety, and in the ſight of God, than all the crowned ruffians that ever lived.

Thoughts on the preſent ſtate of American affairs.

IN the following pages I offer nothing more than ſimple facts, plain arguments, and common ſenſe; and have no other preliminaries to ſettle with the reader, than that he will diveſt himſelf of prejudice and prepoſſeſſion, and ſuffer his reaſon and his feelings to determine for themſelves; that he will put *on*, or rather that he will not put *off*, the

true character of a man, and generouſly enlarge his views beyond the preſent day.

Volumes have been written on the ſubject of the ſtruggle between England and America. Men of all ranks have embarked in the controverſy, from different motives, and with various deſigns; but all have been ineffectual, and the period of debate is cloſed. Arms, as the laſt reſource, decide the conteſt; the appeal was the choice of the king, and the continent hath accepted the challenge.

It has been reported of the late Mr. Pelham (who though an able miniſter was not without his faults) that on his being attacked in the houſe of commons, on the ſcore, that his meaſures were only of a temporary kind, replied, "*they will laſt my time.*" Should a thought ſo fatal and unmanly poſſeſs the colonies in the preſent conteſt, the name of anceſtors will be remembered by future generations with deteſtation.

The ſun never ſhined on a cauſe of greater worth. 'Tis not the affair of a city, a county, a province, or a kingdom, but of a continent—of at leaſt one eighth part of the habitable globe. 'Tis not the concern of a day, a year, or an age; poſterity are virtually involved in the conteſt, and will be more or leſs affected, even to the end of time, by the proceedings now. Now is the ſeed-time of continental union, faith, and honour. The leaſt fracture now will be like a name engraved with the point of a pin on the tender rind of a young oak; the wound will enlarge with the tree, and poſterity read it in full grown characters.

By referring the matter from argument to arms, a new era for politics is ſtruck; a new method of thinking hath ariſen. All plans, propoſals, &c. prior to the nineteenth of April, *i. e.* to the commencement of hoſtilities, are like the almanacks of the laſt year; which, though proper then, are ſuperſeded and uſeleſs now. Whatever was advanced by the advocates on either ſide of the queſtion then, terminated in one and the ſame point, viz. a union with Great-Britain; the only difference between the parties was the method of effecting it; the one propoſing force, the other friendſhip; but it hath ſo far happened that the firſt hath failed, and the ſecond hath withdrawn her influence.

As much hath been ſaid of the advantages of reconciliation, which, like an agreeable dream, hath paſſed away and left us as we were, it is but right, that we ſhould examine the contrary ſide of the argument, and enquire into ſome of the many material injuries which theſe colonies ſuſtain, and always will ſuſtain, by being connected with and de-

pendant on Great-Britain. To examine that connexion and dependance, on the principles of nature and common ſenſe; to ſee what we have to truſt to, if ſeparated, and what we are to expect, if dependant.

I have heard it aſſerted by ſome, that as America hath flouriſhed under her former connexion with Great-Britain, that the ſame connexion is neceſſary towards her future happineſs, and will always have the ſame effect. Nothing can be more fallacious than this kind of argument. We may as well aſſert that becauſe a child has thrived upon milk, that it is never to have meat, or that the firſt twenty years of our lives is to become a precedent for the next twenty. But even this is admitting more than is true, for I anſwer roundly, that America would have flouriſhed as much, and probably much more, had no European power had any thing to do with her. The commerce, by which ſhe hath enriched herſelf are the neceſſaries of life, and will always have a market while eating is the cuſtom of Europe.

But ſhe has protected us, ſay ſome. That ſhe hath engroſſed us is true, and defended the continent at our expence as well as her own, is admitted, and ſhe would have defended Turkey from the ſame motive, viz. the ſake of trade and dominion.

Alas! we have been long led away by ancient prejudices, and made large ſacrifices to ſuperſtition. We have boaſted the protection of Great-Britain, without conſidering, that her motive was *intereſt* not *attachment;* that ſhe did not protect us from *our enemies* on *our account*, but from *her enemies* on *her own account*, from thoſe who had no quarrel with us on any *other account*, and who will always be our enemies on the *ſame account*. Let Britain wave her pretenſions to the continent, or the continent throw off the dependance, and we ſhould be at peace with France and Spain were they at war with Britain. The miſeries of Hanover laſt war ought to warn us againſt connexions.

It hath lately been aſſerted in parliament, that the colonies have no relation to each other but through the parent country, *i. e.* that Pennſylvania and the Jerſeys, and ſo on for the reſt, are ſiſter colonies by the way of England; this is certainly a very round about way of proving relationſhip, but it is the neareſt and only true way of proving enemyſhip, if I may ſo call it. France and Spain never were, nor perhaps ever will be our enemies as *Americans*, but as our being the *ſubjects of Great-Britain*.

But Britain is the parent country, ſay ſome. Then the more ſhame upon her conduct. Even brutes do not devour their young,

nor savages make war upon their families; wherefore the assertion, if true, turns to her reproach; but it happens not to be true, or only partly so, and the phrase *parent* or *mother country* hath been jesuitically adopted by the king and his parasites, with a low papistical design of gaining an unfair bias on the credulous weakness of our minds. Europe, and not England, is the parent country of America. This new world hath been the asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty from *every part* of Europe. Hither have they fled, not from the tender embraces of the mother, but from the cruelty of the monster; and it is so far true of England, that the same tyranny which drove the first emigrants from home, pursues their descendants still.

In this extensive quarter of the globe, we forget the narrow limits of three hundred and sixty miles (the extent of England) and carry our friendship on a larger scale; we claim brotherhood with every European Christian, and triumph in the generosity of the sentiment.

It is pleasant to observe by what regular gradations we surmount the force of local prejudice, as we enlarge our acquaintance with the world. A man born in any town in England divided into parishes, will naturally associate most with his fellow parishioners (because their interests in many cases will be common) and distinguish him by the name of *neighbour*; if he meet him but a few miles from home, he drops the narrow idea of a street, and salutes him, by the name of *townsmen*; if he travel out of the county, and meets him in any other, he forgets the minor divisions of street and town, and calls him *countryman*, i. e. *county-man*; but if in their foreign excursions they should associate in France or any other part of *Europe*, their local remembrance would be enlarged into that of *Englishmen*. And by a just parity of reasoning, all Europeans meeting in America, or any other quarter of the globe, are *countrymen*; for England, Holland, Germany, or Sweden, when compared with the whole, stand in the same places on the larger scale, which the divisions of street, town, and county do on the smaller ones; distinctions too limited for continental minds. Not one third of the inhabitants, even of this province, are of English descent. Wherefore I reprobate the phrase of parent or mother country applied to England only, as being false, selfish, narrow and ungenerous.

But admitting, that we were all of English descent, what does it amount to? Nothing. Britain, being now an open enemy, extinguishes

every other name and title: And to ſay that reconciliation is our duty, is truly farcical. The firſt king of England, of the preſent line (William the Conqueror) was a Frenchman, and half the Peers of England are deſcendants from the ſame country; wherefore, by the ſame method of reaſoning, England ought to be governed by France.

Much hath been ſaid of the united ſtrength of Britain and the colonies, that in conjunction they might bid defiance to the world. But this is mere preſumption; the fate of war is uncertain, neither do the expreſſions mean any thing; for this continent would never ſuffer itſelf to be drained of inhabitants, to ſupport the Britiſh arms in either Aſia, Africa, or Europe.

Beſides, what have we to do with ſetting the world at defiance? Our plan is commerce, and that, well attended to, will ſecure us the peace and friendſhip of all Europe; becauſe, it is the intereſt of all Europe to have America a *free port*. Her trade will always be a protection, and her barrenneſs of gold and ſilver ſecure her from invaders.

I challenge the warmeſt advocate for reconciliation, to ſhew a ſingle advantage that this continent can reap, by being connected with Great-Britain. I repeat the challenge; not a ſingle advantage is derived. Our corn will fetch its price in any market in Europe, and our imported goods muſt be paid for, buy them where we will.

But the injuries and diſadvantages we ſuſtain by that connexion, are without number; and our duty to mankind at large, as well as to ourſelves, inſtruct us to renounce the alliance: Becauſe, any ſubmiſſion to or dependance on Great-Britain, tends directly to involve this continent in European wars and quarrels; and ſets us at variance with nations, who would otherwiſe ſeek our friendſhip, and againſt whom, we have neither anger nor complaint. As Europe is our market for trade, we ought to form no partial connexion with any part of it. It is the true intereſt of America to ſteer clear of European contentions, which ſhe never can do, while, by her dependance on Britain, ſhe is made the make-weight in the ſcale of Britiſh politics.

Europe is too thickly planted with kingdoms to be long at peace, and whenever a war breaks out between England and any foreign power, the trade of America goes to ruin, *becauſe of her connexion with Britain*. The next war may not turn out like the laſt, and ſhould it not, the advocates for reconciliation now will be wiſhing for ſeparation then, becauſe, neutrality in that caſe, would be a ſafer convoy than a man of war. Every thing that is right or natural

pleads for ſeparation. The blood of the ſlain, the weeping voice of nature cries, 'TIS TIME TO PART. Even the diſtance at which the Almighty hath placed England and America, is a ſtrong and natural proof, that the authority of the one, over the other, was never the deſign of Heaven. The time likewiſe at which the continent was diſcovered, adds weight to the argument, and the manner in which it was peopled encreaſes the force of it. The reformation was preceded by the diſcovery of America, as if the Almighty graciouſly meant to open a ſanctuary to the perſecuted in future years, when home ſhould afford neither friendſhip nor ſafety.

The authority of Great-Britain over this continent, is a form of government, which ſooner or later muſt have an end: And a ſerious mind can draw no true pleaſure by looking forward, under the painful and poſitive conviction, that what he calls "the preſent conſtitution" is merely temporary. As parents, we can have no joy, knowing that *this government* is not ſufficiently laſting to enſure any thing which we may bequeath to poſterity: And by a plain method of argument, as we are running the next generation into debt, we ought to do the work of it, otherwiſe we uſe them meanly and pitifully. In order to diſcover the line of our duty rightly, we ſhould take our children in our hand, and fix our ſtation a few years farther into life; that eminence will preſent a proſpect, which a few preſent fears and prejudices conceal from our ſight.

Though I would carefully avoid giving unneceſſary offence, yet I am inclined to believe, that all thoſe who eſpouſe the doctrine of reconciliation, may be included within the following deſcriptions.

Intereſted men, who are not to be truſted; weak men, who *cannot* ſee; prejudiced men, who *will not* ſee; and a certain ſet of moderate men, who think better of the European world than it deſerves: and this laſt claſs, by an ill-judged deliberation, will be the cauſe of more calamities to this continent than all the other three.

It is the good fortune of many to live diſtant from the ſcene of ſorrow; the evil is not ſufficiently brought to *their* doors to make *them* feel the precarioufneſs with which all American property is poſſeſſed. But let our imaginations tranſport us for a few moments to Boſton, that ſeat of wretchedneſs will teach us wiſdom, and inſtruct us for ever to renounce a power in whom we can have no truſt. The inhabitants of that unfortunate city, who but a few months ago were in eaſe and affluence, have now no other alternative than to ſtay and ſtarve, or turn out to beg. Endangered by the fire of their

friends if they continue within the city, and plundered by the ſoldiery if they leave it. In their preſent ſituation they are priſoners without the hope of redemption, and in a general attack for their relief, they would be expoſed to the fury of both armies

Men of paſſive tempers look ſomewhat lightly over the offences of Britain, and, ſtill hoping for the beſt, are apt to call out, "*Come, come, we ſhall be friends again, for all this.*" But examine the paſſions and feelings of mankind—Bring the doctrine of reconciliation to the touchſtone of nature, and then tell me, whether you can hereafter love, honour, and faithfully ſerve the power that hath carried fire and ſword into your land? If you cannot do all theſe, then are you only deceiving yourſelves, and by your delay bringing ruin upon your poſterity. Your future connexion with Britain, whom you can neither love nor honour, will be forced and unnatural, and being formed only on the plan of preſent convenience, will in a little time fall into a relapſe more wretched than the firſt. But if you ſay, you can ſtill paſs the violations over, then I aſk, Hath your houſe been burnt? Hath your property been deſtroyed before your face? Are your wife and children deſtitute of a bed to lie on, or bread to live on? Have you loſt a parent or a child by their hands, and yourſelf the ruined and wretched ſurvivor? If you have not, then are you not a judge of thoſe who have. But if you have, and can ſtill ſhake hands with the murderers, then are you unworthy the name of huſband, father, friend, or lover, and whatever may be your rank or title in life, you have the heart of a coward, and the ſpirit of a ſycophant.

This is not inflaming or exaggerating matters, but trying them by thoſe feelings and affections which nature juſtifies, and without which, we ſhould be incapable of diſcharging the ſocial duties of life, or enjoying the felicities of it. I mean not to exhibit horror for the purpoſe of provoking revenge, but to awaken us from fatal and unmanly ſlumbers, that we may purſue determinately ſome fixed object. It is not in the power of Britain or of Europe to conquer America, if ſhe does not conquer herſelf by *delay* and *timidity*. The preſent winter is worth an age if rightly employed, but if loſt or neglected, the whole continent will partake of the misfortune; and there is no puniſhment which that man will not deſerve, be he who, or what, or where he will, that may be the means of ſacrificing a ſeaſon ſo precious and uſeful.

It is repugnant to reaſon, to the univerſal order of things, to all

examples from former ages, to ſuppoſe, that this continent can longer remain ſubject to any external power. The moſt ſanguine in Britain does not think ſo. The utmoſt ſtretch of human wiſdom cannot, at this time, compaſs a plan ſhort of ſeparation, which can promiſe the continent even a year's ſecurity. Reconciliation is *now* a fallacious dream. Nature hath deſerted the connexion, and art cannot ſupply her place. For, as Milton wiſely expreſſes, "never can true reconcilement grow, where wounds of deadly hate have pierced ſo deep."

Every quiet method for peace hath been ineffectual. Our prayers have been rejected with diſdain; and only tended to convince us, that nothing flatters vanity, or confirms obſtinacy in kings more than repeated petitioning—and nothing hath contributed more than that very meaſure to make the kings of Europe abſolute: Witneſs Denmark and Sweden. Wherefore, ſince nothing but blows will do, for God's ſake, let us come to a final ſeparation, and not leave the next generation to be cutting throats, under the violated unmeaning names of parent and child.

To ſay, they will never attempt it again, is idle and viſionary; we thought ſo at the repeal of the ſtamp-act, yet a year or two undeceived us: As well may we ſuppoſe that nations, which have been once defeated, will never renew the quarrel.

As to government matters, it is not in the power of Britain to do this continent juſtice: The buſineſs of it will ſoon be too weighty, and intricate, to be managed with any tolerable degree of convenience, by a power, ſo diſtant from us, and ſo very ignorant of us; for if they cannot conquer us, they cannot govern us. To be always running three or four thouſand miles with a tale or a petition, waiting four or five months for an anſwer, which when obtained requires five or ſix more to explain it in, will in a few years be looked upon as folly and childiſhneſs—There was a time when it was proper, and there is a proper time for it to ceaſe.

Small iſlands not capable of protecting themſelves, are the proper objects for kingdoms to take under their care; but there is ſomething very abſurd, in ſuppoſing a continent to be perpetually governed by an iſland. In no inſtance hath nature made the ſatellite larger than its primary planet; and as England and America, with reſpect to each other, reverſes the common order of nature, it is evident they belong to different ſyſtems: England to Europe, America to itſelf

I am not induced by motives of pride, party or reſentment, to eſpouſe the doctrine of ſeparation and independence; I am clearly, poſitively, and conſcientiouſly perſuaded that it is the true intereſt of this continent to be ſo; that every thing ſhort of *that* is mere patchwork, that it can afford no laſting felicity,—that it is leaving the ſword to our children, and ſhrinking back at a time, when, a little more, a little farther, would have rendered this continent the glory of the earth.

As Britain hath not manifeſted the leaſt inclination towards a compromiſe, we may be aſſured that no terms can be obtained worthy the acceptance of the continent, or any ways equal to the expence of blood and treaſure we have been already put to.

The object contended for, ought always to bear ſome juſt proportion to the expence. The removal of North, or the whole deteſtable junto, is a matter unworthy the millions we have expended. A temporary ſtoppage of trade, was an inconvenience, which would have ſufficiently balanced the repeal of all the acts complained of, had ſuch repeals been obtained; but if the whole continent muſt take up arms, if every man muſt be a ſoldier, it is ſcarcely worth our while to fight againſt a contemptible miniſtry only. Dearly, dearly, do we pay for the repeal of the acts, if that is all we fight for; for in a juſt eſtimation, it is as great a folly to pay a Bunker-hill price for law, as for land. As I have always conſidered the independency of this continent, as an event which, ſooner or later, muſt arrive, ſo, from the late rapid progreſs of the continent to maturity, the event could not be far off. Wherefore, on the breaking out of hoſtilities, it was not worth the while to have diſputed a matter, which time would have finally redreſſed, unleſs we meant to be in earneſt; otherwiſe, it is like waſting an eſtate on a ſuit at law, to regulate the treſpaſſes of a tenant, whoſe leaſe is juſt expiring. No man was a warmer wiſher for reconciliation than myſelf, before the fatal nineteenth of April 1775,* but the moment the event of that day was made known, I rejected the hardened, ſullen-tempered Pharaoh of England for ever; and diſdain the wretch, that with the pretended title of FATHER OF HIS PEOPLE can unfeelingly hear of their ſlaughter, and compoſedly ſleep with their blood upon his ſoul.

But admitting that matters were now made up, what would be the event? I anſwer, the ruin of the continent. And that for ſeveral reaſons.

Firſt. The powers of governing ſtill remaining in the hands of

* *Maſſacre at Lexington.*

the king, he will have a negative over the whole legiſlation of this continent. And as he hath ſhewn himſelf ſuch an inveterate enemy to liberty, and diſcovered ſuch a thirſt for arbitrary power; is he, or is he not, a proper man to ſay to theſe colonies, "*You ſhall make no laws but what I pleaſe?*" And is there any inhabitant in America ſo ignorant, as not to know, that according to what is called the *preſent conſtitution*, that this continent can make no laws but what the king gives leave to? and is there any man ſo unwiſe, as not to ſee, that (conſidering what has happened) he will ſuffer no law to be made here, but ſuch as ſuit *his* purpoſe? We may be as effectually enſlaved by the want of laws in America, as by ſubmitting to laws made for us in England. After matters are made up (as it is called) can there be any doubt, but the whole power of the crown will be exerted, to keep this continent as low and humble as poſſible? Inſtead of going forward we ſhall go backward, or be perpetually quarrelling or ridiculouſly petitioning.—We are already greater than the king wiſhes us to be, and will he not hereafter endeavour to make us leſs? To bring the matter to one point, Is the power who is jealous of our proſperity, a proper power to govern us? Whoever ſays *No* to this queſtion is an *independant*, for independency means no more, than whether we ſhall make our own laws, or, whether the king, the greateſt enemy this continent hath, or can have, ſhall tell us "*there ſhall be no laws but ſuch as I like.*"

But the king you will ſay has a negative in England; the people there can make no laws without his conſent. In point of right and good order, there is ſomething very ridiculous, that a youth of twenty-one (which hath often happened) ſhall ſay to ſeveral millions of people, older and wiſer than himſelf, I forbid this or that act of yours to be law. But in this place I decline this ſort of reply, though I will never ceaſe to expoſe the abſurdity of it; and only anſwer, that England being the king's reſidence, and America not ſo, makes quite another caſe. The king's negative *here* is ten times more dangerous and fatal than it can be in England; for *there* he will ſcarcely refuſe his conſent to a bill for putting England into as ſtrong a ſtate of defence as poſſible, and in America he would never ſuffer ſuch a bill to be paſſed.

America is only a ſecondary object in the ſyſtem of Britiſh politics —England conſults the good of *this* country, no farther than it anſwers her *own* purpoſe. Wherefore, her own intereſt leads her to ſuppreſs the growth of *ours* in every caſe which doth not promote her advantage, or in the leaſt interferes with it. A pretty ſtate we

ſhould ſoon be in under ſuch a ſecond-hand government, conſidering what has happened! Men do not change from enemies to friends by the alteration of a name: And in order to ſhew that reconciliation *now* is a dangerous doctrine, I affirm, *that it would be policy in the king at this time, to repeal the acts, for the ſake of re-inſtating himſelf in the government of the provinces;* in order, that HE MAY ACCOMPLISH BY CRAFT AND SUBTILTY, IN THE LONG RUN, WHAT HE CANNOT DO BY FORCE AND VIOLENCE IN THE SHORT ONE. Reconciliation and ruin are nearly related.

Secondly, That as even the beſt terms, which we can expect to obtain, can amount to no more than a temporary expedient, or a kind of government by guardianſhip, which can laſt no longer than till the colonies come of age, ſo the general face and ſtate of things, in the interim, will be unſettled and unpromiſing. Emigrants of property will not chooſe to come to a country whoſe form of government hangs but by a thread, and which is every day tottering on the brink of commotion and diſturbance; and numbers of the preſent inhabitants would lay hold of the interval, to diſpoſe of their effects, and quit the continent.

But the moſt powerful of all arguments, is, that nothing but independence, *i. e.* a continental form of government, can keep the peace of the continent and preſerve it inviolate from civil wars. I dread the event of a reconciliation with Britain now, as it is more than probable, that it will be followed by a revolt ſome where or other, the conſequences of which may be far more fatal than all the malice of Britain.

Thouſands are already ruined by Britiſh barbarity. (Thouſands more will probably ſuffer the ſame fate.) Thoſe men have other feelings than us who have nothing ſuffered. All they *now* poſſeſs is liberty, what they before enjoyed is ſacrificed to its ſervice, and having nothing more to loſe, they diſdain ſubmiſſion. Beſides, the general temper of the colonies, towards a Britiſh government, will be like that of a youth, who is nearly out of his time; they will care very little about her. And a government which cannot preſerve the peace, is no government at all, and in that caſe we pay our money for nothing; and pray what is it that Britain can do, whoſe power will be wholly on paper, ſhould a civil tumult break out the very day after reconciliation? I have heard ſome men ſay, many of whom I believe ſpoke without thinking, that they dreaded an independence, fearing that it would produce civil wars. It is but ſeldom that our

firſt thoughts are truly correct, and that is the caſe here; for there are ten times more to dread from a patched-up connexion than from independence. I make the ſufferers' caſe my own, and I proteſt, that were I driven from houſe and home, my property deſtroyed, and my circumſtances ruined, that as a man, ſenſible of injuries, I could never reliſh the doctrine of reconciliation, or conſider myſelf bound thereby.

The colonies have manifeſted ſuch a ſpirit of good order and obedience to continental government, as is ſufficient to make every reaſonable perſon eaſy and happy on that head. No man can aſſign the leaſt pretence for his fears, on any other grounds, than ſuch as are truly childiſh and ridiculous, viz. that one colony will be ſtriving for ſuperiority over another.

Where there are no diſtinctions there can be no ſuperiority; perfect equality affords no temptation. The republics of Europe are all (and we may ſay always) in peace. Holland and Swiſſerland are without wars, foreign or domeſtic: Monarchical governments, it is true, are never long at reſt: the crown itſelf is a temptation to enterpriſing ruffians at home; and that degree of pride and inſolence ever attendant on regal authority, ſwells into a rupture with foreign powers, in inſtances where a republican government, by being formed on more natural principles, would negociate the miſtake.

If there is any true cauſe of fear reſpecting independence, it is becauſe no plan is yet laid down. Men do not ſee their way out—Wherefore, as an opening into that buſineſs, I offer the following hints; at the ſame time modeſtly affirming, that I have no other opinion of them myſelf, than that they may be the means of giving riſe to ſomething better. Could the ſtraggling thoughts of individuals be collected, they would frequently form materials for wiſe and able men to improve into uſeful matter.

Let the aſſemblies be annual, with a preſident only. The repreſentation more equal. Their buſineſs wholly domeſtic, and ſubject to the authority of a continental congreſs.

Let each colony be divided into ſix, eight, or ten, convenient diſtricts, each diſtrict to ſend a proper number of delegates to congreſs, ſo that each colony ſend at leaſt thirty. The whole number in congreſs will be at leaſt 390. Each congreſs to ſit ..... and to chooſe a preſident by the following method. When the delegates are met, let a colony be taken from the whole thirteen colonies by lot, after which, let the whole congreſs chooſe (by ballot) a preſident from out of the delegates of that province. In the next

congreſs, let a colony be taken by lot from twelve only, omitting that colony from which the preſident was taken in the former congreſs, and ſo proceeding on till the whole thirteen ſhall have had their proper rotation. And in order that nothing may paſs into a law but what is ſatisfactorily juſt, not leſs than three-fifths of the congreſs to be called a majority. He that will promote diſcord, under a government ſo equally formed as this, would have joined Lucifer in his revolt.

But as there is a peculiar delicacy, from whom, or in what manner, this buſineſs muſt firſt ariſe, and as it ſeems moſt agreeable and conſiſtent, that it ſhould come from ſome intermediate body between the governed and the governors, that is, between the congreſs and the people, let a CONTINENTAL CONFERENCE be held, in the following manner, and for the following purpoſe.

A committee of twenty-ſix members of congreſs, viz. two for each colony. Two members from each houſe of aſſembly, or provincial convention; and five repreſentatives of the people at large, to be choſen in the capital city or town of each province, for, and in behalf of the whole province, by as many qualified voters as ſhall think proper to attend from all parts of the province for that purpoſe; or, if more convenient, the repreſentatives may be choſen in two or three of the moſt populous parts thereof. In this conference, thus aſſembled, will be united, the two grand principles of buſineſs, *knowledge* and *power*. The members of congreſs, aſſemblies, or convention, by having had experience in national concerns, will be able and uſeful counſellors, and the whole, being empowered by the people, will have a truly legal authority.

The conferring members being met, let their buſineſs be to frame a CONTINENTAL CHARTER, or Charter of the United Colonies (anſwering to what is called the Magna Charter of England); fixing the number and manner of chooſing members of congreſs, members of aſſembly, with their date of ſitting, and drawing the line of buſineſs and juriſdiction between them: (Always remembering, that our ſtrength is continental, not provincial:) Securing freedom and property to all men, and above all things, the free exerciſe of religion, according to the dictates of conſcience; with ſuch other matter as is neceſſary for a charter to contain. Immediately after which, the ſaid conference to diſſolve, and the bodies which ſhall be choſen conformable to the ſaid charter, to be the legiſlators and governors of this continent for the time being: Whoſe peace and happineſs, may God preſerve, Amen.

Should any body of men be hereafter delegated for this or some similar purpose, I offer them the following extracts from that wise observer on governments, *Dragonetti*. "The science" says he "of "the politician consists in fixing the true point of happiness and "freedom. Those men would deserve the gratitude of ages, who "should discover a mode of government that contained the greatest "sum of individual happiness, with the least national expence."

Dragonetti on Virtue and Rewards.

But where, says some, is the king of America? I'll tell you, friend, he reigns above, and doth not make havoc of mankind like the royal brute of Britain. Yet that we may not appear to be defective even in earthly honours, let a day be solemnly set apart for proclaiming the charter; let it be brought forth placed on the divine law, the word of God; let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know, that so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America THE LAW IS KING. For as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other. But lest any ill use should afterwards arise, let the crown at the conclusion of the ceremony be demolished, and scattered among the people whose right it is.

A government of our own is our natural right: And when a man seriously reflects on the precariousness of human affairs, he will become convinced, that it is infinitely wiser and safer, to form a constitution of our own in a cool deliberate manner, while we have it in our power, than to trust such an interesting event to time and chance. If we omit it now, some Massanello * may hereafter arise, who laying hold of popular disquietudes, may collect together the desperate and the discontented, and by assuming to themselves the powers of government, may sweep away the liberties of the continent like a deluge. Should the government of America return again into the hands of Britain, the tottering situation of things, will be a temptation for some desperate adventurer to try his fortune; and in such a case, what relief can Britain give! Ere she could hear the news, the fatal business might be done; and ourselves suffering like the wretched Britons under the oppression of the Conqueror. Ye that oppose independence now, ye know not what ye do; ye are opening a door to eternal tyranny, by keeping vacant the seat of government. There are thousands and tens

* *Thomas Anello, otherwise Massanello, a fisherman of Naples, who after spiriting up his countrymen in the public market place, against the oppression of the Spaniards, to whom the place was then subject, prompted them to revolt, and in the space of a day became king.*

of thouſands, who would think it glorious to expel from the continent, that barbarous and helliſh power, which hath ſtirred up the Indians and Negroes to deſtroy us—the cruelty hath a double guilt, it is dealing brutally by us, and treacherouſly by them.

To talk of friendſhip with thoſe in whom our reaſon forbids us to have faith, and our affections, wounded through a thouſand pores, inſtruct us to deteſt, is madneſs and folly. Every day wears out the little remains of kindred between us and them; and can there be any reaſon to hope, that as the relationſhip expires, the affection will encreaſe, or that we ſhall agree better, when we have ten times more and greater concerns to quarrel over than ever?

Ye that tell us of harmony and reconciliation, can ye reſtore to us the time that is paſt? Can ye give to proſtitution its former innocence? Neither can ye reconcile Britain and America. The laſt cord now is broken, the people of England are preſenting addreſſes againſt us. There are injuries which nature cannot forgive; ſhe would ceaſe to be nature if ſhe did. As well can the lover forgive the raviſher of his miſtreſs, as the continent forgive the murders of Britain. The Almighty hath implanted in us theſe unextinguiſhable feelings, for good and wiſe purpoſes. They are the guardians of his image in our hearts. They diſtinguiſh us from the herd of common animals. The ſocial compact would diſſolve, and juſtice be extirpated the earth, or have only a caſual exiſtence were we callous to the touches of affection. The robber, and the murderer, would often eſcape unpuniſhed, did not the injuries which our tempers ſuſtain, provoke us into juſtice.

O ye that love mankind! Ye that dare oppoſe, not only the tyranny, but the tyrant, ſtand forth! Every ſpot of the old world is over run with oppreſſion. Freedom hath been haunted round the globe. Aſia, and Africa, have long expelled her.—Europe regards her like a ſtranger, and England hath given her warning to depart. O! receive the fugitive, and prepare in time an aſylum for mankind.

Of the preſent ability of America: with ſome miſcellaneous reflections.

I HAVE never met with a man, either in England or America, who hath not confeſſed his opinion, that a ſeparation between the countries, would take place one time or other: and there is no inſtance, in which we have ſhewn leſs judgment, than in endeavouring to deſcribe, what we call, the ripeneſs or fitneſs of the continent for independence.

As all men allow the meaſure, and vary only in their opinion of the time, let us, in order to remove miſtakes, take a general ſurvey of things, and endeavour, if poſſible, to find out the *very* time. But we need not go far, the inquiry ceaſes at once, for, the *time hath found us*. The general concurrence, the glorious union of all things prove the fact.

It is not in numbers, but in unity, that our great ſtrength lies; yet our preſent numbers are ſufficient to repel the force of all the world. The continent hath, at this time, the largeſt body of armed and diſciplined men of any power under heaven; and is juſt arrived at that pitch of ſtrength, in which, no ſingle colony is able to ſupport, itſelf, and the whole, when united, can accompliſh the matter, and either more, or leſs than this, might be fatal in its effects. Our land force is already ſufficient, and as to naval affairs, we cannot be inſenſible, that Britain would never ſuffer an American man of war to be built, while the continent remained in her hands. Wherefore, we ſhould be no forwarder an hundred years hence in that branch, than we are now; but the truth is, we ſhould be leſs ſo, becauſe the timber of the country is every day diminiſhing, and that which will remain at laſt, will be far off or difficult to procure.

Were the continent crowded with inhabitants, her ſufferings under the preſent circumſtances would be intolerable. The more ſea-port towns we had, the more ſhould we have both to defend and to loſe. Our preſent numbers are ſo happily proportioned to our wants, that no man need be idle. The diminution of trade affords an army, and the neceſſities of an army create a new trade.

Debts we have none; and whatever we may contract on this account will ſerve as a glorious memento of our virtue. Can we but leave poſterity with a ſettled form of government, an independent conſtitution of its own, the purchaſe at any price will be cheap. But to expend millions for the ſake of getting a few vile acts repealed, and routing the preſent miniſtry only, is unworthy the charge, and is uſing poſterity with the utmoſt cruelty; becauſe it is leaving them the great work to do, and a debt upon their backs, from which they derive no advantage. Such a thought is unworthy a man of honour, and is the true characteriſtic of a narrow heart and a pedling politician.

The debt we may contract doth not deſerve our regard, if the work be but accompliſhed. No nation ought to be without a debt. A national debt is a national bond; and when it bears no intereſt, is in no caſe a grievance. Britain is oppreſſed with a debt of up-

wards of one hundred and forty millions ſterling, for which ſhe pays upwards of four millions intereſt. And as a compenſation for her debt, ſhe has a large navy; America is without a debt, and without a navy; yet for the twentieth part of the Engliſh national debt, could have a navy as large again. The navy of England is not worth, at this time, more than three millions and a half ſterling.

The following calculations are given as a proof that the above eſtimation of the navy is a juſt one. [*See Entick's Naval Hiſtory, Intro.* page 56.]

The charge of building a ſhip of each rate, and furniſhing her with maſts, yards, ſails and rigging, together with a proportion of eight months boatſwain's and carpenter's ſea-ſtores, as calculated by Mr. Burchett, Secretary to the navy.

For a ſhip of	100 guns	£.35,553
	90	29,886
	80	23,638
	70	17,785
	60	14,197
	50	10,606
	40	7,558
	30	5,846
	20	3,710

And from hence it is eaſy to ſum up the value, or coſt rather, of the whole Britiſh navy, which in the year 1757, when it was at its greateſt glory conſiſted of the following ſhips and guns.

Ships.	Guns.	Coſt of one.	Coſt of all.
6	100	£.55,553	£.213,318
12	90	29,886	358,632
12	80	23,638	283,656
43	70	17,785	764,755
35	60	14,197	496,895
40	50	10,605	424,240
45	40	7,558	340,110
58	20	3,710	215,180
85	Sloops, bombs, and fire-ſhips, one with another, at	2,000	170,000
		Coſt,	£.3,266,786
	Remains for guns,		233,214
		Total,	£.3,500,000

No country on the globe is so happily situated, or so internally capable of raising a fleet as America. Tar, timber, iron, and cordage are her natural produce. We need go abroad for nothing. Whereas the Dutch, who make large profits by hiring out their ships of war to the Spaniards and Portuguese, are obliged to import most of the materials they use. We ought to view the building a fleet as an article of commerce, it being the natural manufacture of this country. It is the best money we can lay out. A navy when finished is worth more than it cost. And is that nice point in national policy, in which commerce and protection are united. Let us build; if we want them not, we can sell; and by that means replace our paper currency with ready gold and silver.

In point of manning a fleet, people in general run into great errors; it is not necessary that one fourth part should be sailors. The Terrible privateer, captain Death, stood the hottest engagement of any ship last war, yet had not twenty sailors on board, though her complement of men was upwards of two hundred. A few able and social sailors will soon instruct a sufficient number of active landmen in the common work of a ship. Wherefore, we never can be more capable to begin on maritime matters than now, while our timber is standing, our fisheries blocked up, and our sailors and shipwrights out of employ. Men of war, of seventy and eighty guns were built forty years ago in New-England, and why not the same now? Ship-building is America's greatest pride, and in which, she will in time excel the whole world. The great empires of the east are mostly inland, and consequently excluded from the possibility of rivalling her. Africa is in a state of barbarism; and no power in Europe, hath either such an extent of coast, or such an internal supply of materials. Where nature hath given the one, she has withheld the other; to America only hath she been liberal of both. The vast empire of Russia is almost shut out from the sea; wherefore, her boundless forests, her tar, iron, and cordage are only articles of commerce.

In point of safety, ought we to be without a fleet? We are not the little people now, which we were sixty years ago; at that time we might have trusted our property in the streets, or fields rather; and slept securely without locks or bolts to our doors or windows. The case is now altered, and our methods of defence, ought to improve, with our increase of property. A common pirate, twelve months ago, might have come up the Delaware, and laid the city of Philadelphia under instant contribution, for what sum he pleased; and the same

might have happened to other places. Nay, any daring fellow, in a brig of fourteen or ſixteen guns, might have robbed the whole continent, and carried off half a million of money. Theſe are circumſtances which demand our attention, and point out the neceſſity of naval protection.

Some, perhaps, will ſay, that after we have made it up with Britain, ſhe will protect us. Can we be ſo unwiſe as to mean, that ſhe ſhall keep a navy in our harbours for that purpoſe? Common ſenſe will tell us, that the power which hath endeavoured to ſubdue us, is of all others, the moſt improper to defend us. Conqueſt may be effected under the pretence of friendſhip; and ourſelves, after a long and brave reſiſtance, be at laſt cheated into ſlavery. And if her ſhips are not to be admitted into our harbours, I would aſk, how is ſhe to protect us? A navy three or four thouſand miles off can be of little uſe, and on ſudden emergencies, none at all. Wherefore, if we muſt hereafter protect ourſelves, why not do it for ourſelves? Why do it for another?

The Engliſh liſt of ſhips of war, is long and formidable, but not a tenth part of them are at any one time fit for ſervice, numbers of them not in being; yet their names are pompouſly continued in the liſt, if only a plank be left of the ſhip: and not a fifth part of ſuch as are fit for ſervice, can be ſpared on any one ſtation at one time. The Eaſt and Weſt Indies, Mediterranean, Africa, and other parts over which Britain extends her claim, make large demands upon her navy. From a mixture of prejudice and inattention, we have contracted a falſe notion reſpecting the navy of England, and have talked as if we ſhould have the whole of it to encounter at once, and for that reaſon, ſuppoſed, that we muſt have one as large; which not being inſtantly practicable, has been made uſe of by a ſet of diſguiſed tories to diſcourage our beginning thereon. Nothing can be further from truth than this; for if America had only a twentieth part of the naval force of Britain, ſhe would be by far an over match for her; becauſe, as we neither have, nor claim any foreign dominion, our whole force would be employed on our own coaſt, where we ſhould, in the long run, have two to one the advantage of thoſe who had three or four thouſand miles to ſail over, before they could attack us, and the ſame diſtance to return in order to refit and recruit. And although Britain, by her fleet, hath a check over our trade to Europe, we have as large a one over her trade to the Weſt Indies, which, by laying in the neighbourhood of the continent, is entirely at its mercy.

Some method might be fallen on to keep up a naval force in time

of peace, if we ſhould not judge it neceſſary to ſupport a conſtant navy. If premiums were to be given to merchants, to build and employ in their ſervice, ſhips mounted with twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty guns (the premiums to be in proportion to the loſs of bulk to the merchants), fifty or ſixty of thoſe ſhips, with a few guard-ſhips on conſtant duty, would keep up a ſufficient navy, and that without burdening ourſelves with the evil ſo loudly complained of in England, of ſuffering their fleet, in time of peace, to lie rotting in the docks. To unite the ſinews of commerce and defence is found policy; for when our ſtrength and our riches play into each other's hand, we need fear no external enemy.

In almoſt every article of defence we abound. Hemp flouriſhes even to rankneſs, ſo that we need not want cordage. Our iron is ſuperior to that of other countries. Our ſmall arms equal to any in the world. Cannon we can caſt at pleaſure. Saltpetre and gunpowder we are every day producing. Our knowledge is hourly improving. Reſolution is our inherent character, and courage hath never yet forſaken us. Wherefore, what is it that we want? Why is it that we heſitate? From Britain we can expect nothing but ruin. If ſhe is once admitted to the government of America again, this continent will not be worth living in. Jealouſies will be always ariſing; inſurrections will be conſtantly happening; and who will go forth to quell them? Who will venture his life to reduce his own countrymen to a foreign obedience? The difference between Pennſylvania and Connecticut, reſpecting ſome unlocated lands, ſhews the inſignificance of a Britiſh government, and fully proves, that nothing but continental authority can regulate continental matters.

Another reaſon why the preſent time is preferable to all others, is, that the fewer our numbers are, the more land there is yet unoccupied, which inſtead of being laviſhed by the king on his worthleſs dependants, may be hereafter applied, not only to the diſcharge of the preſent debt, but to the conſtant ſupport of government. No nation under heaven hath ſuch an advantage as this.

The infant ſtate of the colonies, as it is called, ſo far from being againſt, is an argument in favour of, independence. We are ſufficiently numerous, and were we more ſo, we might be leſs united. It is a matter worthy of obſervation, that the more a country is peopled, the ſmaller their armies are. In military numbers, the ancients far exceeded the moderns: And the reaſon is evident, for trade being the conſequence of population, men become too much abſorbed

thereby to attend to any thing elſe. Commerce diminiſhes the ſpirit, both of patriotiſm and military defence. And hiſtory ſufficiently informs us, that the braveſt atchievements were always accompliſhed in the non-age of a nation. With the increaſe of commerce, England hath loſt its ſpirit. The city of London, notwithſtanding its numbers, ſubmits to continued inſults with the patience of a coward. The more men have to loſe, the leſs willing are they to venture. The rich are in general ſlaves to fear, and ſubmit to courtly power with the trembling duplicity of a ſpaniel.

Youth is the ſeed-time of good habits, as well in nations as in individuals. It might be difficult, if not impoſſible, to form the continent into one government half a century hence. The vaſt variety of intereſts, occaſioned by an increaſe of trade and population, would create confuſion. Colony would be againſt colony. Each being able, might ſcorn each other's aſſiſtance: And while the proud and fooliſh gloried in their little diſtinctions, the wiſe would lament, that the union had not been formed before. Wherefore, the *preſent time* is the *true time* for eſtabliſhing it. The intimacy which is contracted in infancy, and the friendſhip which is formed in misfortune, are, of all others, the moſt laſting and unalterable. Our preſent union is marked with both theſe characters: we are young, and we have been diſtreſſed; but our concord hath withſtood our troubles, and fixes a memorable era for poſterity to glory in.

The preſent time, likewiſe, is that peculiar time, which never happens to a nation but once, viz. the time of forming itſelf into a government. Moſt nations have let ſlip the opportunity, and by that means have been compelled to receive laws from their conquerors, inſtead of making laws for themſelves. Firſt, they had a king, and then a form of government; whereas the articles or charter of government, ſhould be formed firſt, and men delegated to execute them afterward: but from the errors of other nations, let us learn wiſdom, and lay hold of the preſent opportunity—*To begin government at the right end.*

When William the Conqueror ſubdued England, he gave them law at the point of the ſword; and until we conſent that the ſeat of government, in America, be legally and authoritatively occupied, we ſhall be in danger of having it filled by ſome fortunate ruffian, who may treat us in the ſame manner, and then, where will be our freedom? where our property?

As to religion, I hold it to be the indiſpenſible duty of all go-

vernments, to protect all conſcientious profeſſors thereof, and I know of no other buſineſs which government hath to do therewith. Let a man throw aſide that narrowneſs of ſoul, that ſelfiſhneſs of principle, which the niggards of all profeſſions are ſo unwilling to part with, and he will be at once delivered of his fears on that head. Suſpicion is the companion of mean ſouls, and the bane of all good ſociety. For myſelf, I fully and conſcientiouſly believe, that it is the will of the Almighty, that there ſhould be a diverſity of religious opinions among us: It affords a larger field for our Chriſtian kindneſs. Were we all of one way of thinking, our religious diſpoſitions would want matter for probation; and on this liberal principle, I look on the various denominations among us, to be like children of the ſame family, differing only, in what is called, their Chriſtian names.

In a former page, I threw out a few thoughts on the propriety of a Continental Charter (for I only preſume to offer hints, not plans) and in this place, I take the liberty of re-mentioning the ſubject, by obſerving, that a charter is to be underſtood as a bond of ſolemn obligation, which the whole enters into, to ſupport the right of every ſeparate part, whether of religion, perſonal freedom, or property. A firm bargain and a right reckoning make long friends.

I have heretofore likewiſe mentioned the neceſſity of a large and equal repreſentation; and there is no political matter which more deſerves our attention. A ſmall number of electors, or a ſmall number of repreſentatives, are equally dangerous. But if the number of the repreſentatives be not only ſmall, but unequal, the danger is increaſed. As an inſtance of this, I mention the following; when the aſſociators' petition was before the houſe of aſſembly of Pennſylvania, twenty-eight members only were preſent, all the Bucks County members, being eight, voted againſt it, and had ſeven of the Cheſter members done the ſame, this whole province had been governed by two counties only; and this danger it is always expoſed to. The unwarrantable ſtretch likewiſe, which that houſe made in their laſt ſitting, to gain an undue authority over the delegates of that province, ought to warn the people at large, how they truſt power out of their own hands. A ſet of inſtructions for their delegates were put together, which in point of ſenſe and buſineſs would have diſhonoured a ſchool-boy, and after being approved by a *few*, a *very few* without doors, were carried into the houſe, and there paſſed *in behalf of the whole colony;* whereas, did the whole colony know, with what ill-will that houſe had entered on ſome neceſſary public meaſures, they

would not hesitate a moment to think them unworthy of such a trust.

Immediate necessity makes many things convenient, which if continued would grow into oppressions. Expedience and right are different things. When the calamities of America required a consultation, there was no method so ready, or at that time so proper, as to appoint persons from the several houses of assembly for that purpose; and the wisdom with which they have proceeded hath preserved this continent from ruin. But as it is more than probable that we shall never be without a CONGRESS, every well-wisher to good order, must own, that the mode for choosing members of that body, deserves consideration. And I put it as a question to those, who make a study of mankind, whether *representation and election* is not too great a power for one and the same body of men to possess? Whenever we are planning for posterity, we ought to remember, that virtue is not hereditary.

It is from our enemies that we often gain excellent maxims, and are frequently surprised into reason by their mistakes. Mr. Cornwall (one of the lords of the treasury) treated the petition of the New-York assembly with contempt, because *that* house, he said, consisted but of twenty-six members, which trifling number, he argued, could not with decency be put for the whole. We thank him for his involuntary honesty.*

To CONCLUDE, however strange it may appear to some, or however unwilling they may be to think so, matters not, but many strong and striking reasons may be given, to shew, that nothing can settle our affairs so expeditiously as an open and determined declaration for independence. Some of which are,

First.—It is the custom of nations, when any two are at war, for some other powers, not engaged in the quarrel, to step in as mediators, and bring about the preliminaries of a peace: but while America calls herself the subject of Britain, no power, however well disposed she may be, can offer her mediation. Wherefore, in our present state we may quarrel on for ever.

Secondly.—It is unreasonable to suppose, that France or Spain will give us any kind of assistance, if we mean only, to make use of that assistance for the purpose of repairing the breach, and strengthening

* *Those who would fully understand of what great consequence a large and equal representation is to a state, should read Burgh's Political Disquisitions.*

the connection between Britain and America; becauſe, thoſe powers would be ſufferers by the conſequences.

Thirdly.—While we profeſs ourſelves the ſubjects of Britain, we muſt, in the eye of foreign nations, be conſidered as rebels. The precedent is ſomewhat dangerous to *their peace*, for men to be in arms under the name of ſubjects; we, on the ſpot, can ſolve the paradox: but to unite reſiſtance and ſubjection, requires an idea much too refined for common underſtanding.

Fourthly.—Were a manifeſto to be publiſhed, and diſpatched to foreign courts, ſetting forth the miſeries we have endured, and the peaceable methods we have ineffectually uſed for redreſs; declaring, at the ſame time, that not being able, any longer, to live happily or ſafely under the cruel diſpoſition of the Britiſh court, we had been driven to the neceſſity of breaking off all connexions with her; at the ſame time, aſſuring all ſuch courts of our peaceable diſpoſition towards them, and of our deſire of entering into trade with them. Such a memorial would produce more good effects to this continent, than if a ſhip were freighted with petitions to Britain.

Under our preſent denomination of Britiſh ſubjects, we can neither be received nor heard abroad: The cuſtom of all courts is againſt us, and will be ſo, until, by an independence, we take rank with other nations.

Theſe proceedings may at firſt appear ſtrange and difficult; but, like all other ſteps, which we have already paſſed over, will in a little time become familiar and agreeable; and, until an independence is declared, the continent will feel itſelf like a man who continues putting off ſome unpleaſant buſineſs from day to day, yet knows it muſt be done, hates to ſet about it, wiſhes it over, and is continually haunted with the thoughts of its neceſſity

APPENDIX.

SINCE the publication of the firſt edition of this pamphlet, or rather, on the ſame day on which it came out, the king's ſpeech made its appearance in this city. Had the ſpirit of prophecy directed the birth of this production, it could not have brought it forth at a more ſeaſonable juncture, or a more neceſſary time.—The bloody mindedneſs of the one, ſhews the neceſſity of purſuing the doctrine of the other. Men read by way of revenge:—And the ſpeech,

inſtead of terrifying, prepared a way for the manly principles of independence.

Ceremony, and even ſilence, from whatever motives they may ariſe, have a hurtful tendency, when they give the leaſt degree of countenance to baſe and wicked performances; wherefore, if this maxim be admitted, it naturally follows, that the king's ſpeech, as being a piece of finiſhed villany, deſerved, and ſtill deſerves, a general execration, both by the congreſs and the people. Yet, as the domeſtic tranquility of a nation, depends greatly, on the *chaſtity* of what may properly be called NATIONAL MANNERS, it is often better, to paſs ſome things over in ſilent diſdain, than to make uſe of ſuch new methods of diſlike, as might introduce the leaſt innovation, on that guardian of our peace and ſafety. And, perhaps, it is chiefly owing to this prudent delicacy, that the king's ſpeech, hath not, before now, ſuffered a public execution. The ſpeech, if it may be called one, is nothing better than a wilful, audacious libel againſt the truth, the common good, and the exiſtence of mankind; and is a formal and pompous method of offering up human ſacrifices to the pride of tyrants. But this general maſſacre of mankind, is one of the privileges, and the certain conſequences of kings; for as nature knows them *not*, they know *not her*, and although they are beings of our *own* creating, they know not *us*, and are become the gods of their creators. The ſpeech hath one good quality, which is, that it is not calculated to deceive, neither can we, if we would, be deceived by it. Brutality and tyranny appear on the face of it. It leaves us at no loſs: and every line convinces, even in the moment of reading, that he, who hunts the woods for prey, the naked and untutored Indian, is leſs ſavage than the king of Britain.

Sir John Dalrymple, the putative father of a whining jeſuitical piece, fallaciouſly called, "*The addreſs of the people of* England *to the inhabitants of* America," hath, perhaps, from a vain ſuppoſition, that the people *here* were to be frightened at the pomp and deſcription of a king, given (though very unwiſely on his part) the real character of the preſent one: "But," ſays this writer, "if you are inclined to pay compliments to an adminiſtration, which we do not complain of" (meaning the Marquis of Rockingham's at the repeal of the Stamp Act), "it is very unfair in you to withhold them from that prince, *by whoſe* NOD ALONE *they were permitted to do any thing*." This is toryiſm with a witneſs! Here is idolatry even without a maſk: And he who can calmly hear, and digeſt ſuch doc-

trine, hath forfeited his claim to rationality; is an apoſtate from the order of manhood; and ought to be conſidered—as one, who hath not only given up the proper dignity of man, but ſunk himſelf beneath the rank of animals, and contemptibly crawls through the world like a worm.

However, it matters very little now, what the king of England either ſays or does; he hath wickedly broken through every moral and human obligation, trampled nature and conſcience beneath his feet; and by a ſteady and conſtitutional ſpirit of inſolence and cruelty, procured for himſelf an univerſal hatred. It is *now* the intereſt of America to provide for herſelf. She hath already a large and young family, whom it is more her duty to take care of, than to be granting away her property, to ſupport a power who is become a reproach to the names of men and Chriſtians—YE, whoſe office is to watch over the morals of a nation, of whatſoever ſect or denomination ye are of, as well as ye, who are more immediately the guardians of the public liberty, if you wiſh to preſerve your native country uncontaminated by European corruption, ye muſt in ſecret wiſh a ſeparation—But leaving the moral part to private reflection, I ſhall chiefly confine my further remarks to the following heads:

Firſt, That it is the intereſt of America to be ſeparated from Britain.

Secondly, Which is the eaſieſt and moſt practicable plan, RECONCILIATION or INDEPENDENCE? with ſome occaſional remarks.

In ſupport of the firſt, I could, if I judged it proper, produce the opinion of ſome of the ableſt and moſt experienced men on this continent; and whoſe ſentiments, on that head, are not yet publicly known. It is in reality a ſelf-evident poſition: For no nation in a ſtate of foreign dependence, limited in its commerce, and cramped and fettered in its legiſlative powers, can ever arrive at any material eminence. America doth not yet know what opulence is; and although the progreſs which ſhe hath made ſtands unparalleled in the hiſtory of other nations, it is but childhood, compared with what ſhe would be capable of arriving at, had ſhe, as ſhe ought to have, the legiſlative powers in her own hands. England *is*, at this time, proudly coveting what would do her no good, were ſhe to accompliſh it; and the continent heſitating on a matter which will be her final ruin if neglected. It is the commerce and not the conqueſt of America by which England is to be benefited, and that would in a great meaſure continue, were the countries as independent

of each other as France and Spain; becauſe in many articles, neither can go to a better market. But it is the independence of this country on Britain or any other, which is now the main and only object worthy of contention, and which, like all other truths diſcovered by neceſſity, will appear clearer and ſtronger every day.

Firſt, Becauſe it will come to that one time or other.

Secondly, Becauſe the longer it is delayed, the harder it will be to accompliſh.

I have frequently amuſed myſelf both in public and private companies, with ſilently remarking the ſpecious errors of thoſe who ſpeak without reflecting. And among the many which I have heard, the following ſeems the moſt general, viz. that had this rupture happened forty or fifty years hence, inſtead of *now*, the continent would have been more able to have ſhaken off the dependence. To which I reply, that our military ability, *at this time*, ariſes from the experience gained in the laſt war, and which in forty or fifty years time, would have been totally extinct. The continent, would not, by that time, have had a general, or even a military officer left; and we, or thoſe who may ſucceed us, would have been as ignorant of martial matters as the ancient Indians: And this ſingle poſition, cloſely attended to, will unanſwerably prove that the preſent time is preferable to all others. The argument turns thus—at the concluſion of the laſt war, we had experience, but wanted numbers; and forty or fifty years hence, we ſhould have numbers, without experience; wherefore, the proper point of time, muſt be ſome particular point between the two extremes, in which a ſufficiency of the former remains, and a proper increaſe of the latter is obtained: And that point of time is the preſent time.

The reader will pardon this digreſſion, as it does not properly come under the head I firſt ſet out with, and to which I again return by the following poſition, viz.

Should affairs be patched up with Britain, and ſhe remain the governing and ſovereign power of America (which, as matters are now circumſtanced, is giving up the point entirely), we ſhall deprive ourſelves of the very means of ſinking the debt we have, or may contract. The value of the back lands which ſome of the provinces are clandeſtinely deprived of, by the unjuſt extenſion of the limits of Canada, valued only at five pounds ſterling per hundred acres, amount to upwards of twenty-five millions, Pennſylvania currency; and the quit-rents at one penny ſterling per acre, to two millions yearly.

It is by the ſale of thoſe lands that the debt may be ſunk, without burden to any, and the quit-rent reſerved thereon, will always leſſen, and in time, will wholly ſupport the yearly expence of government. It matters not how long the debt is in paying, ſo that the lands when ſold be applied to the diſcharge of it, and for the execution of which, the congreſs for the time being, will be the continental truſtees.

I proceed now to the ſecond head, viz. Which is the eaſieſt and moſt practicable plan, RECONCILIATION or INDEPENDENCE? with ſome occaſional remarks.

He who takes nature for his guide is not eaſily beaten out of his argument, and on that ground, I anſwer *generally—That* INDEPENDENCE *being a* SINGLE SIMPLE LINE, *contained within ourſelves; and reconciliation, a matter exceedingly perplexed and complicated, and in which, a treacherous, capricious court is to interfere, gives the anſwer without a doubt.*

The preſent ſtate of America is truly alarming to every man who is capable of reflection. Without law, without government, without any other mode of power than what is founded on, and granted by courteſy. Held together by an unexampled concurrence of ſentiment, which, is nevertheleſs ſubject to change, and which, every ſecret enemy is endeavouring to diſſolve. Our preſent condition, is, Legiſlation without law; wiſdom without a plan; a conſtitution without a name; and, what is ſtrangely aſtoniſhing, perfect independence contending for dependence. The inſtance is without a precedent; the caſe never exiſted before; and who can tell what may be the event? The property of no man is ſecure in the preſent unbraced ſyſtem of things. The mind of the multitude is left at random, and ſeeing no fixed object before them, they purſue ſuch as fancy or opinion ſtarts. Nothing is criminal; there is no ſuch thing as treaſon; wherefore, every one thinks himſelf at liberty to act as he pleaſes. The tories dared not have aſſembled offenſively, had they known that their lives, by that act, were forfeited to the laws of the ſtate. A line of diſtinction ſhould be drawn, between Engliſh ſoldiers taken in battle, and inhabitants of America taken in arms. The firſt are priſoners, but the latter traitors. The one forfeits his liberty, the other his head.

Notwithſtanding our wiſdom, there is a viſible feebleneſs in ſome of our proceedings which gives encouragement to diſſentions. The Continental Belt is too looſely buckled. And if ſomething is not done in time, it will be too late to do any thing, and we ſhall fall into a ſtate, in which, neither *Reconciliation* nor *Independence* will be prac-

ticable. The king and his worthleſs adherents are got at their old game of dividing the continent, and there are not wanting among us, printers, who will be buſy in ſpreading ſpecious falſehoods. The artful and hypocritical letter which appeared a few months ago in two of the New-York papers, and likewiſe in others, is an evidence that there are men who want either judgment or honeſty.

It is eaſy getting into holes and corners and talking of reconciliation: But do ſuch men ſeriouſly conſider, how difficult the taſk is, and how dangerous it may prove, ſhould the continent divide thereon. Do they take within their view, all the various orders of men whoſe ſituation and circumſtances, as well as their own, are to be conſidered therein. Do they put themſelves in the place of the ſufferer whoſe *all* is *already* gone, and of the ſoldier, who hath quitted *all* for the defence of his country? If their ill-judged moderation be ſuited to their own private ſituations *only*, regardleſs of others, the event will convince them, that "they are reckoning without their hoſt."

Put us, ſay ſome, on the footing we were on in ſixty-three: To which I anſwer, the requeſt is not *now* in the power of Britain to comply with, neither will ſhe propoſe it; but if it were, and even ſhould be granted, I aſk, as a reaſonable queſtion, By what means is ſuch a corrupt and faithleſs court to be kept to its engagements? Another parliament, nay, even the preſent, may hereafter repeal the obligation, on the pretence, of its being violently obtained, or unwiſely granted; and in that caſe, Where is our redreſs?—No going to law with nations; cannon are the barriſters of crowns; and the ſword, not of juſtice, but of war, decides the ſuit. To be on the footing of ſixty-three, it is not ſufficient, that the laws only be put on the ſame ſtate, but, that our circumſtances, likewiſe, be put on the ſame ſtate; our burnt and deſtroyed towns repaired or built up, our private loſſes made good, our public debts (contracted for defence) diſcharged; otherwiſe, we ſhall be millions worſe than we were at that enviable period. Such a requeſt, had it been complied with a year ago, would have won the heart and ſoul of the continent—but now it is too late "The Rubicon is paſſed."

Beſides, the taking up arms, merely to enforce the repeal of a pecuniary law, ſeems as unwarrantable by the divine law, and as repugnant to human feelings, as the taking up arms to enforce obedience thereto. The object, on either ſide, doth not juſtify the means; for the lives of men are too valuable to be caſt away on ſuch trifles. It is the violence which is done and threatened to our perſons; the de-

ſtruction of our property by an armed force; the invaſion of our country by fire and ſword, which conſcientiouſly qualifies the uſe of arms: And the inſtant, in which ſuch a mode of defence became neceſſary, all ſubjection to Britain ought to have ceaſed; and the independency of America, ſhould have been conſidered, as dating its era from, and publiſhed by, *the firſt muſket that was fired againſt her.* This line is a line of conſiſtency; neither drawn by caprice, nor extended by ambition; but produced by a chain of events, of which the colonies were not the authors.

I ſhall conclude theſe remarks, with the following timely and well-intended hints. We ought to reflect, that there are three different ways, by which an independency may hereafter be effected; and that *one* of thoſe *three*, will, one day or other, be the fate of America, viz. By the legal voice of the people in congreſs; by a military power; or by a mob: It may not always happen that our ſoldiers are citizens, and the multitude a body of reaſonable men; virtue, as I have already remarked, is not hereditary, neither is it perpetual. Should an independency be brought about by the firſt of thoſe means, we have every opportunity and every encouragement before us, to form the nobleſt, pureſt conſtitution on the face of the earth. We have it in our power to begin the world over again. A ſituation, ſimilar to the preſent, hath not happened ſince the days of Noah until now. The birth-day of a new world is at hand, and a race of men, perhaps as numerous as all Europe contains, are to receive their portion of freedom from the events of a few months. The reflection is awful—and in this point of view, How trifling, how ridiculous, do the little, paltry cavillings, of a few weak or intereſted men appear, when weighed againſt the buſineſs of a world.

Should we neglect the preſent favourable and inviting period, and an independence be hereafter effected by any other means, we muſt charge the conſequence to ourſelves, or to thoſe rather, whoſe narrow and prejudiced ſouls, are habitually oppoſing the meaſure, without either enquiring or reflecting. There are reaſons to be given in ſupport of independence, which men ſhould rather privately think of, than be publicly told of. We ought not now to be debating whether we ſhall be independent or not, but, anxious to accompliſh it on a firm, ſecure, and honourable baſis, and uneaſy rather that it is not yet began upon. Every day convinces us of its neceſſity. Even the tories (if ſuch beings yet remain among us) ſhould, of all men, be the moſt ſolicitous to promote it; for, as the appointment of committees

at firſt, protected them from popular rage, ſo, a wiſe and well-eſtabliſhed form of government, will be the only certain means of continuing it ſecurely to them. *Wherefore*, if they have not virtue enough to be WHIGS, they ought to have prudence enough to wiſh for independence.

In ſhort, independence is the only BOND that can tie and keep us together. We ſhall then ſee our object, and our ears will be legally ſhut againſt the ſchemes of an intriguing, as well as a cruel, enemy. We ſhall then too, be on a proper footing to treat with Britain; for there is reaſon to conclude, that the pride of that court, will be leſs hurt by treating with the American ſtates for terms of peace, than with thoſe, whom ſhe denominates, "rebellious ſubjects," for terms of accommodation. It is our delaying it that encourages her to hope for conqueſt, and our backwardneſs tends only to prolong the war. As we have, without any good effect therefrom, withheld our trade to obtain a redreſs of our grievances, let us *now* try the alternative, by *independently* redreſſing them ourſelves, and then offering to open the trade. The mercantile and reaſonable part of England, will be ſtill with us; becauſe, peace *with* trade, is preferable to war *without* it. And if this offer be not accepted, other courts may be applied to.

On theſe grounds I reſt the matter. And as no offer hath yet been made to refute the doctrine contained in the former editions of this pamphlet, it is a negative proof, that either the doctrine cannot be refuted, or, that the party in favour of it are too numerous to be oppoſed. WHEREFORE, inſtead of gazing at each other, with ſuſpicious or doubtful curioſity, let each of us, hold out to his neighbour the hearty hand of friendſhip, and unite in drawing a line, which, like an act of oblivion, ſhall bury in forgetfulneſs every former diſſention. Let the names of whig and tory be extinct; and let none other be heard among us, than thoſe of *a good citizen, an open and reſolute friend, and a virtuous ſupporter of the* rights *of* mankind *and of the* FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA.

END OF COMMON SENSE.

To the Repreſentatives of the Religious Society of the People called Quakers, or to ſo many of them as were concerned in publiſhing a late piece, entitled "THE ANCIENT TESTIMONY and PRINCIPLES of the People called QUAKERS renewed, with reſpect to the KING and GOVERNMENT, and touching the COMMOTIONS now prevailing in theſe and other parts of AMERICA, addreſſed to the PEOPLE IN GENERAL."

THE Writer of this is one of thoſe few, who never diſhonours religion either by ridiculing, or cavilling at any denomination whatſoever. To God, and not to man, are all men accountable on the ſcore of religion. Wherefore, this epiſtle is not ſo properly addreſſed to you as a religious, but as a political body, dabbling in matters, which the profeſſed Quietude of your Principles inſtruct you not to meddle with.

As you have, without a proper authority for ſo doing, put yourſelves in the place of the whole body of the Quakers, ſo the writer of this, in order to be on an equal rank with yourſelves, is under the neceſſity of putting himſelf in the place of all thoſe who approve the very writings and principles, againſt which your teſtimony is directed: And he hath choſen their ſingular ſituation, in order that you might diſcover in him, that preſumption of character which you cannot ſee in yourſelves. For neither he nor you have any claim or title to *Political Repreſentation.*

When men have departed from the right way, it is no wonder that they ſtumble and fall. And it is evident from the manner in which ye have managed your teſtimony, that politics (as a religious body of men) is not your proper walk; for however well adapted it might appear to you, it is, nevertheleſs, a jumble of good and bad put unwiſely together, and the concluſion drawn therefrom, both unnatural and unjuſt.

The two firſt pages (and the whole doth not make four) we give you credit for, and expect the ſame civility from you, becauſe the love and deſire of peace is not confined to Quakeriſm, it is the *natural*, as well as the religious wiſh of all denominations of men. And on this ground, as men labouring to eſtabliſh an Independent Conſtitution of our own, do we exceed all others in our hope, end, and

sim. *Our plan is peace for ever.* We are tired of contention with Britain, and can see no real end to it but in a final separation. We act consistently, because for the sake of introducing an endless and uninterrupted peace, do we bear the evils and burdens of the present day. We are endeavouring, and will steadily continue to endeavour, to separate and dissolve a connexion which has already filled our land with blood; and which, while the name of it remains, will be the fatal cause of future mischiefs to both countries.

We fight neither for revenge nor conquest; neither from pride nor passion; we are not insulting the world with our fleets and armies, nor ravaging the globe for plunder. Beneath the shade of our own vines are we attacked; in our own houses, and on our own lands, is the violence committed against us. We view our enemies in the characters of Highwaymen and Housebreakers, and having no defence for ourselves in the civil law, are obliged to punish them by the military one, and apply the sword, in the very case where you have before now applied the halter.——Perhaps we feel for the ruined and insulted sufferers in all and every part of the continent, with a degree of tenderness which hath not yet made its way into some of your bosoms. But be ye sure that ye mistake not the cause and ground of your Testimony. Call not coldness of soul, religion; nor put the *Bigot* in the place of the *Christian*.

O ye partial ministers of your own acknowledged principles! If the bearing arms be sinful, the first going to war must be more so, by all the difference between wilful attack and unavoidable defence.

Wherefore if ye really preach from conscience, and mean not to make a political hobby-horse of your religion, convince the world thereof, by proclaiming your doctrine to our enemies, *for they likewise bear* ARMS. Give us proof of your sincerity by publishing it at St. James's, to the commanders in chief at Boston, to the Admirals and Captains who are piratically ravaging our coasts, and to all the murdering miscreants who are acting in authority under HIM whom ye profess to serve. Had ye the honest soul of *Barclay** ye would

* "*Thou hast tasted of prosperity and adversity; thou knowest what* "*it is to be banished thy native country, to be over-ruled as well as to rule,* "*and set upon the throne; and being* oppressed *thou hast reason to know* "*how* hateful *the* oppressor *is both to God and man: If after all these* "*warnings and advertisements, thou dost not turn unto the Lord with all* "*thy heart, but forget him who remembered thee in thy distress, and give*

preach repentance to *your* king; Ye would tell the Royal tyrant his ſins, and warn him of eternal ruin. Ye would not ſpend your partial invectives againſt the injured and inſulted only, but like faithful miniſters, would cry aloud and *ſpare none*. Say not that ye are perſecuted, neither endeavour to make us the authors of that reproach, which ye are bringing upon yourſelves; for we teſtify unto all men, that we do not complain againſt you becauſe ye are *Quakers*, but becauſe ye pretend to *be* and are NOT Quakers.

Alas! it ſeems by the particular tendency of ſome part of your teſtimony, and other parts of your conduct, as if all ſin was reduced to, and comprehended in *the act of bearing arms*, and that by the *people only*. Ye appear to us, to have miſtaken party for conſcience; becauſe the general tenor of your actions wants uniformity: and it is exceedingly difficult to us to give credit to many of your pretended ſcruples; becauſe we ſee them made by the ſame men, who, in the very inſtant that they are exclaiming againſt the mammon of this world, are, nevertheleſs, hunting after it with a ſtep as ſteady as Time, and an appetite as keen as Death.

The quotation which ye have made from Proverbs, in the third page of your teſtimony, that, "when a man's ways pleaſe the Lord, he maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him;" is very unwiſely choſen on your part; becauſe it amounts to a proof, that the king's ways (whom ye are ſo deſirous of ſupporting) do *not* pleaſe the Lord, otherwiſe his reign would be in peace.

I now proceed to the latter part of your teſtimony, and that, for which all the foregoing ſeems only an introduction, viz.

"It hath ever been our judgment and principle, ſince we were "called to profeſs the light of Chriſt Jeſus, manifeſted in our conſci- "ences unto this day, that the ſetting up and putting down kings "and governments, is God's peculiar perogative; for cauſes beſt "known to himſelf: And that it is not our buſineſs to have any hand "or contrivance therein; nor to be buſy bodies above our ſtation,

"*up thyſelf to follow luſt and vanity, ſurely great will be thy condemna-*
"*tion.—Againſt which ſnare, as well as the temptation of thoſe who*
"*may or do feed thee, and prompt thee to evil, the moſt excellent and pre-*
"*valent remedy will be, to apply thyſelf to that light of Chriſt which*
"*ſhineth in thy conſcience, and which neither can, nor will flatter thee,*
"*nor ſuffer thee to be at eaſe in thy ſins.*"

Barclay's Addreſs to Charles II.

" much leſs to plot and contrive the ruin, or overturn any of them, " but to pray for the king, and ſafety of our nation, and good of all " men: That we may live a peaceable and quiet life, in all godli- " neſs and honeſty; *under the government which God is pleaſed to ſet* " *over us.*"——If theſe are *really* your principles why do ye not abide by them? Why do ye not leave that, which ye call God's Work, to be managed by himſelf? Theſe very principles inſtruct you to wait with patience and humility, for the event of all public meaſures, and to receive *that event* as the divine will towards you. *Wherefore*, what occaſion is there for your *political teſtimony* if you fully believe what it contains? And the very publiſhing it proves, that either ye do not believe what ye profeſs, or have not virtue enough to practiſe what ye believe.

The principles of Quakeriſm have a direct tendency to make a man the quiet and inoffenſive ſubject of any, and every government *which is ſet over him.* And if the ſetting up and putting down of kings and governments is God's peculiar perogative, he moſt certainly will not be robbed thereof by us; wherefore, the principle itſelf leads you to approve of every thing, which ever happened, or may happen to kings as being his work. OLIVER CROMWELL thanks you.—CHARLES, then, died not by the hands of man; and ſhould the preſent Proud Imitator of him come to the ſame untimely end, the writers and publiſhers of the teſtimony, are bound by the doctrine it contains, to applaud the fact. Kings are not taken away by miracles, neither are changes in governments brought about by any other means than ſuch as are common and human; and ſuch as we are now uſing. Even the diſperſing of the Jews, though foretold by our Saviour, was effected by arms. Wherefore, as ye refuſe to be the means on one ſide, ye ought not to be meddlers on the other; but to wait the iſſue in ſilence; and unleſs you can produce divine authority, to prove, that the Almighty who hath created and placed this *new* world, at the greateſt diſtance it could poſſibly ſtand, eaſt and weſt, from every part of the old, doth, nevertheleſs, diſapprove of its being independent of the corrupt and abandoned court of Britain; unleſs, I ſay, ye can ſhew this, how can ye, on the ground of your principles, juſtify the exciting and ſtirring up the people " firmly to unite in the *abhorrence* " of all ſuch *writings*, and *meaſures*, as evince a deſire and deſign to " break off the *happy* connexion we have hitherto enjoyed, with the " kingdom of Great Britain, and our juſt and neceſſary ſubordination " to the king, and thoſe who are lawfully placed in authority under

"him." What a flap in the face is here! the men, who, in the very paragraph before, have quietly and paſſively reſigned up the ordering, altering and diſpoſal of kings and governments, into the hands of God, are now recalling their principles, and putting in for a ſhare of the buſineſs. Is it poſſible, that the concluſion, which is here juſtly quoted, can any ways follow from the doctrine laid down! The inconſiſtency is too glaring not to be ſeen; the abſurdity too great not to be laughed at; and ſuch as could only have been made by thoſe, whoſe underſtandings were darkened by the narrow and crabby ſpirit of a deſpairing political party; for ye are not to be conſidered as the whole body of the Quakers, but only as a factional and fractional part thereof.

Here ends the examination of your teſtimony (which I call upon no man to abhor, as ye have done, but only to read and judge of fairly); to which I ſubjoin the following remark; "That the ſetting up "and putting down of kings," muſt certainly mean, the making him a king, who is yet not ſo, and the making him no king who is already one. And pray what hath this to do in the preſent caſe? We neither mean to *ſet up* nor to *put down*, neither to *make* nor to *unmake*, but to have nothing to *do* with them. Wherefore your teſtimony, in whatever light it is viewed, ſerves only to diſhonour your judgment, and for many other reaſons had better have been let alone than publiſhed.

Firſt. Becauſe it tends to the decreaſe and reproach of all religion whatever, and is of the utmoſt danger to ſociety, to make it a party in political diſputes.

Secondly. Becauſe it exhibits a body of men, numbers of whom diſavow the publiſhing political teſtimonies, as being concerned therein and approvers thereof.

Thirdly. Becauſe it hath a tendency to undo that continental harmony and friendſhip which yourſelves by your late liberal and charitable donations hath lent a hand to eſtabliſh; and the preſervation of which, is of the utmoſt conſequence to us all.

And here without anger, or reſentment I bid you farewel. Sincerely wiſhing, that as men and Chriſtians, ye may always fully and uninterruptedly enjoy every civil and religious right; and he, in your turn, the means of ſecuring it to others; but that the example which ye have unwiſely ſet, of mingling religion with politics, *may be diſavowed and reprobated by every inhabitant of* AMERICA.

THE CRISIS.

NUMBER I.

December 23, 1776.

THESE are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sublime patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country; but he that stands it NOW, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly: 'Tis dearness only that gives every thing its value. Heaven knows how to put a proper *price* upon its goods; and it would be strange indeed, if so celestial an article as FREEDOM should not be highly rated. Britain, with an army to enforce her tyranny, has declared that she has a right *(not only to* TAX) but "*to* BIND *us in* ALL CASES WHATSOEVER," and if being *bound in that manner*, is not slavery, then is there not such a thing as slavery upon earth. Even the expression is impious, for so unlimited a power can belong only to GOD.

Whether the independence of the continent was declared too soon, or delayed too long, I will not now enter into as an argument; my own simple opinion is, that had it been eight months earlier, it would have been much better. We did not make a proper use of last winter, neither could we, while we were in a dependant state. However, the fault, if it were one, was all our own; we have none to blame but ourselves. But no great deal is lost yet; all that Howe has been doing for this month past is rather a ravage than a conquest, which the spirit of the Jerseys a-year ago would have quickly repulsed, and which time and a little resolution will soon recover.

I have as little superstition in me as any man living, but my secret opinion has ever been, and still is, that God Almighty will not give up a people to military destruction, or leave them unsupportedly to perish, who had so earnestly and so repeatedly fought to avoid the

calamities of war, by every decent method which wiſdom could invent. Neither have I ſo much of the infidel in me, as to ſuppoſe that HE has relinquiſhed the government of the world, and given us up to the care of devils; and as I do not, I cannot ſee on what grounds the king of Britain can look up to Heaven for help againſt us: A common murderer, a highwayman, or a houſe-breaker, has as good a pretence as he.

'Tis ſurpriſing to ſee how rapidly a panic will ſometimes run through a country. All nations and ages have been ſubject to them: Britain has trembled like an ague at the report of a French fleet of flat bottomed boats; and in the fourteenth century the whole Engliſh army, after ravaging the kingdom of France, was driven back like men petrified with fear; and this brave exploit was performed by a few broken forces collected and headed by a woman, Joan of Arc. Would, that Heaven might inſpire ſome Jerſey maid to ſpirit up her countrymen, and ſave her fair fellow ſufferers from ravage and raviſhment! Yet panics, in ſome caſes, have their uſes, they produce as much good as hurt. Their duration is always ſhort; the mind ſoon grows through them, and acquires a firmer habit than before. But their peculiar advantage is, that they are the touchſtones of ſincerity and hypocriſy, and bring things and men to light, which might otherwiſe have lain for ever undiſcovered. In fact, they have the ſame effect on ſecret traitors, which an imaginary apparition would have upon a private murderer. They ſift out the hidden thoughts of man, and hold them up in public to the world. Many a diſguiſed tory has lately ſhewn his head, that ſhall penitentially ſolemnize with curſes the day on which Howe arrived upon the Delaware.

As I was with the troops at Fort-Lee, and marched with them to the edge of Pennſylvania, I am well acquainted with many circumſtances, which thoſe who lived at a diſtance know but little or nothing of. Our ſituation there was exceedingly cramped, the place being on a narrow neck of land between the North River and the Hackenſack. Our force was inconſiderable, being not one fourth ſo great as Howe could bring againſt us. We had no army at hand to have relieved the garriſon, had we ſhut ourſelves up and ſtood on the defence. Our ammunition, light artillery, and the beſt part of our ſtores, had been removed upon the apprehenſion that Howe would endeavour to penetrate the Jerſeys, in which caſe Fort-Lee could be of no uſe to us; for it muſt occur to every thinking man, whether in

the army or not, that theſe kind of field forts are only for temporary purpoſes, and laſt in uſe no longer than the enemy directs his force againſt the particular object, which ſuch forts are raiſed to defend. Such was our ſituation and condition at Fort-Lee on the morning of the 20th of November, when an officer arrived with information that the enemy with 200 boats had landed about ſeven or eight miles above: Major General Greene, who commanded the garriſon, immediately ordered them under arms, and ſent expreſs to his Excellency General Waſhington at the town of Hackenſack, diſtant by the way of the ferry ſix miles. Our firſt object was to ſecure the bridge over the Hackenſack, which laid up the river between the enemy and us, about ſix miles from us, and three from them. General Waſhington arrived in about three quarters of an hour, and marched at the head of the troops towards the bridge, which place I expected we ſhould have a bruſh for; however they did not chooſe to diſpute it with us, and the greateſt part of our troops went over the bridge, the reſt over the ferry, except ſome which paſſed at a mill on a ſmall creek, between the bridge and the ferry, and made their way through ſome marſhy grounds up to the town of Hackenſack, and there paſſed the river. We brought off as much baggage as the waggons could contain, the reſt was loſt. The ſimple object was to bring off the garriſon, and to march them on till they could be ſtrengthened by the Jerſey or Pennſylvania militia, ſo as to be enabled to make a ſtand. We ſtaid four days at Newark, collected in our out-poſts with ſome of the Jerſey militia, and marched out twice to meet the enemy on information of their being advancing, though our numbers were greatly inferior to theirs. Howe, in my little opinion, committed a great error in generalſhip in not throwing a body of forces off from Staten-Iſland through Amboy, by which means he might have ſeized all our ſtores at Brunſwick, and intercepted our march into Pennſylvania: But if we believe the power of hell to be limited, we muſt likewiſe believe that their agents are under ſome providential control.

I ſhall not now attempt to give all the particulars of our retreat to the Delaware; ſuffice it for the preſent to ſay, that both officers and men, though greatly haraſſed and fatigued, frequently without reſt, covering, or proviſion, the inevitable conſequences of a long retreat, bore it with a manly and martial ſpirit. All their wiſhes were one, which was, that the country would turn out and help them to drive the enemy back. Voltaire has remarked that King William never appeared to full advantage but in difficulties and in action; the ſame

remark may be made on General Washington, for the character fits him. There is a natural firmness in some minds which cannot be unlocked by trifles, but which, when unlocked, discovers a cabinet of fortitude; and I reckon it among those kind of public blessings, which we do not immediately see, that GOD hath blest him with uninterrupted health, and given him a mind that can even flourish upon care.

I shall conclude this paper with some miscellaneous remarks on the state of our affairs; and shall begin with asking the following question, Why is it that the enemy have left the New-England provinces, and made these middle ones the seat of war? The answer is easy: New-England is not infested with tories, and we are. I have been tender in raising the cry against these men, and used numberless arguments to shew them their danger, but it will not do to sacrifice a world to either their folly or their baseness. The period is now arrived, in which either they or we must change our sentiments, or one or both must fall. And what is a tory? Good GOD! what is he? I should not be afraid to go with an hundred whigs against a thousand tories, were they to attempt to get into arms. Every tory is a coward, for a servile, slavish, self-interested fear is the foundation of toryism; and a man under such influence, though he may be cruel, never can be brave.

But, before the line of irrecoverable separation be drawn between us, let us reason the matter together: Your conduct is an invitation to the enemy, yet not one in a thousand of you has heart enough to join him. Howe is as much deceived by you as the American cause is injured by you. He expects you will all take up arms, and flock to his standard with muskets on your shoulders. Your opinions are of no use to him, unless you support him personally, for 'tis soldiers, and not tories, that he wants.

I once felt all that kind of anger, which a man ought to feel, against the mean principles that are held by the tories: A noted one, who kept a tavern at Amboy, was standing at his door, with as pretty a child in his hand, about eight or nine years old, as most I ever saw, and after speaking his mind as freely as he thought was prudent, finished with this unfatherly expression, "*Well! give me peace in my day.*" Not a man lives on the continent but fully believes that a separation must some time or other finally take place, and a generous parent should have said, "*If there must be trouble, let it be in my day, that my child may have peace;*" and this single reflection, well applied, is

ſufficient to awaken every man to duty. Not a place upon earth might be ſo happy as America. Her ſituation is remote from all the wrangling world, and ſhe has nothing to do but to trade with them. A man may eaſily diſtinguiſh in himſelf between temper and principle, and I am as confident, as I am that GOD governs the world, that America will never be happy till ſhe gets clear of foreign dominion. Wars, without ceaſing, will break out till that period arrives, and the continent muſt in the end be conqueror; for though the flame of liberty may ſometimes ceaſe to ſhine, the coal can never expire.

America did not, nor does not want force; but ſhe wanted a proper application of that force. Wiſdom is not the purchaſe of a day, and it is no wonder that we ſhould err at the firſt ſetting off. From an exceſs of tenderneſs, we were unwilling to raiſe an army, and truſted our cauſe to the temporary defence of a well-meaning militia. A ſummer's experience has now taught us better; yet with thoſe troops, while they were collected, we were able to ſet bounds to the progreſs of the enemy, and, thank GOD! they are again aſſembling. I always conſidered a militia as the beſt troops in the world for a ſudden exertion, but they will not do for a long campaign. Howe, it is probable, will make an attempt on this city; ſhould he fail on this ſide the Delaware, he is ruined: If he ſucceeds, our cauſe is not ruined. He ſtakes all on his ſide againſt a part on ours; admitting he ſucceeds, the conſequence will be, that armies from both ends of the continent will march to aſſiſt their ſuffering friends in the middle ſtates; for he cannot go every where, it is impoſſible. I conſider Howe as the greateſt enemy the tories have; he is bringing a war into their country, which, had it not been for him and partly for themſelves, they had been clear of. Should he now be expelled, I wiſh with all the devotion of a Chriſtian, that the names of whig and tory may never more be mentioned; but ſhould the tories give him encouragement to come, or aſſiſtance if he come, I as ſincerely wiſh that our next year's arms may expel them from the continent, and the congreſs appropriate their poſſeſſions to the relief of thoſe who have ſuffered in well-doing. A ſingle ſucceſsful battle next year will ſettle the whole. America could carry on a two years war by the confiſcation of the property of diſaffected perſons, and be made happy by their expulſion. Say not that this is revenge, call it rather the ſoft reſentment of a ſuffering people, who, having no object in view but the GOOD of ALL, have ſtaked their OWN ALL upon a ſeemingly doubtful event. Yet it is folly to argue

againſt determined hardneſs; eloquence may ſtrike the ear, and the language of ſorrow draw forth the tear of compaſſion, but nothing can reach the heart that is ſteeled with prejudice.

Quitting this claſs of men, I turn with the warm ardour of a friend to thoſe who have nobly ſtood, and are yet determined to ſtand the matter out: I call not upon a few, but upon all: not on THIS ſtate or THAT ſtate, but on EVERY ſtate; up and help us; lay your ſhoulders to the wheel; better have too much force than too little, when ſo great an object is at ſtake. Let it be told to the future world, that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could ſurvive, that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet and to repulſe it. Say not, that thouſands are gone, turn out your tens of thouſands; throw not the burden of the day upon Providence, but "*ſhew your faith by your works*," that God may bleſs you. It matters not where you live, or what rank of life you hold, the evil or the bleſſing will reach you all. The far and the near, the home counties and the back, the rich and the poor, will ſuffer or rejoice alike. The heart that feels not now, is dead: The blood of his children will curſe his cowardice, who ſhrinks back at a time when a little might have ſaved the whole, and made *them* happy. I love the man that can ſmile in trouble, that can gather ſtrength from diſtreſs, and grow brave by reflection. 'Tis the buſineſs of little minds to ſhrink; but he whoſe heart is firm, and whoſe conſcience approves his conduct, will purſue his principles unto death. My own line of reaſoning is to myſelf as ſtrait and clear as a ray of light. Not all the treaſures of the world, ſo far as I believe, could have induced me to ſupport an offenſive war, for I think it murder; but if a thief break into my houſe, burn and deſtroy my property, and kill or threaten to kill me, or thoſe that are in it, and to "*bind me in all caſes whatſoever*," to his abſolute will, am I to ſuffer it? What ſignifies it to me, whether he who does it, is a king or a common man; my countryman or not my countryman? whether it is done by an individual villain, or an army of them? If we reaſon to the root of things we ſhall find no difference; neither can any juſt cauſe be aſſigned why we ſhould puniſh in the one caſe and pardon in the other. Let them call me rebel, and welcome, I feel no concern from it; but I ſhould ſuffer the miſery of devils, were I to make a whore of my ſoul by ſwearing allegiance to one whoſe character is that of a ſottiſh, ſtupid, ſtubborn worthleſs, brutiſh man. I conceive likewiſe a horrid idea in receiving

mercy from a being, who at the laſt day ſhall be ſhrieking to the rocks and mountains to cover him, and fleeing with terror from the orphan, the widow, and the ſlain of America.

There are caſes which cannot be overdone by language, and this is one. There are perſons too who ſee not the full extent of the evil which threatens them, they ſolace themſelves with hopes that the enemy, if they ſucceed, will be merciful. It is the madneſs of folly to expect mercy from thoſe who have refuſed to do juſtice; and even mercy, where conqueſt is the object, is only a trick of war: The cunning of the fox is as murderous as the violence of the wolf; and we ought to guard equally againſt both. Howe's firſt object is partly by threats and partly by promiſe, to terrify or ſeduce the people to deliver up their arms, and receive mercy. The miniſtry recommended the ſame plan to Gage, and this is what the tories call making their peace; "*a peace which paſſeth all underſtanding*" *indeed!* A peace which would be the immediate forerunner of a worſe ruin than any we have yet thought of. Ye men of Pennſylvania, do reaſon upon theſe things! Were the back countries to give up their arms, they would fall an eaſy prey to the Indians, who are all alarmed: This perhaps is what ſome tories would not be ſorry for. Were the home counties to deliver up their arms, they would be expoſed to the reſentment of the back counties, who would then have it in their power to chaſtiſe their defection at pleaſure. And were any one ſtate to give up its arms, THAT ſtate muſt be garriſoned by all Howe's army of Britons and Heſſians to preſerve it from the anger of the reſt. Mutual fear is a principal link in the chain of mutual love, and woe be to that ſtate that breaks the compact. Howe is mercifully inviting you to barbarous deſtruction, and men muſt be either rogues or fools that will not ſee it. I dwell not upon the powers of imagination; I bring reaſon to your ears; and in language as plain as A, B, C, hold up truth to your eyes.

I thank GOD that I fear not. I ſee no real cauſe for fear. I know our ſituation well, and can ſee the way out of it. While our army was collected, Howe, dared not riſk a battle, and it is no credit to him that he decamped from the White Plains, and waited a mean opportunity to ravage the defenceleſs Jerſeys; but it is great credit to us, that, with a handful of men, we ſuſtained an orderly retreat for near an hundred miles, brought off our ammunition, all our field pieces, the greateſt part of our ſtores, and had four rivers to paſs. None can ſay that our retreat was precipitate, for we were near three weeks in per-

forming it, that the country might have time to come in. Twice we marched back to meet the enemy and remained out till dark. The ſign of fear was not ſeen in our camp, and had not ſome of the cowardly and diſaffected inhabitants ſpread falſe alarms through the country, the Jerſeys had never been ravaged. Once more we are again collected and collecting, our new army at both ends of the continent is recruiting faſt, and we ſhall be able to open the next campaign with ſixty thouſand men, well armed and cloathed. This is our ſituation, and who will may know it. By perſeverance and fortitude we have the proſpect of a glorious iſſue; by cowardice and ſubmiſſion, the ſad choice of a variety of evils—a ravaged country—a depopulated city—habitations without ſafety, and ſlavery without hope—our homes turned into barracks and bawdy-houſes for Heſſians, and a future race to provide for whoſe fathers we ſhall doubt of. Look on this picture and weep over it! and if there yet remains one thoughtleſs wretch who believes it not, let him ſuffer it unlamented.

COMMON SENSE.

THE CRISIS.—NUMBER II.

Philadelphia, January 13, 1777.

TO LORD HOWE.

"What's in the name of LORD *that I ſhould fear,*
"To bring my grievance to the public ear?"

CHURCHILL.

UNIVERSAL empire is the prerogative of a writer. His concerns are with all mankind, and though he cannot command their obedience, he can aſſign them their duty. The Republic of Letters is more ancient than monarchy, and of far higher character in the world, than the vaſſal court of Britain; he that rebels againſt reaſon is a real rebel, but he that in defence of reaſon, rebels againſt tyranny, has a better title to "DEFENDER OF THE FAITH," than George the Third.

As a military man your lordſhip may hold out the ſword of war, and call it the "*Ultima Ratio Regum:*" *The laſt reaſon of kings;* we in return can ſhow you the ſword of juſtice, and call it, "The

beſt ſcourge of tyrants." The firſt of theſe two may threaten, or even frighten, for a while, and caſt a ſickly langour over an inſulted people, but reaſon will ſoon recover the debauch, and reſtore them again to tranquil fortitude. Your lordſhip, I find, has now commenced author, and publiſhed a Proclamation; I have publiſhed a Criſis; as they ſtand, they are the antipodes of each other; both cannot riſe at once, and one of them muſt deſcend:—And ſo quick is the revolution of things, that your lordſhip's performance, I ſee, has already fallen many degrees from its firſt place, and is now juſt viſible on the edge of the political horizon.

It is ſurpriſing to what pitch of infatuation blind folly and obſtinacy will carry mankind, and your lordſhip's drowſy proclamation is a proof that it does not even quit them in their ſleep. Perhaps you thought America too was taking a nap, and therefore choſe, like Satan to Eve, to whiſper the deluſion ſoftly, leſt you ſhould awaken her. This continent, ſir, is too extenſive to ſleep all at once, and too watchful, even in its ſlumbers, not to ſtartle at the unhallowed foot of an invader. You may iſſue your proclamations, and welcome, for we have learned to "reverence ourſelves," and ſcorn the inſulting ruffian that employs you. America, for your deceaſed brother's ſake, would gladly have ſhewn you reſpect, and it is a new aggravation to her feelings, that Howe ſhould be forgetful, and raiſe his ſword againſt thoſe, who at their own charge raiſed a monument to his brother. But your maſter has commanded, and you have not enough of nature left to refuſe. Surely! there muſt be ſomething ſtrangely degenerating in the love of monarchy, that can ſo completely wear a man down to an ingrate, and make him proud to lick the duſt that kings have trod upon. A few more years, ſhould you ſurvive them, will beſtow on you the title of 'an old man:' And in ſome hour of future reflection you may probably find the fitneſs of Wolſey's deſpairing penitence—"had I ſerved my God as faithfully as I have ſerved my king, he would not thus have forſaken me in my old age."

The character you appear to us in is truly ridiculous. Your friends, the tories, announced your coming, with high deſcriptions of your unlimited powers; but your proclamation has given them the lie, by ſhewing you to be a commiſſioner without authority. Had your powers been ever ſo great, they were nothing to us, farther than we pleaſed; becauſe we had the ſame right which other nations had, to do what we thought was beſt. "*The* UNITED STATES *of*

AMERICA" will found as pompouſly in the world or in hiſtory, as "The kingdom of Great-Britain;" the character of *general Waſhington*, will fill a page with as much luſtre as that of *lord Howe:* and the *congreſs* have as much right to command the *king and parliament* of London, to deſiſt from legiſlation, as *they* or *you* have to command the congreſs. Only ſuppoſe how laughable ſuch an edict would appear from us, and then, in that merry mood, do but turn the tables upon yourſelf, and you will ſee how your proclamation is received here. Having thus placed you in a proper poſition in which you may have a full view of folly, and learn to deſpiſe it, I hold up to you, for that purpoſe, the following quotation from your own lunarian proclamation.—"And we (lord Howe and general Howe) do command (and in his majeſty's name forſooth) all ſuch perſons as are aſſembled together, under the name of general or provincial congreſſes, committees, conventions or other aſſociations, by whatever name or names known and diſtinguiſhed, to deſiſt and ceaſe from all ſuch treaſonable actings and doings."

You introduce your proclamation by referring to your declarations of the 14th of July and 19th of September. In the laſt of theſe, you ſunk yourſelf below the character of a private gentleman. That I may not ſeem to accuſe you unjuſtly, I ſhall ſtate the circumſtance: By a verbal invitation of yours, communicated to congreſs by general Sullivan, then a priſoner on his parole, you ſignified your deſire of conferring with ſome members of that body as private gentlemen. It was beneath the dignity of the American Congreſs to pay any regard to a meſſage that at beſt was but a genteel affront, and had too much of the miniſterial complexion of tampering with private perſons; and which might probably have been the caſe, had the gentlemen who were deputed on the buſineſs, poſſeſſed that kind of caſy virtue which an Engliſh courtier is ſo truly diſtinguiſhed by. Your requeſt however was complied with, for honeſt men are naturally more tender of their civil than their political fame. The interview ended as every ſenſible man thought it would; for your lordſhip knows, as well as the writer of the Criſis, that it is impoſſible for the king of England to promiſe the repeal, or even the reviſal of any acts of parliament; wherefore, on your part, you had nothing to ſay, more than to requeſt, in the room of demanding, the entire ſurrender of the continent; and then, if that was complied with, to promiſe that the inhabitants ſhould eſcape with their lives. This was the upſhot of the conference. You informed the conferees

that you were two months in ſoliciting theſe powers. We aſk, What powers? for as commiſſioner you have none. If you mean the power of pardoning, it is an oblique proof that your maſter was determined to ſacrifice all before him; and that you were two months in diſſuading him from his purpoſe Another evidence of his ſavage obſtinacy! From your own account of the matter we may juſtly draw theſe two concluſions: firſt, that you ſerve a monſter; and ſecondly, that never was a meſſenger ſent on a more fooliſh errand than yourſelf. This plain language may perhaps ſound uncouthly to an ear vitiated by courtly refinements; but words were made for uſe, and the fault lies in deſerving them, or the abuſe in applying them unfairly.

Soon after your return to New-York, you publiſhed a very illiberal and unmanly hand bill againſt the congreſs; for it was certainly ſtepping out of the line of common civility, firſt to ſcreen your national pride by ſoliciting an interview with them as private gentlemen, and in the concluſion to endeavour to deceive the multitude by making a hand bill attack on the whole body of the congreſs; you got them together under one name, and abuſed them under another. But the king you ſerve, and the cauſe you ſupport, afford you ſo few inſtances of acting the gentleman, that out of pity to your ſituation the congreſs pardoned the inſult by taking no notice of it.

You ſay in that hand bill, "that they, the congreſs, diſavowed every purpoſe for reconciliation not conſonant with their extravagant and inadmiſſible claim of independence." Why, God bleſs me! what have you to do with our independence? We aſk no leave of yours to ſet it up; we aſk no money of yours to ſupport it; we can do better without your fleets and armies than with them; you may ſoon have enough to do to protect yourſelves without being burdened with us. We are very willing to be at peace with you, to buy of you and ſell to you, and, like young beginners in the world, to work for our own living; therefore, why do you put yourſelves out of caſh, when we know you cannot ſpare it, and we do not deſire you to run into debt? I am willing, ſir, you ſhould ſee your folly in every view I can place it, and for that reaſon deſcend ſometimes to tell you in jeſt what I wiſh you to ſee in earneſt. But to be more ſerious with you, why do you ſay, "their independence?" To ſet you right, ſir, we tell you, that the independency is ours, not theirs. The congreſs were authoriſed by every ſtate on the continent to publiſh it to all the world, and in ſo doing are not to be conſidered as the inventors, but only as

the heralds that proclaimed it, or the office from which the ſenſe of the people received a legal form; and it was as much as any or all their heads were worth, to have treated with you on the ſubject of ſubmiſſion under any name whatever. But we know the men in whom we have truſted; can England ſay the ſame of her parliament?

I come now more particularly to your proclamation of the 30th of November laſt. Had you gained an entire conqueſt over all the armies of America, and then put forth a proclamation, offering (what you call) mercy, your conduct would have had ſome ſpecious ſhow of humanity; but to creep by ſurpriſe into a province, and there endeavour to terrify and ſeduce the inhabitants from their juſt allegiance to the reſt by promiſes, which you neither meant, nor were able to fulfil, is both cruel and unmanly: Cruel in its effects; becauſe, unleſs you can keep all the ground you have marched over, how are you, in the words of your proclamation to ſecure to your proſelytes "the enjoyment of their property?" What are to become either of your new adopted ſubjects, of your old friends the tories, in Burlington, Bordentown, Trenton, Mountholly, and many other places, where you proudly lorded it for a few days, and then fled with the precipitation of a purſued thief? What, I ſay, are to become of thoſe wretches? What are to become of thoſe who went over to you from this city and ſtate? What more can you ſay to them than "Shift for yourſelves?" Or what more can they hope for than to wander like vagabonds over the face of the earth? You may now tell them to take their leave of America, and all that once was theirs. Recommend them, for conſolation, to your maſter's court; there perhaps they may make a ſhift to live on the ſcraps of ſome dangling paraſite, and chooſe companions among thouſands like themſelves. A traitor is the foulеſt fiend on earth!

In a political ſenſe we ought to thank you for thus bequeathing eſtates to the continent; we ſhall ſoon, at this rate, be able to carry on a war without expence, and grow rich by the ill policy of lord Howe, and the generous defection of the tories. Had you ſet your foot into this city, you would have beſtowed eſtates upon us which we never thought of, by bringing forth traitors we were unwilling to ſuſpect. But theſe men, you'll ſay, "are his majeſty's moſt faithful ſubjects;" let that honour then be all their fortune, and let his majeſty take them to himſelf.

I am now thoroughly diſguſted with them; they live in ungrateful eaſe, and bend their whole minds to miſchief. It ſeems as if God

had given them over to a ſpirit of infidelity, and that they are open to conviction in no other line but that of puniſhment. It is time to have done with tarring, feathering, carting, and taking ſecurities for their future good behaviour; every ſenſible man muſt feel a conſcious ſhame at ſeeing a poor fellow hawked for a ſhow about the ſtreets, when it is known he is only the tool of ſome principal villain, biaſſed into his offence by the force of falſe reaſoning, or bribed thereto through ſad neceſſity. We diſhonour ourſelves by attacking ſuch trifling characters, while greater ones are ſuffered to eſcape; 'tis our duty to find *them* out, and their proper puniſhment would be to exile them from the continent for ever. The circle of them is not ſo great as ſome imagine; the influence of a few have tainted many who are not naturally corrupt. A continual circulation of lies among thoſe who are not much in the way of hearing them contradicted, will in time paſs for truth; and the crime lies not in the believer but the inventor. I am not for declaring war againſt every man that appears not ſo warm as myſelf: Difference of conſtitution, temper, habit of ſpeaking, and many other things will go a great way in fixing the outward character of a man, yet ſimple honeſty may remain at bottom. Some men have naturally a military turn, and can brave hardſhips and the riſk of life with a cheerful face; others have not; no ſlavery appears to them ſo great as the fatigue of arms, and no terror ſo powerful as that of perſonal danger: What can we ſay? We cannot alter nature, neither ought we to puniſh the ſon becauſe the father begot him in a cowardly mood. However, I believe moſt men have more courage than they know of, and that a little at firſt is enough to begin with. I knew the time when I thought that the whiſtling of a cannon ball would have frightened me almoſt to death: but I have ſince tried it, and find I can ſtand it with as little diſcompoſure, and, I believe, with a much eaſier conſcience than your lordſhip. The ſame dread would return to me again were I in your ſituation, for my ſolemn belief of your cauſe is, that it is heiliſh and damnable, and under that conviction every thinking man's heart *muſt* fail him.

From a concern that a good cauſe ſhould be diſhonoured by the leaſt diſunion among us, I ſaid in my former paper, No. I. "That ſhould the enemy now be expelled, I wiſh, with all the ſincerity of a Chriſtian, that the names of whig and tory might never more be mentioned," but there is a knot of men among us of ſuch a venomous caſt, that they will not admit even one's good wiſhes to act in their favour. Inſtead of rejoicing that heaven had, as it were, providentially

preſerved this city from plunder and deſtruction, by delivering ſo great a part of the enemy into our hands with ſo little effuſion of blood, they ſtubbornly affected to diſbelieve it till within an hour, nay, half an hour, of the priſoners arriving; and the Quakers put forth a teſtimony, dated the 20th of December, ſigned, "John Pemberton," declaring their attachment to the Britiſh government.* Theſe men are continually harping on the great ſin of *our* bearing arms, but the king of Britain may lay waſte the world in blood and famine, and they, poor fallen ſouls, have nothing to ſay.

In ſome future paper I intend to diſtinguiſh between the different kind of perſons who have been denominated tories; for this I am clear in, that all are not ſo who have been called ſo, nor all men whigs who were once thought ſo; and as I mean not to conceal the name of any true friend when there ſhall be occaſion to mention him, neither will I that of an enemy who ought to be known, let his rank, ſtation or religion be what it may. Much pains have been taken by ſome to ſet your lordſhip's private character in an amiable light, but as it has chiefly been done by men who know nothing about you, and who are no ways remarkable for their attachment to us, we have no juſt authority for believing it. George the third was impoſed upon us by the ſame arts, but TIME, at length, has done him juſtice, and the ſame fate may probably attend your lordſhip. Your avowed purpoſe here, is to kill, conquer, plunder, pardon, and enſlave; and the ravages of your army through the Jerſeys have been marked with as much barbariſm as if you had openly profeſſed yourſelf the prince of ruffians; not even the appearance of humanity has been preſerved either on the march or the retreat of your troops; no general order that I could ever learn, has ever been iſſued to prevent or even forbid your troops from robbery, wherever they came, and the only inſtance of juſtice, if it can be called ſuch, which has diſtinguiſhed you for impartiality, is, that you treated

* *I have ever been careful of charging offences upon whole ſocieties of men, but as the paper referred to is put forth by an unknown ſet of men, who claim to themſelves the right of repreſenting the whole; and while the whole ſociety of Quakers admit its validity by a ſilent acknowledgment, it is impoſſible that any diſtinction can be made by the public; and the more ſo, becauſe the New-York paper of the 30th of December, printed by permiſſion of our enemies, ſays that "the Quakers begin to ſpeak openly of their attachment to the Britiſh conſtitution." We are certain that we have many friends among them, and wiſh to know them.*

and plundered all alike ; what could not be carried away has been deſtroyed, and mahogany furniture has been deliberately laid on the fire for fuel, rather than the men ſhould be fatigued with cutting wood.* There was a time when the whigs confided much in your ſuppoſed candour, and the tories reſted themſelves in your favour ; the experiments have now been made, and failed; in every town, nay every cottage, in the Jerſeys, where your arms have been, is a teſtimony againſt you. How you may reſt under this ſacrifice of character I know not; but this I know, that you ſleep and riſe with the daily curſes of thouſands upon you ; perhaps the miſery which the tories have ſuffered by your proffered mercy may give them ſome claim to their country's pity, and be in the end the beſt favour you could ſhew them.

In a folio general-order book belonging to colonel Rhol's battalion, taken at Trenton, and now in the poſſeſſion of the council of ſafety for this ſtate, the following barbarous order is frequently repeated, " His excellency the COMMANDER IN CHIEF orders, that all " inhabitants who ſhall be found with arms, not having an officer " with them, ſhall be immediately taken and hung up." How many you may thus have privately ſacrificed we know not, and the account can only be ſettled in another world. Your treatment of priſoners, in order to diſtreſs them to enliſt into your infernal ſervice, is not to be equalled by any inſtance in Europe. Yet this is the humane lord Howe and his brother, whom the tories and their three quarter kindred the Quakers, or ſome of them at leaſt, have been holding up for patterns of juſtice and mercy !

A bad cauſe will ever be ſupported by bad means, and bad men, and whoever will be at the pains of examining ſtrictly into things, will find that one and the ſame ſpirit of oppreſſion and impiety, more or leſs, governs through your whole party in both countries : Not many days ago I accidentally fell in company with a perſon of this city, noted for eſpouſing your cauſe, and on my remarking to him, " that it appeared clear to me, by the late providential turn of affairs, that GOD Almighty was viſibly on our ſide," he replied, " We care

* *As ſome people may doubt the truth of ſuch wanton deſtruction, I think it neceſſary to inform, that one of the people called Quakers, who lives at Trenton, gave me this information at the houſe of Mr. Michael Hutchinſon (one of the ſame profeſſion) who lives near to Trenton ferry, on the Pennſylvania ſide, Mr. Hutchinſon being preſent.*

nothing for that, you may have HIM, and welcome; if we have but enough of the devil on our ſide we ſhall do." However careleſsly this might be ſpoken matters not, 'tis ſtill the inſenſible principle that directs all your conduct, and will at laſt moſt aſſuredly deceive and ruin you.

If ever a nation was mad and fooliſh, blind to its own intereſt and bent on its own deſtruction, it is Britain. There are ſuch things as national ſins, and though the puniſhment of individuals may be reſerved to *another* world, national puniſhment can only be inflicted in *this* world. Britain, as a nation, is in my inmoſt belief the greateſt and moſt ungrateful offender againſt GOD on the face of the whole earth: Bleſſed with all the commerce ſhe could wiſh for, and furniſhed by a vaſt extenſion of dominion, with the means of civilizing both the eaſtern and weſtern world, ſhe has made no other uſe of both than proudly to idolize her own "Thunder," and rip up the bowels of whole countries for what ſhe could get:—Like Alexander ſhe has made war her ſport, and inflicted miſery for prodigality ſake. The blood of India is not yet repaid, nor the wretchedneſs of Africa yet requited. Of late ſhe has enlarged her liſt of national cruelties, by her butcherly deſtruction of the Caribbs of St. Vincents, and in returning an anſwer by the ſword to the meek prayer for "*Peace, liberty and ſafety.*" Theſe are ſerious things, and whatever a fooliſh tyrant, a debauched court, a trafficking legiſlature or a blinded people may think, the national account with heaven muſt ſome day or other be ſettled: All countries have ſooner or later been called to their reckoning; the proudeſt empires have ſunk when the balance was ſtruck; and Britain, like an individual penitent, muſt undergo her day of ſorrow, and the ſoonet it happens to her the better: As I wiſh it over, I wiſh it to come, but withal wiſh that it may be as light as poſſible.

Perhaps your lordſhip has no taſte for ſerious things; by your connexions in England I ſhould ſuppoſe not: Therefore I ſhall drop this part of the ſubject, and take it up in a line in which you will better underſtand me.

By what means, may I aſk, do you expect to conquer America? If you could not effect it in the ſummer, when our army was leſs than yours, nor in the winter, when we had none, how are you to do it? In point of generalſhip you have been outwitted, and in point of fortitude outdone: Your advantages turn out to your loſs, and ſhow us that it is in our power to ruin you by gifts: Like a game of drafts,

we can move out of *one* ſquare to let you come in, in order that we may afterwards take two or three for one; and as we can always keep a double corner for ourſelves, we can always prevent a total defeat. You cannot be ſo inſenſible, as not to ſee that we have two to one the advantage of you, becauſe we conquer by a drawn game, and you loſe by it. Burgoyne might have taught your lordſhip this knowledge; he has been long a ſtudent in the doctrine of chances.

I have no other idea of conquering countries than by ſubduing the armies which defend them: Have you done this, or can you do this? If you have not, it would be civil in you to let your proclamations alone for the preſent; otherwiſe, you will ruin more tories by your grace and favour than you will whigs by your arms.

Were you to obtain poſſeſſion of this city, you would not know what to do with it more than to plunder it. To hold it in the manner you hold New-York, would be an additional dead weight upon your hands; and if a general conqueſt is your object, you had better be without the city than with it. When you have defeated all our armies, the cities will fall into your hands of themſelves; but to creep into them in the manner you got into Princetown, Trenton, &c. is like robbing an orchard in the night before the fruit be ripe, and running away in the morning. Your experiment in the Jerſeys is ſufficient to teach you that you have ſomething more to do than barely to get into other people's houſes; and your new converts, to whom you promiſed all manner of protection, and ſeduced into new guilt by pardoning them from their former virtues, muſt begin to have a very contemptible opinion both of your power and your policy. Your authority in the Jerſeys is now reduced to the ſmall circle which your army occupies, and your proclamation is no where elſe ſeen unleſs it be to be laughed at. The mighty ſubduers of the continent are retreated into a nut-ſhell, and the proud forgivers of our ſins are fled from thoſe they came to pardon; and all this at a time when they were diſpatching veſſel after veſſel to England with the great news of every day. In ſhort, you have managed your Jerſey expedition ſo very dextrouſly that the dead only are conquerors, becauſe none will diſpute the ground with them.

In all the wars you have formerly been concerned in, you had only armies to contend with; in this caſe you have both an army and a country to combat with. In former wars, the countries followed the fate of their capitals; Canada fell with Quebec, and Minorca with Port Mahon or St. Philips; by ſubduing thoſe, the conquerors

opened a way into, and became maſters of the country: Here it is otherwiſe; if you get poſſeſſion of a city here, you are obliged to ſhut yourſelves up in it, and can make no other uſe of it, than to ſpend your country's money in. This is all the advantage you have drawn from New-York; and you would draw leſs from Philadelphia, becauſe it requires more force to keep it, and is much farther from the ſea. A pretty figure you and the tories would cut in this city, with a river full of ice, and a town full of fire; for the immediate conſequence of your getting here would be, that you would be cannonaded out again, and the tories be obliged to make good the damage: and this, ſooner or later, will be the fate of New-York.

I wiſh to ſee the city ſaved, not ſo much from military as from natural motives. 'Tis the hiding place of women and children, and lord Howe's proper buſineſs is with our armies. When I put all the circumſtances together which ought to be taken, I laugh at your notion of conquering America. Becauſe you lived in a little country, where an army might run over the whole in a few days, and where a ſingle company of ſoldiers might put a multitude to the route, you expected to find it the ſame here. It is plain that you brought over with you all the narrow notions you were bred up with, and imagined that a proclamation in the king's name was to do great things; but Engliſhmen always travel for knowledge, and your lordſhip, I hope, will return, if you return at all, much wiſer than you came.

We may be ſurpriſed by events we did not expect, and in that interval of recollection you may gain ſome temporary advantage: Such was the caſe a few weeks ago, but we ſoon ripen again into reaſon, collect our ſtrength, and while you are preparing for a triumph, we come upon you with a defeat. Such it has been, and ſuch it would be were you to try it an hundred times over. Were you to garriſon the places you might march over, in order to ſecure their ſubjection (for remember you can do it by no other means), your army would be like a ſtream of water running to nothing. By the time you reached from New-York to Virginia, you would be reduced to a ſtring of drops not capable of hanging together; while we, by retreating from ſtate to ſtate, like a river turning back upon itſelf, would acquire ſtrength in the ſame proportion as you loſt it, and in the end be capable of overwhelming you. The country in the mean time would ſuffer, but 'tis a day of ſuffering, and we ought to expect it. What we contend for is worthy the affliction we may go through. If we get but bread to eat, and any kind of raiment to put on, we

ought not only to be contented, but thankful. More than *that* we ought not to look for, and leſs than *that* Heaven has not yet ſuffered us to want. He that would ſell his birthright for a little *ſalt*, is as worthleſs as he who ſold it for *porridge* without ſalt. And he that would part with it for a gay coat, or a *plain* coat, ought forever to be a ſlave in buff. What are ſalt, ſugar and finery, to the ineſtimable bleſſings of "Liberty and ſafety!" Or what are the inconveniencies of a few months to the tributary bondage of ages? The meaneſt peaſant in America, bleſt with theſe ſentiments, is a happy man compared with a New-York tory; he can eat his morſel without repining, and when he has done, can ſweeten it with a repaſt of wholeſome air; he can take his child by the hand and bleſs it, without feeling the conſcious ſhame of neglecting a parent's duty.

In publiſhing theſe remarks I have ſeveral objects in view.

On your part they are, to expoſe the folly of your pretended authority as a commiſſioner; the wickedneſs of your cauſe in general; and the impoſſibility of your conquering us at any rate. On the part of the public my meaning is, to ſhew them their true and ſolid intereſt; to encourage them to their own good, to remove the fears and falſities which bad men had ſpread, and weak men had encouraged; and to excite in all men a love for union, and a cheerfulneſs for duty.

I ſhall ſubmit one more caſe to you reſpecting your conqueſt of this country, and then proceed to new obſervations:

Suppoſe our armies in every part of this continent were immediately to diſperſe, every man to his home, or where elſe he might be ſafe, and engage to re-aſſemble again on a certain future day; it is clear that you would then have no army to contend with, yet you would be as much at a loſs in that caſe as you are now; you would be afraid to ſend your troops in parties over the continent, either to diſarm, or prevent us from aſſembling, leſt they ſhould not return; and while you kept them together, having no army of ours to diſpute with, you could not call it a conqueſt; you might furniſh out a pompous page in the London Gazette or the New-York paper, but when we returned at the appointed time, you would have the ſame work to do you had at firſt.

It has been the folly of Britain to ſuppoſe herſelf more powerful than ſhe really is, and by that means has arrogated to herſelf a rank in the world ſhe is not entitled to: for more than this century paſt ſhe has not been able to carry on a war without foreign aſſiſtance. In

Marlborough's campaigns, and from that day to this, the number of German troops and officers aſſiſting her have been about equal with her own; ten thouſand Heſſians were ſent to England laſt war to protect her from a French invaſion; and ſhe would have cut but a poor figure in her Canadian and Weſt-Indian expeditions, had not America been laviſh both of her money and men to help her along. The only inſtance in which ſhe was engaged ſingly, that I can recollect, was againſt the rebellion in Scotland in forty-five and forty-ſix, and in that, out of three battles, ſhe was twice beaten, till by thus reducing their numbers (as we ſhall yours) and taking a ſupply ſhip that was coming to Scotland with clothes, arms and money (as we have often done) ſhe was at laſt enabled to defeat them. England was never famous by land; her officers have generally been ſuſpected of cowardice, have more of the air of a dancing-maſter than a ſoldier, and by the ſample we have taken priſoners we give the preference to ourſelves. Her ſtrength of late has lain in her extravagance; but as her finances and her credit are now low, her ſinews in that line begin to fail faſt. As a nation ſhe is the pooreſt in Europe; for were the whole kingdom, and all that is in it, to be put up to ſale like the eſtate of a bankrupt, it would not fetch as much as ſhe owes; yet this thoughtleſs wretch muſt go to war, and with the avowed deſign too of making us beaſts of burden, to ſupport her in riot and debauchery, and to aſſiſt her afterwards in diſtreſſing thoſe nations who are now our beſt friends. This ingratitude may ſuit a tory, or the unchriſtian peeviſhneſs of a fallen Quaker, but none elſe.

'Tis the unhappy temper of the Engliſh to be pleaſed with any war, right or wrong, be it but ſucceſsful; but they ſoon grow diſcontented with ill fortune, and it is an even chance that they are as clamorous for peace next ſummer, as the king and his miniſters were for war laſt winter. In this natural view of things, your lordſhip ſtands in a very ugly critical ſituation: Your whole character is ſtaked upon your laurels; if they wither, you wither with them; if they flouriſh, you cannot live long to look at them; and at any rate, the black account hereafter is not far off. What lately appeared to us misfortunes, were only bleſſings in diſguiſe; and the ſeeming advantages on your ſide have turned out to our profit. Even our loſs of this city, as far as we can ſee, might be a principal gain to us: The more ſurface you ſpread over, the thinner you will be, and the eaſier wiped away; and our conſolation under that apparent diſaſter would be, that the eſtates of the tories

would become ſecurities for the repairs. In ſhort, there is no old ground we can fall upon, but ſome new foundation riſes again to ſupport us. "We have put, ſir, our hands to the plough, and curſed be he that looketh back."

Your king, in his ſpeech to parliament laſt ſpring, declared to them, "That he had no doubt but the great force they had enabled him to ſend to America, would effectually reduce the rebellious colonies." It has not, neither can it; but it has done juſt enough to lay the foundation of its own next year's ruin. You are ſenſible that you left England in a divided diſtracted ſtate of politics, and, by the command you had here, you became a principal prop in the court party; their fortunes reſt on yours; by a ſingle expreſs you can fix their value with the public, and the degree to which their ſpirits ſhall riſe or fall; they are in your hands as ſtock, and you have the ſecret of the alley with you. Thus ſituated and connected, you become the unintentional mechanical inſtrument of your own and their overthrow. The king and his miniſters put conqueſt out of doubt, and the credit of both depended on the proof. To ſupport them in the interim, it was neceſſary you ſhould make the moſt of every thing; and we can tell by Hugh Gaine's New York paper what the complexion of the London Gazette is. With ſuch a liſt of victories the nation cannot expect you will aſk new ſupplies; and to confeſs your want of them, would give the lie to your triumphs, and impeach the king and his miniſters of treaſonable deception. If you make the neceſſary demand at home, your party ſinks; if you make it not you ſink yourſelf; to aſk it now is too late, and to aſk it before was too ſoon, and unleſs it arrive quickly will be of no uſe. In ſhort, the part you have to act, cannot be acted; and I am fully perſuaded that all you have to truſt to is, to do the beſt you can with what force you have got, or little more. Though we have greatly exceeded you in point of generalſhip and bravery of men, yet, as a people, we have not entered into the full ſoul of enterprize; for I, who know England and the diſpoſition of the people well, am confident, that it is eaſier for us to effect a revolution there, than you a conqueſt here; a few thouſand men landed in England with the declared deſign of depoſing the preſent king, bringing his miniſters to trial, and ſetting up the duke of Glouceſter in his ſtead, would aſſuredly carry their point, while you were grovelling here ignorant of the matter. As I ſend all my papers to England, this, like COMMON SENSE, will find its way there; and though it may put one party on their guard, it will inform the other and the nation in general of our deſign to help them.

Thus far, ſir, I have endeavoured to give you a picture of preſent affairs: You may draw from it what concluſions you pleaſe. I wiſh as well to the true proſperity of England as you can, but I conſider *Independence as America's natural right and intereſt*, and never could ſee any real diſſervice it would be to Britain. If an Engliſh merchant receives an order, and is paid for it, it ſignifies nothing to him who governs the country. This is my creed of politics. If I have any where expreſſed myſelf over warmly, 'tis from a fixt immoveable hatred I have, and ever had, to cruel men and cruel meaſures. I have likewiſe an averſion to monarchy, as being too debaſing to the dignity of man; but I never troubled others with my notions till very lately, nor ever publiſhed a ſyllable in England in my life. What I write is pure nature, and my pen and my ſoul have ever gone together. My writings I have always given away, reſerving only the expence of printing and paper, and ſometimes not even that. I never courted either fame or intereſt, and my manner of life, to thoſe who know it, will juſtify what I ſay. My ſtudy is to be uſeful, and if your lordſhip loves mankind as well as I do, you would, ſeeing you cannot conquer us, caſt about and lend your hand towards accompliſhing a peace. Our independence, with God's bleſſing, we will maintain againſt all the world; but as we wiſh to avoid evil ourſelves, we wiſh not to inflict it on others. I am never over inquiſitive into the ſecrets of the cabinet, but I have ſome notion, that if you neglect the preſent opportunity, that it will not be in our power to make a ſeparate peace with you afterwards; for whatever treaties or alliances we form, we ſhall moſt faithfully abide by; wherefore you may be deceived if you think you can make it with us at any time. A laſting independent peace is my wiſh, end and aim; and to accompliſh that, "*I pray* "*God the* Americans *may never be defeated, and I truſt while they have* "*good officers, and are well commanded,*" and willing to be commanded, "*that they* NEVER WILL."

COMMON SENSE.

THE CRISIS.—NUMBER III.

Philadelphia, April 19, 1777.

IN the progreſs of politics, as in the common occurrences of life, we are not only apt to forget the ground we have travelled over, but frequently neglect to gather up experience as we go. We expend, if I may

ſo ſay, the knowledge of every day on the circumſtances that produce it, and journey on in ſearch of new matter and new refinements: But as it is pleaſant, and ſometimes uſeful, to look back, even to the firſt periods of infancy, and trace the turns and windings through which we have paſſed, ſo we may likewiſe derive many advantages by halting a while in our political career, and taking a review of the wondrous complicated labyrinth of little more than yeſterday.

Truly, may we ſay, that never did man grow old in ſo ſhort a time! We have crowded the buſineſs of an age into the compaſs of a few months, and have been driven through ſuch a rapid ſucceſſion of things, that, for the want of leiſure to think, we unavoidably waſted knowledge as we came, and have left nearly as much behind us as we brought with us: But the road is yet rich with the fragments, and, before we fully loſe ſight of them, will repay us for the trouble of ſtopping to pick them up.

Were a man to be totally deprived of memory, he would be incapable of forming any juſt opinion; every thing about him would ſeem a chaos; he would have even his own hiſtory to aſk from every one; and by not knowing how the world went in his abſence, he would be at a loſs to know how it *ought* to go on when he recovered, or rather, returned to it again. In like manner, though in a leſs degree, a too great inattention to paſt occurrences retards and bewilders our judgment in every thing; while, on the contrary, by comparing what is paſt with what is preſent, we frequently hit on the true character of both, and become wiſe with very little trouble. It is a kind of counter-march, by which we get into the rear of time, and mark the movements and meaning of things as we make our return. There are certain circumſtances, which, at the time of their happening, are kind of riddles, and as every riddle is to be followed by its anſwer, ſo thoſe kind of circumſtances will be followed by their events, and thoſe events are always the true ſolution. A conſiderable ſpace of time may lapſe between, and unleſs we continue our obſervations from the one to the other, the harmony of them will paſs away unnoticed: But the misfortune is, that partly from the preſſing neceſſity of ſome inſtant things, and partly from the impatience of our own tempers, we are frequently in ſuch a hurry to make out the meaning of every thing as faſt as it happens, that we thereby never truly underſtand it; and not only ſtart new difficulties to ourſelves by ſo doing, but, as it were, embarraſs Providence in her good deſigns.

I have been civil in ſtating this fault on a large ſcale, for, as it now ſtands, it does not appear to be levelled againſt any particular ſet of men; but were it to be refined a little farther, it might afterwards be applied to the tories with a degree of ſtriking propriety: Thoſe men have been remarkable for drawing ſudden concluſions from ſingle facts. The leaſt apparent miſhap on our ſide, or the leaſt ſeeming advantage on the part of the enemy, have determined with them the fate of a whole campaign. By this haſty judgment they have converted a retreat into a defeat; miſtook generalſhip for error; while every little advantage purpoſely given the enemy, either to weaken their ſtrength by dividing it, embarraſs their councils by multiplying their objects, or to ſecure a greater poſt by the ſurrender of a leſs, has been inſtantly magnified into a conqueſt. Thus, by quartering ill policy upon ill principles, they have frequently promoted the cauſe they deſigned to injure, and injured that which they intended to promote.

It is probable the campaign may open before this number comes from the preſs. The enemy have long lain idle and amuſed themſelves with carrying on the war by proclamations only. While they continue their delay our ſtrength increaſes, and were they to move to action now, it is a circumſtantial proof they have no reinforcement coming; wherefore, in either caſe, the comparative advantage will be ours. Like a wounded diſabled whale, they want only time and room to die in; and though in the agony of their exit, it may be unſafe to live within the flapping of their tail, yet every hour ſhortens their date and leſſens their power of miſchief. If any thing happens while this number is in the preſs, it will afford me a ſubject for the laſt pages of it. At preſent I am tired of waiting; and as neither the enemy, nor the ſtate of politics, have *yet* produced any thing new, I am thereby left in the field of general matter undirected by any ſtriking or particular object. This Criſis, therefore, will be made up rather of variety than novelty, and conſiſt more of things uſeful than things wonderful.

The ſucceſs of the cauſe, the union of the people, and the means of ſupporting and ſecuring both, are points which cannot be too much attended to. He who doubts of the former is a deſponding coward, and he who wilfully diſturbs the latter is a traitor. Their characters are eaſily fixt, and under theſe ſhort deſcriptions I leave them for the preſent.

One of the greateſt degrees of ſentimental union which America

ever knew, was in denying the right of the Britiſh parliament "*to bind the colonies in all caſes whatſoever.*" The declaration is in its form an almighty one, and is the loftieſt ſtretch of arbitrary power that ever one ſet of men, or one country claimed over another. Taxation was nothing more than the putting the declared right into practice; and this failing, recourſe was had to arms, as a means to eſtabliſh both the right *and* the practice, or to anſwer a worſe purpoſe, which will be mentioned in the courſe of this number. And in order to repay themſelves the expence of an army, and to profit by their own injuſtice, the colonies were, by another law, declared to be in a ſtate of actual rebellion, and of conſequence all property therein would fall to the conquerors.

The colonies, on their part, FIRST, denied the right; SECONDLY, they ſuſpended the uſe of taxable articles, and petitioned againſt the practice of taxation: and theſe failing, they THIRDLY, defended their property by force, as ſoon as it was forcibly invaded, and in anſwer to the declaration of rebellion and non-protection, publiſhed their declaration of independence and right of ſelf-protection.

Theſe, in a few words, are the different ſtages of the quarrel; and the parts are ſo intimately and neceſſarily connected with each other as to admit of no ſeparation. A perſon, to uſe a trite phraſe, muſt be a whig or a tory in the lump. His feeling, as a man, may be wounded; his charity, as a Chriſtian, may be moved; but his political principles muſt go through all the caſes on one ſide or the other. He cannot be a whig in *this* ſtage, and a tory in *that*. If he ſays he is againſt the united independence of the continent, he is to all intents and purpoſes againſt her in all the reſt; becauſe THIS LAST comprehends the whole. And he may juſt as well ſay, that Britain was right in declaring us rebels; right in taxing us; and right in declaring her "*right to bind the colonies in all caſes whatſoever.*" It ſignifies nothing what neutral ground, of his own creating, he may ſkulk upon for ſhelter, for the quarrel in no ſtage of it hath afforded any ſuch ground; and either we or Britain are abſolutely right or abſolutely wrong through the whole.

Britain, like a gameſter nearly ruined, hath now put all her loſſes into one bet, and is playing a deſperate game for the total. If ſhe wins it, ſhe wins from *me* my life; ſhe wins the continent as the forfeited property of rebels; the right of taxing thoſe that are left as reduced ſubjects; and the power of binding them ſlaves: And the ſingle die which determines this unparalleled event is, whether we ſup-

port our independence or ſhe overturn it. This is coming to the point at once. Here is the touch-ſtone to try men by. *He that is not a ſupporter of the independent ſtates of America, in the ſame degree that his religious and political principles would ſuffer him to ſupport the government of any other country, of which he called himſelf a ſubject, is, in the American ſenſe of the word,* A TORY; *and the inſtant that he endeavours to bring his toryiſm into practice, he becomes* A TRAITOR. The firſt can only be detected by a general teſt, and the law hath already provided for the latter.

It is unnatural and impolitic to admit men who would root up our independence to have any ſhare in our legiſlation, either as electors or repreſentatives; becauſe the ſupport of our independence reſts in a great meaſure on the vigour and purity of our public bodies. Would Britain, even in time of peace, much leſs in war, ſuffer an election to be carried by men who profeſſed themſelves to be her ſubjects, or allow ſuch to ſit in parliament? Certainly not.

But there are a certain ſpecies of tories with whom conſcience or principle hath nothing to do, and who are ſo from avarice only. Some of the firſt fortunes in the continent, on the part of the whigs, are ſtaked on the iſſue of our preſent meaſures. And ſhall diſaffection only be rewarded with ſecurity? Can any thing be a greater inducement to a miſerly man, than the hope of making his mammon ſafe? And though the ſcheme be fraught with every character of folly, yet, ſo long as he ſuppoſes, that by doing nothing materially criminal againſt America on one part, and by expreſſing his private diſapprobation againſt independence, as palliative with the enemy on the other part, he ſtands thereby in a ſafe line between both, while, I ſay, this ground be ſuffered to remain, craft and the ſpirit of avarice will point it out, and men will not be wanting to fill up this moſt contemptible of all characters.

Theſe men, aſhamed to own the ſordid cauſe from whence their diſaffection ſprings, add thereby meanneſs to meanneſs, by endeavouring to ſhelter themſelves under the maſk of hypocriſy; that is, they had rather be thought to be tories from *ſome kind of principle*, than tories by having *no principle at all*. But till ſuch time as they can ſhow ſome real reaſon, natural, political, or conſcientious, on which their objections to independence are founded, we are not obliged to give them credit for being tories of the firſt ſtamp, but muſt ſet them down as tories of the laſt.

In the ſecond number of the Criſis I endeavoured to ſhew the impoſſibility of the enemy making any conqueſt of America, that no-

thing was wanting on our part but patience and perſeverance, and that, with theſe virtues, our ſucceſs, as far as human ſpeculation could diſcern, ſeemed as certain as fate. But as there are many among us, who, influenced by others, have regularly gone back from the principles they once held, in proportion as we have gone forward; and as it is the unfortunate lot of many a good man to live within the neighbourhood of diſaffected ones ; I ſhall therefore, for the ſake of confirming the one and recovering the other, endeavour, in the ſpace of a page or two, to go over ſome of the leading principles in ſupport of independence. It is a much pleaſanter taſk to prevent vice than to puniſh it; and however our tempers may be gratified by reſentment, or our national expences eaſed by forfeited eſtates, harmony and friendſhip is nevertheleſs the happieſt condition a country can be bleſt with.

The principal arguments in ſupport of independence may be comprehended under the four following heads.

Firſt,—The natural right of the continent to independence.

Secondly,—Her intereſt in being independent.

Thirdly,—the neceſſity,—and

Fourthly,—The moral advantages ariſing therefrom.

I. The natural right of the continent to independence, is a point which never yet was called in queſtion. It will not even admit of a debate. To deny ſuch a right, would be a kind of atheiſm againſt nature: And the beſt anſwer to ſuch an objection would be, "*The fool hath ſaid in his heart there is no God.*"

II. The intereſt of the continent in being independent is a point as clearly right as the former. America, by her own internal induſtry, and unknown to all the powers of Europe, was at the beginning of the diſpute, arrived at a pitch of greatneſs, trade and population, beyond which it was the intereſt of Britain not to ſuffer her to paſs, leſt ſhe ſhould grow too powerful to be kept ſubordinate. She began to view this country with the ſame uneaſy malicious eye, with which a covetous guardian would view his ward whoſe eſtate he had been enriching himſelf by for twenty years, and ſaw him juſt arriving at manhood. And America owes no more to Britain for her preſent maturity, than the ward would to his guardian for being twenty-one years of age. That America hath flouriſhed *at the time* ſhe was under the government of Britain, is true ; but there is every natural reaſon to believe, that had ſhe been an independent country from the firſt ſettlement thereof, uncontrolled by any foreign power, free to make her own laws, regulate and encourage her own commerce, ſhe

had by this time been of much greater worth than now. The caſe is ſimply this, The firſt ſettlers in the different colonies were left to ſhift for themſelves, unnoticed and unſupported by any European government; but as the tyranny and perſecution of the old world daily drove numbers to the new, and as, by the favour of Heaven on their induſtry and perſeverence, they grew into importance, ſo, in a like degree, they became an object of profit to the greedy eyes of Europe. It was impoſſible in this ſtate of infancy, however thriving and promiſing, that they could reſiſt the power of any armed invader that ſhould ſeek to bring them under his authority. In this ſituation Britain thought it worth her while to claim them, and the continent received and acknowledged the claimer. It was, in reality, of no very great importance who was her maſter, ſeeing, that from the force and ambition of the different powers of Europe ſhe muſt, till ſhe acquired ſtrength enough to aſſert her own right, acknowledge ſome one. As well, perhaps, Britain as another; and it might have been as well to have been under the ſtates of Holland as any. The ſame hopes of engroſſing and profiting by her trade, by not oppreſſing it too much, would have operated alike with any maſter, and produced to the colonies the ſame effects. The clamour of protection, likewiſe, was all a farce; becauſe, in order to make *that* protection neceſſary, ſhe muſt firſt, by her own quarrels create us enemies. Hard terms! indeed!

To know whether it be the intereſt of the continent to be independent, we need only aſk this eaſy, ſimple queſtion: Is it the intereſt of a man to be a boy all his life? The anſwer to one will be the anſwer to both. America hath been one continued ſcene of legiſlative contention from the firſt king's repreſentative to the laſt; and this was unavoidably founded in the natural oppoſition of intereſt between the old country and the new. A governor ſent from England, or receiving his authority therefrom, ought never to have been conſidered in any other light than that of a genteel commiſſioned ſpy, whoſe private buſineſs was information, and his public buſineſs a kind of civilized oppreſſion. In the firſt of theſe characters he was to watch the tempers, ſentiments and diſpoſition of the people, the growth of trade, and the increaſe of private fortunes; and in the latter, to ſuppreſs all ſuch acts of the aſſemblies, however beneficial to the people, which did not directly or indirectly throw ſome increaſe of power or profit into the hands of thoſe who ſent him.

America, till now, could never be called a *free country*, becauſe

her legiſlation depended on the will of a man three thouſand miles diſtant, whoſe intereſt was in oppoſition to ours, and who, by a ſingle "no," could forbid what law he pleaſed.

The freedom of trade, likewiſe, is, to a trading country, an article of ſuch vaſt importance, that the principal ſource of wealth depends upon it; and it is impoſſible that any country can flouriſh, as it otherwiſe might do, whoſe commerce is engroſſed, cramped and fettered by the laws and mandates of another—yet theſe evils, and more than I can here enumerate, the continent has ſuffered by being under the government of Great-Britain. By an independence we clear the whole at once—put an end to the buſineſs of unanſwered petitions and fruitleſs remonſtrances—exchange Britain for Europe—ſhake hands with the world—live at peace with mankind—and trade to any market where we beſt can buy and ſell.

III. The neceſſity, likewiſe, of being independent, even before it was declared, became ſo evident and important, that the continent ran the riſk of being ruined every day ſhe delayed it. There were reaſons to believe that Britain would endeavour to make an European matter of it, and rather than loſe the whole, would diſmember it like Poland, and diſpoſe of her ſeveral claims to the higheſt bidder. Genoa, failing in her attempts to reduce Corſica, made a ſale of it to the French, and ſuch traffics have been common in the old world. We had at that time no Ambaſſador in any part of Europe, to counteract her negociations, and by that means ſhe had the range of every foreign court uncontradicted on our part. We even knew nothing of the treaty for the Heſſians till it was concluded, and the troops ready to embark. Had we been independent before, we had probably prevented her obtaining them. We had no credit abroad, becauſe of our rebellious dependency. Our ſhips could claim no protection in foreign ports, becauſe we afforded them no juſtifiable reaſon for granting it to us. The calling ourſelves ſubjects, and at the ſame time fighting againſt the power we acknowledged, was a dangerous precedent to all Europe. If the grievances juſtified our taking up arms, they juſtified our ſeparation; if they did not juſtify our ſeparation, neither could they juſtify our taking up arms. All Europe was intereſted in reducing us as rebels, and all Europe (or the greateſt part at leaſt) is intereſted in ſupporting us as independent ſtates. At home our condition was ſtill worſe: Our currency had no foundation, and the fall of it would have ruined whig and tory alike. We had no other law than a kind of moderated paſſion; no other civil power

than an honeſt mob ; and no other protection than the temporary attachment of one man to another. Had independence been delayed a few months longer, this continent would have been plunged into irrecoverable confuſion: Some violent for it, ſome againſt it, till in the general cabal the rich would have been ruined, and the poor deſtroyed. It is to independence that every tory owes the preſent ſafety he lives in; for by *that*, and *that only*, we emerged from a ſtate of dangerous ſuſpenſe, and became a regular people.

The neceſſity likewiſe of being independent, had there been no rupture between Britain and America, would in a little time have brought one on. The increaſing importance of commerce, the weight and perplexity of legiſlation, and the entangled ſtate of European politics, would daily have ſhewn to the continent the impoſſibility of continuing ſubordinate; for, after the cooleſt reflections on the matter, *this muſt* be allowed, that Britain was too jealous of America, to govern it juſtly; too ignorant of it, to govern it well; and too diſtant from it, to govern it at all.

IV. But, what weigh moſt with all men of ſerious reflection are the MORAL ADVANTAGES ariſing from independence: War and deſolation are become the trades of the old world; and America neither could, nor can be under the government of Britain without becoming a ſharer of her guilt, and a partner in all the diſmal commerce of death. The ſpirit of duelling, extended on a national ſcale, is a proper character for European wars. They have ſeldom any other motive than pride, or any other object than fame. The conquerors and the conquered are generally ruined alike, and the chief difference at laſt is, that the one marches home with his honours, and the other without them. 'Tis the natural temper of the Engliſh to fight for a feather, if they ſuppoſe *that feather* to be an affront; and America, without the right of aſking why, muſt have abetted in every quarrel and abided by its fate. It is a ſhocking ſituation to live in, that one country muſt be brought into all the wars of another, whether the meaſure be right or wrong, or whether ſhe will or not; yet this, in the fulleſt extent, was, and ever would be, the unavoidable conſequence of the connexion. Surely! the Quakers forgot their own principles, when in their late teſtimony they called *this connexion* with theſe military and miſerable appendages hanging to it, "*The happy conſtitution.*"

Britain, for centuries paſt, has been nearly fifty years out of every hundred at war with ſome power or other. It certainly ought to be

a conſcientious as well as political conſideration with America, not to dip her hands in the bloody work of Europe. Our ſituation affords us a retreat from their cabals, and the preſent happy union of the ſtates bids fair for extirpating the future uſe of arms from one quarter of the world; yet ſuch have been the irreligious politics of the preſent leaders of the Quakers, that, for the ſake of they ſcarce know what, they would cut off every hope of ſuch a bleſſing by tying this continent to Britain, like Hector to the chariot-wheel of Achilles, to be dragged through all the miſeries of endleſs European wars.

The connection, viewed from this ground, is diſtreſſing to every man who has the feelings of humanity. By having Britain for our maſter, we became enemies to the greateſt part of Europe, and they to us; and the conſequence was war inevitable. By being our own maſters, independent of any foreign one, we have Europe for our friends, and the proſpect of an endleſs peace among ourſelves. Thoſe who were advocates for the Britiſh government over theſe colonies, were obliged to limit both their arguments and their ideas to the period of an European peace only: The moment Britain became plunged in war, every ſuppoſed convenience to us vaniſhed away, and all we could hope for was *not to be ruined.* Could this be a deſirable condition for a young country to be in?

Had the French purſued their fortune immediately after the defeat of Braddock laſt war, this city and province had then experienced the woeful calamities of being a Britiſh ſubject. A ſcene of the ſame kind might happen again; for America, conſidered as a ſubject to the crown of Britain, would ever have been the ſeat of war and the bone of contention between the two powers.

On the whole, if the future expulſion of arms from one quarter of the world would be a deſirable object to a peaceable man;—if the freedom of trade to every part of it can engage the attention of a man of buſineſs;—if the ſupport or fall of millions of currency can affect our intereſts;—if the entire poſſeſſion of eſtates, by cutting off the lordly claims of Britain over the ſoil, deſerves the regard of landed property;—and if the right of making our own laws, uncontrolled by royal or miniſterial ſpies or mandates, be worthy our care as freemen;—then are all men intereſted in the ſupport of independence; and may he that ſupports it not, be driven from the bleſſing, and live unpitied beneath the ſervile ſufferings of ſcandalous ſubjection!

We have been amuſed with the tales of ancient wonders; we have

read, and wept over, the hiſtories of other nations; applauded, cenſured or pitied, as their caſes affected us.—The fortitude and patience of the ſufferers—the juſtneſs of their cauſe—the weight of their oppreſſions and oppreſſors—the object to be ſaved or loſt—with all the conſequences of a defeat or a conqueſt—have, in the hour of ſympathy, bewitched our hearts and chained it to their fate: But where is the power that ever made war upon petitioners? Or where is the war on which a world was ſtaked till now?

We may not, perhaps, be wiſe enough to make all the advantages we ought of our independence; but they are, nevertheleſs, marked and preſented to us with every character of GREAT and GOOD, and worthy the hand of him who ſent them. I look through the preſent trouble to a time of tranquility, when we ſhall have it in our power to ſet an example of peace to all the world. Were the Quakers really impreſſed and influenced by the quiet principles they profeſs to hold, they would, however they might diſapprove the means, be the firſt of all men to approve of INDEPENDENCE, becauſe, by ſeparating from the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, it affords an opportunity, never given to man before, of carrying their favourite principle of peace into general practice, by eſtabliſhing governments that ſhall hereafter exiſt without wars. Oh ye fallen, cringing prieſt and Pemberton-ridden people! what more can we ſay of ye than that a religious Quaker is a valuable character, and a political Quaker a real Jeſuit.

Having thus gone over ſome of the principal points in ſupport of independence, I muſt now requeſt the reader to return back with me to the period when it firſt began to be a public doctrine, and to examine the progreſs it has made among the various claſſes of men. The era I mean to begin at, is the breaking out of hoſtilities, April 19th, 1775. Until this event happened, the continent ſeemed to view the diſpute as a kind of law-ſuit for a matter of right, litigating between the old country and the new; and ſhe felt the ſame kind and degree of horror, as if ſhe had ſeen an oppreſſive plaintiff, at the head of a band of ruffians, enter the court, while the cauſe was before it, and put the judge, the jury, the defendant and his council, to the ſword. Perhaps a more heart-felt convulſion never reached a country with the ſame degree of power and rapidity before, and never may again. Pity for the ſufferers, mixt with indignation at the violence, and heightened with apprehenſions of undergoing the ſame fate, made the affair of Lexington the affair of the continent. Every part of

it felt the ſhock, and all vibrated together. A general promotion of ſentiment took place: Thoſe who had drank deeply into whiggiſh principles, that is, the right and neceſſity not only of oppoſing, but wholly ſetting aſide the power of the crown as ſoon as it became practically dangerous (for in theory it was always ſo) ſtept into the firſt ſtage of independence; while another claſs of whigs, equally ſound in principle, but not ſo ſanguine in enterprize, attached themſelves the ſtronger to the cauſe, and fell cloſe in with the rear of the former; their partition was a mere point. Numbers of the moderate men, whoſe chief fault, *at that time*, aroſe from their entertaining a better opinion of Britain than ſhe deſerved, convinced now of their miſtake, gave her up and publicly declared themſelves good whigs. While the tories, ſeeing it was no longer a laughing matter, either ſunk into ſilent obſcurity, or contented themſelves with coming forth and abuſing General Gage: Not a ſingle advocate appeared to juſtify the action of that day; it ſeemed to appear to every one with the ſame magnitude, ſtruck every one with the ſame force, and created in every one the ſame abhorrence. From this period we may date the growth of independence.

If the many circumſtances, which happened at this memorable time, be taken in one view, and compared with each other, they will juſtify a concluſion which ſeems not to be attended to, I mean a fixt deſign in the king and miniſtry of driving America into arms, in order that they might be furniſhed with a pretence for ſeizing the whole continent, as the immediate property of the crown. A noble plunder for hungry courtiers!

It ought to be remembered, that the firſt petition from the congreſs was at this time unanſwered on the part of the Britiſh king. That the motion, called lord North's motion, of the 20th of February, 1775, arrived in America the latter end of March. This motion was to be laid by the ſeveral governers, then in being, before the aſſembly of each province; and the firſt aſſembly before which it was laid, was the aſſembly of Pennſylvania in *May* following. This being a juſt ſtate of the caſe, I then aſk, why were hoſtilities commenced between the time of paſſing the reſolve in the houſe of commons, of the 20th of February, and the time of the aſſemblies meeting to deliberate upon it? Degrading and infamous as that motion was, there is, nevertheleſs, reaſon to believe that the king and his adherents were afraid the colonies would agree to it, and leſt they ſhould, took effectual care they ſhould not, by provoking them with hoſtilities in the

interim. They had not the leaſt doubt at that time of conquering America at one blow; and what they expected to get by a conqueſt being infinitely greater than any thing they could hope to get either by taxation or accommodation, they ſeemed determined to prevent even the poſſibility of hearing each other, leſt America ſhould diſappoint their greedy hopes of the whole, by liſtening even to their own terms. On the one hand they refuſed to hear the petition of the continent, and on the other hand took effectual care the continent ſhould not hear them.

That the motion of the 20th of February and the orders for commencing hoſtilities were both concerted by the ſame perſon or perſons, and not the latter by General Gage, as was falſely imagined at firſt, is evident from an extract of a letter of his to adminiſtration, read among other papers in the houſe of commons; in which he informs his maſters, *That though their idea of his diſarming certain counties was a right one, yet it required him to be maſter of the country, in order to enable him to execute it.* This was prior to the commencement of hoſtilities, and conſequently before the motion of the 20th of February could be deliberated on by the ſeveral aſſemblies.

Perhaps it may be aſked, why was the motion paſt, if there was at the ſame time a plan to aggravate the Americans not to liſten to it? Lord North aſſigned one reaſon himſelf, which was, *a hope of dividing them.* This was publicly tempting them to reject it; that if, in caſe the injury of arms ſhould fail of provoking them ſufficiently, the inſult of ſuch a declaration might fill it up. But by paſſing the motion and getting it afterwards rejected in America, it enabled them, in their wretched idea of politics, among other things, to hold up the colonies to foreign powers with every poſſible mark of diſobedience and rebellion. They had applied to thoſe powers not to ſupply the continent with arms, ammunition, &c. and it was neceſſary they ſhould incenſe them againſt us, by aſſigning on their own part ſome ſeeming reputable reaſon why. By dividing, it had a tendency to weaken the ſtates, and likewiſe to perplex the adherents of America in England. But the principal ſcheme, and that which has marked their character in every part of their conduct, was a deſign of precipitating the colonies into a ſtate which they might afterwards deem rebellion, and under that pretence put an end to all future complaints, petitions and remonſtrances, by ſeizing the whole at once. They had ravaged one part of the globe, till it could glut them no longer; their prodigality required new plunder, and through the Eaſt-India article TEA they

hoped to transfer their rapine from that quarter of the world to this. —Every deſigned quarrel had its pretence ; and the ſame barbarian avarice accompanied the *plant* to America, which ruined the country which produced it.

That men never turn rogues without turning fools, is a maxim, ſooner or later, univerſally true. The commencement of hoſtilities, being in the beginning of April, was, of all times the worſt choſen : The congreſs were to meet the tenth of May following, and the diſtreſs the continent felt at this unparalleled outrage gave a ſtability to *that body*, which no other circumſtance could have done. It ſuppreſſed too, all inferior debates, and bound them together by a neceſſitous affection, without giving them time to differ upon trifles. The ſuffering likewiſe, ſoftened the whole body of the people into a degree of pliability, which laid the principal foundation-ſtone of union, order and government ; and which, at any other time, might only have fretted and then faded away unnoticed and unimproved : But Providence, who beſt knows how to time her misfortunes as well as her immediate favours, choſe this to be the time : And who dares diſpute it ?

It did not ſeem the diſpoſition of the people at this criſis to heap petition upon petition, while the former remained unanſwered : The meaſure, however, was carried in congreſs, and a ſecond petition was ſent ? of which I ſhall only remark, that it was ſubmiſſive even to a dangerous fault, becauſe the prayer of it appealed ſolely to, what it called, the prerogative of the crown, while the matter in diſpute was confeſſed to be conſtitutional. But even this petition, flattering as it was, was ſtill not ſo harmonious as the chink of caſh, and conſequently not ſufficiently grateful to the tyrant and his miniſtry. From every circumſtance it is evident, that it was the determination of the Britiſh court to have nothing to do with America but to conquer it fully and abſolutely. They were certain of ſucceſs, and the field of battle was to be the only place of treaty. I am confident there are thouſands and tens of thouſands in America who wonder *now* they ſhould ever think otherwiſe ; but the ſin of that day was the ſin of civility, yet it operated againſt our preſent good in the ſame manner that a civil opinion of the devil would againſt our future peace.

Independence was a doctrine ſcarce and rare even towards the concluſion of the year ſeventy-five : All our politics had been founded on the hope or expectation of making the matter up—a hope, which, though general on the ſide of America, had never entered the head or heart of the Britiſh court. Their hope was conqueſt and confiſcation.

Good Heavens! what volumes of thanks does America owe to Britain? What infinite obligations to the tool, that fills, with paradoxical vacancy, the throne! Nothing but the ſharpeſt eſſence of villany, compounded with the ſtrongeſt diſtillation of folly, could have produced a menſtruum that would have effected a ſeparation. The congreſs in ſeventy-four adminiſtered an abortive medicine to independence, by prohibiting the importation of goods, and the ſucceeding congreſs rendered the doſe ſtill more dangerous by continuing it. Had independence been a ſettled ſyſtem with America (as Britain has advanced), ſhe ought to have *doubled* her importation, and prohibited in ſome degree her exportation. And this ſingle circumſtance is ſufficient to acquit America before any jury of nations of having a continental plan of independence in view: A charge, which had it been true, would have been honourable, but is ſo groſsly falſe, that either the amazing ignorance, or the wilful diſhoneſty of the Britiſh court, is effectually proved by it.

The ſecond petition, like the firſt, produced no anſwer; it was ſcarcely acknowledged to be received; the Britiſh court were too determined in their villany even to act it artfully, and in their rage for conqueſt neglected the neceſſary ſubtilties for obtaining it. They might have divided, diſtracted and played a thouſand tricks with us, had they been as cunning as they were cruel.

This laſt indignity gave a new ſpring to independence. Thoſe who knew the ſavage obſtinacy of the king and the jobbing gambling ſpirit of the court, predicted the fate of the petition, as ſoon as it was ſent from America; for the men being known, their meaſures were eaſily foreſeen. As politicians we ought not ſo much to ground our hope on the reaſonableneſs of the thing we aſk, as on the reaſonableneſs of the perſon of whom we aſk it: Who would expect diſcretion from a fool, candour from a tyrant, or juſtice from a villain.

As every proſpect of accommodation ſeemed now to fail faſt, men began to think ſeriouſly on the matter; and their reaſon being thus ſtript of the falſe hope which had long encompaſſed it, became approachable by fair debate; yet ſtill the bulk of the people heſitated; they ſtartled at the novelty of independence, without once conſidering that our getting into arms at firſt was a more extraordinary novelty, and that all other nations had gone through the work of independence before us. They doubted, likewiſe, the ability of the continent to ſupport it, without reflecting, that it required the ſame force to obtain an accommodation by arms as an independence. If the one

was acquirable, the other was the ſame; becauſe, to accompliſh either, it was neceſſary that our ſtrength ſhould be too great for Britain to ſubdue; and it was too unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, that with the power of being maſters, we ſhould ſubmit to be ſervants.* Their caution at this time, was exceedingly miſplaced; for if they were able to defend their property and maintain their rights by arms, they conſequently were able to defend and ſupport their independence; and in proportion as theſe men ſaw the neceſſity and rightneſs of the meaſure, they honeſtly and openly declared and adopted it, and the part they have acted ſince, has done them honour, and fully eſtabliſhed their characters. Error in opinion has this peculiar advantage with it, that the foremoſt point of the contrary ground may at any time be reached by the ſudden exertion of a thought; and it frequently happens in ſentimental differences that ſome ſtriking circumſtance, or ſome forcible reaſon, quickly conceived, will effect in an inſtant what neither argument nor example could produce in an age.

I find it impoſſible in the ſmall compaſs I am limited to, to trace out the progreſs which independence has made on the minds of the different claſſes of men, and the ſeveral reaſons by which they were moved. With ſome, it was a paſſionate abhorrence againſt the king

* *In this ſtate of political ſuſpenſe the pamphlet* Common Senſe *made its appearance, and the ſucceſs it met with does not become me to mention. Dr. Franklin, Mr. Samuel and John Adams, were ſeverally ſpoken of as the ſuppoſed author. I had not, at that time, the pleaſure either of perſonally knowing or being known to the two laſt gentlemen. The favour of Dr. Franklin's friendſhip I poſſeſſed in England, and my introduction to this part of the world was through his patronage. I happened, when a ſchool-boy, to pick up a pleaſing natural hiſtory of Virginia, and my inclination from that day of ſeeing the weſtern ſide of the Atlantic never left me. In October, ſeventy-five, Dr. Franklin propoſed giving me ſuch materials as were in his hands, towards completing a hiſtory of the preſent tranſactions, and ſeemed deſirous of having the firſt volume out the next ſpring. I had then formed the outlines of Common Senſe, and finiſhed nearly the firſt part; and as I ſuppoſed the Doctor's deſign in getting out a hiſtory, was to open the new year with a new ſyſtem, I expected to ſurpriſe him with a production on that ſubject, much earlier than he thought of; and without informing him of what I was doing, got it ready for the preſs as faſt as I conveniently could, and ſent him the firſt pamphlet that was printed off.*

of England and his miniſtry, as a ſet of ſavages and brutes; and theſe men, governed by the agony of a wounded mind, were for truſting every thing to hope and Heaven, and bidding defiance at once. With others, it was a growing conviction that the ſcheme of the Britiſh court was to create, ferment and drive on a quarrel for the ſake of confiſcated plunder: Men of this caſt ripened into independence in proportion as the evidence increaſed. While a third claſs, conceived it was the true intereſt of America, internally and externally, to be her own maſter, gave their ſupport to independence, ſtep by ſtep, as they ſaw her abilities to maintain it enlarge. With many, it was a compound of all theſe reaſons; while thoſe who were too callous to be reached by either, remained, and ſtill remain tories.

The *legal neceſſity* of being independent, with ſeveral collateral reaſons, is pointed out in an elegant, maſterly manner, in a charge to the grand jury for the diſtrict of Charleſtown, by the hon. William Henry Drayton, eſq. chief juſtice of South-Carolina. This performance, and the addreſs of the convention of New-York, are pieces, in my humble opinion, of the firſt rank in America.

The principal cauſes why independence has not been ſo univerſally ſupported as it ought, are *fear* and *indolence*, and the cauſes why it has been oppoſed, are, *avarice*, *downright villany*, and *luſt of perſonal power*. There is not ſuch a being in America, as a tory from conſcience; ſome ſecret defect or other is interwoven in the character of all thoſe, be they men or women, who can look with patience on the brutality, luxury, and debauchery of the Britiſh court, and the violations of their army here. A woman's virtue muſt ſit very lightly on her who can even hint a favourable ſentiment in their behalf. It is remarkable that the whole race of proſtitutes in New-York were tories; and the ſchemes for ſupporting the tory cauſe, in this city, for which ſeveral are now in gaol, and one hanged, were concerted and carried on in common baudy-houſes, aſſiſted by thoſe who kept them.

The connexion between vice and meanneſs is a fit object for ſatire, but when the ſatire is a fact, it cuts with the irreſiſtible power of a diamond. If a Quaker, in defence of his juſt rights, his property and the chaſtity of his houſe, takes up a muſket, he is expelled the meeting; but the preſent king of England, who ſeduced and took into keeping a ſiſter of their ſociety, is reverenced and ſupported with repeated teſtimonies, while the friendly noodle from whom ſhe was taken (and

who is now in this city) continues a drudge in the ſervice of his rival, as if proud of being cuckolded by a creature called a king.

Our ſupport and ſucceſs depend on ſuch a variety of men and circumſtances, that every one, who does but wiſh well, is of ſome uſe: There are men who have a ſtrange awkwardneſs to arms, yet have hearts to riſk every ſhilling in the cauſe, or in ſupport of thoſe who have better talents for defending it. Nature, in the arrangement of mankind, has fitted ſome for every ſervice in life: Were all ſoldiers, all would ſtarve and go naked, and were none ſoldiers, all would be ſlaves. As *diſaffection* to independence is the badge of a tory, ſo *affection* to it is the mark of a whig; and the different ſervices of the whigs down from thoſe who nobly contribute every thing, to thoſe who have nothing to render but their wiſhes, tend all to the ſame centre, though with different degrees of merit and ability. The larger we make the circle, the more we ſhall harmonize, and the ſtronger we ſhall be. All we want to ſhut out, is diſaffection, and, *that excluded*, we muſt accept from each other ſuch duties as we are beſt fitted to beſtow. A narrow ſyſtem of politics, like a narrow ſyſtem of religion, is calculated only to ſour the temper, and live at variance with mankind.

All we want to know in America is ſimply this, who is for independence, and who is not? Thoſe who are for it, will ſupport it, and the remainder will undoubtly ſee the reaſonableneſs of their paying the charges; while thoſe who oppoſe or ſeek to betray it, muſt expect the more rigid fate of the gaol and the gibbet. There is a baſtard kind of generoſity, which, by being extended to all men, is as fatal to ſociety, on one hand, as the want of true generoſity is on the other. A lax manner of adminiſtering juſtice, falſely termed moderation, has a tendency both to diſpirit public virtue, and promote the growth of public evils. Had the late committee of ſafety taken cognizance of the laſt teſtimony of the Quakers, and proceeded againſt ſuch delinquents as were concerned therein, they had, probably prevented the treaſonable plans which have been concerted ſince. When one villain is ſuffered to eſcape, it encourages another to proceed, either from a hope of eſcaping likewiſe, or an apprehenſion that we dare not puniſh. It has been a matter of general ſurpriſe, that no notice was taken of the incendiary publication of the Quakers, of the 20th of November laſt: A publication evidently intended to promote ſedition and treaſon, and encourage the enemy, who were then within a day's march of this city, to proceed on and poſſeſs it. I here preſent the reader with a memorial, which was laid before the board of

safety a few days after the testimony appeared. Not a member of that board, that I conversed with, but expressed the highest detestation of the perverted principles and conduct of the Quaker junto, and that the board would take the matter up; notwithstanding which, it was suffered to pass away unnoticed, to the encouragement of new acts of treason, the general danger of the cause, and the disgrace of the state.

To the honourable the council of safety of the state of Pennsylvania.

At a meeting of a reputable number of the inhabitants of the city of Philadelphia, impressed with a proper sense of the justice of the cause which this continent is engaged in, and animated with a generous fervour for supporting the same, it was resolved, that the following be laid before the board of safety:

"We profess liberality of sentiment to all men; with this distinction *only*, that those who do not deserve it, would become wise and *seek* to deserve it. We hold the pure doctrine of universal liberty of conscience, and conceive it our duty to endeavour to secure that sacred right to others, as well as to defend it for ourselves; for we undertake not to judge of the religious rectitude of tenets, but leave the whole matter to Him who made us.

"We persecute no man, neither will we abet in the persecution of any man for religion sake; our common relation to others, being that of fellow-citizens and fellow-subjects of one single community; and in this line of connexion we hold out the right hand of fellowship to all men. But we should conceive ourselves to be unworthy members of the FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA, were we unconcernedly to see or suffer any treasonable wound, public or private, directly or indirectly, to be given against the peace and safety of the same. We enquire not into the rank of the offenders, nor their religious persuasion; we have no business with either, our part being only to find them out, and exhibit them to justice.

"A printed paper, dated the 20th of November, and signed "*John Pemberton*," whom we suppose to be an inhabitant of this city, has lately been dispersed abroad, a copy of which accompanies this. Had the framers and publishers of that paper conceived it their duty, to exhort the youth, and others, of their society, to a patient submission under the present trying visitations, and humbly to wait the event of Heaven towards them, they had therein shewn a Christian temper, and

we had been ſilent; but the anger and political virulence with which their inſtructions are given, and the abuſe with which they ſtigmatize all ranks of men, not thinking like themſelves, leave no doubt on our minds from what ſpirit their publication proceeded: And it is diſgraceful to the pure cauſe of truth, that men can dally with words of the moſt ſacred import, and play them as mechanically off as if religion conſiſted only in contrivance. We know of no inſtance in which the Quakers have been compelled to bear arms, or to do any thing which might ſtrain their conſcience; wherefore their advice, "to withſtand and refuſe to ſubmit to the arbitrary inſtructions and ordinances of men," appear to us a falſe alarm, and could only be treaſonably calculated to gain favour with our enemies, when they were ſeemingly on the brink of invading this ſtate, or, what is ſtill worſe, to weaken the hands of our defence, that their entrance into this city might be made practical and eaſy.

"We diſclaim all tumult and diſorder in the puniſhment of offenders; and wiſh to be governed, not by temper but by reaſon, in the manner of treating them. We are ſenſible that our cauſe has ſuffered by the two following errors; firſt, by ill-judged lenity to traitorous perſons in ſome caſes; and ſecondly, by only a paſſionate treatment of them in others. For the future we diſown both, and wiſh to be ſteady in our proceedings, and ſerious in our puniſhments.

"Every ſtate in America has by the repeated voice of its inhabitants, directed and authoriſed the continental congreſs to publiſh a formal declaration of independence of, and ſeparation from, the oppreſſive king and parliament of Great Britain; and we look on every man an enemy who does not in ſome line or other give his aſſiſtance towards ſupporting the ſame; at the ſame time we conſider the offence to be heightened to a degree of unpardonable guilt, when ſuch perſons, under the ſhew of religion, endeavour, either by writing, ſpeaking, or otherwiſe, to ſubvert, overturn, or bring reproach upon the independence of this continent as declared by congreſs.

"The publiſhers of the paper, ſigned "John Pemberton," have called in a loud and paſſionate manner on their friends and connexions, "to withſtand and refuſe" obedience to whatever "inſtructions or ordinances" may be publiſhed, not warranted by (what they call) "that happy conſtitution under which they and others long en-"joyed tranquility and peace." If this be not treaſon, we know not what may properly be called by that name.

"To us it is a matter of ſurpriſe and aſtoniſhment, that men with

the word "*peace, peace,*" continually on their lips ſhould be ſo fond of living under, and ſupporting a government, and at the ſame time calling it "*happy,*" which is never better pleaſed than when at war—that hath filled India with carnage and famine—Africa with ſlavery—and tampered with Indians and Negroes to cut the throats of the freemen of America. We conceive it a diſgrace to this ſtate to harbour or wink at ſuch palpable hypocriſy. But as we ſeek not to hurt the hair of any man's head, when we can make ourſelves ſafe without, we wiſh ſuch perſons to reſtore peace to themſelves and us, by removing themſelves to ſome part of the king of Great Britain's dominions, as by that means they may live unmoleſted by us or we by them; for our fixt opinion is, that thoſe who do not deſerve a place among us, ought not to have one.

"We conclude, with requeſting the council of ſafety to take into their conſideration the paper ſigned "*John Pemberton;*" and if it ſhall appear to them to be of a dangerous tendency, or of a treaſonable nature, that they would commit the ſigner, together with ſuch other perſons as they can diſcover were concerned therein, into cuſtody, until ſuch time as ſome mode of trial ſhall aſcertain the full degree of their guilt and puniſhment; in the doing of which, we wiſh their judges, whoever they may be, to diſregard the man, his connexions, intereſt, riches, poverty or principles of religion, and to attend to the nature of his offence only."

The moſt cavilling ſectarian cannot accuſe the foregoing with containing the leaſt ingredient of perſecution. The free ſpirit on which the American cauſe is founded, diſdains to mix with ſuch an impurity, and leave it a rubbiſh fit only for narrow and ſuſpicious minds to grovel in. Suſpicion and perſecution are weeds of the ſame dunghill, and flouriſh together. Had the Quakers minded their religion and their buſineſs, they might have lived through this diſpute in enviable eaſe, and none would have moleſted them. The common phraſe with theſe people is, "*Our principles are peace.*" To which may be replied, *and your practices are the reverſe;* for never did the conduct of men oppoſe their own doctrine more notoriouſly than the preſent race of the Quakers. They have artfully changed themſelves into a different ſort of people to what they uſed to be, and yet have the addreſs to purſuade each other they are not altered; like antiquated virgins they ſee not the havoc deformity hath made upon them, but pleaſantly miſtaking wrinkles for dimples, conceit themſelves yet lovely, and wonder at the ſtupid world for not admiring them.

Did no injury arife to the public by this apoftacy of the Quakers from themfelves, the public would have nothing to do with it; but as both the defign and confequences are pointed againft a caufe in which the whole community are intereſted, it is therefore no longer a fubject confined to the cognizance of the meeting only, but comes as a matter of criminality before either the authority of the particular ſtate *in which* it is acted, or of the continent *againſt which* it operates. Every attempt now to ſupport the authority of the king and parliament of Great Britain over America, is treaſon againſt *every* ſtate; therefore it is impoſſible that any *one* can pardon or ſcreen from puniſhment an offender againſt *all*.

But to proceed: While the infatuated tories of this and other ſtates were laſt ſpring talking of commiſſioners, accommodation, making the matter up, and the Lord knows what ſtuff and nonſenſe, their *good* king and miniſtry were glutting themſelves with the revenge of reducing America to *unconditional ſubmiſſion*, and ſolacing each other with the certainty of conquering it in *one campaign*. The following quotations are from the parliamentary regiſter of the debates of the houſe of lords, March 5th, 1776.

" The Americans," ſays lord *Talbot*,* " have been obſtinate, " undutiful and ungovernable from the very beginning, from their " firſt early and infant ſettlements; and I am every day more and " more convinced that this people will never be brought back to their " duty, and the ſubordinate relation they ſtand in to this country, " till *reduced to unconditional effectual ſubmiſſion; no conceſſion on our* " *part, no lenity, no endurance*, will have any other effect but that of " increaſing their inſolence."

" The ſtruggle," ſays lord *Townſend*,† " is now a ſtruggle for " power; the die is caſt, and the ONLY POINT which now re- " mains to be determined, is, in what manner the war can be moſt " effectually proſecuted and ſpeedily finiſhed, in order to procure that " *unconditional ſubmiſſion*, which has been ſo ably ſtated by the noble " Earl with the white ſtaff" (meaning lord Talbot); " and I have " no reaſon to doubt that the meaſures now purſuing will put an end " to the war in the courſe of a SINGLE CAMPAIGN." " Should it linger longer, we ſhall then have reaſon to expect that

* *Steward of the king's houſhold.*

† *Formerly general Townſend at Quebec, and late lord-lieutenant of Ireland.*

" ſome foreign power will interfere, and take advantage of our " domeſtic troubles and civil diſtractions."

Lord *Littleton*, " My ſentiments are pretty well known. I ſhall " only obſerve now, that lenient meaſures have had no other effect " than to produce inſult after inſult; that the more we conceded, " the higher America roſe in her demands, and the more inſolent " ſhe has grown. It is for this reaſon that I am now for the moſt " effective and deciſive meaſures; and am of opinion, that no alter- " native is left us, but to relinquiſh America for ever, or finally " determine to compel her to acknowledge the legiſlative authority " of this country; and it is the principle of an *unconditional ſub-* " *miſſion* I would be for maintaining."

Can words be more expreſſive than theſe. Surely the tories will believe the tory lords! The truth is, they *do believe them*, and know as fully as any whig on the continent knows, that the king and miniſtry never had the leaſt deſign of an accommodation with America, but an abſolute unconditional conqueſt. And the part which the tories were to act, was, by downright lying, to endeavour to put the continent off its guard, and to divide and ſow diſcontent in the minds of ſuch whigs as they might gain an influence over. In ſhort, to keep up a diſtraction here, that the force ſent from England might be able to conquer in " *one campaign*." They and the miniſtry were, by a different game, playing into each others hands. The cry of the tories in England was, " *No reconciliation, no accommodation*," in order to obtain the greater military force; while thoſe in America were crying nothing but " *reconciliation and accommodation*," that the force ſent might conquer with the leſs reſiſtance.

But *this* " *ſingle campaign*" is over, and America not conquered. The whole work is yet to do, and the force much leſs to do it with. Their condition is both deſpicable and deplorable: Out of caſh—out of heart, and out of hope. A country furniſhed with arms and ammunition, as America now is, with three millions of inhabitants, and three thouſand miles diſtant from the neareſt enemy that can approach her, is able to look and laugh them in the face.

Howe appears to have two objects in view, either to go up the North-river, or come to Philadelphia.

By going up the North-river, he ſecures a retreat for his army through Canada, but the ſhips muſt return if they return at all, the ſame way they went; and as our army would be in the rear, the ſafety of their paſſage down is a doubtful matter. By ſuch a motion

he ſhuts himſelf from all ſupplies from Europe but through Canada, and expoſes his army and navy to the danger of periſhing. The idea of his cutting off the communication between the Eaſtern and Southern ſtates, by means of the North-river, is merely viſionary. He cannot do it by his ſhipping; becauſe no ſhip can lay long at anchor in any river within reach of the ſhore; a ſingle gun would drive a firſt rate from ſuch a ſtation. This was fully proved laſt October at forts Waſhington and Lee, where one gun only, on each ſide the river, obliged two frigates to cut and be towed off in an hour's time. Neither can he cut it off by his army; becauſe the ſeveral poſts they muſt occupy, would divide them almoſt to nothing, and expoſe them to be picked up by ours like pebbles on a river's bank; but admitting he could, where is the injury? Becauſe while his whole force is cantoned out, as centries over the water, they will be very innocently employed, and the moment they march into the country, the communication opens.

The moſt probable object is Philadelphia, and the reaſons are many. Howe's buſineſs in America is to conquer it, and in proportion as he finds himſelf unable to the taſk, he will employ his ſtrength to diſtreſs women and weak minds, in order to accompliſh through *their* fears what he cannot effect by his *own* force. His coming or attempting to come to Philadelphia is a circumſtance that proves his weakneſs: For no general, that felt himſelf able to take the field and attack his antagoniſt, would think of bringing his army into a city in the ſummer time; and this mere ſhifting the ſcene from place to place, without effecting any thing, has feebleneſs and cowardice on the face of it, and holds him up in a contemptible light to any one who can reaſon juſtly and firmly. By ſeveral informations from New-York, it appears that their army in general, both officers and men, have given up the expectation of conquering America; their eye now is fixt upon the ſpoil. They ſuppoſe Philadelphia to be rich with ſtores, and as they think to get more by robbing a town than by attacking an army, their movement towards this city is probable. We are not now contending againſt an army of ſoldiers, but againſt a band of thieves, who had rather plunder than fight, and have no other hope of conqueſt than by cruelty.

They expect to get a mighty booty and ſtrike another general panic by making a ſudden movement and getting poſſeſſion of this city; but unleſs they can march *out* as well as *in*, or get the entire command of the river, to remove off their plunder, they may probably

be ſtopt with the ſtolen goods upon them. They have never yet ſucceeded wherever they have been oppoſed but at fort Waſhington. At Charleſton their defeat was effectual. At Ticonderoga they ran away. In every ſkirmiſh at Kingſbridge and the White Plains they were obliged to retreat, and the inſtant our arms were turned upon them in the Jerſeys, they turned likewiſe, and thoſe that turned not were taken.

The neceſſity of always fitting our internal police to the circumſtances of the times we live in, is ſomething ſo ſtrikingly obvious that no ſufficient objection can be made againſt it. The ſafety of all ſocieties depend upon it; and where this point is not attended to, the conſequences will either be a general languor or a tumult. The encouragement and protection of the good ſubjects of any ſtate, and the ſuppreſſion and puniſhment of bad ones, are the principal objects for which all authority is inſtituted, and the line in which it ought to operate. We have in this city a ſtrange variety of men and characters, and the circumſtances of the times require they ſhould be publicly known; it is not the number of tories that hurt us, ſo much as the not finding out who they are; men muſt now take one ſide or the other, and abide by the conſequences: The Quakers, truſting to their ſhort-ſighted ſagacity, have, moſt unluckily for them, made their declaration in their laſt teſtimony, and we ought *now* to take them at their word. They have voluntarily read themſelves out of the continental meeting, and cannot hope to be reſtored to it again, but by payment and penitence. Men whoſe political principles are founded on avarice, are beyond the reach of reaſon, and the only cure of toryiſm of this caſt, is to tax it. A ſubſtantial good drawn from a real evil, is of the ſame benefit to ſociety, as if drawn from a virtue; and where men have not public ſpirit to render themſelves ſerviceable, it ought to be the ſtudy of government to draw the beſt uſe poſſible from their vices. When the governing paſſion of any man or ſet of men is once known, the method of managing them is eaſy; for even miſers, whom no public virtue can impreſs, would become generous, could a heavy tax be laid upon covetouſneſs.

The tories have endeavoured to inſure their property with the enemy, by forfeiting their reputation with us; from which may be juſtly inferred, that their governing paſſion is avarice. Make them as much afraid of loſing on one ſide as the other, and you ſtagger their toryiſm; make them more ſo, and you reclaim them; for their principle is to worſhip any power they are moſt afraid of.

This method of considering men and things together, opens into a large field for speculation, and affords me opportunity of offering some observations on the state of our currency, so as to make the support of it go hand in hand, with the suppression of disaffection and the encouragement of public spirit.

The thing which first presents itself in inspecting the state of the currency, is, that we have too much of it, and that there is a necessity of reducing the quantity, in order to encrease the value. Men are daily growing poor by the very means they take to get rich, for in the same proportion that the prices of all goods on hand are raised, the value of all money laid by is reduced. A simple case will make this clear: Let a man have one hundred pounds cash, and as many goods on hand as will to day sell for £.20 but not content with the present market price, he raises them to 40, and by so doing, obliges others in their own defence to raise cent. per cent. likewise; in this case, it is evident that his hundred pounds laid by is reduced fifty pounds in value; whereas, had the markets dropt cent. per cent. his goods would have sold but for ten, but his hundred pounds would have risen in value to two hundred; because it would then purchase as many goods again, or support his family as long again as before. And strange as it may seem, he is one hundred and fifty pounds the poorer for raising his goods, to what he would have been had he lowered them; because the forty pounds his goods sold for, is, by the general rise of the markets cent. per cent. rendered of no more value than the ten pounds would be had the market fallen in the same proportion; and consequently the whole difference of gain or loss is on the different values of the hundred pounds laid by, viz. from fifty to two hundred. This rage for raising goods is for several reasons much more the fault of the tories than the whigs; and yet the tories (to their shame and confusion ought they to be told of it) are by far the most noisy and discontented. The greatest part of the whigs, by being now either in the army or employed in some public service, are *buyers* only and not *sellers*, and as this evil has its origin in trade, it cannot be charged on those who are out of it.

But the grievance is now become too general to be remedied by partial methods, and the only effectual cure is to reduce the quantity of money: With half the quantity we should be richer than we are now, because the value of it would be doubled, and consequently our attachment to it increased; for it is not the number of dollars a man has, but how far they will go, that makes him either rich or poor.

Theſe two points being admitted, viz. that the quantity of money is too great, and that the prices of goods can be only effectually reduced by reducing the quantity of the money, the next point to be conſidered is, The method how to reduce it.

The circumſtances of the times, as before obſerved, require that the public characters of all men ſhould *now* be fully underſtood, and the only general method of aſcertaining it is by an oath or affirmation, renouncing all allegiance to the king of Great-Britain, and to ſupport the independency of the United States as declared by congreſs. Let at the ſame time, a tax of ten, fifteen or twenty per cent. per annum, to be collected quarterly, be levied on all property. Theſe alternatives, by being perfectly voluntary, will take in all ſorts of people. Here is the teſt; here is the tax. He who takes the former, conſcientiouſly proves his affection to the cauſe, and binds himſelf to pay his quota by the beſt *ſervices* in his power, and is thereby juſtly exempt from the latter; and thoſe who chooſe the latter, pay their quota in money, to be excuſed from taking the former, or rather 'tis the price paid to us for their ſuppoſed, though miſtaken, inſurance with the enemy.

But this is only a part of the advantage which would ariſe by knowing the different characters of men. The whigs ſtake every thing on the iſſue of their arms, while the tories, by their diſaffection, are ſapping and undermining their ſtrength; and, of conſequence, the property of the whigs is the more expoſed thereby; and whatever injury their eſtates may ſuſtain by the movements of the enemy, muſt either be borne by themſelves, who have done every thing which has *yet* been done, or by the tories, who have not only done nothing, but have by their diſaffection, invited the enemy on.

In the preſent criſis we ought to know ſquare by ſquare, and houſe by houſe, who are in real allegiance with the United Independent States, and who are not. Let but the line be made clear and diſtinct, and all men will then know what they are to truſt to. It would not only be good policy, but ſtrict juſtice, to raiſe fifty or a hundred thouſand pounds, or more, if it is neceſſary, out of the eſtates and property of the king of England's votaries, reſident in Philadelphia, to be diſtributed, as a reward to thoſe inhabitants of the city and ſtate, who ſhould turn out and repulſe the enemy, ſhould they attempt their march this way; and likewiſe, to bind the property of all ſuch perſons to make good the damages which that of the whigs might ſuſtain. In the undiſtinguiſhable mode of conducting a war, we frequently

make repriſals at ſea, on the veſſels of perſons in England who are friends to our cauſe compared with the reſidentiary tories among us.

In every former publication of mine, from Common Senſe down to the laſt Criſis, I have generally gone on the charitable ſuppoſition, that the tories were rather a miſtaken than a criminal people, and have applied argument after argument with all the candour and temper I was capable of, in order to ſet every part of the caſe clearly and fairly before them, and if poſſible to reclaim them from ruin to reaſon. I have done my duty by them and have now done with that doctrine, taking it for granted, that thoſe who yet hold their diſaffection, are, either a ſet of avaricious miſcreants, who would ſacrifice the continent to ſave themſelves, or a banditti of hungry traitors, who are hoping for a diviſion of the ſpoil. To which may be added, a liſt of crown or proprietary dependants, who, rather than go without a portion of power, would be content to ſhare it with the devil. Of ſuch men there is no hope; and their obedience will only be according to the danger that is ſet before them, and the power that is exerciſed over them.

A time will ſhortly arrive, in which, by aſcertaining the characters of perſons now, we ſhall be guarded againſt their miſchiefs then; for in proportion as the enemy deſpair of conqueſt, they will be trying the arts of ſeduction and the force of fear by all the miſchiefs they can inflict. But in war we may be certain of theſe two things, viz. that cruelty in an enemy, and motions made with more than uſual parade, are always ſigns of weakneſs. He that can conquer, finds his mind too free and pleaſant to be brutiſh; and he that intends to conquer, never makes too much ſhow of his ſtrength.

We now know the enemy we have to do with. While drunk with the certainty of victory they diſdained to be civil; and in proportion as diſappointment makes them ſober, and their apprehenſions of an European war alarm them, they will become cringing and artful; honeſt they cannot be. But our anſwer to them, in either condition they may be in, is ſhort and full, "As free and independent ſtates we are willing to make peace with you to-morrow, but we can neither hear nor reply in any other character."

If Britain cannot conquer us, it proves, that ſhe is neither able to govern nor protect us, and our particular ſituation now is ſuch, that any connexion with her would be unwiſely exchanging a half-defeated enemy for two powerful ones. Europe, by every appearance and

information, is now on the eve, nay, on the morning twilight of a war, and any alliance with *George the third* brings *France* and *Spain* upon our backs; a separation from him attach them to our side; therefore, the only road to *peace*, *honour* and commerce, is INDEPENDENCE.

Written this fourth year of the UNION, *which GOD preserve.*

COMMON SENSE.

THE CRISIS.—NUMBER IV.

Philadelphia, September 12, 1777.

THOSE who expect to reap the blessings of freedom, must, like men, undergo the fatigues of supporting it. The event of yesterday is one of those kind alarms which is just sufficient to rouse us to duty, without being of consequence enough to depress our fortitude. It is not a field of a few acres of ground, but a cause, that we are defending, and whether we defeat the enemy in one battle, or by degrees, the consequence will be the same.

Look back at the events of last winter and the present year, there you will find that the enemy's successes have always contributed to reduce them. What they have gained in ground, they paid so dearly for in numbers, that their victories have in the end amounted to defeats. We have always been masters at the last push, and always shall while we do our duty. Howe has been once on the banks of the Delaware, and from thence driven back with loss and disgrace: and why not be again driven from the Schuylkill? His condition and ours are very different. He has every body to fight, we have only his *one* army to cope with, and which wastes away at every engagement; we can not only reinforce, but can redouble our numbers; he is cut off from all supplies, and must sooner or later inevitably fall into our hands.

Shall a band of ten or twelve thousand robbers, who are this day fifteen hundred or two thousand men less in strength than they were yesterday, conquer America, or subdue even a single state? The thing cannot be, unless we sit down and suffer them to do it. Another such a brush, notwithstanding we lost the ground, would, by still reducing the enemy, put them in a condition to be afterwards totally defeated.

Could our whole army have come up to the attack at one time, the conſequences had probably been otherwiſe; but our having different parts of the Brandywine-creek to guard, and the uncertainty which road to Philadelphia the enemy would attempt to take, naturally afforded them an opportunity of paſſing with their main body at a place where only a part of ours could be poſted; for it muſt ſtrike every thinking man with conviction, that it requires a much greater force to oppoſe an enemy in ſeveral places, than is ſufficient to defeat in any one place.

Men who are ſincere in defending their freedom, will always feel concern at every circumſtance which ſeems to make againſt them; it is the natural and honeſt conſequence of all affectionate attachments, and the want of it is a vice. But the dejection laſts only for a moment; they ſoon riſe out of it with additional vigour; the glow of hope, courage and fortitude, will, in a little time ſupply the place of every inferior paſſion and kindle the whole heart into heroiſm.

There is a myſtery in the countenance of ſome cauſes, which we have not always preſent judgment enough to explain. It is diſtreſſing to ſee an enemy advancing into a country, but it is the only place in which we can beat them, and in which we have always beaten them, whenever they made the attempt. The nearer any diſeaſe approaches to a criſis, the nearer it is to a cure. Danger and deliverance make their advances together, and it is only the laſt puſh, that one or the other takes the lead.

There are many men who will do their duty when it it not wanted; but a genuine public ſpirit always appears moſt when there is moſt occaſion for it. Thank God! our army, though fatigued, is yet entire. The attack made by us yeſterday, was under many diſadvantages, naturally ariſing from the uncertainty of knowing which route the enemy would take; and from that circumſtance, the whole of our force could not be brought up together time enough to engage all at once. Our ſtrength is yet reſerved; and it is evident that Howe does not think himſelf a gainer by the affair, otherwiſe he would this morning have moved down and attacked General Waſhington.

Gentlemen of the city and country, it is in your power, by a ſpirited improvement of the preſent circumſtance, to turn it to a real advantage. Howe is now weaker than before, and every ſhot will contribute to reduce him. You are more immediately intereſted than any other part of the continent; your all is at ſtake; it is not ſo with the general cauſe; you are devoted by the enemy to plunder and de-

ſtruction : It is the encouragement which Howe, the chief of plunderers, has promiſed his army. Thus circumſtanced, you may ſave yourſelves by a manly reſiſtance, but you can have no hope in any other conduct. I never yet knew our brave general, or any part of the army, officers or men, out of heart, and I have ſeen them in circumſtances a thouſand times more trying than the preſent. It is only thoſe that are not in action, that feel languor and heavineſs, and the beſt way to rub it off is to turn out, and make ſure work of it.

Our army muſt undoubtedly feel fatigue, and want a reinforcement of reſt, though not of valour. Our own intereſt and happineſs call upon us to give them every ſupport in our power, and make the burden of the day, on which the ſafety of this city depends, light as poſſible. Remember, gentlemen, that we have forces both to the northward and ſouthward of Philadelphia, and if the enemy be but ſtopt till thoſe can arrive, this city will be ſaved, and the enemy finally routed. You have too much at ſtake to heſitate. You ought not to think an hour upon the matter, but to ſpring to action at once. Other ſtates have been invaded, have likewiſe driven off the invaders. Now our time and turn is come, and perhaps the finiſhing ſtroke is reſerved for us. When we look back on the dangers we have been ſaved from, and reflect on the ſucceſs we have been bleſſed with, it would be ſinful either to be idle or deſpair.

I cloſe this paper with a ſhort addreſs to general Howe. You, ſir, are only lingering out the period that ſhall bring with it your defeat. You have yet ſcarce began upon the war, and the farther you enter, the faſter will your troubles thicken. What you now enjoy is only a reſpite from ruin ; an invitation to deſtruction ; ſomething that will lead on to our deliverance at your expence. We know the cauſe we are engaged in, and though a paſſionate fondneſs for it may make us grieve at every injury that threatens it, yet, when the moment of concern is over, the determination to duty returns. We are not moved by the gloomy ſmile of a worthleſs king, but by the ardent glow of generous patriotiſm. We fight not to enſlave, but to ſet a country free, and to make room upon the earth for honeſt men to live in. In ſuch a cauſe we are ſure we are right; and we leave to you the deſpairing reflection of being the tool of a miſerable tyrant.

COMMON SENSE.

THE CRISIS.—NUMBER V.

TO GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE.

Lancaſter, March 21, 1778.

TO argue with a man who has renounced the uſe and authority of reaſon, and whoſe philoſophy conſiſts in holding humanity in contempt, is like adminiſtring medicine to the dead, or endeavouring to convert an atheiſt by ſcripture. Enjoy, ſir, your inſenſibility of feeling and reflecting. It is the prerogative of animals. And no man will envy you thoſe honours, in which a ſavage only can be your rival and a bear your maſter.

As the generoſity of this country rewarded your brother's ſervices laſt war with an elegant monument in Weſtminſter-Abbey, it is conſiſtent that ſhe ſhould beſtow ſome mark of diſtinction upon you. You certainly deſerve her notice, and a conſpicuous place in the catalogue of extraordinary perſons. Yet it would be a pity to paſs you from the world in ſtate, and conſign you to magnificent oblivion among the tombs, without telling the future beholder why. Judas is as much known as John, yet hiſtory aſcribes their fame to very different actions.

Sir William hath undoubtedly merited a monument: But of what kind, or with what inſcription, where placed or how embelliſhed, is a queſtion that would puzzle all the heralds of St. James's in the profoundeſt mood of hiſtorical deliberation. We are at no loſs, ſir, to aſcertain your real character, but ſomewhat perplexed how to perpetuate its identity, and preſerve it uninjured from the transformations of time or miſtake. A ſtatuary may give a falſe expreſſion to your buſt, or decorate it with ſome equivocal emblems, by which you may happen to ſteal into reputation and impoſe upon the hereafter traditionary world. Ill nature or ridicule may conſpire, or a variety of accidents combine, to leſſen, enlarge, or change Sir William's fame; and no doubt but he who has taken ſo much pains to be ſingular in his conduct, would chooſe to be juſt as ſingular in his exit, his monument and his epitaph.

The uſual honours of the dead, to be ſure, are not ſufficiently ſublime to eſcort a character like you to the republic of duſt and aſhes; for however men may differ in their ideas of grandeur or government here, the grave is nevertheleſs a perfect republic. Death

is not the monarch of the dead, but of the dying. The moment he obtains a conqueſt he loſes a ſubject, and, like the fooliſh king you ſerve, will, in the end, war himſelf out of all his dominion.

As a proper preliminary towards the arrangement of your funeral honours, we readily admit your new rank of *knighthood*. The title is perfectly in character, and is your own, more by merit than creation. There are knights of various orders, from the knight of the windmill to the knight of the poſt. The former is your patron for exploits, and the latter will aſſiſt you in ſettling your accounts. No honorary title could be more happily applied! The ingenuity is ſublime! And your royal maſter hath diſcovered more genius in fitting you therewith, than in generating the moſt finiſhed figure for a button, or deſcanting on the properties of a button-mould.

But how, ſir, ſhall we diſpoſe of you? The invention of a ſtatuary is exhauſted, and Sir William is yet unprovided with a monument. America is anxious to beſtow her funeral favours upon you, and wiſhes to do it in a manner that ſhall diſtinguiſh you from all the deceaſed heroes of the laſt war. The *Egyptian method of embalming* is not known to the preſent age, and hieroglyphical pageantry hath outlived the ſcience of decyphering it. Some other method, therefore, muſt be thought of to immortalize the new knight of the windmill and poſt. Sir William, thanks to his ſtars, is not oppreſſed with very delicate ideas. He has no ambition of being wrapped up and handed about in myrrh, aloes and caſſia. Leſs chargeable odours will ſuffice; and it fortunately happens, that the ſimple genius of America hath diſcovered the art of preſerving bodies and embelliſhing them too, with much greater frugality than the ancients. In a balmage, ſir, of humble tar, you will be as ſecure as Pharaoh, and in a hieroglyphic of feathers rival in finery all the mummies of Egypt.

As you have already made your exit from the moral world, and by numberleſs acts both of paſſionate and deliberate injuſtice engraved an "*Here Lyeth*," on your deceaſed honour, it muſt be mere affectation in you to pretend concern at the humours or opinions of mankind reſpecting you. What remains of you may expire at any time. The ſooner the better. For he who ſurvives his reputation, lives out of ſpite to himſelf, like a man liſtening to his own reproach.

Thus entombed and ornamented, I leave you to the inſpection of the curious, and return to the hiſtory of your yet ſurviving actions.

———The character of Sir William hath undergone ſome extraordinary revolutions ſince his arrival in America. It is now fixed and

known; and we have nothing to hope from your candour or to fear from your capacity. Indolence and inability have too large a ſhare in your compoſition ever to ſuffer you to be any thing more than the hero of little villanies and unfiniſhed adventures. That, which to ſome perſons appeared moderation in you at firſt, was not produced by any real virtue of your own, but by a contraſt of paſſions dividing and holding you in perpetual irreſolution. One vice will frequently expel another, without the leaſt merit in the man; as powers in contrary directions reduce each other to reſt.

It became you to have ſupported a dignified ſolemnity of character; to have ſhewn a ſuperior liberality of ſoul; to have won reſpect by an obſtinate perſeverance in maintaining order, and to have exhibited on all occaſions, ſuch an unchangeable graciouſneſs of conduct, that while we beheld in you the reſolution of an enemy, we might admire in you the ſincerity of a man. You came to America under the high-ſounding titles of commander and commiſſioner; not only to ſuppreſs what you called rebellion by arms, but to ſhame it out of countenance, by the excellence of your example. Inſtead of which, you have been the patron of low and vulgar frauds, the encourager of Indian cruelties; and have imported a cargo of vices blacker than thoſe you pretended to ſuppreſs.

Mankind are not univerſally agreed in their determination of right and wrong; but there are certain actions which the conſent of all nations and individuals hath branded with the unchangeable name of MEANNESS. In the liſt of human vices we find ſome of ſuch a refined conſtitution, that they cannot be carried into practice without ſeducing ſome virtue to their aſſiſtance; but *meanneſs* hath neither alliance nor apology. It is generated in the duſt and ſweepings of other vices, and is of ſuch a hateful figure that all the reſt conſpire to diſown it. Sir William, the commiſſioner of George the Third, hath at laſt vouchſafed to give it rank and pedigree. He has placed the fugitive at the council board, and dubbed it companion of the order of knighthood.

The particular act of meanneſs which I allude to in this deſcription, is forgery. You, ſir, have abetted and patroniſed the forging and uttering counterfeit continental bills. In the ſame New-York newſpapers in which your own proclamation under your maſter's authority was publiſhed, offering, or pretending to offer, pardon and protection to the inhabitants of theſe ſtates, there were repeated advertiſements of counterfeit money for ſale, and perſons who have

come officially from you and under ſanction of your flag, have been taken up in attempting to put them off.

A conduct ſo baſely mean in a public character is without precedent or pretence. Every nation on earth, whether friends or enemies, will unite in deſpiſing you. 'Tis an incendiary war upon ſociety which nothing can excuſe or palliate—An improvement upon beggarly villany—and ſhews an inbred wretchedneſs of heart made up between the venomous malignity of a ſerpent and the ſpiteful imbecility of an inferior reptile.

The laws of any civilized country would condemn you to the gibbet without regard to your rank or titles, becauſe it is an action foreign to the uſage and cuſtom of war; and ſhould you fall into our hands, which pray God you may, it will be a doubtful matter whether we are to conſider you as a military priſoner or a priſoner for felony.

Beſides, it is exceedingly unwiſe and impolitic in you, or any perſons in the Engliſh ſervice, to promote, or even encourage, or wink, at the crime of forgery in any caſe whatever. Becauſe, as the riches of England, as a nation, are chiefly in paper, and the far greater part of trade among individuals is carried on by the ſame medium, that is, by notes and drafts on one another, they, therefore, of all people in the world ought to endeavour to keep forgery out of ſight, and, if poſſible not to revive the idea of it. It is dangerous to make men familiar with a crime which they may afterwards practiſe to much greater advantage againſt thoſe who firſt taught them. Several officers in the Engliſh army have made their exit at the gallows for forgery on their agents; for we all know, who know any thing of England, that there is not a more neceſſitous body of men, taking them generally, than what the Engliſh officers are. They contrive to make a ſhew at the expence of the tailor, and appear clean at the charge of the waſher-women.

England hath at this time nearly two hundred million pounds ſterling of public money in paper, for which ſhe hath no real property, beſides a large circulation of bank notes, bank-poſt bills, and promiſſory notes and drafts of private bankers, merchants and tradeſmen. She hath the greateſt quantity of paper currency and the leaſt quantity of gold and ſilver of any nation in Europe; the real ſpecie, which is about ſixteen millions ſterling, ſerves only as change in large ſums, which are always made in paper, or for payment in ſmall ones. Thus circumſtanced, the nation is put to its wit's end, and obliged to

be ſevere almoſt to criminalty, to prevent the practice and growth of forgery. Scarcely a ſeſſion paſſes at the Old Bailey, or an execution at Tyburn, but witneſſeth this truth. Yet you, ſir, regardleſs of the policy which her neceſſity obliges her to adopt, have made your whole army intimate with the crime. And as all armies, at the concluſion of a war, are too apt to carry into practice the vices of the campaign, it will probably happen, that England will hereafter abound in forgeries, to which art, the practitioners were firſt initiated under your authority in America. You, ſir, have the honour of adding a new vice to the military catalogue; and the reaſon, perhaps, why the invention was reſerved for you is, becauſe no General before was mean enough even to think of it.

That a man whoſe ſoul is abſorbed in the low traffic of vulgar vice, is incapable of moving in any ſuperior region, is clearly ſhewn in you by the event of every campaign. Your military exploits have been without plan, object or deciſion. Can it be poſſible that you or your employers can ſuppoſe the poſſeſſion of Philadelphia to be any ways equal to the expence or expectation of the nation which ſupports you? What advantages does England derive from any atchievements of yours? To *her* it is perfectly indifferent what place you are in, ſo long as the buſineſs of conqueſt is unperformed and the charge of maintaining you remains the ſame.

If the principal events of the three campaigns be attended to, the balance will appear ſtrongly againſt you at the cloſe of each; but the laſt, in point of importance to us, hath exceeded the former two. It is pleaſant to look back on dangers paſt, and equally as pleaſant to meditate on preſent ones when the way out begins to appear. *That* period is now arrived, and the long doubtful winter of war is changing to the ſweeter proſpects of victory and joy. At the cloſe of the campaign in ſeventy-five, you were obliged to retreat from Boſton. In the ſummer of ſeventy-ſix, you appeared with a numerous fleet and army in the harbour of New-York. By what miracle the Continent was preſerved in that ſeaſon of danger is a ſubject of admiration! If inſtead of waſting your time againſt Long-Iſland, you had run up the North-River and landed any where above New-York, the conſequence muſt have been, that either you would have compelled General Waſhington to fight you with very unequal numbers, or he muſt have ſuddenly evacuated the city with the loſs of nearly all the ſtores of the army, or have ſurrendered for want of proviſions, the ſituation of the place naturally producing one or other of theſe events.

The preparations made to defend New-York were, nevertheleſs, wiſe and military; becauſe your forces were then at ſea, their numbers uncertain; ſtorms, ſickneſs, or a variety of accidents might have diſabled their coming, or ſo diminiſhed them on their paſſage, that thoſe which ſurvived would have been incapable of opening the campaign with any proſpect of ſucceſs; in which caſe, the defence would have been ſufficient and the place preſerved; for cities that have been raiſed from nothing with an infinitude of labour and expence, are not to be thrown away on the bare probability of their being taken. On thoſe grounds, the preparations made to maintain New-York were as judicious as the retreat afterwards. While you, in the interim, let ſlip the *very* opportunity which ſeemed to put conqueſt in your power.

Through the whole of that campaign you had nearly double the forces which General Waſhington immediately commanded. The principal plan, at that time, on our part, was to wear away the ſeaſon with as little loſs as poſſible, and to raiſe the army for the next year. Long-Iſland, New-York, Forts Waſhington and Lee were not defended, after your ſuperior force was known, under any expectation of their being finally maintained, but as a range of out works, in the attacking of which, your time might be waſted, your numbers reduced, and your vanity amuſed by poſſeſſing them on our retreat. It was intended to have withdrawn the garriſon from Fort Waſhington after it had anſwered the former of thoſe purpoſes, but the fate of that day put a prize into your hands without much honour to yourſelves.

Your progreſ through the Jerſeys was accidental; you had it not even in contemplation, or you would not have ſent ſo principal a part of your force to Rhode-Iſland before-hand. The utmoſt hope of America in the year ſeventy-ſix reached no higher than that ſhe might not *then* be conquered. She had no expectation of defeating you in that campaign. Even the moſt cowardly tory allowed, that, could ſhe withſtand the ſhock of *that* ſummer her independence would be paſt a doubt. You had *then* greatly the advantage of her. You were formidable. Your military knowledge was ſuppoſed to be complete. Your fleets and forces arrived without an accident. You had neither experience nor reinforcements to wait for. You had nothing to do but to begin, and your chance lay in the firſt vigourous onſet.

America was young and unſkilled. She was obliged to truſt her defence to time and practice; and hath, by mere dint of perſeverance,

maintained her cauſe, and brought her enemy to a condition, in which, ſhe is now capable of meeting him on any grounds.

It is remarkable that in the campaign of ſeventy-ſix, you gained no more, notwithſtanding your great force, than what was given you by conſent of evacuation, except Fort Waſhington: While every advantage obtained by us was by fair and hard fighting. The defeat of Sir Peter Parker was complete. The conqueſt of the Heſſians at Trenton by the remains of a retreating army, which but a few days before you affected to deſpiſe, is an inſtance of heroic perſeverance very ſeldom to be met with. And the victory over the Britiſh troops at Princeton, by a haraſſed and wearied party, who had been engaged the day before and marched all night without refreſhment, is attended with ſuch a ſcene of circumſtances and ſuperiority of generalſhip, as will ever give it a place on the firſt line in the hiſtory of great actions.

When I look back on the gloomy days of laſt winter and ſee America ſuſpended by a thread, I feel a triumph of joy at the recollection of her delivery, and a reverence for the characters which ſnatched her from deſtruction. To doubt *now* would be a ſpecies of infidelity, and to forget the inſtruments which ſaved us *then* would be ingratitude.

The cloſe of that campaign left us with the ſpirit of conquerors. The northern diſtricts were relieved by the retreat of general Carleton over the lakes. The army under your command were hunted back and had their bounds preſcribed. The continent began to feel its military importance, and the winter paſſed pleaſantly away in preparations for the next campaign.

However confident you might be on your firſt arrival, the courſe of the year ſeventy-ſix gave you ſome idea of the difficulty, if not impoſſibility, of conqueſt. To this reaſon I aſcribe your delay in opening the campaign of ſeventy-ſeven. The face of matters, on the cloſe of the former year, gave you no encouragement to purſue a diſcretionary war as ſoon as the ſpring admitted the taking the field: for though conqueſt, in that caſe, would have given you a double portion of fame, yet the experiment was too hazardous. The miniſtry, had you failed, would have ſhifted the whole blame upon you, charged you with having acted without orders, and condemned at once both your plan and your execution.

To avoid thoſe misfortunes, which might have involved you and your money accounts in perplexity and ſuſpicion, you prudently

waited the arrival of a plan of operations from England, which was, that you ſhould proceed for Philadelphia by the way of Cheſapeak, and that Burgoyne, after reducing Ticonderago, ſhould take his route by Albany, and, if neceſſary, join you.

The ſplendid laurels of the laſt campaign have flouriſhed in the north. In that quarter America hath ſurprized the world, and laid the foundation of her this year's glory. The conqueſt of Ticonderoga (if it may be called a conqueſt) has, like all your other victories, led on to ruin. Even the proviſions taken in that fortreſs (which by general Burgoyne's return was ſufficient in bread and flour for nearly 5000 men for ten weeks, and in beef and pork for the ſame number of men for one month) ſerved only to haſten his overthrow, by enabling him to proceed for Saratoga, the place of his deſtruction. A ſhort review of the operations of the laſt campaign will ſhew the condition of affairs on both ſides.

You have taken Ticonderoga and marched into Philadelphia. Theſe are all the events which the year hath produced on your part. A trifling campaign indeed, compared with the expences of England and the conqueſt of the continent, On the other ſide, a conſiderable part of your northern force has been routed by the New-York militia under general Herkemer. Fort Stanwix hath bravely ſurvived a compounded attack of ſoldiers and ſavages, and the beſiegers have fled. The battle of Bennington has put a thouſand priſoners into our hands, with all their arms, ſtores, artillery and baggage. General Burgoyne in two engagements has been defeated; himſelf, his army, and all that were his and theirs are now ours. Ticonderoga and Independence are retaken, and not the ſhadow of an enemy remains in all the northern diſtricts. At this inſtant we have upwards of eleven thouſand priſoners, between ſixty and ſeventy pieces of braſs ordnance, beſides ſmall arms, tents, ſtores, &c. &c.

In order to know the real value of thoſe advantages we muſt reverſe the ſcene, and ſuppoſe general Gates and the force he commanded, to be at your mercy as priſoners, and general Burgoyne with his army of ſoldiers and ſavages to be already joined to you in Pennſylvania. So diſmal a picture can ſcarcely be looked at. It hath all the tracings and colourings of horror and deſpair; and excites the moſt ſwelling emotions of gratitude by exhibiting the miſeries we are ſo graciouſly preſerved from.

I admire this diſtribution of laurels around the continent. It is the earneſt of future union. South-Carolina has had her day of ſuffering

and of fame; and the other ſouthern ſtates have exerted themſelves in proportion to the force that invaded or inſulted them. Towards the cloſe of the campaign in ſeventy-ſix, theſe middle ſtates were called upon and did their duty nobly. They were witneſſes to the almoſt expiring flame of human freedom. It was the cloſe ſtruggle of life and death. The line of inviſible diviſion; and on which, the unabated fortitude of a Waſhington prevailed, and ſaved the ſpark that has ſince blazed in the north with unrivalled luſtre.

Let me aſk, ſir, what great exploits have you performed? Through all the variety of changes and opportunities which this war hath produced, I know no one action of yours that can be ſtiled maſterly. You have moved in and out, backward and forward, round and round, as if valour conſiſted in a military jig. The hiſtory and figure of your movements would be truly ridiculous could they be juſtly delineated. They reſemble the labours of a puppy purſuing his tail; the end is ſtill at the ſame diſtance, and all the turnings round muſt be done over again.

The firſt appearance of affairs at Ticonderoga wore ſuch an unpromiſing aſpect, that it was neceſſary, in July, to detach a part of the forces to the ſupport of that quarter, which were otherwiſe deſtined or intended to act againſt you, and this, perhaps, has been the means of poſtponing your downfal to another campaign. The deſtruction of one army at a time is work enough. We know, ſir, what we are about, what we have to do, and how to do it.

Your progreſs from Cheſapeak was marked by no capital ſtroke of policy or heroiſm. Your principal aim was to get General Waſhington between the Delaware and Schuylkill and between Philadelphia and your army. In that ſituation, with a river on each of his flanks, which united about five miles below the city, and your army above him, you could have intercepted his reinforcements and ſupplies, cut off all his communication with the country, and, if neceſſary, have diſpatched aſſiſtance to open a paſſage for General Burgoyne. This ſcheme was too viſible to ſucceed, for had General Waſhington ſuffered you to command the open country above him, I think it a very reaſonable conjecture that the conqueſt of Burgoyne would not have taken place, becauſe you could, in that caſe, have relieved him. It was therefore neceſſary, while that important victory was in ſuſpence, to trepan *you* into a ſituation, in which you could only be on the defenſive, without the power of affording him aſſiſtance. The manœuvre had its effect and Burgoyne was conquered.

There has been something unmilitary paſſive in you from the time of your paſſing the Schuylkill and getting poſſeſſion of Philadelphia to the cloſe of the campaign. You miſtook a trap for a conqueſt, the probability of which had been made known to Europe, and the edge of your triumph taken off by our own information long before.

Having got you into this ſituation, a ſcheme for a general attack upon you at Germantown was carried into execution on the fourth of October, and though the ſucceſs was not equal to the excellence of the plan, yet the attempting it proved the genius of America to be on the riſe, and her power approaching to ſuperiority. The obſcurity of the morning was your beſt friend, for a fog is always favourable to a hunted enemy. Some weeks after this, you, likewiſe, planned an attack on General Waſhington while at Whitemarſh. Marched out with infinite parade, but on finding him preparing to attack you the next morning, you prudently cut about and retreated to Philadelphia with all the precipitation of a man conquered in imagination.

Immediately after the battle of Germantown, the probability of Burgoyne's defeat gave a new policy to affairs in Pennſylvania, and it was judged moſt conſiſtent with the general ſafety of America to wait the iſſue of the Northern campaign. Slow and ſure is ſound work. The news of that victory arrived in our camp on the 18th of October, and no ſooner did the ſhout of joy and the report of the thirteen cannon reach your ears, than you reſolved upon a retreat, and the next day, that is, on the 19th, withdrew your drooping army into Philadelphia. This movement was evidently dictated by fear; and carried with it a poſitive confeſſion that you dreaded a ſecond attack. It was hiding yourſelf among women and children, and ſleeping away the choiceſt part of a campaign in expenſive inactivity. An army in a city can never be a conquering army. The ſituation admits only of defence. It is mere ſhelter; and every military power in Europe will conclude you to be eventually defeated.

The time when you made this retreat was the very time you ought to have fought a battle, in order to put yourſelf in a condition of recovering in Pennſylvania what you had loſt at Saratoga. And the reaſon why you did not, muſt be either prudence or cowardice; the former ſuppoſes your inability, and the latter needs no explanation. I draw no concluſions, ſir, but ſuch as are naturally deduced from known and viſible facts, and ſuch as will always have a being while the facts which produced them remain unaltered.

After this retreat a new difficulty arose which exhibited the power of Britain in a very contemptible light; which was the attack and defence of Mud-Island. For several weeks did that little unfinished fortress stand out against all the attempts of Admiral and General Howe. It was the fable of Bendar realized on the Delaware. Scheme after scheme, and force upon force were tried and defeated. The garrison, with scarce any thing to cover them but their bravery, survived in the midst of mud, shot and shells, and were at last obliged to give it up more to the powers of time and gunpowder than to the military superiority of the besiegers.

It is my sincere opinion that matters are in a much worse condition with you than what is generally known. Your master's speech at the opening of parliament is like a soliloquy on ill luck. It shows him to be coming a little to his reason, for sense of pain is the first symptom of recovery in profound stupefactions. His condition is deplorable. He is obliged to submit to all the insults of France and Spain, without daring to know or resent them; and thankful for the most trivial evasions to the most humble remonstrances. The time *was* when he could not *deign* an answer to a petition from America, and the time now *is* when he dare not *give* an answer to an affront from France. The capture of Burgoyne's army will sink his consequence as much in Europe as in America. In his speech he expresses his suspicions at the warlike preparations of France and Spain, and as he has only the one army which you command to support his character in the world with, it remains very uncertain when, or in what quarter, it will be most wanted or can be best employed; and this will partly account for the great care you take to keep it from action and attacks, for should Burgoyne's fate be yours, which it probably will, England may take her endless farewel not only of all America but of all the West-Indies.

Never did a nation invite destruction upon itself with the eagerness and ignorance with which Britain had done. Bent upon the ruin of a young and unoffending country, she hath drawn the sword that hath wounded herself to the heart, and in the agony of her resentment hath applied a poison for a cure. Her conduct towards America is a compound of rage and lunacy; she aims at the government of it, yet preserves neither dignity nor character in her methods to obtain it. Were government a mere manufacture or article of commerce, immaterial by whom it should be made or sold, we might as well employ her as another, but when we consider it as the fountain from whence

the general manners and morality of a country take their rife, that the perfons intrufted with the execution thereof are by their ferious example and authority to fupport thefe principles, how abominably abfurd is the idea of being hereafter governed by a fet of men who have been guilty of forgery, perjury, treachery, theft, and every fpecies of villany which the loweft wretches on earth could practife or invent. What greater public curfe can befal any country than to be under fuch authority, and what greater bleffing than to be delivered therefrom. The foul of any man of fentiment would rife in brave rebellion againft them and fpurn them from the earth.

The malignant and venomous tempered General Vaughan has amufed his favage fancy in burning the whole town of Kingfton, in York government, and the late Governer of that State, Mr. Tryon, in his letter to General Parfons, has endeavoured to juftify it, and declared his wifh to burn the houfes of every committee-man in the country. Such a confeffion from one who was once entrufted with the powers of civil government, is a reproach to the character. But it is the wifh and the declaration of a man whom anguifh and difappointment have driven to defpair, and who is daily decaying into the grave with conftitutional rottennefs.

There is not in the compafs of language a fufficiency of words to expref's the bafenefs of your king, his miniftry and his army. They have refined upon villany till it wants a name. To the fiercer vices of former ages they have added the dregs and fcummings of the moft finifhed rafcality, and are fo completely funk in ferpentine deceit, that there is not left among them *one* generous enemy.

From fuch men and fuch maflers may the gracious hand of Heaven preferve America! And though the fufferings fhe now endures are heavy, and fevere, they are like ftraws in the wind compared to the weight of evils fhe would feel under the government of your king, and his penfioned parliament.

There is fomething in meannefs which excites a fpecies of refentment that never fubfides, and fomething in cruelty which ftirs up the heart to the higheft agony of human hatred; Britain hath filled up both thefe characters till no addition can be made, and hath not reputation left with us to obtain credit for the flighteft promife. The will of God hath parted us, and the deed is regiftered for eternity. When fhe fhall be a fpot fcarcely vifible among the nations, America fhall flourifh the favourite of Heaven and the friend of mankind.

For the domeftic happinefs of Britain and the peace of the world I

wiſh ſhe had not a foot of land but what is circumſcribed within her own iſland. Extent of dominion hath been her ruin, and inſtead of civilizing others hath brutalized herſelf. Her late reduction of India, under Clive and his ſucceſſors, was not ſo properly a conqueſt as an extermination of mankind. She is the only power who could practiſe the prodigal barbarity of tying men to the mouths of loaded cannon and blowing them away. It happens that General Burgoyne, who made the report of that horrid tranſaction in the houſe of commons, is now a priſoner with us, and though an enemy, I can appeal to him for the truth of it, being confident that he neither can nor will deny it. Yet Clive received the approbation of the laſt parliament.

When we take a ſurvey of mankind we cannot help curſing the wretch, who, to the unavoidable misfortunes of nature ſhall wilfully add the calamities of war. One wouldthink there were evils enough in the world without ſtudying to increaſe them, and that life is ſufficiently ſhort without ſhaking the ſand that meaſures it. The hiſtories of Alexander, and Charles of Sweden, are the hiſtories of human devils; a good man can not think of their actions without abhorrence nor of their deaths without rejoicings. To ſee the bounties of Heaven deſtroyed, the beautiful face of nature laid waſte, and the choiceſt works of creation and art tumbled into ruin, would fetch a curſe from the ſoul of piety itſelf. But in this country the aggravation is heightened by a new combination of affecting circumſtances. America was young, and, compared with other countries, was virtuous. None but a Herod of uncommon malice would have made war upon infancy and innocence; and none but a people of the moſt finiſhed fortitude dared under thoſe circumſtances, have reſiſted the tyranny. The natives, or their anceſtors, had fled from the former oppreſſions of England, and with the induſtry of bees had changed a wilderneſs into a habitable world. To Britain they were indebted for nothing. The country was the gift of Heaven, and God alone is their Lord and Sovereign.

The time, ſir, will come when you, in a melancholy hour, ſhall reckon up your miſeries by your murders in America. Life, with you, begins to wear a clouded aſpect. The viſion of pleaſurable deluſion is wearing away, and changing to the barren wild of age and ſorrow. The poor reflection of having ſerved your king will yield you no conſolation in your parting moments. He will crumble to the ſame undiſtinguiſhed aſhes with yourſelf, and have ſins enough of his own to anſwer for. It is not the farcical benedictions of a biſhop, nor the

cringing hypocrisy of a court of chaplains, nor the formality of an act of parliament, that can change guilt into innocence, or make the punishment *one* pang the less. You may, perhaps, be unwilling to be serious, but this destruction of the goods of Providence, this havoc of the human race, and this sowing the world with mischief, must be accounted for to him who made and governs it. To us they are only present sufferings, but to him they are deep rebellions.

If there is a sin superior to every other it is that of wilful and offensive war. Most other sins are circumscribed within narrow limits, that is, the power of *one* man cannot give them a very general extension, and many kinds of sins have only a mental existence from which no infection arises; but he who is the author of a war, lets loose the whole contagion of hell, and opens a vein that bleeds a nation to death. We leave it to England and Indians to boast of these honours; we feel no thirst for such savage glory; a nobler flame, a purer spirit animates America. She hath taken up the sword of virtuous defence; she hath bravely put herself between Tyranny and Freedom, between a curse and a blessing, determined to expel the one, and protect the other.

It is the object only of war that makes it honourable. And if there were ever *a just* war since the world began, it is this which America is now engaged in. She invaded no land of yours. She hired no mercenaries to burn your towns, nor Indians to massacre their inhabitants. She wanted nothing from you and was indebted for nothing to you; and thus circumstanced, her defence is honourable and her prosperity is certain.

Yet it is not on the *justice* only, but likewise on the *importance* of this cause that I ground my seeming enthusiastical confidence of our success. The vast extension of America makes her of too much value in the scale of Providence, to be cast, like a pearl before swine, at the feet of an European island; and of much less consequence would it be that Britain were sunk in the sea than that America should miscarry. There has been such a chain of extraordinary events in the discovery of this country at first, in the peopling and planting it afterwards, in the rearing and nursing it to its present state, and in the protection of it through the present war, that no man can doubt, but Providence hath some nobler end to accomplish than the gratification of the petty elector of Hanover or the ignorant and insignificant king of Britain.

As the blood of the martyrs hath been the seed of the Christian church, so the political persecutions of England will and hath already

enriched America with induſtry, experience, union and importance. Before the preſent era ſhe was a mere chaos of uncemented colonies, individually expoſed to the ravages of the Indians and the invaſion of any power that Britain ſhould be at war with. She had nothing ſhe could call her own. Her felicity depended upon accident. The convulſions of Europe might have thrown her from one conqueror to another, till ſhe had been the ſlave of all and ruined by every one; for until ſhe had ſpirit enough to become her own maſter, there was no knowing to which maſter ſhe ſhould belong. *That* period, thank God, is paſt, and ſhe is no longer the dependant, diſunited colonies of Britain, but the Independent and United States of America, knowing no maſter but Heaven and herſelf. You or your king may call this "Deluſion," "Rebellion," or what name you pleaſe. To us it is perfectly indifferent. The iſſue will determine the character, and time will give it a name as laſting as his own.

You have now, ſir, tried the fate of three campaigns, and can fully declare to England, that nothing is to be got on your part but blows and broken bones, and nothing on hers but waſte of trade and credit and an increaſe of poverty and taxes. You are now only where you might have been two years ago, without the loſs of a ſingle ſhip, and yet not a ſtep the forwarder towards the conqueſt of the Continent; becauſe, as I have already hinted, "An army in a city can never be a conquering army." The full amount of your loſſes ſince the beginning of the war exceeds twenty thouſand men, beſides millions of treaſure, for which you have nothing in exchange. Our expences, though great, are circulated within ourſelves. Yours is a direct ſinking of money, and that from both ends at once, firſt in hiring troops out of the nation, and in paying them afterwards, becauſe the money in neither caſe can return again to Britain. We are already in poſſeſſion of the prize, you only in ſuit for it. To us it is a real treaſure, to you it would be only an empty triumph. Our expences will repay themſelves with tenfold intereſt, while yours entail upon you everlaſting poverty.

Take a review, ſir, of the ground you have gone over, and let it teach you policy, if it cannot honeſty. You ſtand but on a very tottering foundation. A change of the miniſtry in England may probably bring your meaſures into queſtion and your head to the block. Clive, with all his ſucceſſes, had ſome difficulty in eſcaping, and yours being all a war of loſſes, will afford you leſs pretenſions, and your enemies more grounds for impeachment.

Go home, ſir, and endeavour to ſave the remains of your ruined country, by a juſt repreſentation of the madneſs of her meaſures. A few moments well applied may yet preſerve her from political deſtruction. I am not one of thoſe who wiſh to ſee Europe in a flame, becauſe I am perſuaded ſuch an event will not ſhorten the war. The rupture, at preſent, is confined between the two powers of America and England. England finds ſhe cannot conquer America, and America has no wiſh to conquer England. You are fighting for what you can never obtain, and we defending what we mean never to part with. A few words, therefore, ſettle the bargain. Let England mind her own buſineſs and we will mind ours. Govern yourſelves and we will govern ourſelves. You may then trade where you pleaſe unmoleſted by us, and we will trade where we pleaſe unmoleſted by you; and ſuch articles as we can purchaſe of each other better than elſewhere may be mutually done. If it were poſſible that you could carry on the war for twenty years you muſt ſtill come to this point at laſt, or worſe, and the ſooner you think of it the better it will be for you.

My official ſituation enables me to know the repeated inſults which Britain is obliged to put up with from foreign powers, and the wretched ſhifts ſhe is driven to, to gloſs them over. Her reduced ſtrength and exhauſted coffers in a three years' war with America, have given a powerful ſuperiority to France and Spain. She is not now a match for them——But if neither counſels can prevail on her to think, nor ſufferings awaken her to reaſon, ſhe muſt e'en go on, till the honour of England becomes a proverb of contempt, and Europe dub her the Land of Fools.

I am, Sir,

With every wiſh for an honourable peace,

Your friend, enemy, and countryman,

COMMON SENSE.

To the Inhabitants of America.

WITH all the pleaſure with which a man exchanges bad company for good, I take my leave of Sir William and return to you. It is now nearly three years ſince the tyranny of Britain received its firſt repulſe by the arms of America. A period, which has given birth to a new world, and erected a monument to the folly of the old.

I cannot help being ſometimes ſurpriſed at the complimentary references which I have ſeen and heard made to antient hiſtories and tranſactions. The wiſdom, civil governments, and ſenſe of honour of the States of Greece and Rome, are frequently held up as objects of excellence and imitation. Mankind have lived for very little purpoſe, if, at this period of the world, they muſt go two or three thouſand years back for leſſons and examples We do diſhonourary injuſtice to ourſelves by placing them in ſuch a ſuperior line. We have no juſt authority for it, neither can we tell why it is that we ſhould ſuppoſe ourſelves inferior.

Could the miſt of antiquity be taken away, and men and things viewed as they then really were, it is more than probable that they would admire us, rather than we them. America has ſurmounted a greater variety and combination of difficulties than, I believe, ever fell to the ſhare of any one people in the ſame ſpace of time, and has repleniſhed the world with more uſeful knowledge and ſounder maxims of civil government than were ever produced in any age before. Had it not been for America there had been no ſuch thing as freedom left throughout the whole univerſe. England hath loſt hers in a long chain of right reaſoning from wrong principles, and it is from this country now ſhe muſt learn the reſolution to redreſs herſelf, and the wiſdom how.

The Grecians and Romans were ſtrongly poſſeſſed of the *ſpirit* of liberty but *not* the *principle*, for at the time they were determined not to be ſlaves themſelves, they employed their power to enſlave the reſt of mankind. But this diſtinguiſhed era is blotted by no one miſanthropical vice. In ſhort, if the principle on which the cauſe is founded, the univerſal bleſſings that are to ariſe from it, the difficulties that accompanied it, the wiſdom with which it has been debated, the fortitude by which it has been ſupported, the ſtrength of the power we had to oppoſe, and the condition in which we undertook it, be all taken in one view, we may juſtly ſtile it the moſt virtuous and illuſtrious revolution that ever graced the hiſtory of mankind.

A good opinion of ourſelves is exceedingly neceſſary in private life, but abſolutely neceſſary in public life, and of the utmoſt importance in ſupporting national character. I have no notion of yielding the palm of the United States to any Grecians or Romans that were ever born. We have equalled the braveſt in times of danger, and excelled the wiſeſt in the conſtruction of civil governments, *no one in America excepted.*

From this agreeable eminence let us take a review of preſent affairs. The ſpirit of corruption is ſo inſeparably interwoven with Britiſh politics, that their miniſtry ſuppoſe all mankind are governed by the ſame motive. They have no idea of a people ſubmitting even to temporary inconvenience from an attachment to rights and privileges. Their plans of buſineſs are calculated *by* the hour and *for* the hour, and are uniform in nothing but the corruption which gives them birth. They never had, neither have they at this time, any regular plan for the conqueſt of America by arms. They know not how to go about it, neither have they power to effect it if they could know. The thing is not within the compaſs of human practicability, for America is too extenſive either to be fully conquered or *paſſively* defended. But ſhe may be *actively* defended by defeating or making priſoners of the army that invades her. And this is the only ſyſtem of defence that can be effectual in a large country.

There is ſomething in a war carried on by invaſion which makes it differ in circumſtances from any other mode of war, becauſe he who conducts it cannot tell whether the ground he gains, be for him, or againſt him, when he firſt makes it. In the winter of ſeventy-ſix General Howe marched with an air of victory through the Jerſeys, the conſequence of which was his defeat, and General Burgoyne at Saratoga experienced the ſame fate from the ſame cauſe. The Spaniards about two years ago were defeated by the Algerines in the ſame manner, that is, their firſt triumphs became a trap in which they were totally routed. And whoever will attend to the circumſtances and events of a war carried on by invaſion, will find, that any invader, in order to be finally conquered muſt firſt begin to conquer.

I confeſs myſelf one of thoſe who believe the loſs of Philadelphia to be attended with more advantages than injuries. The caſe ſtood thus. The enemy imagined Philadelphia to be of more importance to us than it really was; for we all knew that it had long ceaſed to be a port, not a cargo of goods had been brought into it for near a twelvemonth, nor any fixed manufactories, nor even ſhip-building carried on in it; yet as the enemy believed the conqueſt of it to be practicable, and to that belief added the abſurd idea that the ſoul of all America was centered there, and would be conquered there, it naturally follows, that their poſſeſſion of it, by not anſwering the end propoſed, muſt break up the plans they had ſo fooliſhly gone upon, and either oblige them to form a new one, for which their preſent ſtrength is not ſufficient, or to give over the attempt.

We never had ſo ſmall an army to fight againſt, nor ſo fair an opportunity of final ſucceſs as *now*. The death wound is already given. The day is our own if we follow it up. The enemy by his ſituation is within our reach, and by his reduced ſtrength is within our power. The miniſters of Britain may rage as they pleaſe, but our part is to conquer their armies. Let them wrangle and welcome, but let it not draw our attention from the *one* thing needful. *Here, in this* ſpot is our buſineſs to be accompliſhed, our felicity ſecured. What we have now to do is as clear as light, and the way to do it is as ſtraight as a line. It needs not to be commented upon, yet, in order to be perfectly underſtood I will put a caſe that cannot admit of a miſtake.

Had the armies under the Generals Howe and Burgoyne been united and taken poſt at Germantown, and had the Northern army, under General Gates, been joined to that under General Waſhington at White Marſh, the conſequence would have been a general action; and if in that action we had killed and taken the ſame number of officers and men, that is, between nine and ten thouſand, with the ſame quantity of artillery, arms, ſtores, &c. as have been taken at the Northward, and obliged General Howe with the remains of his army, that is, with the ſame number he now commands, to take ſhelter in Philadelphia, we ſhould certainly have thought ourſelves the greateſt heroes in the world; and ſhould, as ſoon as the ſeaſon permitted, have collected together all the force of the Continent and laid ſiege to the city, for it requires a much greater force to beſiege an enemy in a town than to defeat them in the field. The caſe *now* is juſt the ſame as if it had been produced by the means I have here ſuppoſed. Between nine and ten thouſand have been killed and taken, all their ſtores are in our poſſeſſion, and General Howe, in conſequence of that victory, has thrown himſelf for ſhelter into Philadelphia. He, or his trifling friend Galloway, may form what pretences they pleaſe, yet no juſt reaſon can be given for their going into winter quarters ſo early as the 19th of October but their apprehenſions of a defeat if they continued out, or their conſcious inability of keeping the field with ſafety. I ſee no advantage which can ariſe to America by hunting the enemy from ſtate to ſtate. It is a triumph without a prize, and wholly unworthy the attention of a people determined to conquer. Neither can any ſtate promiſe itſelf ſecurity while the enemy remains in a condition to tranſport themſelves from one part of the Continent to another. Howe, likewiſe, cannot conquer where we have no army to oppoſe, therefore any ſuch removals in him are mean and cowardly,

and reduces Britain to a common pilferer. If he retreats from Philadelphia, he will be defpifed; if he ftays, he may be fhut up and ftarved out, and the country, if he advances into it, may become his Saratoga. He has his choice of evils and we of opportunities. If he moves early, it is not only a fign but a proof that he expects no reinforcement, and his delays will prove that he either waits for the arrival of a plan to go upon, or force to execute it, or both; in *which* cafe, our ftrength will increafe more than his, therefore in *any* cafe we cannot be wrong if we do but proceed.

The particular condition of Pennfylvania deferves the attention of all the other ftates. Her military ftrength muft not be eftimated by the number of inhabitants. Here are men of all nations, characters, profeffions and intereffs. Here are the firmeft whigs, furviving, like fparks in the ocean, unquenched and uncooled in the midft of difcouragement and difaffection. Here are men lofing their all with cheerfulnefs, and collecting fire and fortitude from the flames of their own eftates. Here are others fkulking in fecret, many making a market of the times, and numbers who are changing whig and tory with the circumftances of every day.

It is by mere dint of fortitude and perfeverance that the whigs of this ftate have been able to maintain fo good a countenance, and do even what they have done. We want help, and the fooner it can arrive the more effectual it will be. The invaded ftate, be it which it may, will always feel an additional burden upon its back, and be hard fet to fupport its civil power with fufficient authority: and this difficulty will always rife or fall, in proportion as the other ftates throw in their affiftance to the common caufe.

The enemy will moft probably make many manœuvres at the opening of this campaign, to amufe and draw off the attention of the feveral ftates from the *one thing needful*. We may expect to hear of alarms and pretended expeditions to *this* place and *that* place, to the Southward, the Eaftward and the Northward, all intended to prevent our forming into one formidable body. The lefs the enemy's ftrength is, the more fubtleties of this kind will they make ufe of. Their exiftence depends upon it, becaufe the force of America, when collected, is fufficient to fwallow their prefent army up. It is therefore our bufinefs to make fhort work of it, by bending our whole attention to *this one principal point*, for the inftant that the main body under General Howe is defeated, all the inferior alarms throughout the Continent, like fo many fhadows, will follow his downfal.

The only way to finiſh a war with the leaſt poſſible bloodſhed, or perhaps without any, is to collect an army, againſt the power of which, the enemy ſhall have no chance. By not doing this, we prolong the war, and double both the calamities and the expences of it. What a rich and happy country would America be, were ſhe, by a vigourous exertion, to reduce Howe as ſhe has reduced Burgoyne. Her currency would riſe to millions beyond its preſent value. Every man would be rich, and every man would have it in his power to be happy. And why not do theſe things? What is there to hinder? America is her own miſtreſs and can do what ſhe pleaſes.

If we had not at this time a man in the field, we could, nevertheleſs, raiſe an army in a few weeks ſufficient to overwhelm all the force which General Howe at preſent commands. Vigour and determination will do any thing and every thing. We began the war with this kind of ſpirit, why not end it with the ſame? Here, gentlemen, is the enemy. Here is the army. The intereſt, the happineſs, of all America is centered in this half ruined ſpot. Come on and help us. Here are laurels, come and ſhare them. Here are tories, come and help us to expel them. Here are whigs that will make you welcome, and enemies that dread your coming.

The worſt of all policy is that of doing things by halves. Penny wiſe and pound fooliſh, has been the ruin of thouſands. The preſent ſpring, if rightly improved, will free us from all our troubles, and ſave us the expence of millions. We have now only one army to cope with. No opportunity can be fairer; no proſpect more promiſing. I ſhall conclude this paper with a few outlines of a plan, either for filling up the battalions with expedition, or for raiſing an additional force, for any limited time, on any ſudden emergency.

That in which every man is intereſted, is every man's duty to ſupport. And any burden which falls equally on all men, and, from which every man is to receive an equal beneſit, is conſiſtent with the moſt perfect ideas of liberty. I would wiſh to revive ſomething of that virtuous ambition which firſt called America into the field. Then every man was eager to do his part, and perhaps the principal reaſon why we have in any degree fallen therefrom, is, becauſe we did not ſet a ſufficient value by it at firſt, but left it to blaze out of itſelf, inſtead of regulating and preſerving it by juſt proportions of reſt and ſervice.

Suppoſe any ſtate whoſe number of effective inhabitants was 80,000, ſhould be required to furniſh 3,200 men towards the defence of the continent, on any ſudden emergency.

Firſt, Let the whole number of effective inhabitants be divided into hundreds; then if each of thoſe hundreds turn out four men, the whole number of 3,200 will be had.

Secondly, Let the names of each hundred men be entered in a book, and let four dollars be collected from each man, with as much more as any of the gentlemen, whoſe abilities can afford it, ſhall pleaſe to throw in, which gifts likewiſe ſhall be entered againſt the donors' names.

Thirdly, Let the ſums ſo collected be offered as a preſent, over and above the bounty of twenty dollars, to any four who may be inclined to propoſe themſelves as volunteers: If more than four offer, the majority of the ſubſcribers preſent ſhall determine which; if none offer, then four out of the hundred ſhall be taken by lot, who ſhall be entitled to the ſaid ſums, and ſhall either go, or provide others that will, in the ſpace of ſix days.

Fourthly, As it will always happen, that in the ſpace of ground on which an hundred men ſhall live, there will be always a number of perſons who, by age and infirmity, are incapable of doing perſonal ſervice, and as ſuch perſons are generally poſſeſſed of the greateſt part of the property in any county, their portion of ſervice, therefore, will be to furniſh each man with a blanket, which will make a regimental coat, jacket, and breeches, or clothes in lieu thereof, and another for a watch cloak, and two pair of ſhoes—for however choice people may be of theſe things matters not in caſes of this kind —Thoſe who live always in houſes can find many ways to keep themſelves warm, but it is a ſhame and a ſin to ſuffer a ſoldier in the field to want a blanket while there is one in the country.

Should the clothing not be wanted, the ſuperannuated or infirm perſons poſſeſſing property, may, in lieu thereof, throw in their money ſubſcriptions towards increaſing the bounty; for though age will naturally exempt a perſon from perſonal ſervice, it cannot exempt him from his ſhare of the charge, becauſe the men are raiſed for the defence of property and liberty, jointly.

There never was a ſcheme againſt which objections might not be raiſed. But this alone is not a ſufficient reaſon for rejection. The only line to judge truly upon, is, to draw out and admit all the objections which can fairly be made, and place againſt them all the contrary qualities, conveniencies and advantages, then by ſtriking a balance you come at the true character of any ſcheme, principle or poſition.

The moſt material advantages of the plan here propoſed are eaſe, expedition, and cheapneſs; yet the men ſo raiſed get a much larger bounty than is any where at preſent given; becauſe all the expences, extravagance, and conſequent idleneſs of recruiting are ſaved or prevented. The country incurs no new debt, nor intereſt thereon; the whole matter being all ſettled at once and entirely done with. It is a ſubſcription anſwering all the purpoſes of a tax, without either the charge or trouble of collecting. The men are ready for the field with the greateſt poſſible expedition, becauſe it becomes the duty of the inhabitants themſelves, in every part of the country, to find up their proportion of men, inſtead of leaving it to a recruiting ſerjeant, who, be he ever ſo induſtrious, cannot know always where to apply.

I do not propoſe this as a regular digeſted plan, neither will the limits of this paper admit of any further remarks upon it. I believe it to be a hint capable of much improvement, and as ſuch ſubmit it to the public.

COMMON SENSE.

THE CRISIS.—NUMBER VI.

TO THE EARL OF CARLISLE, GENERAL CLINTON, AND WILLIAM EDEN, ESQ. BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, AT NEW-YORK.

Philadelphia, October 20, 1778.

THERE is a dignity in the warm paſſions of a whig, which is never to be found in the cold malice of a tory. In the one, nature is only heated—in the other ſhe is poiſoned. The inſtant the former has it in his power to puniſh, he feels a diſpoſition to forgive; but the canine venom of the latter knows no relief but revenge. This general diſtinction will, I believe, apply in all caſes, and ſuit as well the meridian of England as America.

As I preſume your laſt proclamation will undergo the ſtrictures of other pens, I ſhall confine my remarks to only a few parts thereof. All that you have ſaid might have been compriſed in half the compaſs. It is tedious and unmeaning, and only a repetition of your former follies, with here and there an offenſive aggravation. Your cargo of pardons will have no market—It is unfaſhionable to look at

them—Even ſpeculation is at an end. They are become a perfect drug, and no way calculated for the climate.

In the courſe of your proclamation you ſay, "The policy as well as the BENEVOLENCE OF GREAT-BRITAIN, have thus far checked the extremes of war, when they tended to diſtreſs a people ſtill conſidered as their fellow ſubjects, and to deſolate a country ſhortly to become again a ſource of mutual advantage." What you mean by "the BENEVOLENCE of Great-Britain" is to me inconceivable. To put a plain queſtion: Do you conſider yourſelves men or devils? For until this point is ſettled, no determinate ſenſe can be put upon the expreſſion. You have already equalled, and in many caſes excelled, the ſavages of either Indies; and if you have yet a cruelty in ſtore you muſt have imported it unmixed with every human material from the original warehouſe of hell.

To the interpoſition of Providence, and her bleſſings on our endeavours, and not to BRITISH BENEVOLENCE, are we indebted for the ſhort chain that limits your ravages. Remember you do not at this time, command a foot of land on the Continent of America. Staten-Iſland, York-Iſland, a ſmall part of Long-Iſland, and Rhode-Iſland, circumſcribe your power; and even thoſe you hold at the expence of the Weſt-Indies. To avoid a defeat and prevent a deſertion of your troops, you have taken up your quarters in holes and corners of inacceſſible ſecurity; and in order to conceal what every one can conceive, you now endeavour to impoſe your weakneſs upon us for an act of mercy. If you think to ſucceed by ſuch ſhadowy devices, you are but infants in the political world; you have the A, B, C, of ſtratagem yet to learn, and are wholly ignorant of the people you have to contend with. Like men in a ſtate of intoxication, you forget that the reſt of the world have eyes, and that the ſame ſtupidity which conceals you from yourſelves, expoſes you to their ſatire and contempt.

The paragraph I have quoted, ſtands as an introduction to the following: "But when that country (America) profeſſes the unnatural deſign, not only of eſtranging herſelf from us, but of mortgaging herſelf and her reſources to our enemies, the whole conteſt is changed; and the queſtion is, how far Great-Britain may, by every means in her power, deſtroy or render uſeleſs, a connexion contrived for her ruin, and the aggrandizement of France. Under ſuch circumſtances, the laws of ſelf preſervation muſt direct the conduct of Britain, and if the Britiſh colonies are to become an acceſſion to

France, will direct her to render that acceſſion of as little avail as poſſible to her enemy.

I conſider you in this declaration, like madmen biting in the hour of death. It contains likewiſe a fraudulent meanneſs; for, in order to juſtify a barbarous concluſion, you have advanced a falſe poſition. The treaty we have formed with France is open, noble and generous. It is true policy, founded on ſound philoſophy, and neither a ſurrender or mortgage, as you would ſcandalouſly inſinuate. I have ſeen every article, and ſpeak from poſitive knowledge. In France, we have found an affectionate friend, a faithful ally; from Britain, nothing but tyranny, cruelty and infidelity.

But the happineſs is, that the miſchief you threaten, is not in your power to execute; and if it were, the puniſhment would return upon you in a ten-fold degree. The humanity of America hath hitherto reſtrained her from acts of retaliation, and the affection ſhe retains for many individuals in England, who have fed, clothed, and comforted her priſoners, has, to the preſent day, warded off her reſentment, and operated as a ſcreen to the whole. But even theſe conſiderations muſt ceaſe, when national objects interfere and oppoſe them. Repeated aggravations will provoke a retort, and policy juſtify the meaſure. We mean now to take you ſeriouſly up upon your own ground and principle, and as you do, ſo ſhall you be done by.

You ought to know, gentlemen, that England and Scotland, are far more expoſed to incendiary deſolation than America, in her preſent ſtate, can poſſibly be. We occupy a country, with but few towns, and whoſe riches conſiſt in land and annual produce. The two laſt can ſuffer but little and that only within a very limited compaſs. In Britain, it is otherwiſe. Her wealth lies chiefly in cities and large towns, the repoſitories of manufactures and fleets of merchantmen.—There is not a nobleman's country-ſeat but may be laid in aſhes by a ſingle perſon. Your own may probably contribute to the proof: In ſhort, there is no evil which cannot be returned when you come to incendiary miſchief.—The ſhips in the Thames, may certainly be as eaſily ſet on fire, as the temporary bridge was a few years ago; yet of that affair no diſcovery was ever made; and the loſs you would ſuſtain by ſuch an event, executed at a proper ſeaſon, is infinitely greater than any you can inflict. The Eaſt-India houſe, and the bank, neither are, nor can be ſecure from this ſort of deſtruction, and, as Dr. Price juſtly obſerves, a fire at the latter would bankrupt the nation. It has never been the cuſtom of France and England, when at war, to make thoſe

havocs on each other, becauſe the eaſe with which they could retaliate, rendered it as impolitic as if each had deſtroyed his own.

But think not, gentlemen, that our diſtance ſecures you, or our invention fails us. We can much eaſier accompliſh ſuch a point than any nation in Europe. We talk the ſame language, dreſs in the ſame habit, and appear with the ſame manners as yourſelves. We can paſs from one part of England to another unſuſpected; many of us are as well acquainted with the country as you are, and ſhould you impolitically provoke our will, you will moſt aſſuredly lament the effects of it. Miſchiefs of this kind require no army to execute them. The means are obvious, and the opportunities unguardable. I hold up a warning piece to your ſenſes, if you have any left and "to the unhappy people likewiſe, whoſe affairs are committed to you."* I call not with the rancour of an enemy, but with the earneſtneſs of a friend, on the deluded people of England, left between your blunders and theirs, they ſink beneath the evils contrived for us.

"He who lives in a glaſs-houſe, ſays the Spaniſh proverb, ſhould never begin throwing ſtones." This, gentlemen, is exactly your caſe and you muſt be the moſt ignorant of mankind or ſuppoſe us ſo, not to ſee on which ſide the balance of accounts will fall. There are many other modes of retaliation, which, for ſeveral reaſons, I chooſe not to mention. But be aſſured of this, that the inſtant you put a threat in execution, a counter blow will follow it. If you openly profeſs yourſelves ſavages, it is high time we ſhould treat you as ſuch, and if nothing but diſtreſs can recover you to reaſon, to puniſh will become an office of charity.

While your fleet lay laſt winter in the Delaware, I offered my ſervice to the Pennſylvania navy-board then at Trenton, as one who would make a party with them, or any four or five gentlemen on an expedition down the river to ſet fire to it, and though it was not then accepted, nor the thing perſonally attempted, it is more than probable, that your own folly will provoke a much more vulnerable part. Say not when the miſchief is done, that you had not warning, and remember that we do not begin it, but mean to repay it. Thus much for your ſavage and impolitic threat.

In another part of your proclamation you ſay, "But if the honours of a military life are become the object of the Americans, let them ſeek thoſe honours under the banners of their rightful ſovereign, and

* *General Clinton's letter to congreſs.*

in fighting the battles of the united Britiſh empire, againſt our late mutual and natural enemies." Surely! the union of abſurdity with madneſs was never marked in more diſtinguiſhable lines than theſe. Your rightful ſovereign as you call him, may do well enough for you, who dare not enquire into the humble capacities of the man; but we who eſtimate perſons and things by their real worth, cannot ſuffer our judgments to be ſo impoſed upon; and, unleſs it is your wiſh to ſee him expoſed, it ought to be your endeavour to keep him out of ſight. The leſs you have to ſay about him the better. We have done with him, and that ought to be anſwer enough. You have been often told ſo. Strange! that the anſwer muſt be ſo often repeated. You go a begging with your king as with a brat, or with ſome unſaleable commodity you were tired of; and though every body tells no, no, ſtill you keep hawking him about. But there is one that will have him in a little time, and as we have no inclination to diſappoint you of a cuſtomer, we bid nothing for him.

The impertinent folly of the paragraph I have juſt quoted, deſerves no other notice than to be laughed at and thrown by, but the principle on which it is founded is deteſtable. We are invited to ſubmit to a man who has attempted by every cruelty to deſtroy us, and to join him in making war againſt France, who is already at war againſt him for our ſupport.

Can Bedlam, in concert with Lucifer, form a more mad and deviliſh requeſt? Were it poſſible a people could ſink into ſuch apoſtacy they would deſerve to be ſwept from the earth like the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah. The propoſition is an univerſal affront to the rank which man holds in the creation and an indignity to him who placed him there. It ſuppoſes him made up without a ſpark of honour, and under no obligation to God or man.

What ſort of men or Chriſtians muſt you ſuppoſe the Americans to be, who, after ſeeing their moſt humble petitions inſultingly rejected; the moſt grievous laws paſſed to diſtreſs them in every quarter; an undeclared war let looſe upon them, and Indians and Negroes invited to the ſlaughter: Who, after ſeeing their kinſmen murdered, their fellow citizens ſtarved to death in priſons, and their houſes and property deſtroyed and burned: Who, after the moſt ſerious appeals to Heaven; the moſt ſolemn abjuration by oath of all government connected with you, and the moſt heart-felt pledges and proteſtation of faith to each other; and who, after ſoliciting the friendſhip, and entering into alliances with other nations, ſhould at laſt break through all

theſe obligations, civil and divine, by complying with your horrid and infernal propoſal. Ought we ever after to be conſidered as a part of the human race? Or, ought we not rather to be blotted from the ſociety of mankind, and become a ſpectacle of miſery to the world? But there is ſomething in corruption, which, like a jaundiced eye, transfers the colour of itſelf to the object it looks upon, and ſees every thing ſtained and impure; for unleſs you were capable of ſuch conduct yourſelves, you could never have ſuppoſed ſuch a character in us. The offer fixes your infamy. It exhibits you as a nation without faith; with whom oaths and treaties are conſidered as trifles, and the breaking them as the breaking of a bubble. Regard to decency or to rank might have taught you better, or pride inſpired you, though virtue could not. There is not left a ſtep in the degradation of character to which you can now deſcend; you have put your foot on the ground floor, and the key of the dungeon is turned upon you.

That the invitation may want nothing of being a complete monſter, you have thought proper to finiſh it with an aſſertion which has no foundation, either in fact or philoſophy; and as Mr. Ferguſon, your ſecretary, is a man of letters, and has made civil ſociety his ſtudy, and publiſhed a treatiſe on that ſubject, I addreſs this part to him.

In the cloſe of the paragraph which I laſt quoted, France is ſtiled the "natural enemy" of England, and by way of lugging us into ſome ſtrange idea, ſhe is ſtiled "the late mutual and natural enemy" of both countries. I deny that ſhe ever was the natural enemy of either; and that there does not exiſt in nature ſuch a principle. The expreſſion is an unmeaning barbariſm, and wholly unphiloſophical, when applied to beings of the ſame ſpecies, let their ſtation in the creation be what it may. We have a perfect idea of a natural enemy when we think of the devil, becauſe the enmity is perpetual, unalterable, and unabateable. It admits neither of peace, truce, or treaty; conſequently the warfare is eternal, and therefore it is natural. But man with man cannot arrange in the ſame oppoſition. Their quarrels are accidental and equivocally created. They become friends or enemies as the change of temper, or the caſt of intereſt inclines them. The Creator of man did not conſtitute them the natural enemy of each other. He has not made any one order of beings ſo. Even wolves may quarrel, ſtill they herd together. If any two nations are ſo, then muſt all nations be ſo, otherwiſe it is not nature but cuſtom, and the offence frequently originates with the accuſer. England is as truly the natural enemy of France, as France is of England,

and perhaps more ſo Separated from the reſt of Europe, ſhe has contracted an unſocial habit of manners, and imagines in others the jealouſy ſhe creates in herſelf. Never long ſatisfied with peace, ſhe ſuppoſes the diſcontent univerſal, and buoyed up with her own importance, conceives herſelf the only object pointed at. The expreſſion has been often uſed, and always with a fraudulent deſign; for, when the idea of a natural enemy is conceived, it prevents all other enquiries, and the real cauſe of the quarrel is hidden in the univerſality of the conceit. Men ſtart at the notion of a natural enemy, and aſk no other queſtion. The cry obtains credit like the alarm of a mad dog, and is one of thoſe kind of tricks, which, by operating on the common paſſions, ſecures their intereſt through their folly.

But we, ſir, are not to be thus impoſed upon. We live in a large world, and have extended our ideas beyond the limits and prejudices of an iſland. We hold out the right hand of friendſhip to all the univerſe, and we conceive there to be a ſociality in the manners of France, which is much better diſpoſed to peace and negotiation than that of England, and until the latter becomes more civilized, ſhe cannot expect to live long at peace with any power. Her common language is vulgar and offenſive, and children with their milk ſuck in the rudiments of inſult——'The arm of Britain! The mighty 'arm of Britain! Britain that ſhakes the earth to its centre and 'its poles! The ſcourge of France! The terror of the world! 'That governs with a nod, and pours down vengeance like a God.' This language neither makes a nation great or little; but it ſhews a ſavageneſs of manners, and has a tendency to keep national animoſity alive. The entertainments of the ſtage are calculated to the ſame end, and almoſt every public exhibition is tinctured with inſult. Yet England is always in dread of France. Terrified at the apprehenſion of an invaſion. Suſpicious of being outwitted in a treaty and privately cringing, though ſhe is publicly offending. Let her therefore, reform her manners and do juſtice, and ſhe will find the idea of a natural enemy, to be only a phantom of her own imagination.

Little did I think, at this period of the war, to ſee a proclamation which could promiſe you no one uſeful purpoſe whatever, and tend only to expoſe you. One would think you were juſt awakened from a four years' dream, and knew nothing of what had paſſed in the interval. Is this a time to be offering pardons, or renewing the long forgotten ſubjects of charters and taxation? Is it worth your while, after every force has failed you, to retreat under the ſhelter of argu-

ment and perfuafion? Or can you think that we with nearly half your army prifoners, and in alliance with France, are to be begged or threatened into fubmiffion by a piece of paper? But as commiffioners, at a hundred pounds fterling a week each, you conceive yourfelves bound to do fomething, and the genius of ill fortune told you, you muft write.

For my own part, I have not put pen to paper thefe feveral months. Convinced of your fuperiority by the iffue of every campaign, I was inclined to hope, that that which all the reft of the world now fee, would become vifible to you, and therefore felt unwilling to ruffle your temper by fretting you with repetitions and difcoveries. There have been intervals of hefitation in your conduct, from which it feemed a pity to difturb you, and a charity to leave you to yourfelves. You have often ftopt, as if you intended to think, but your thoughts have ever been too early or too late.

There was a time when Britain difdained to anfwer, or even hear a petition from America. That time is paft, and fhe in her turn is petitioning our acceptance. We now ftand on higher ground, and offer her peace; and the time will come when fhe, perhaps in vain, will afk it from us. The latter cafe is as probable as the former ever was. She cannot refufe to acknowledge our independence with greater obftinacy than fhe before refufed to repeal her laws; and if America alone could bring her to the one, united with France fhe will reduce her to the other. There is fomething in obftinacy which differs from every other paffion, whenever it fails it never recovers, but either breaks like iron, or crumbles fulkily away like a fractured arch. Moft other paffions have their periods of fatigue and reft; their fuffering and their cure; but obftinacy has no refource, and the firft wound is mortal. You have already begun to give it up, and you will, from the natural conftruction of the vice, find yourfelves both obliged and inclined to do fo.

If you look back you fee nothing but lofs and difgrace. If you look forward the fame fcene continues, and the clofe is an impenetratrable gloom. You may plan and execute little mifchiefs, but are they worth the expence they coft you, or will fuch partial evils have any effect on the general caufe? Your expedition to Egg-Harbour, will be felt at a diftance like an attack upon a hen-rooft, and expofe you in Europe, with a fort of childifh phrenzy. Is it worth while to keep an army to protect you in writing proclamations, or to get once a year into winter-quarters? Poffeffing yourfelves of towns is

not conqueſt, but convenience, and in which you will one day or other be trepanned. Your retreat from Philadelphia, was only a timely eſcape, and your next expedition may be leſs fortunate.

It would puzzle all the politicians in the univerſe to conceive what you ſtay for, or why you ſhould have ſtaid ſo long. You are proſecuting a war in which you confeſs you have neither object nor hope, and that conqueſt, could it be effected, would not repay the charges: In the mean while, the reſt of your affairs are running into ruin, and a European war kindling againſt you. In ſuch a ſituation, there is neither doubt or difficulty; the firſt rudiments of reaſon will determine the choice, for if peace can be procured with more advantages than even a conqueſt can be obtained, he muſt be an ideot indeed that heſitates.

But you are probably buoyed up by a ſet of wretched mortals, who, having deceived themſelves, are cringing with the duplicity of a ſpaniel for a little temporary bread. Thoſe men will tell you juſt what you pleaſe. It is their intereſt to amuſe, in order to lengthen out their protection. They ſtudy to keep you amongſt them for that very purpoſe; and in proportion as you diſregard their advice, and grow callous to their complaints, they will ſtretch into improbability, and pepper off their flattery the higher.—Characters like theſe, are to be found in every country, and every country will deſpiſe them.

COMMON SENSE.

THE CRISIS.—NUMBER VII.

TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND.

Philadelphia, November 21, 1778.

THERE are ſtages in the buſineſs of ſerious life in which to amuſe is cruel, but to deceive is to deſtroy; and it is of little conſequence, in the concluſion, whether men deceive themſelves or ſubmit, by a kind of mutual conſent, to the impoſitions of each other. That England has long been under the influence of deluſion or miſtake, needs no other proof than the unexpected and wretched ſituation ſhe is now involved in: And ſo powerful has been the influence, that no

proviſion was ever made or thought of againſt the misfortune, becauſe the poſſibility of its happening was never conceived.

The general and ſucceſsful reſiſtance of America, the conqueſt of Burgoyne, and a war with France, were treated in parliament as the dreams of a diſcontented oppoſition, or a diſtempered imagination. They were beheld as objects unworthy of a ſerious thought, and the bare intimation of them afforded the miniſtry a triumph of laughter. Short triumph indeed! For every thing which has been predicted has happened, and all that was promiſed have failed. A long ſeries of politics ſo remarkably diſtinguiſhed by a ſucceſſion of misfortunes, without one alleviating turn, muſt certainly have ſomething in it ſyſtematically wrong. It is ſufficient to awaken the moſt credulous into ſuſpicion, and the moſt obſtinate into thought. Either the means in your power are inſufficient, or the meaſures ill planned; either the execution has been bad, or the thing attempted impracticable; or to ſpeak more emphatically, either you are not able, or Heaven is not willing. For, why is it that you have not conquered us? Who, or what has prevented you? You have had every opportunity you could deſire, and ſucceeded to your utmoſt wiſh in every preparatory means, Your fleets and armies have arrived in America without an accident. No uncommon misfortune hath intervened. No foreign nation hath interfered until the time you had allotted for victory was paſt. The oppoſition either in or out of parliament, neither diſconcerted your meaſures, retarded or diminiſhed your force. They only foretold your fate. Every miniſterial ſcheme was carried with as high a hand as if the whole nation had been unanimous. Every thing wanted was aſked for, and every thing aſked for was granted. A greater force was not within the compaſs of your abilities to ſend, and the time you ſent it was of all others the moſt favourable. You were then at reſt with the whole world beſide. You had the range of every court in Europe uncontradicted by us. You amuſed us with a tale of commiſſioners of peace, and under that diſguiſe collected a numerous army and came almoſt unexpectedly upon us. The force was much greater than we looked for; and that which we had to oppoſe it with, was unequal in numbers, badly armed, and poorly diſciplined; beſide which, it was embodied only for a ſhort time, and expired within a few months after your arrival. We had governments to form; meaſures to concert; an army to raiſe and train, and every neceſſary article to import or to create. Our non-importation ſcheme had exhauſted

our ſtores and your command by ſea intercepted our ſupplies. We were a people unknown, and unconnected with the political world, and ſtrangers to the diſpoſition of foreign powers. Could you poſſibly wiſh for a more favourable conjunction of circumſtances? Yet all theſe have happened and paſſed away, and as it were left you with a laugh. They are likewiſe events of ſuch an original nativity as can never happen again, unleſs a new world ſhould ariſe from the ocean.

If any thing can be a leſſon to preſumption, ſurely the circumſtances of this war will have their effect. Had Britain been defeated by any European power, her pride would have drawn conſolation from the importance of her conquerors; but in the preſent caſe, ſhe is excelled by thoſe ſhe affected to deſpiſe, and her own opinions retorting on herſelf, become an aggravation of her diſgrace. Misfortune and experience are loſt upon mankind when they produce neither reflection nor reformation. Evils, like poiſons, have their uſes, and there are diſeaſes which no other remedy can reach. It has been the crime and folly of Englandto ſuppoſe herſelf invincible, and that, without acknowledging or perceiving that a full third of her ſtrength was drawn from the country ſhe is now at war with. The arm of Britain has been ſpoken of as the arm of the Almighty, and ſhe has lived of late as if ſhe thought the whole world created for her diverſion. Her politics, inſtead of civilizing, has tended to brutalize mankind, and under the vain unmeaning title of "Defender of the Faith," ſhe has made war like an Indian againſt the religion of humanity. Her cruelties in the Eaſt-Indies will NEVER, NEVER be forgotten; and it is ſomewhat remarkable that the produce of that ruined country, tranſported to America, ſhould there kindle up a war to puniſh the deſtroyer. The chain is continued, though with a kind of myſterious uniformity both in the crime and the puniſhment. The latter runs parallel with the former; and time and fate will give it a perfect illuſtration.

Where information is withheld, ignorance becomes a reaſonable excuſe; and one would charitably hope that the people of England do not encourage cruelty from choice but from miſtake. Their recluſe ſituation, ſurrounded by the ſea, preſerves them from the calamities of war, and keeps them in the dark as to the conduct of their own armies. They ſee not, therefore they feel not. They tell the tale that is told them and believe it, and accuſtomed to no other news than their own, they receive it, ſtript of its horrors and prepared for the palate

of the nation, through the channel of the London Gazette. They are made to believe that their generals and armies differ from thofe of other nations, and have nothing of rudenefs or barbarity in them. They fuppofe them what they wifh them to be. They feel a difgrace in thinking otherwife, and naturally encourage the belief from a partiality to themfelves. There was a time when I felt the fame prejudices, and reafoned from the fame errors; but experience, fad and painful experience, has taught me better. What the conduct of former armies was I know not, but what the conduct of the prefent is I well know. It is low, cruel, indolent, and profligate: And had the people of America no other caufe for feparation than what the army has occafioned, that alone is caufe enough.

The field of politics in England is far more extenfive than that of news. Men have a right to reafon for themfelves, and though they cannot contradict the intelligence in the London Gazette, they may frame upon it what fentiments they pleafe. But the misfortune is, that a general ignorance has prevailed over the whole nation refpecting America. The miniftry and minority have both been wrong. The former was always fo; the latter only lately fo. Politics to be executively right, muft have a unity of means and time, and a defect in either overthrows the whole. The miniftry rejected the plans of the minority while they were practicable, and joined in them when they became impracticable. From wrong meafures they got into wrong time, and have now completed the circle of abfurdity by clofing it upon themfelves.

It was my fate to come to America a few months before the breaking out of hoftilities. I found the difpofition of the people fuch, that they might have been led by a thread and governed by a reed. Their fufpicion was quick and penetrating, but their attachment to Britain was obftinate, and it was at that time a kind of treafon to fpeak againft it. They difliked the miniftry, but they efteemed the nation. Their idea of grievance operated without refentment, and their fingle object was reconciliation. Bad as I believed the miniftry to be, I never conceived them capable of a meafure fo rafh and wicked as the commencing of hoftilities; much lefs did I imagine the nation would encourage it. I viewed the difpute as a kind of law-fuit, in which I fuppofed the parties would find a way either to decide or fettle it. I had no thoughts of independence or of arms. The world could not then have perfuaded me that I fhould be either a foldier or an author. If I had any talents for either they were buried in me, and might ever

have continued ſo, had not the neceſſity of the times dragged and driven them into action. I had formed my plan of life, and conceiving myſelf happy, wiſhed every body elſe ſo. But when the country, into which I had but juſt put my foot, was ſet on fire about my ears, it was time to ſtir. It was time for every man to ſtir. Thoſe who had been long ſettled had ſomething to defend; thoſe who had juſt come had ſomething to purſue; and the call and the concern was equal and univerſal. For in a country where all men were once adventurers, the difference of a few years in their arrival could make none in their right.

The breaking out of hoſtilities opened a new ſuſpicion in the politics of America, which though at that time very rare, has been ſince proved to be very right. What I allude to is, "A ſecret and fixt determination in the Britiſh cabinet to annex America to the crown of England as a conquered country." If this be taken as the object, then the whole line of conduct purſued by the miniſtry, though raſh in its origin and ruinous in its conſequences, is nevertheleſs uniform and conſiſtent in its parts. It applies to every caſe and reſolves every difficulty. But if taxation or any thing elſe be taken in its room, then is there no proportion between the object and the charge. Nothing but the whole ſoil and property of the country can be placed as a poſſible equivalent againſt the millions which the miniſtry expended. No taxes raiſed in America could poſſibly repay it. A revenue of two millions ſterling a year would not diſcharge the ſum and intereſt accumulated thereon, in twenty years.

Reconciliation never appears to have been the wiſh or the object of adminiſtration, they looked on conqueſt as certain and infallible, and under that perſuaſion ſought to drive the Americans into what they might ſtile a general rebellion, and then cruſhing them with arms in their hands, reap the rich harveſt of a general confiſcation, and ſilence them for ever. The dependants at court were too numerous to be provided for in England. The market for plunder in the Eaſt-Indies was over; and the profligacy of government required that a new mine ſhould be opened, and that mine could be no other than America conquered and forfeited. They had no where elſe to go. Every other channel was drained; and extravagance, with the thirſt of a drunkard, was gaping for ſupplies.

If the miniſtry deny this to have been their plan, it becomes them to explain what was their plan. For either they have abuſed us in coveting property they never laboured for, or they have abuſed you

in expending an amazing ſum upon an incompetent object. Taxation, as I mentioned before, could never be worth the charge of obtaining it by arms; and any kind of formal obedience which America could have made, would have weighed with the lightneſs of a laugh againſt ſuch a load of expence. It is therefore moſt probable, that the miniſtry will at laſt juſtify their policy by their diſhoneſty, and openly declare, that their original deſign was conqueſt: And in this caſe, it well becomes the people of England to conſider how far the nation would have been benefited by the ſucceſs.

In a general view there are few conqueſts that repay the charge of making them, and mankind are pretty well convinced that it can never be worth their while to go to war for profit ſake. If they are made war upon, their country invaded, or their exiſtence at ſtake, it is their duty to defend and preſerve themſelves, but in every other light and from every other cauſe is war inglorious and deteſtable. But to return to the caſe in queſtion—

When conqueſts are made of foreign countries, it is ſuppoſed that the COMMERCE and DOMINION of the country which made them are extended. But this could neither be the object nor the conſequence of the preſent war. You enjoyed the whole commerce before. It could receive no poſſible addition by a conqueſt, but on the contrary, muſt diminiſh as the inhabitants were reduced in numbers and wealth. You had the ſame DOMINION over the country which you uſed to have, and had no complaint to make againſt her for breach of any part of the contract between you or her, or contending againſt any eſtabliſhed cuſtom, commercial, political or territorial. The country and commerce were both your own when you BEGAN to conquer, in the ſame manner and form as they had been your own an hundred years before. Nations have ſometimes been induced to make conqueſts for the ſake only of reducing the power of their enemies, or bringing it to a balance with their own. But this could be no part of your plan. No foreign authority was claimed here, neither was any ſuch authority ſuſpected by you, or acknowledged or imagined by us. What then, in the name of Heaven, could you go to war for? or what chance could you poſſibly have in the event, but either to hold the ſame country which you held before, and that in a much worſe condition, or to loſe with an amazing expence what you might have retained without a farthing charges.

War never can be the intereſt of a trading nation, any more

than quarrelling can be profitable to a man in buſineſs. But to make war with thoſe who trade with us, is like ſetting a bull-dog upon a cuſtomer at the ſhop-door. The leaſt degree of common ſenſe ſhews the madneſs of the latter, and it will apply with the ſame force of conviction to the former. Piratical nations, having neither commerce or commodities of their own to loſe, may make war upon all the world, and lucratively find their account in it. But it is quite otherwiſe with Britain. For beſides the ſtoppage of trade in time of war ſhe expoſes more of her own property to be loſt, than ſhe has the chance of taking from others. Some miniſterial gentlemen in parliament have mentioned the greatneſs of her trade as an apology for the greatneſs of her loſs. This is miſerable politics indeed! becauſe it ought to have been given as a reaſon for her not engaging in a war at firſt. The coaſt of America commands the Weſt-India trade almoſt as effectually as the coaſt of Africa does that of the Streights; and England can no more carry on the former without the conſent of America, than ſhe can the latter without a Mediterranean paſs.

In whatever light the war with America is conſidered upon commercial principles, it is evidently the intereſt of the people of England not to ſupport it; and why it has been ſupported ſo long againſt the cleareſt demonſtrations of truth and national advantage, is to me, and muſt be to all the reaſonable world, a matter of aſtoniſhment. Perhaps it may be ſaid that I live in America, and write this from intereſt. To this I reply, that my principles are univerſal. My attachment is to all the world, and not to any particular part, and if what I advance is right, no matter where or who it comes from. We have given the proclamation of your commiſſioners a currency in our newſpapers, and I have no doubt you will give this a place in yours. To oblige and be obliged is fair.

Before I diſmiſs this part of my addreſs, I ſhall mention one more circumſtance in which I think the people of England have been equally miſtaken; and then proceed to other matter.

There is ſuch an idea exiſting in the world, as that of NATIONAL HONOUR, and this falſely underſtood, is oftentimes the cauſe of war. In a Chriſtian and philoſophical ſenſe, mankind ſeem to have ſtood ſtill at individual civilization, and to retain as nations all the original rudeneſs of nature. Peace by treaty is only a ceſſation of violence for a reformation of ſentiment. It is a ſubſtitute for a principle that is wanting and ever will be wanting till the idea of

NATIONAL HONOUR be rightly underſtood. As individuals we profeſs ourſelves Chriſtians, but as nations we are heathens, Romans, and what not. I remember the late admiral Saunders declaring in the houſe of commons, and that in the time of peace, "That the city of Madrid laid in aſhes was not a ſufficient atonement for the Spaniards taking off the rudder of an Engliſh ſloop of war." I do not aſk whether this is Chriſtianity or morality, I aſk whether it is decency? whether it is proper language for a nation to uſe? In private life we ſhould call it by the plain name of bullying, and the elevation of rank cannot alter its character. It is I think exceedingly eaſy to define what ought to be underſtood by national honour; for that which is the beſt character for an individual is the beſt character for a nation; and wherever the latter exceeds or falls beneath the former, there is a departure from the line of true greatneſs.

I have thrown out this obſervation with a deſign of applying it to Great-Britain. Her idea of national honour ſeems devoid of that benevolence of heart, that univerſal expanſion of philanthropy, and that triumph over the rage of vulgar prejudice, without which man is inferior to himſelf, and a companion of common animals. To know whom ſhe ſhall regard or diſlike, ſhe aſks what country they are of, what religion they profeſs, and what property they enjoy. Her idea of national honour ſeems to conſiſt in national inſult, and that to be a great people, is to be neither a Chriſtian, a philoſopher, or a gentleman, but to threaten with the rudeneſs of a bear, and to devour with the ferocity of a lion. This perhaps may ſound harſh and uncourtly, but it is too true, and the more is the pity.

I mention this only as her general character. But towards America ſhe has obſerved no character at all; and deſtroyed by her conduct what ſhe aſſumed in her title. She ſet out with the title of Parent, or Mother Country. The aſſociation of ideas which naturally accompany this expreſſion, are filled with every thing that is fond, tender and forbearing. They have an energy particular to themſelves, and overlooking the accidental attachment of common affections, apply with peculiar ſoftneſs to the firſt feelings of the heart. It is a political term which every mother can feel the force of, and every child can judge of. It needs no painting of mine to ſet it off, for nature only can do it juſtice.

But has any part of your conduct to America correſponded with the title you ſet up? If in your general national character you are unpoliſhed and ſevere, in this you are inconſiſtent and unnatural, and

you muſt have exceeding falſe notions of national honour, to ſuppoſe that the world can admire a want of humanity, or that national honour depends on the violence of reſentment the inflexibility of temper, or the vengeance of execution.

I would willingly convince you, and that with as much temper as the times will ſuffer me to do, that as you oppoſed your own intereſt by quarrelling with us, ſo likewiſe your national honour, rightly conceived and underſtood, was no ways called upon to enter into a war with America; had you ſtudied true greatneſs of heart, the firſt and faireſt ornament of mankind, you would have acted directly contrary to all that you have done, and the world would have aſcribed it to a generous cauſe; beſides which, you had (though with the aſſiſtance of this country) ſecured a powerful name by the laſt war. You were known and dreaded abroad; and it would have been wiſe in you to have ſuffered the world to have ſlept undiſturbed under that idea. It was to you a force exiſting without expence. It produced to you all the advantages of real power; and you were ſtronger through the univerſality of that charm, than any future fleets and armies may probably make you. Your greatneſs was ſo ſecured and interwoven with your ſilence, that you ought never to have awakened mankind, and had nothing to do but to be quiet. Had you been true politicians you would have ſeen all this, and continued to draw from the magic of a name, the force and authority of a nation.

Unwiſe as you were in breaking the charm, you were ſtill more unwiſe in the manner of doing it. Samſon only told the ſecret, but you have performed the operation; you have ſhaven your own head, and wantonly thrown away the locks. America was the hair from which the charm was drawn that infatuated the world. You ought to have quarrelled with no power; but with her upon no account. You had nothing to fear from any condeſcenſion you might make. You might have humoured her, even if there had been no juſtice in her claims, without any riſk to your reputation; for Europe, faſcinated by your fame, would have aſcribed it to your benevolence, and America, intoxicated by the grant, would have ſlumbered in her fetters.

But this method of ſtudying the progreſs of the paſſions, in order to aſcertain the probable conduct of mankind, is a philoſophy in politics which thoſe who preſide at St. James's have no conception of. They know no other influence than corruption, and reckon all their probabilities from precedent. A new caſe is to them a new world, and while

they are ſeeking for a parallel they get loſt. The talents of Lord Mansfield can be eſtimated at beſt no higher than thoſe of a ſophiſt. He underſtands the ſubtleties but not the elegance of nature; and by continually viewing mankind through the cold medium of the law, never thinks of penetrating into the warmer region of the mind. As for Lord North, it is his happineſs to have in him more philoſophy than ſentiment, for he bears flogging like a top and ſleeps the better for it. His puniſhment becomes his ſupport, for while he ſuffers the laſh for his ſins he keeps himſelf up by twirling about. In politics, he is a good arithmetician, and in every thing elſe nothing at all.

There is one circumſtance which comes ſo much within Lord North's province as a financier, that I am ſurprized it ſhould eſcape him, which is the different abilities of the two countries in ſupporting the expence; for, ſtrange as it may ſeem, England is not a match for America in this particular. By a curious kind of revolution in accounts, the people of England ſeem to miſtake their poverty for their riches; that is, they reckon their national debt as a part of their national wealth. They make the ſame kind of error which a man would do, who after mortgaging his eſtate, ſhould add the money borrowed, to the full value of the eſtate in order to count up his worth, and in this caſe he would conceit that he got rich by running into debt. Juſt thus it is with England. The government owed at the beginning of this war one hundred and thirty-five millions ſterling, and though the individuals to whom it was due, had a right to reckon their ſhares as ſo much private property, yet to the nation collectively it was ſo much poverty. There is as effectual limits to public debts as to private ones, for when once the money borrowed is ſo great as to require the whole yearly revenue to diſcharge the intereſt thereon, there is an end to a farther borrowing; in the ſame manner as when the intereſt of a man's debts amounts to the yearly income of his eſtate, there is an end to his credit. This is nearly the caſe with England, the intereſt of her preſent debt being at leaſt equal to one half of her yearly revenue, ſo that out of ten millions annually collected by taxes, ſhe has but five ſhe can call her own.

The very reverſe of this was the caſe with America; ſhe began the war without any debt upon her, and in order to carry it on, ſhe neither raiſed money by taxes, nor borrowed it upon intereſt, but created it; and her ſituation at this time continues ſo much the reverſe of yours that taxing would make her rich, whereas it would make you poor. When we ſhall have ſunk the ſum which we have created, we ſhall

then be out of debt, be juſt as rich as when we began, and all the while we are doing it, ſhall feel no difference, becauſe the value will riſe as the quantity decreaſes.

There was not a country in the world ſo capable of bearing the expence of a war as America; not only becauſe ſhe was not in debt when ſhe began, but becauſe the country is young and capable of infinite improvement, and has an almoſt boundleſs tract of new lands in ſtore, whereas England has got to her extent of age and growth, and has no unoccupied land or property in reſerve. The one is like a young heir coming to a large improvable eſtate; the other like an old man whoſe chances are over, and his eſtate mortgaged for half its worth.

In the ſecond number of the Criſis, which I find has been re-publiſhed in England, I endeavoured to ſet forth the impracticability of conquering America. I ſtated every caſe, that I conceived could poſſibly happen, and ventured to predict its conſequence. As my concluſions were drawn not artfully but naturally, they have all proved to be true. I was upon the ſpot; knew the politics of America, her ſtrength and reſources, and by a train of ſervices, the beſt in my power to render, was honoured with the friendſhip of the congreſs, the army and the people. I conſidered the cauſe a juſt one. I know and feel it a juſt one, and under that confidence never made my own profit or loſs an object. My endeavour was to have the matter well underſtood on both ſides, and I conceived myſelf tendering a general ſervice, by ſetting forth to the one the impoſſibility of being conquered, and to the other the impoſſibility of conquering. Moſt of the arguments made uſe of by the miniſtry for ſupporting the war, are the very arguments that ought to have been uſed againſt ſupporting it; and the plans, by which they thought to conquer, are the very plans in which they were ſure to be defeated. They have taken every thing up at the wrong end. Their ignorance is aſtoniſhing, and were you in my ſituation you would ſee it. They may perhaps have your confidence, but I am perſuaded they would make very indifferent members of congreſs. I know what England is, and what America is, and from the compound of knowledge, am better enabled to judge of the iſſue, than what the king or any of his miniſters can be.

In this number I have endeavoured to ſhew the ill policy and diſadvantages of the war. I believe many of my remarks are new. Thoſe which are not ſo, I have ſtudied to improve and place in a manner that may be clear and ſtriking. Your failure is, I am per-

ſuaded, as certain as fate. America is above your reach. She is at leaſt your equal in the world, and her independence neither reſts upon your conſent, nor can be prevented by your arms. In ſhort, you ſpend your ſubſtance in vain, and impoveriſh yourſelves without a hope.

But ſuppoſe you had conquered America, what advantage collectively or individually, as merchants, manufacturers, or conquerors, could you have looked for. This is an object you ſeemed never to have attended to. Liſtening for the ſound of victory, and led away by the phrenzy of arms, you neglected to reckon either the coſt or the conſequences. You muſt all pay towards the expence; the pooreſt among you muſt bear his ſhare, and it is both your right and your duty to weigh ſeriouſly the matter. Had America been conquered, ſhe might have been parcelled out in grants to the favourites at court, but no ſhare of it would have fallen to you. Your taxes would not have been leſſened, becauſe ſhe would have been in no condition to have paid any towards your relief. We are rich by a contrivance of our own, which would have ceaſed as ſoon as you became maſters. Our paper money will be of no uſe in England, and ſilver and gold we have none. In the laſt war you made many conqueſts, but were any of your taxes leſſened thereby? On the contrary, were you not taxed to pay for the charge of making them, and have not the ſame been the caſe in every war?

To the parliament I beg to addreſs myſelf in a particular manner. They appear to have ſuppoſed themſelves partners in the chace, and to have hunted with the lion from an expectation of a right in the booty; but in this it is moſt probable they would, as legiſlators, have been diſappointed. The caſe is quite a new one, and many unforeſeen difficulties would have ariſen thereon. The parliament claimed a legiſlative right over America, and the war originated from that pretence. But the army is ſuppoſed to belong to the crown, and if America had been conquered through their means, the claim of the legiſlature would have been ſuffocated in the conqueſt. Ceded or conquered countries are ſuppoſed to be out of the authority of parliament. Taxation is exerciſed over them by prerogative and not by law. It was attempted to be done in the Grenades a few years ago, and the only reaſon why it was not done was becauſe the crown had made a prior relinquiſhment of its claim. Therefore, parliament have been all this while ſupporting meaſures for the eſtabliſhment of their authority, in the iſſue of which, they would have been triumphed

over by the prerogative. This might have opened a new and intereſting oppoſition between the parliament and the crown. The crown would have ſaid that it conquered for itſelf, and that to conquer for parliament was an unknown caſe. The parliament might have replied, that America not being a foreign country, but a country in rebellion, could not be ſaid to be conquered, but reduced; and thus continued their claim by diſowning the term. The crown might have rejoined, that however America might be conſidered at firſt, ſhe became foreign at laſt by a declaration of independence and a treaty with France; and that her caſe being, by that treaty, put within the law of nations, was out of the law of parliament. The parliament might have maintained, that as their claim over America had never been ſurrendered, ſo neither could it be taken away. The crown might have inſiſted, that though the claim of parliament could not be taken away, yet being an inferior it might be ſuperceded; and that, whether the claim was withdrawn from the object, or the object taken from the claim, the ſame ſeparation enſued; and that America being ſubdued after a treaty with France, was to all intents and purpoſes a regal conqueſt, and of courſe the ſole property of the king. The parliament, as the legal delegates of the people, might have contended againſt the term "inferior," and reſted the caſe upon the antiquity of power, and this would have brought on a ſet of very intereſting and rational queſtions.

Firſt, What is the original fountain of power and honour in any country?

Secondly, Whether the prerogative does not belong to the people?

Thirdly, Whether there is any ſuch thing as the Engliſh conſtitution?

Fourthly, Of what uſe is the crown to the people?

Fifthly, Whether he who invented a crown was not an enemy to mankind?

Sixthly, Whether it is not a ſhame for a man to ſpend a million a year and do no good for it, and whether the money might not be better applied?

Seventhly, Whether ſuch a man is not better dead than alive?

Eighthly, Whether a congreſs conſtituted like that of America, is not the moſt happy and conſiſtent form of government in the world? —With a number of others of the ſame import.

In ſhort, the contention about the dividend might have diſtracted

the nation; for nothing is more common than to agree in the conqueſt and quarrel for the prize; therefore it is, perhaps, a happy circumſtance, that our ſucceſſes have prevented the diſpute.

If the parliament had been thrown out in their claim, which it is moſt probable they would, the nation likewiſe would have been thrown out in their expectation; for as the taxes would have been laid on by the crown without the parliament, the revenue ariſing therefrom, if any could have aroſe, would not have gone into the exchequer, but into the privy purſe, and ſo far from leſſening their taxes, would not even have been added to them, but ſerved only as pocket money to the crown. The more I reflect on this matter the more I am aſtoniſhed at the blindneſs and ill policy of my countrymen, whoſe wiſdom ſeems to operate without diſcernment, and their ſtrength without an object.

To the great bulwark of the nation, I mean the mercantile and manufacturing part thereof, I likewiſe preſent my addreſs. It is your intereſt to ſee America an independent country and not a conquered one. If conquered, ſhe is ruined; and if ruined, poor; conſequently the trade will be a trifle, and her credit doubtful. If independent, ſhe flouriſhes, and from her flouriſhing muſt your profits ariſe. It matters nothing to you who governs America, if your manufactures find a conſumption there. Some articles will conſequently be obtained from other places, and right they ſhould; but the demand of others will increaſe by the great influx of inhabitants which a ſtate of independence and peace will occaſion, and on the final event you may be enriched. The commerce of America is perfectly free, and ever will be ſo. She will conſign away no part of it to any nation. She has not to her friends, and certainly will not to her enemies, though it is probable that your narrow-minded politicians, thinking to pleaſe you thereby, may ſome time or other make ſuch an unneceſſary propoſal. Trade flouriſhes beſt when it is free, and it is weak policy to attempt to fetter it. Her treaty with France is on the moſt liberal and generous principles and the French in their conduct towards her have proved themſelves to be philoſophers, politicians and gentlemen.

To the miniſtry I likewiſe addreſs myſelf. You, gentlemen, have ſtudied the ruin of your country, from which it is not within your abilities to reſcue her. Your attempts to recover are as ridiculous as your plans which involved her are deteſtable. The commiſſioners being about to depart, will probably bring you this, and with it my ſixth number to them; and in ſo doing they carry back more

COMMON SENSE than they brought, and you likewiſe will have more than when you ſent them.

Having thus addreſſed you ſeverally, I conclude by addreſſing you collectively. It is a long lane that has no turning. A period of ſixteen years of miſconduct and misfortune, is certainly long enough for any one nation to ſuffer under; and upon a ſuppoſition that war is not declared between France and you, I beg to place a line of conduct before you that will eaſily lead you out of all your troubles. It has been hinted before, and cannot be too much attended to.

Suppoſe America had remained unknown to Europe till the preſent year, and that Mr. Banks and Doctor Solander, in another voyage round the world, had made the firſt diſcovery of her in the ſelf ſame condition ſhe is now in, of arts, arms, numbers, and civilization. What I aſk in that caſe, would have been your conduct towards her? for THAT will point out what it ought to be now. The problems and their ſolutions are equal, and the right line of the one is the parallel of the other. The queſtion takes in every circumſtance that can poſſibly ariſe. It reduces politics to a ſimple thought, and is moreover a mode of inveſtigation, in which, while you are ſtudying your intereſt, the ſimplicity of the caſe will cheat you into good temper. You have nothing to do but to ſuppoſe you have found America, and ſhe appears found to your hand, and while in the joy of your heart you ſtand ſtill to admire her, the path of politics riſes ſtraight before you.

Were I diſpoſed to paint a contraſt, I could eaſily ſet off what you have done in the preſent caſe againſt what you would have done in THAT caſe, and by juſtly oppoſing them, conclude a picture that would make you bluſh. But, as when any of the prouder paſſions are hurt, it is much better philoſophy to let a man ſlip into a good temper than to attack him in a bad one; for that reaſon, therefore, I only ſtate the caſe, and leave yourſelves to reflect upon it.

To go a little back into politics, it will be found that the true intereſt of Britain lay in propoſing and promoting the independence of America immediately after the laſt peace; for the expence which Britain had then incurred by defending America as her own dominions, ought to have ſhewn her the policy and neceſſity of changing the STILE of the country, as the beſt probable method of preventing future wars and expence, and the only method by which ſhe could hold the commerce without the charge of ſovereignty. Beſides

which, the title ſhe aſſumed of parent country, led to, and pointed out, the propriety, wiſdom and advantage of a ſeparation; for as in private life, children grow into men, and by ſetting up for themſelves, extend and ſecure the intereſt of the whole family, ſo in the ſettlement of colonies large enough to admit of maturity, the ſame policy ſhould be purſued, and the ſame conſequences would follow. Nothing hurts the affections both of parents and children ſo much, as living too cloſely connected, and keeping up the diſtinction too long. Domineering will not do over thoſe, who by a progreſs in life are become equal in rank to their parents, that is, when they have families of their own; and though they may conceive themſelves the ſubjects of their advice, will not ſuppoſe them the objects of their government. I do not, by drawing this parallel, mean to admit the title of PARENT COUNTRY, becauſe if due any where, it is due to Europe collectively, and the firſt ſettlers from England were driven here by proſecution. I mean only to introduce the term for the ſake of policy, and to ſhow from your title, the line of your intereſt.

When you ſaw the ſtate of ſtrength and opulence, and that by her own induſtry, which America had arrived at, you ought to have adviſed her to have ſet up for herſelf, and propoſed an alliance of intereſt with her, and in ſo doing, you would have drawn, and that at her own expence, more real advantage, and more military ſupplies and aſſiſtance both of ſhips and men, than from any weak and wrangling government you could exerciſe over her. In ſhort, had you ſtudied only the domeſtic politics of a family you would have learned how to govern the ſtate; but, inſtead of this eaſy and natural line, you flew out into every thing which was wild and outrageous, till by following the paſſion and ſtupidity of the pilot, you wrecked the veſſel within ſight of the ſhore.

Having ſhown what you ought to have done, I now proceed to ſhew the reaſon why it was not done. The caterpillar circle of the court, had an intereſt to purſue diſtinct from, and oppoſed to yours, for though by the independence of America and an alliance therewith, the trade would have continued, if not increaſed, as in many articles neither country can go to a better market, and though by defending and protecting herſelf, ſhe would have been no expence to you, and conſequently your national charges would have decreaſed, and your taxes might have been proportionably leſſened thereby; yet the ſtriking off ſo many places from the court calendar

was put in oppoſition to the intereſt of the nation. The loſs of thirteen government-ſhips, with their appendages here and in England, is a ſhocking ſound in the ear of a hungry courtier. Your preſent king and miniſtry will be the ruin of you; and you had better riſk a revolution and call a congreſs, than be thus led on from madneſs to deſpair, and from deſpair to ruin. America has ſet you the example, and you may follow it and be free.

I now come to the laſt part, a war with France. This is what no man in his ſenſes will adviſe you to, and all good men would wiſh to prevent. Whether France will declare war againſt you, is not for me in this place to mention, or to hint even if I knew it, but it muſt be madneſs in you to do it firſt. The matter is come now to a full criſis and peace is eaſy if willingly ſet about. Whatever you may think, France has behaved handſomely to you. She would have been unjuſt to herſelf to have acted otherwiſe than ſhe did; and having accepted our offer of alliance ſhe gave you genteel notice of it. There was nothing in her conduct reſerved or indelicate, and while ſhe announced her determination to ſupport her treaty, ſhe left you to give the firſt offence. America on her part, has exhibited a character of firmneſs to the world. Unprepared and unarmed, without form or government, ſhe ſingly oppoſed a nation that domineered over half the globe. The greatneſs of the deed demands reſpect; and though you may feel reſentment, you are compelled both to WONDER and ADMIRE.

Here I reſt my arguments and finiſh my addreſs. Such as it is, it is a gift and you are welcome. It was always my deſign to dedicate a CRISIS to you, when the time ſhould come that would properly MAKE IT A CRISIS; and when, likewiſe, I ſhould catch myſelf in a temper to write it, and ſuppoſe you in a condition to read it. THAT time is now arrived, and with it the opportunity of conveyance. For the commiſſioners—POOR COMMISSIONERS! having proclaimed, that "YET FORTY DAYS AND NINEVEH SHALL BE OVERTHROWN" have waited out the date, and diſcontented with their God, are returning to their gourd. And all the harm I wiſh them is, that it may not WITHER about their ears, and that they may not make their exit in the belly of a whale.

COMMON SENSE.

P. S. Though in the tranquility of my mind I have concluded with a laugh, yet I have ſomething to mention to the COMMIS-

SIONERS, which to them is ſerious and worthy their attention. Their authority is derived from an act of parliament which likewiſe deſcribes and LIMITS their OFFICIAL powers. Their commiſſion, therefore, is only a recital, and perſonal inveſtiture, of thoſe powers, or a nomination and deſcription of the perſons who are to execute them. Had it contained any thing contrary to, or gone beyond the line of, the written law from which it is derived and by which it is bound, it would, by the Engliſh conſtitution, have been treaſon in the crown, and the king been ſubject to an impeachment. He dared not, therefore, put in his commiſſion what you have put in your proclamation, that is, he dared not have authoriſed you in that commiſſion to burn and deſtroy, or to threaten to burn and deſtroy any thing in America. You are both in the ACT and in the COMMISSION ſtiled COMMISSIONERS FOR RESTORING PEACE, and the methods for doing it are there pointed out. Your laſt proclamation is ſigned by you as commiſſioners UNDER THAT ACT. You make parliament the patron of its contents. Yet in the body of it, you inſert matters contrary both to the ſpirit and letter of the act, and what likewiſe your king dared not have put in his commiſſion to you. The ſtate of things in England, gentlemen, is too tickliſh for you to run hazards. You are ACCOUNTABLE TO PARLIAMENT FOR THE EXECUTION OF THAT ACT ACCORDING TO THE LETTER OF IT. Your heads may pay for breaking it, for you certainly have broke it by exceeding it. And as a friend, who would wiſh you to eſcape the paw of the lion as well as the belly of the whale, I civilly hint to you, TO KEEP WITHIN COMPASS.

Sir Harry Clinton, ſtrictly ſpeaking, is as accountable as the reſt; for though a general, he is likewiſe a commiſſioner, acting under a ſuperior authority. His firſt obedience is to the act; and his plea of being a general will not and cannot clear him as a commiſſioner, for that would ſuppoſe the crown, in its ſingle capacity, to have a power of diſpenſing with an act of parliament. Your ſituations, gentlemen, are nice and critical, and the more ſo becauſe England is unſettled. Take heed? Remember the times of Charles the firſt! For Laud and Stafford fell by truſting to a hope like yours.

Having thus ſhewn you the danger of your proclamation, I now ſhew you the folly of it. The means contradict your deſign, You threaten to lay waſte in order to render America a uſeleſs acquiſition of alliance to France. I reply, that the more deſtruction you com-

mit (if you could do it) the more valuable to France you make that alliance. You can deſtroy only houſes and goods; and by ſo doing you increaſe our demand upon her for materials and merchandize; for the wants of one nation, provided it has FREEDOM and CREDIT, naturally produces riches to the other; and as you can neither ruin the land nor prevent the vegetation, you would encreaſe the exportation of our produce in payment, which to her would be a new fund of wealth. In ſhort, had you caſt about for a plan on purpoſe to enrich your enemies you could not have hit upon a better.

C. S.

THE CRISIS.—NUMBER VIII.

ADDRESSED TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND.

"TRUSTING (ſays the king of England in his ſpeech of November laſt) in the Divine Providence, and in the juſtice of my "cauſe, I am firmly reſolved to proſecute the war with vigour, and "to make every exertion in order to compel our enemies to equi-"table terms of peace and accommodation." To this declaration the United States of America and the confederated powers of Europe will reply, *if Britain will have war, ſhe ſhall have enough of it.*

Five years have nearly elapſed ſince the commencement of hoſtilities, and every campaign, by a gradual decay, has leſſened your ability to conquer, without producing a ſerious thought on your condition or your fate. Like a prodigal lingering in an habitual conſumption, you feel the relics of life, and miſtake them for recovery. New ſchemes, like new medicines, have adminiſtered freſh hopes and prolonged the diſeaſe inſtead of curing it. A change of generals, like a change of phyſicians, ſerved only to keep the flattery alive, and furniſh new pretences for new extravagance.

"*Can Britain fail?*"* Has been proudly aſked at the commencement of every enterprize, and that "*whatever ſhe wills is fate!*"† has been given with the ſolemnity of prophetic confidence, and though

* *Whitehead's new-year's ode for* 1776.

† *Ode at the inſtallation of Lord North for chancellor of the univerſity of Oxford.*

the queſtion has been conſtantly replied to by diſappointment, and the prediction falſified by misfortune, yet ſtill the inſult continued, and your catalogue of national evils increaſed therewith. Eager to perſuade the world of her power, ſhe conſidered deſtruction as the miniſter of greatneſs, and conceived that the glory of a nation, like that of an Indian, lay in the number of its ſcalps and the miſeries it inflicts.

Fire, ſword and want, as far as the arms of Britain could extend them, have been ſpread with wanton cruelty along the coaſt of America; and while you, remote from the ſcene of ſuffering, had nothing to loſe and as little to dread, the information reached you like a tale of antiquity, in which the diſtance of time defaces the conception, and changes the ſevereſt ſorrows into converſable amuſement.

This makes the ſecond paper, addreſſed perhaps in vain to the people of England. That advice ſhould be taken wherever example has failed, or precept be regarded where warning is ridiculed, is like a picture of hope reſting on deſpair: But when time ſhall ſtamp with univerſal currency, the facts you have long encountered with a laugh, and the irreſiſtible evidence of accumulated loſſes, like the hand writing on the wall, ſhall add terror to diſtreſs, you will then, in a conflict of ſufferings, learn to ſympathiſe with others by feeling for your ſelves.

The triumphant appearance of the combined fleets in the channel and at your harbours' mouth, and the expedition of captain Paul Jones on the weſtern and eaſtern coaſt of England and Scotland, will, by placing you in the condition of an endangered country, read to you a ſtronger lecture on the calamities of invaſion, and bring to your minds a truer picture of promiſcuous diſtreſs, than the moſt finiſhed rhetoric can deſcribe or the keeneſt imagination conceive.

Hitherto you have experienced the expences, but nothing of the miſeries of war. Your diſappointments have been accompanied with no immediate ſuffering, and your loſſes came to you only by intelligence. Like fire at a diſtance, you heard not even the cry; you felt not the danger, you ſaw not the confuſion. To you every thing has been foreign but the taxes to ſupport it. You knew not what it was to be alarmed at midnight with an armed enemy in the ſtreets. You were ſtrangers to the diſtreſſing ſcene of a family in flight, and to the thouſand reſtleſs cares and tender ſorrows that inceſſantly aroſe. To ſee women and children wandering in the ſeverity of winter, with the broken remains of a well furniſhed houſe, and ſeeking ſhelter in every crib and hut, were matters you had no conception of. You

knew not what it was to ſtand by and ſee your goods chopt for fuel, and your beds ript to pieces to make packages for plunder. The miſery of others, like a tempeſtuous night, added to the pleaſures of your own ſecurity. You even enjoyed the ſtorm, by contemplating the difference of conditions and that which carried ſorrow into the breaſts of thouſands, ſerved but to heighten in you a ſpecies of tranquil pride.——Yet theſe are but the fainter ſufferings of war, when compared with carnage and ſlaughter, the miſeries of a military hoſpital, or a town in flames.

The people of America by anticipating diſtreſs had fortified their minds againſt every ſpecies you could inflict. They had reſolved to abandon their homes, to reſign them to deſtruction, and to ſeek new ſettlements rather than ſubmit. Thus familiariſed to misfortune, before it arrived, they bore their portion with the leſs regret: The juſtneſs of their cauſe was a continual ſource of conſolation, and the hope of final victory, which never left them, ſerved to lighten the load and ſweeten the cup allotted them to drink.

But when their ſuffering ſhall become yours, and invaſion be tranſferred upon the invaders, you will have neither their extended wilderneſs to fly to, their cauſe to comfort you, nor their hopes to reſt on. Diſtreſs with them was ſharpened by no ſelf-reflection. They had not brought it on themſelves. On the contrary, they had by every proceeding endeavoured to avoid it, and had deſcended even below the mark of congreſſional character to prevent a war. The national honour or the advantages of independence were matters, which at the commencement of the diſpute, they had never ſtudied, and it was only at the laſt moment that the meaſure was reſolved on. Thus circumſtanced, they naturally and conſcientiouſly felt a dependence upon Providence. They had a clear pretenſion to it, and had they failed therein, infidelity had gained a triumph.

But your condition is the reverſe of theirs. Every thing you ſuffer you have fought; nay, had you created miſchiefs on purpoſe to inherit them, you could not have ſecured your title by a firmer deed. The world awakens with no pity at your complaints. You felt none for others; you deſerve none for yourſelves. Nature does not intereſt herſelf in caſes like yours, but on the contrary turns from them with diſlike and abandons them to puniſhment. You may now preſent memorials to what court you pleaſe, but ſo far as America is the object, none will liſten. The policy of Europe and the propenſity there is in every mind to curb inſulting ambition, and bring cruelty to judg-

ment, are unitedly againſt you; and where nature and intereſt reinforces each other, the compact is too intimate to be diſſolved.

Make but the caſe of others your own, and your own theirs, and you will then have a clear idea of the whole. Had France acted towards her colonies as you have done, you would have branded her with every epithet of abhorrence; and had you like her, ſtept in to ſuccour a ſtruggling people, all Europe muſt have echoed with your own applauſes. But entangled in the paſſion of diſpute, you ſee it not as you ought, and form opinions thereon which ſuit with no intereſt but your own. You wonder America does not riſe in union with you to impoſe on herſelf a portion of your taxes and reduce herſelf to unconditional ſubmiſſion. You are amazed that the ſouthern powers of Europe do not aſſiſt you in conquering a country which is afterwards to be turned againſt themſelves; and that the northern ones do not contribute to reinſtate you in America who already enjoy the market for naval ſtores by the ſeparation. You ſeem ſurpriſed that Holland does not pour in her ſuccours, to maintain you miſtreſs of the ſeas, when her own commerce is ſuffering by your act of navigation, or that any country ſhould ſtudy her own intereſts while yours is on the carpet.

Such exceſſes of paſſionate folly, and unjuſt as well as unwiſe reſentment, have driven you on, like Pharoah, to unpitied miſeries, and while the importance of the quarrel ſhall perpetuate your diſgrace, the flag of America will carry it round the world. The natural feelings of every rational being will take againſt you, and wherever the ſtory ſhall be told, you will have neither excuſe nor conſolation left. With an unſparing hand and an unſatiable mind, you have havocked the world, both to gain dominion and to loſe it; and while in a phrenzy of avarice and ambition, the eaſt and the weſt are doomed to tributary bondage, you rapidly earned deſtruction as the wages of a nation.

At the thoughts of a war at home every man amongſt you ought to tremble. The proſpect is far more dreadful there than in America. Here the party that was againſt the meaſuresof the continent were in general a kind of neutrals who added ſtrength to neither army. There does not exiſt a being ſo devoid of ſenſe and ſentiment as to covet "UNCONDITIONAL SUBMISSION," and therefore no man in America could be with you in principle. Several might from a cowardice of mind, PREFER it to the hardſhips and dangers of OPPOSING it; but the ſame diſpoſition that gave them ſuch a

choice, unfitted them to act either for or againſt. But England is rent into parties, with equal ſhares of reſolution. The principle which produced the war divides the nation. Their animoſities are in the higheſt ſtate of fermentation, and both ſides, by a call of the militia, are in arms. No human foreſight can diſcern, no concluſion can be formed, what turn a war might take, if once ſet on foot by an invaſion. She is not now in a fit diſpoſition, to make a common cauſe of her own affairs, and having no conqueſts to hope for abroad, and nothing but expences ariſing at home, her every thing is ſtaked upon a defenſive combat, and the further ſhe goes the worſe ſhe is off.

There are ſituations a nation may be in, in which peace or war, abſtracted from every other conſideration, may be politically right or wrong. When nothing can be loſt by a war, but what muſt be loſt without it, war is then the policy of that country; and ſuch was the ſituation of America at the commencement of hoſtilities: But when no ſecurity can be gained by a war, but what may be accompliſhed by a peace, the caſe becomes reverſed, and ſuch now is the ſituation of England.

That America is beyond the reach of conqueſt, is a fact which experience has ſhewn and time confirmed, and this admitted, what, I aſk, is now the object of contention? If there be any honour in purſuing ſelf-deſtruction with inflexible paſſion—if national ſuicide be the perfection of national glory, you may, with all the pride of criminal happineſs, expire unenvied and unrivalled.—But when the tumult of war ſhall ceaſe, and the tempeſt of preſent paſſions be ſucceeded by calm reflection, or when thoſe who ſurviving its fury, ſhall inherit from you a legacy of debts and misfortunes, when the yearly revenue ſhall ſcarcely be able to diſcharge the intereſt of the one, and no poſſible remedy be left for the other: ideas, far different to the preſent, will ariſe, and embitter the remembrance of former follies. A mind diſarmed of its rage, feels no pleaſure in contemplating a frantic quarrel. Sickneſs of thought, the ſure conſequence of conduct like yours, leaves no ability for enjoyment, no reliſh for reſentment; and though, like a man in a fit, you feel not the injury of the ſtruggle, nor diſtinguiſh between ſtrength and diſeaſe, the weakneſs will nevertheleſs be proportioned to the violence, and the ſenſe of pain encreaſe with the recovery.

To what perſons or to whoſe ſyſtem of politics you owe your preſent ſtate of wretchedneſs, is a matter of total indifference to America.

They have contributed, however unwillingly, to ſet her above themſelves, and ſhe in the tranquility of conqueſt reſigns the enquiry. The caſe now is not ſo properly who began the war, as who continues it. That there are men in all countries to whom a ſtate of war is a mine of wealth, is a fact never to be doubted. Characters like theſe naturally breed in the putrefaction of diſtempered times, and after fattening on the diſeaſe they periſh with it, or impregnated with the ſtench retreat into obſcurity.

But there are ſeveral erroneous notions to which you likewiſe owe a ſhare of your misfortunes, and which if continued will only increaſe your trouble and your loſſes. An opinion hangs about the gentlemen of the minority, that America would reliſh meaſures under THEIR adminiſtration, which ſhe would not from the preſent cabinet. On this rock lord Chatham would have ſplit had he gained the helm, and ſeveral of his ſurvivers are ſteering the ſame courſe. Such diſtinctions in the infancy of the argument had ſome degree of foundation, but they now ſerve no other purpoſe than to lengthen out a war, in which the limits of a diſpute, being fixt by the fate of arms, and guaranteed by treaties, are not to be changed or altered by trivial circumſtances.

The miniſtry and many of the minority ſacrifice their time in diſputing on a queſtion with which they have nothing to do, namely, whether America ſhall be independent or not? whereas the only queſtion that can come under their determination is, whether they will accede to it or not? They confound a military queſtion with a political one, and undertake to ſupply by a vote what they loſt by a battle. Say, ſhe ſhall not be independent, and it will ſignify as much as if they voted againſt a decree of fate, or ſay that ſhe ſhall, and ſhe will be no more independent than before. Queſtions, which when determined, cannot be executed, ſerve only to ſhew the folly of diſpute and the weakneſs of diſputants.

From a long habit of calling America your own, you ſuppoſe her governed by the ſame prejudices and conceits which govern yourſelves. Becauſe you have ſet up a particular denomination of religion to the excluſion of all others, you imagine ſhe muſt do the ſame, and becauſe you, with an unſociable narrowneſs of mind, have cheriſhed enmity againſt France and Spain, you ſuppoſe her alliance muſt be defective in friendſhip. Copying her notions of the world from you, ſhe formerly thought as you inſtructed, but now feeling herſelf free, and the prejudice removed, ſhe thinks and acts upon

a different ſyſtem. It frequently happens that in proportion as we are taught to diſlike perſons and countries not knowing why, we feel an ardour of eſteem upon the removal of the miſtake: It ſeems as if ſomething was to be made amends for, and we eagerly give into every office of friendſhip, to atone for the injury of the error.

But perhaps there is ſomething in the extent of countries, which, among the generality of people, inſenſibly communicates extenſion of the mind. The ſoul of an iſlander in its native ſtate ſeems bounded by the foggy confines of the water's edge, and all beyond affords to him matters only for profit or curioſity, not for friendſhip. His iſland is to him his world, and fixt to that, his every thing centres in it; while thoſe, who are inhabitants of a continent, by caſting their eye over a larger field, take in likewiſe a larger intellectual circuit, and thus approaching nearer to an acquaintance with the univerſe, their atmoſphere of thought is extended, and their liberality fills a wider ſpace. In ſhort, our minds ſeem to be meaſured by countries when we are men, as they are by places, when we are children, and until ſomething happens to diſentangle us from the prejudice, we ſerve under it without perceiving it.

In addition to this, it may be remarked, that men who ſtudy any univerſal ſcience, the principles of which are univerſally known, or admitted, and applied without diſtinction to the common benefit of all countries, obtain thereby a larger ſhare of philanthropy than thoſe who only ſtudy national arts and improvements. Natural philoſophy, mathematics and aſtronomy, carry the mind from the country to the creation, and give it a fitneſs ſuited to the extent. It was not Newton's honour, neither could it be his pride, that he was an Engliſhman, but that he was a philoſopher: The Heavens had liberated him from the prejudices of an iſland, and ſcience had expanded his ſoul as boundleſs as his ſtudies.

COMMON SENSE.

March, 1780.

THE CRISIS.—NUMBER IX.

Philadelphia, June 9, 1780.

HAD America purſued her advantages with half the ſpirit ſhe reſiſted her misfortunes, ſhe would before now, have been a con

quering and a peaceful people; but lulled in the lap of ſoft tranquility, ſhe reſted on her hopes, and adverſity only has convulſed her into action. Whether ſubtlety or ſincerity, at the cloſe of the laſt year, induced the enemy to an appearance for peace, is a point not material to know: It is ſufficient that we ſee the effects it has had on our politics, and that we ſternly riſe to reſent the deluſion.

The war, on the part of America, has been a war of natural feelings. Brave in diſtreſs; ſerene in conqueſt; drowſey while at reſt; and in every ſituation generouſly diſpoſed to peace. A dangerous calm, and a moſt heightened zeal, have, as circumſtances varied, ſucceeded each other. Every paſſion, but that of deſpair, has been called to a tour of duty; and ſo miſtaken has been the enemy, of our abilities and diſpoſition, that when ſhe ſuppoſed us conquered, we roſe the conquerors. The extenſiveneſs of the United States, and the variety of their reſources; the univerſality of their cauſe, the quick operation of their feelings, and the ſimilarity of their ſentiments, have, in every trying ſituation, produced a *ſomething*, which, favoured by Providence, and purſued with ardour, has accompliſhed in an inſtant the buſineſs of a campaign We have never deliberately ſought victory, but ſnatched it; and bravely undone in an hour, the blotted operations of a ſeaſon.

The reported fate of Charleſton, like the misfortunes of ſeventy-ſix, has at laſt called forth a ſpirit, and kindled up a flame, which perhaps no other event could have produced. If the enemy has circulated a falſehood, they have unwiſely aggravated us into life, and if they have told us a truth, they have unintentionally done us a ſervice. We were returning with folded arms from the fatigues of war, and thinking and ſetting leiſurely down to enjoy repoſe. The dependence that has been put upon Charleſton threw a drowſineſs over America. We looked on the buſineſs done—the conflict over—the matter ſettled —or that all which remained unfiniſhed would follow of itſelf. In this ſtate of dangerous relax, expoſed to the poiſonous infuſions of the enemy, and having no common danger to attract our attention, we were extinguiſhing by ſtages the ardour we began with, and ſurrendering by peace-meals the virtue that defended us.

Afflicting as the loſs of Charleſton may be, yet if it univerſally rouſe us from the ſlumber of a twelve-months paſt, and renew in us the ſpirit of former days, it will produce an advantage more important than its loſs. America ever *is* what ſhe *thinks* herſelf to be. Governed

by ſentiment, and acting her own mind, ſhe becomes, as ſhe pleaſes, the victor or the victim.

It is not the conqueſt of towns, nor the accidental capture of garriſons, that can reduce a country ſo extenſive as this. The ſufferings of one part can never be relieved by the exertions of another, and there is no ſituation the enemy can be in, that does not afford to us the ſame advantages ſhe ſeeks herſelf. By dividing her force, ſhe leaves every poſt attackable. It is a mode of war that carries with it a confeſſion of weakneſs, and goes on the principle of diſtreſs, rather than conqueſt.

The decline of the enemy is viſible not only in their operations, but in their plans; Charleſton originally made but a ſecondary object in the ſyſtem of attack, and it is now become their principal one, becauſe they have not been able to ſucceed elſewhere. It would have carried a cowardly appearance in Europe had they formed their grand expedition in ſeventy-ſix, againſt a part of the continent where there was no army, or not a ſufficient one to oppoſe them; but failing year after year in their impreſſions here, and to the eaſtward and northward, they deſerted their firſt capital deſign, and prudently contenting themſelves with what they can get, give a flouriſh of honour to conceal diſgrace.

But this piece-meal work is not conquering the continent. It is a diſcredit in them to attempt it, and in us to ſuffer it. It is now full time to put an end to a war of aggravations, which, on one ſide, has no poſſible object, and on the other, has every inducement which honour, intereſt, ſafety and happineſs can inſpire. If we ſuffer them much longer to remain among us, we ſhall become as bad as themſelves. An aſſociation of vices will reduce us more than the ſword, A nation hardened in the practice of iniquity knows better how to profit by it, than a young country newly corrupted. We are not a match for them in the line of advantageous guilt, nor they to us on the principles we bravely ſet out with. Our firſt days were our days of honour. They have marked the character of America wherever the ſtory of her wars are told; and convinced of this, we have nothing to do, but wiſely and unitedly to tread the well known track. The progreſs of a war is often as ruinous to individuals, as the iſſue of it is to a nation; and it is not only neceſſary that our forces be ſuch, that we be conquerors in the end, but that by timely exertions we be ſecure in the interim. The preſent campaign will afford an opportunity which has never preſented itſelf before, and the preparations for it are equally neceſſary, whether Charleſton ſtand or fall. Suppoſe

the firſt, it is in that caſe only a failure of the enemy, not a defeat. All the conqueſt a beſieged town can hope for is, not to be conquered; and compelling an enemy to raiſe the ſiege, is to the beſieged a victory. But there muſt be a probability amounting almoſt to certainty, that would juſtify a garriſon marching out to attack a retreat. Therefore ſhould Charleſton not be taken, and the enemy abandon the ſiege, every other part of the continent ſhould prepare to meet them; and on the contrary, ſhould it be taken, the ſame preparations are neceſſary, to balance the loſs, and put ourſelves in a condition to co-operate with our allies, immediately on their arrival.

We are not now fighting our battles alone, as we were in ſeventy-ſix. England, from a malicious diſpoſition to America, has not only not declared war againſt France and Spain, but the better to proſecute her paſſions here, has afforded thoſe powers no military object, and avoids them, to diſtreſs us. She will ſuffer her Weſt-India iſlands to be over-run by France, and her ſouthern ſettlements taken by Spain, rather than quit the object that gratifies revenge. This conduct, on the part of Britain, has pointed out the propriety of France ſending a naval and land force to co-operate with America on the ſpot. Their arrival cannot be very diſtant, nor the ravages of the enemy long. In the mean time the party neceſſary to us needs no illuſtration. The recruiting the army, and procuring the ſupplies, are the two things needful, and a capture of either of the enemy's diviſions will reſtore to America peace and plenty.

At a criſis, big, like the preſent, with expectation and events, the whole country is called to unanimity and exertion. Not an ability ought now to ſleep, that can produce but a mite to the general good, nor even a whiſper to paſs that militates againſt it. The neceſſity of the caſe, and the importance of the conſequences, admit no delay from a friend, no apology from an enemy. To ſpare now, would be the height of extravagance, and to conſult preſent eaſe, would be to ſacrifice it, perhaps, for ever.

America, rich in patriotiſm and produce, can want neither men nor ſupplies, when a ſerious neceſſity calls them forth. The ſlow operation of taxes, owing to the extenſiveneſs of collection, and their depreciated value before they arrived in the treaſury, have, in many inſtances thrown a burden upon government, which has been artfully interpreted by the enemy into a general decline throughout the country. Yet this, inconvenient as it may at firſt appear, is not only remediable, but may be turned to an immediate advantage; for it

makes no real difference, whether a certain number of men, or company of militia (and in this country every man is a militia-man) are directed by law to ſend a recruit at their own expence, or whether a tax is laid on them for that purpoſe, and the man hired by government afterwards. The firſt, if there is any difference, is both cheapeſt and beſt, becauſe it ſaves the expence which would attend collecting it as a tax, and brings the man ſooner into the field than the modes of recruiting formerly uſed: And on this principle, a law has been paſſed in this ſtate for recruiting two men from each company of militia, which will add upwards of a thouſand to the force of the country.

But the flame, which has broke forth in this city ſince the report from New-York of the loſs of Charleſton, not only does honour to the place, but, like the blaze of ſeventy-ſix, will kindle into action the ſcattered ſparks throughout America.—The valour of a country may be learned by the bravery of its ſoldiery, and the general caſt of its inhabitants, but confidence of ſucceſs is beſt diſcovered by the active meaſures purſued by men of property; and when the ſpirit of enterprize becomes ſo univerſal, as to act at once on all ranks of men, a war may then and not till then, be ſtiled truly popular.

In ſeventy-ſix the ardour of the enterpriſing part was conſiderably checked by the real revolt of ſome, and the coolneſs of others. But in the preſent caſe there is a firmneſs in the ſubſtance and property of the country to the public cauſe. An aſſociation has been entered into by the merchants, tradeſmen and principal inhabitants of this city, to receive and ſupport the new ſtate money at the value of gold and ſilver; a meaſure which, while it does them honour, will likewiſe contribute to their intereſt, by rendering the operations of the campaign convenient and effectual.

Neither has the ſpirit of exertion ſtopt here. A voluntary ſubſcription is likewiſe began to raiſe a fund of hard money, to be given as bounties to fill up the full quota of the Pennſylvania line. It has been the remark of the enemy, that every thing in America has been done by the force of government; but when ſhe ſees the individuals throwing in their voluntary aids, and facilitating the public meaſures in concert with the eſtabliſhed powers of the country, it will convince her that the cauſe of America ſtands not on the will of a few, but on the broad foundation of property and popularity.

Thus aided, and thus ſupported, diſaffection will decline, and the withered head of tyranny expire in America. The ravages of the

enemy will be ſhort and limited, and like all their former ones will produce a victory over themſelves.

COMMON SENSE.

☞ At the time of writing this number of the Criſis, the loſs of Charleſton, though believed by ſome, was more confidently diſbelieved by others. But there ought to be no longer a doubt upon the matter. Charleſton is gone, and I believe for the want of a ſufficient ſupply of proviſions. The man that does not now feel for the honour of the beſt and nobleſt cauſe that ever a country engaged in, and exert himſelf accordingly, is no longer worthy a peaceable reſidence among a people determined to be free. C. S.

THE CRISIS EXTRAORDINARY.

(ON THE SUBJECT OF TAXATION.)

Philadelphia, October 6, 1780.

IT is impoſſible to ſit down and think ſeriouſly on the affairs of America, but the original principles on which ſhe reſiſted, and the glow and ardour they inſpired, will occur like the undefaced remembrance of a lovely ſcene. To trace over in imagination the purity of the cauſe, the voluntary ſacrifices made to ſupport it, and all the various turnings of the war in its defence, is at once both paying and receiving reſpect. The principles deſerve to be remembered, and to remember them rightly is repoſſeſſing them. In this indulgence of generous recollection we become gainers by what we ſeem to give, and the more we beſtow the richer we become.

So extenſively right was the ground on which America proceeded, that it not only took in every juſt and liberal ſentiment which could impreſs the heart, but made it the direct intereſt of every claſs and order of men to defend the country. The war, on the part of Britain, was originally a war of covetouſneſs. The ſordid and not the ſplendid paſſions gave it being. The fertile fields and proſperous infancy of America appeared to her as mines for tributary wealth. She viewed the hive, and diſregarding the induſtry that had enriched it, thirſted for the honey. But in the preſent ſtage of her affairs, the violence of temper is added to the rage of avarice; and therefore, that which at the firſt ſetting out proceeded from purity of

principle and public intereſt, is now heightened by all the obligations of neceſſity; for it requires but little knowledge of human nature to diſcern what would be the conſequence, were America again reduced to the ſubjection of Britain. Uncontrolled power, in the hands of an incenſed, imperious and rapacious conqueror, is an engine of dreadful execution, and woe be to that country over which it can be exerciſed. The names of whig and tory would then be ſunk in the general term of rebel, and the oppreſſion, whatever it might be, would, with very few inſtances of exception, light equally on all.

Britain did not go to war with America for the ſake of dominion, becauſe ſhe was then in poſſeſſion; neither was it for the extenſion of trade and commerce, becauſe ſhe had monopolized the whole and the country had yielded to it; neither was it to extinguiſh what *ſhe* might call rebellion, becauſe before ſhe began no reſiſtance exiſted. It could then be from no other motive than avarice, or a deſign of eſtabliſhing, in the firſt inſtance, the ſame taxes in America as are paid in England (which, as I ſhall preſently ſhow, are above eleven times heavier than the taxes we now pay for the preſent year 1780) or, in the ſecond inſtance, to confiſcate the whole property of America, in caſe of reſiſtance and conqueſt of the latter, of which ſhe had then no doubt.

I ſhall now proceed to ſhow what the taxes in England are, and what the yearly expence of the preſent war is to her—What the taxes of this country amount to, and what the annual expence of defending it effectually will be to us; and ſhall endeavour conciſely to point out the cauſe of our difficulties, and the advantages on one ſide, and the conſequences on the other, in caſe we do, or do not, put ourſelves in an effectual ſtate of defence. I mean to be open, candid and ſincere. I ſee a univerſal wiſh to expel the enemy from the country, a murmuring becauſe the war is not carried on with more vigour, and my intention is to ſhow as ſhortly as poſſible both the reaſon and the remedy.

The number of ſouls in England (excluſive of Scotland and Ireland) is ſeven millions,* and the number of ſouls in America is three millions.

The amount of the taxes in England (excluſive of Scotland and Ireland) was, before the preſent war commenced, eleven millions ſix hundred and forty-two thouſand ſix hundred and fifty-three pounds ſterling, which on an average is no leſs a ſum than one pound thirteen ſhillings

* *This is taking the higheſt number that the people of England have been, or can be rated at.*

and three-pence ſterling per head per annum, men, women and children; beſides county taxes, taxes for the ſupport of the poor, and a tenth of all the produce of the earth for the ſupport of the biſhops and clergy. * Nearly five millions of this ſum went annually to pay the intereſt of the national debt contracted by former wars, and the remaining ſum of ſix millions ſix hundred and forty-two thouſand ſix hundred pounds was applied to defray the yearly expence of government, the peace eſtabliſhment of the army and navy, placemen, penſioners, &c. conſequently the whole of the enormous taxes being thus appropriated ſhe had nothing to ſpare out of them towards defraying the expences of the preſent war or any other. Yet had ſhe not been in debt at the beginning of the war as we were not, and like us had only a land and not a naval war to carry on, her then revenue of eleven millions and

* *The following is taken from Dr. Price's ſtate of the taxes of England, pages* 96, 97, 98.

An account of the money drawn from the public by taxes annually, being the medium of three years before the year 1776.

Amount of cuſtoms in England,	£. 2,528,275
Amount of the exciſe in England,	4,649,892
Land tax at 3*s.*	1,300,000
Land tax at 1*s. in the pound,*	450,000
Salt duties,	218,739
Duties on ſtamps, cards, dice, advertiſements, bonds, leaſes, indentures, newſpapers, almanacks, &c.	280,788
Duties on houſes and windows,	385,369
Poſt office, ſeizures, wine licences, hackney coaches, &c.	250,000
Annual profits from lotteries,	150,000
Expence of collecting the exciſes in England,	297,887
Expence of collecting the cuſtoms in England,	468,700
Intereſt of loans on the land tax at 4*s. expences of collection, militia, &c.*	250,000
Perquiſites, &c. on cuſtom houſe officers, &c. ſuppoſed	250,000
Expence of collecting the ſalt duties in England 10 1-2 *per cent.*	27,000
Bounties on fiſh exported,	18,000
Expence of collecting the duties on ſtamps, cards, advertiſements, &c. at 5 *and* 1-2 *per cent.*	18,000
Total,	£.11,642,653

a half pounds ſterling would defray all her annual expences of war and government within each year.

But this not being the caſe with her, ſhe is obliged to borrow about ten million pounds ſterling yearly, to proſecute the war ſhe is now engaged in (this year ſhe borrowed twelve) and lay on new taxes to diſcharge the intereſt; and allowing that the preſent war has coſt her only fifty millions ſterling, the intereſt thereon at five per cent. will be two millions and an half, therefore the amount of her taxes now muſt be fourteen millions, which on an average is no leſs than forty ſhillings ſterling per head, men, women, and children throughout the nation. Now as this expence of fifty millions was borrowed on the hopes of conquering America, and as it was avarice which firſt induced her to commence the war, how truly wretched and deplorable would the condition of this country be, were ſhe, by her own remiſſneſs, to ſuffer an enemy of ſuch a diſpoſition, and ſo circumſtanced, to reduce her to ſubjection.

I now proceed to the revenues of America.

I have already ſtated the number of ſouls in America to be three millions, and by a calculation I have made, which I have every reaſon to believe is ſufficiently right, the whole expence of the war, and the ſupport of the ſeveral governments, may be defrayed for two million pounds ſterling annually; which on an average is thirteen ſhillings and four pence per head, men, women, and children, and the peace eſtabliſhment at the end of the war, will be but three quarters of a million, or five ſhillings ſterling per head. Now, throwing out of the queſtion every thing of honour, principle, happineſs, freedom and reputation in the world, and taking it up on the ſimple ground of intereſt, I put the following caſe.

Suppoſe Britain was to conquer America, and as conquerors was to lay her under no other conditions than to pay the ſame proportion towards her annual revenue which the people of England pay; our ſhare in that caſe, would be ſix million pounds ſterling yearly; can it then be a queſtion, whether it is beſt to raiſe two millions to defend the country, and govern it ourſelves, and only three quarters of a million afterwards, or pay ſix millions to have it conquered, and let the enemy govern it.

Can it be ſuppoſed that conquerors would chooſe to put themſelves in a worſe condition than what they granted to the conquered? In England the tax on rum is five ſhillings and one penny ſterling per gallon, which is one ſilver dollar and fourteen coppers. Now would

it not be laughable to imagine, that after the expence they have been at, they would let either whig or tory in America drink it cheaper than themfelves. Coffee which is fo conſiderable an article of conſumption and fupport here, is there loaded with a duty, which makes the price between five and fix ſhillings ſterling a pound, and a penalty of fifty pounds ſterling on any perſon detected in roaſting it in his own houſe. There is ſcarce an article of life you can eat, drink, wear, or enjoy, that is not there loaded with a tax ; even the light from heaven is only permitted to ſhine into their dwellings by paying eighteen pence ſterling per window annually ; and the humbleſt drink of life, ſmall beer, cannot there be purchaſed without a tax of nearly two coppers a gallon, beſides a heavy tax upon the malt, and another on the hops before it is brewed, excluſive of a land tax on the earth which produces them. In ſhort, the condition of that country in point of taxation is ſo oppreſſive, the number of her poor ſo great, and the extravagance and rapacioufneſs of the court ſo enormous, that were they to effect a conqueſt of America, it is then only that the diſtreſſes of America would begin. Neither would it ſignify any thing to a man whether he be whig or tory. The people of England and the miniſtry of that country know us by no ſuch diſtinctions. What they want is clear ſolid revenue, and the modes they would take to procure it, would operate alike on all. Their manner of reaſoning would be ſhort, becauſe they would naturally infer that if we were able to carry on a war of five or ſix years againſt them, we were able to pay the ſame taxes which they do.

I have already ſtated that the expence of conducting the preſent war, and the government of the ſeveral ſtates, may be done for two millions ſterling and the eſtabliſhment in time of peace, for three quarters of a million.*

As to navy matters, they flouriſh ſo well, and are ſo well attended in the hands of individuals, that I think it conſiſtent on every principle of real uſe and economy, to turn the navy into hard money (keeping only three or four packets) and apply it to promote the ſervice of the army. We ſhall not have a ſhip the leſs ; the uſe of them, and the benefit from them, will be greatly increaſed, and their expence ſaved.

* *I have made the calculations in ſterling, becauſe it is a rate generally known in all the ſtates, and becauſe likewiſe, it admits of an eaſy compariſon between our expences to ſupport the war and thoſe of the enemy. Four ſilver dollars and an half is one pound ſterling, and three pence over.*

We are now allied with a formidable naval power, from whom we derive the aſſiſtance of a navy. And the line in which we can proſecute the war, ſo as to reduce the common enemy and benefit the alliance moſt effectually, will be by attending cloſely to the land ſervice.

I eſtimate the charge of keeping up and maintaining an army, officering them, and all expences included, ſufficient for the defence of the country, to be equal to the expence of forty thouſand men at thirty pounds ſterling per head, which is one million two hundred thouſand pounds.

I likewiſe allow four hundred thouſand pounds for continental expences at home and abroad.

And four hundred thouſand pounds for the ſupport of the ſeveral ſtate governments, the amount will then be,

	£.
For the army,	1,200,000
Continental expences at home and abroad,	400,000
Government of the ſeveral ſtates, - -	400,000
Total, £.	2,000,000

I take the proportion of this ſtate, Pennſylvania, to be an eighth part of the thirteen United States, the quota then for us to raiſe will be two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds ſterling; two hundred thouſand of which will be our ſhare for the ſupport and pay of the army and continental expences at home and abroad, and fifty thouſand pounds for the ſupport of ſtate government.

In order to gain an idea of the proportion in which the raiſing ſuch a ſum will fall, I make the following calculation.

Pennſylvania contains three hundred and ſeventy-five thouſand inhabitants, men, women and children, which is likewiſe an eighth of the whole inhabitants of the whole United States: Therefore two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds ſterling to be raiſed among three hundred and ſeventy-five thouſand perſons, is, on an average, thirteen ſhillings and four pence ſterling per head, per annum, or ſomething more than one ſhilling ſterling per month. And our proportion of three quarters of a million for the government of the country, in time of peace, will be ninety-three thouſand ſeven hundred and fifty pounds ſterling, fifty thouſand of which will be for the government expences of the ſtate, and forty-three thouſand ſeven hundred and fifty pounds for continental expences at home and abroad.

The peace eſtabliſhment then will, on an average, be five ſhillings ſterling per head. Whereas was England now to ſtop, and the war

ceaſe, her peace eſtabliſhment would continue the ſame as it is now, viz. forty ſhillings per head; therefore was our taxes neceſſary for carrying on the war as much per head as hers now is, and the difference to be only whether we ſhould, at the end of the war, pay at the rate of five ſhillings per head, or forty ſhillings per head, the caſe needs no thinking of. But as we can ſecurely defend and keep the country for one third leſs than what our burden would be if it was conquered, and ſupport the governments afterward for one eighth of what Britain would levy on us, and could I find a miſer whoſe heart never felt the emotion of a ſpark of principle, even that man, uninfluenced by every love but the love of money, and capable of no attachment but to his intereſt, would and muſt, from the frugality which governs him, contribute to the defence of the country, or he ceaſes to be a miſer and becomes an ideot. But when we take in with it every thing that can ornament mankind; when the line of our intereſt becomes the line of our happineſs; when all that can cheer and animate the heart; when ſenſe of honour, fame, character, at home and abroad, are interwoven not only with the ſecurity but the increaſe of property, there exiſts not a man in America, unleſs he be a hired emiſſary, who does not ſee that his good is connected with keeping up a ſufficient defence.

I do not imagine that an inſtance can be produced in the world of a country putting herſelf to ſuch an amazing charge to conquer and enſlave another as Britain has done. The ſum is too great for her to think of with any tolerable degree of temper; and when we conſider the burden ſhe ſuſtains as well as the diſpoſition ſhe has ſhewn, it would be the height of folly in us to ſuppoſe that ſhe would not reimburſe herſelf by the moſt rapid means, had ſhe once more America within her power. With ſuch an oppreſſion of expence, what would an empty conqueſt be to her! what relief under ſuch circumſtances could ſhe derive from a victory without a prize? It was money, it was revenue ſhe firſt went to war for, and nothing but *that* would ſatisfy her. It is not the nature of avarice to be ſatisfied with any thing elſe. Every paſſion that acts upon mankind has a peculiar mode of operation. Many of them are temporary and fluctuating; they admit of ceſſation and variety. But avarice is a fixed uniform paſſion. It neither abates of its vigour nor changes its object; and the reaſon why it does not is founded in the nature of things, for wealth has not a rival where avarice is a ruling paſſion. One beauty may excel another, and extinguiſh from the mind of a man the pictured remembrance

of a former one: But wealth is the phœnix of avarice, and therefore cannot ſeek a new object, becauſe there is not another in the world.

I now paſs on to ſhew the value of the preſent taxes, and compare them with the annual expence; but this I ſhall preface with a few explanatory remarks.

There are two diſtinct things which make the payment of taxes difficult; the one is the large and real value of the ſum to be paid, and the other is the ſcarcity of the thing in which the payment is to be made; and although theſe appear to be one and the ſame, they are in ſeveral inſtances not only different, but the difficulty ſprings from different cauſes.

Suppoſe a tax was to be laid equal to one half of what a man's yearly income is, ſuch a tax could not be paid becauſe the property could not be ſpared; and on the other hand, ſuppoſe a very trifling tax was laid to be collected in *pearls*, ſuch a tax likewiſe could not be paid, becauſe it could not be had. Now any perſon may ſee that theſe are diſtinct caſes, and the latter of them is a repreſentation of ours.

That the difficulty cannot proceed from the former, that is, from the real value or weight of the tax is evident at firſt view to any perſon who will conſider it.

The amount of the quota of taxes for this ſtate for the preſent year, 1780 (and ſo in proportion for every other ſtate) is twenty millions of dollars, which at ſeventy for one is but ſixty-four thouſand two hundred and eighty pounds three ſhillings ſterling, and on an average is no more than three ſhillings and five pence ſterling per head per annum per man, woman and child, or three pence two-fifths per head per month. Now here is a clear poſitive fact, that cannot be contradicted, and which proves that the difficulty cannot be in the weight of the tax, for in itſelf it is a triſle and far from being adequate to our quota of the expence of the war. The quit-rents of one penny ſterling per acre on only one half the ſtate, come to upwards of fifty thouſand pounds, which is almoſt as much as all the taxes of the preſent year, and as thoſe quit-rents made no part of the taxes then paid, and are now diſcontinued, the quantity of money drawn for public ſervice this year, excluſive of the militia fines, which I ſhall take notice of in the proceſs of this work, is leſs than what was paid and payable in any year preceding the revolution, and ſince the laſt war; what I mean is, that the quit-rents and taxes taken together came to a larger ſum then, than the preſent taxes without the quit-rents do now.

My intention by theſe arguments and calculations is to place the difficulty to the right cauſe, and ſhew that it does not proceed from the weight or worth of the tax, but from the ſcarcity of the medium in which it is paid; and to illuſtrate this point ſtill farther, I ſhall now ſhew, that if the tax of twenty millions of dollars was of four times the real value it now is or nearly ſo, which would be about two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds ſterling, and would be our full quota, that this ſum would have been raiſed with more eaſe, and leſs felt, than the preſent ſum of only ſixty-four thouſand two hundred and eighty pounds.

The convenience or inconvenience of paying a tax in money ariſes from the quantity of money that can be ſpared out of trade.

When the emiſſions ſtopt, the continent was left in poſſeſſion of two hundred millions of dollars, perhaps as equally diſperſed as it was poſſible for trade to do it. And as no more was to be iſſued, the riſe or fall of prices could neither increaſe nor diminiſh the quantity. It therefore remained the ſame through all the fluctuations of trade and exchange

Now had the exchange ſtood at twenty for one, which was the rate congreſs calculated upon when they quotad the ſtates the latter end of laſt year, trade would have been carried on for nearly four times leſs money than it is now, and conſequently the twenty millions would have been ſpared with much greater eaſe, and when collected would have been of almoſt four times the value they now are. And on the other hand, was the depreciation to be ninety or one hundred for one, the quantity required for trade would be more than at ſixty or ſeventy for one, and though the value of them would be leſs, the difficulty of ſparing the money out of trade would be greater. And on theſe facts and arguments I reſt the matter, to prove that it is not the want of property, but the ſcarcity of the medium by which the proportion of property for taxation is to be meaſured out, that makes the embarraſſment we lie under. There is not money enough, and what is equally as true, the people will not let there be money enough.

While I am on the ſubject of the currency, I ſhall offer one remark which will appear true to every body, and can be accounted for by nobody, which is, that the better the times were, the worſe the money grew; and the worſe the times were, the better the money ſtood. It never depreciated by any advantage obtained by the enemy. The troubles of ſeventy-ſix, and the loſs of Philadelphia in

ſeventy ſeven, made no ſenſible impreſſion on it, and every one knows that the ſurrender of Charleſton did not produce the leaſt alteration in the rate of exchange, which for long before, and for more than three months after, ſtood at ſixty for one. It ſeems as if the certainty of its being our own, made us careleſs of its value, and that the moſt diſtant thoughts of loſing it made us hug it the cloſer, like ſomething we were loth to part with; or that we depreciate it for our paſtime, which, when called to ſerioufneſs by the enemy, we leave off to renew again at our leiſure. In ſhort our good luck ſeems to break us, and our bad make us whole.

Paſſing on from this digreſſion, I ſhall now endeavour to bring into one view the ſeveral parts I have already ſtated, and form thereon ſome propoſitions, and conclude.

I have placed before the reader, the average tax per head paid by the people of England; which is forty ſhillings ſterling.

And I have ſhewn the rate on an average per head, which will defray all the expences of the war to us, and ſupport the ſeveral governments without running the country into debt, which is thirteen ſhillings and four pence.

I have ſhewn what the peace eſtabliſhment may be conducted for, viz. an eighth part of what it would be, if under the government of Britain.

And I have likewiſe ſhewn what the average per head of the preſent taxes are, namely, three ſhillings and five pence ſterling, or three pence two-fifths per month; and that their whole yearly value, in ſterling, is only ſixty-four thouſand two hundred and eighty pounds. Whereas our quota, to keep the payments equal with the expences, is two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds. Conſequently, there is a deficiency of one hundred and eighty-five thouſand ſeven hundred and twenty pounds, and the ſame proportion of defect, according to the ſeveral quotas, happens in every other ſtate. And this defect is the cauſe why the army has been ſo indifferently fed, clothed and paid. It is the cauſe, likewiſe, of the nerveleſs ſtate of the campaign, and the inſecurity of the country. Now, if a tax equal to thirteen and four pence per head, will remove all theſe difficulties, make people ſecure in their homes, leave them to follow the buſineſs of their ſtores and farms unmoleſted, and not only keep out, but drive out the enemy from the country; and if the neglect of raiſing this ſum will let them in, and produce the evils which might be prevented—on which ſide, I aſk, does the wiſdom, intereſt

and policy lie? Or, rather, would it not be an infult to reafon to put the queftion? The fum, when proportioned out according to the feveral abilities of the people, can hurt no one, but an inroad from the enemy ruins hundreds of families.

Look at the deftruction done in this city. The many houfes totally deftroyed, and others damaged; the waſte of fences in the country round it, befides the plunder of furniture, forage and proviſion. I do not fuppofe that half a million ſterling would reinſtate the ſufferers; and, does this, I aſk, bear any proportion to the expence that would make us ſecure. The damage, on an average, is at leaſt ten pounds ſterling per head, which is as much as thirteen ſhillings and four pence per head comes to for fifteen years. The ſame has happened on the frontiers, and in the Jerſeys, New-York, and other places where the enemy has been—Carolina and Georgia are likewiſe ſuffering the ſame fate.

That the people generally do not underſtand the inſufficiency of the taxes to carry on the war, is evident, not only from common obſervation, but from the conſtruction of ſeveral petitions, which were preſented to the aſſembly of this ſtate, againſt the recommendation of Congreſs of the 18th of March laſt, for taking up and funding the preſent currency at forty for one, and iſſuing new money in its ſtead. The prayer of the petition was, *That the currency might be appreciated by taxes* (meaning the preſent taxes) *and that part of the taxes be applied to the ſupport of the army, if the army could not be otherwiſe ſupported.* Now it could not have been poſſible for ſuch a petition to have been preſented, had the petitioners known, that ſo far from *part* of the taxes being ſufficient for the ſupport of the army, the *whole* of them falls three-fourths ſhort of the year's expences.

Before I proceed to propoſe methods by which a ſufficiency of money may be raiſed, I ſhall take a ſhort view of the general ſtate of the country.

Notwithſtanding the weight of the war, the ravages of the enemy, and the obſtructions ſhe has thrown in the way of trade and commerce, ſo ſoon does a young country out grow misfortune, that America has already ſurmounted many that once heavily oppreſſed her. For the firſt year or two of the war, we were ſhut up within our ports, ſcarce venturing to look towards the ocean. Now our rivers are beautified with large and valuable veſſels, our ſtores filled with merchandize, and the produce of the country has a ready market, and an advantageous price. Gold and ſilver, that for a while ſeemed to have retreated

again within the bowels of the earth, is once more riſen into circulation, and every day adds new ſtrength to trade, commerce, and agriculture. In a pamphlet written by Sir John Dalrymple, and diſperſed in America in the year 1775, he aſſerted, that, *two twenty gun ſhips, nay, ſays he, tenders of thoſe ſhips, ſtationed between Albemarle ſound and Cheſapeak bay would ſhut up the trade of America for* 600 *miles.* How little did Sir John Dalrymple know of the abilities of America!

While under the government of Britain, the trade of this country was loaded with reſtrictions. It was only a few foreign ports we were allowed to ſail to. Now it is otherwiſe; and allowing that the quantity of trade is but half what it was before the war, the caſe muſt ſhew the vaſt advantage of an open trade, becauſe the preſent quantity under her reſtrictions could not ſupport itſelf; from which I infer, that if half the quantity without the reſtrictions can bear itſelf up nearly, if not quite, as well as the whole when ſubject to them, how proſperous muſt the condition of America be when the whole ſhall return open with all the world. By trade I do not mean the employment of a merchant only, but the whole intereſt and buſineſs of the country taken collectively.

It is not ſo much my intention, by this publication, to propoſe particular plans for raiſing money, as it is to ſhew the neceſſity and the advantages to be derived from it. My principal deſign is to form the diſpoſition of the people to ſuch meaſures which I am fully perſuaded is their intereſt and duty to adopt, and which needs no other force to accompliſh them than the force of being felt. But as every hint may be uſeful, I ſhall throw out a ſketch, and leave others to make ſuch improvements upon it as to them may appear reaſonable.

The annual ſum wanted is two millions, and the average rate in which it falls is thirteen ſhillings and four pence per head.

Suppoſe then that we raiſe half the ſum and ſixty thouſand pounds over. The average rate thereof will be ſeven ſhillings per head.

In this caſe we ſhall have half the ſupply we want and an annual fund of ſixty thouſand pounds whereon to borrow the other million; becauſe ſixty thouſand pounds is the intereſt of a million at ſix per cent. and if at the end of another year we ſhould be obliged, by the continuance of the war, to borrow another million, the taxes will be increaſed to ſeven ſhillings and ſix pence; and thus for every million borrowed, an additional tax equal to ſix pence per head muſt be levied.

The ſum then to be raiſed next year will be one million and ſixty

thouſand pounds: One half of which I would propoſe ſhould be raiſed by duties on imported goods and prize goods, and the other half by a tax on landed property and houſes, or ſuch other means as each ſtate may deviſe.

But as the duties on imports and prize goods muſt be the ſame in all the ſtates, therefore the rate per cent. or what other form the duty ſhall be laid, muſt be aſcertained and regulated by Congreſs, and ingrafted in that form into the law of each ſtate; and the monies ariſing therefrom carried into the treaſury of each ſtate. The duties to be paid in gold or ſilver.

There are many reaſons why a duty on imports is the moſt convenient duty or tax that can be collected; one of which is, becauſe the whole is payable in a few places in a country, and it likewiſe operates with the greateſt eaſe and equality, becauſe as every one pays in proportion to what he conſumes, ſo people in general conſume in proportion to what they can afford, and therefore the tax is regulated by the abilities which every man ſuppoſes himſelf to have, or in other words every man becomes his own aſſeſſor, and pays by a little at a time when it ſuits him to buy. Beſides, it is a tax which people may pay or let alone by not conſuming the articles; and though the alternative may have no influence on their conduct, the power of chooſing is an agreeable thing to the mind. For my own part, it would be a ſatisfaction to me, was there a duty on all ſorts of liquors during the war, as in my idea of things it would be an addition to the pleaſures of ſociety, to know, that when the health of the army goes round, a few drops from every glaſs become theirs. How often have I heard an emphatical wiſh almoſt accompanied with a tear, "*Oh, that our poor fellows in the field had ſome of this!*" Why then need we ſuffer under a fruitleſs ſympathy, when there is a way to enjoy both the wiſh and the entertainment at once?

But the great national policy of putting a duty upon imports is, that it either keeps the foreign trade in our own hands, or draws ſomething for the defence of the country from every foreigner who participates it with us.

Thus much for the firſt half of the taxes, and as each ſtate will beſt deviſe means to raiſe the other half, I ſhall confine my remarks to the reſources of this ſtate.

The quota then of this ſtate of one million and ſixty thouſand pounds will be one hundred and thirty three thouſand two hundred

and fifty pounds, the half of which is ſixty-ſix thouſand ſix hundred and twenty-five pounds; and ſuppoſing one fourth part of Pennſylvania inhabited, then a tax of one buſhel of wheat on every twenty acres of land, one with another, would produce the ſum, and all the preſent taxes to ceaſe. Whereas the tithes of the biſhops and clergy in England, excluſive of the taxes, are upwards of half a buſhel of wheat on *every ſingle* acre of land, good and bad, throughout the nation.

In the former part of this paper I mentioned the militia fines, but reſerved ſpeaking to the matter, which I ſhall now do: The ground I ſhall put it upon is, that two millions ſterling a-year will ſupport a ſufficient army, and all the expences of war and government, without having recourſe to the inconvenient method of continually calling men from their employments, which of all others is the moſt expenſive and the leaſt ſubſtantial. I conſider the revenues created by taxes as the firſt and principal thing, and fines only as ſecondary and accidental things. It was not the intention of the militia law to apply the militia fines to any thing elſe but the ſupport of the militia, neither do they produce any revenue to the ſtate, yet theſe fines amount to more than all the taxes; for taking the muſter-roll to be ſixty thouſand men, the fine on forty thouſand who may not attend, will be ſixty thouſand pounds ſterling, and thoſe who muſter, will give up a portion of time equal to half that ſum, and if the eight claſſes ſhould be called within the year, and one third turn out, the fine on the remaining forty thouſand would amount to ſeventy-two millions of dollars, beſides the fifteen ſhillings on every hundred pounds property, and the charge of ſeven and an half per cent. for collecting in certain inſtances, which on the whole would be upwards of two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds ſterling.

Now if thoſe very fines diſable the country from raiſing a ſufficient revenue without producing an equivalent advantage, would it not be to the eaſe and intereſt of all parties to encreaſe the revenue, in the manner I have propoſed, or any better, if a better can be deviſed, and ceaſe the operation of the fines? I would ſtill keep the militia as an organized body of men, and ſhould there be a real neceſſity to call them forth, pay them out of the proper revenues of the ſtate, and encreaſe the taxes a third or fourth per cent. on thoſe who do not attend. My limits will not allow me to go farther into this matter, which I ſhall therefore cloſe with this remark; that fines are, of all modes of revenue, the moſt unſuited to the mind of a free country. When a man

pays a tax, he knows the public neceſſity requires it, and therefore feels a pride in diſcharging his duty; but a fine ſeems an atonement for neglect of duty, and of conſequence is paid with diſcredit, and frequently levied with ſeverity.

I have now only one ſubject more to ſpeak to, with which I ſhall conclude, which is, the reſolve of congreſs of the 18th of March laſt, for taking up and funding the preſent currency at forty for one, and iſſuing new money in its ſtead.

Every one knows I am not the flatterer of congreſs, but in this inſtance *they are right;* and if that meaſure is ſupported, the currency will acquire a value, which without it, it will not. But this is not all: It will give relief to the finances until ſuch time as they can be properly arranged, and ſave the country from being immediately double taxed under the preſent mode. In ſhort, ſupport that meaſure, and it will ſupport you.

I have now waded through a tedious courſe of difficult buſineſs, and over an untrodden path. The ſubject on every point it could be viewed was entangled with perplexities, and enveloped in obſcurity, yet ſuch are the reſources of America, that ſhe wants nothing but ſyſtem to ſecure ſucceſs.

COMMON SENSE.

THE CRISIS.—NUMBER X.

ON THE KING OF ENGLAND'S SPEECH.

OF all the innocent paſſions which actuate the human mind, there is none more univerſally prevalent than curioſity. It reaches all mankind, and in matters which concern us, or concern us not, it alike provokes in us a deſire to know.

Although the ſituation of America, ſuperior to every effort to enſlave her, and daily riſing to importance and opulence, hath placed her above the region of anxiety, it ſtill left her within the circle of curioſity; and her fancy to ſee the ſpeech of a man who had proudly threatened to bring her to his feet, was viſibly marked with that tranquil confidence which cared nothing about its contents. It was enquired after with a ſmile, read with a laugh, and diſmiſſed with diſdain.

But, as juſtice is due, even to an enemy, it is right to ſay, that the ſpeech is as well managed as the embarraſſed condition of their affairs could well admit of; and though ſcarce a line of it is true, except the mournful ſtory of Cornwallis, it may ſerve to amuſe the deluded commons and people of England, for whom it was calculated.

"The war," ſays the ſpeech, "is ſtill unhappily prolonged by that "reſtleſs ambition which firſt excited our enemies to commence it, "and which ſtill continues to diſappoint my earneſt wiſhes and dili- "gent exertions to reſtore the public tranquility."

How eaſy it is to abuſe truth and language, when men, by habitual wickedneſs, have learned to ſet juſtice at defiance. That the very man who began the war, who, with the moſt ſullen inſolence refuſed to anſwer, and even to hear the humbleſt of all petitions, who hath encouraged his officers and his army in the moſt ſavage cruelties, and the moſt ſcandalous plunderings, who hath ſtirred up the Indians on one ſide, and the Negroes on the other, and invoked every aid of hell in his behalf, ſhould now with an affected air of pity turn the tables from himſelf, and charge on another the wickedneſs that is his own, can only be equalled by the baſeneſs of the heart that ſpoke it.

TO BE NOBLY WRONG IS MORE MANLY THAN TO BE MEANLY RIGHT, is an expreſſion I once uſed on a former occaſion, and it is equally applicable now. We feel ſomething like reſpect for conſiſtency even in error. We lament the virtue that is debauched into a vice, but the vice that affects a virtue, becomes the more deteſtable: And amongſt the various aſſumptions of character, which hypocriſy has taught, and men have practiſed, there is none that raiſes a higher reliſh of diſguſt, than to ſee diſappointed inveteracy twiſting itſelf, by the moſt viſible falſhoods, into an appearance of piety it has no pretenſions to.

"But I ſhould not," continues the ſpeech, "anſwer the truſt "committed to the ſovereign of a FREE PEOPLE, nor make a "ſuitable return to my ſubjects for their conſtant, zealous, and "affectionate attachment to my perſon, family and government, if I "conſented to ſacrifice, either to my own deſire of peace, or "to their temporary eaſe and relief, THOSE ESSENTIAL "RIGHTS AND PERMANENT INTERESTS, upon the "maintenance and preſervation of which, the future ſtrength and "ſecurity of this country muſt principally depend."

That the man whoſe ignorance and obſtinacy firſt involved and

ſtill continues the nation in the moſt hopeleſs and expenſive of all wars, ſhould now meanly flatter them with the name of a FREE PEOPLE, and make a merit of his crime, under the diſguiſe of their eſſential rights and permanent intereſts, is ſomething which diſgraces even the character of perverſeneſs. Is he afraid they will ſend him to Hanover, or what does he fear? Why is the ſycophant thus added to the hypocrite, and the man who pretends to govern, ſunk into the humble and ſubmiſſive memorialiſt?

What thoſe eſſential rights and permanent intereſts are, on which the future ſtrength and ſecurity of England muſt principally DEPEND, are not ſo much as alluded to. They are words which impreſs nothing but the ear, and are calculated only for the ſound.

But if they have any reference to America, then do they amount to the diſgraceful confeſſion, that England, who once aſſumed to be her protectreſs, is now become her DEPENDENT. The Britiſh king and miniſtry are conſtantly holding up the veſt importance which America is of to England, in order to allure the nation to carry on the war: Now whatever ground there is for this idea, it ought to have operated as a reaſon for not beginning it; and therefore they ſupport their preſent meaſures at their own diſgrace, becauſe the arguments they now uſe, are a direct reflexion on their former policy.

"The favourable appearance of affairs," continues the ſpeech, "in "the Eaſt Indies and the ſafe arrival of the numerous commercial "fleets of my kingdom muſt have given you ſatisfaction."

That things are not QUITE ſo bad every where as in America may be ſome cauſe of conſolation, but can be none for triumph. One broken leg is better than two, but ſtill it is not joy: and let the appearance of affairs in the Eaſt-Indies be ever ſo favourable, they are nevertheleſs worſe than at firſt, without a proſpect of their ever being better. But the mournful ſtory of Cornwallis was yet to be told, and it was neceſſary to give it the ſofteſt introduction poſſible.

"But in the courſe of this year," continues the ſpeech, "my aſſi- "duous endeavours to guard the extenſive dominions of my crown, "have not been attended with ſucceſs equal to the juſtice and upright- "neſs of my views." ———What juſtice and uprightneſs there was in beginning a war with America the world will judge of, and the unequalled barbarity with which it has been conducted is not to be worn from the memory by the cant of ſnivelling hypocriſy.

"And it is with GREAT CONCERN that I inform you that "the events of war have been very unfortunate to my arms in Vir-

" ginia, having ended in the loſs of my forces in that province."—— And OUR great concern is that they are not all ſerved in the ſame manner.

" No endeavours have been wanting on my part," ſays the ſpeech, " to extinguiſh that ſpirit of rebellion which our enemies have found " means to foment and maintain in the colonies; and to reſtore to my " DELUDED SUBJECTS in America that happy and proſpe- " rous condition which they formerly derived from a due obedience " to the laws."

The expreſſion of DELUDED SUBJECTS is become ſo hack- nied and contemptable, and the more ſo when we ſee them making priſoners of whole armies at a time, that the pride of not being laughed at would induce a man of common ſenſe to leave it off. But the moſt offenſive falſehood in the paragraph, is the attributing the proſperity of America to a wrong cauſe. It was the unremitted induſtry of the ſettlers and their deſcendants, the hard labour and toil of perſever- ing fortitude that were the true cauſes of the proſperity of Ame- rica. The former tyranny of England ſerved to people it, and the virtue of the adventurers to improve it. Aſk the man who with his axe hath cleared a way in the wilderneſs and now poſſeſſes an eſtate, what made him rich, and he will tell you the labour of his hands, the ſweat of his brow and the bleſſing of heaven. Let Britain but leave America to herſelf and ſhe aſks no more. She has riſen into great- neſs without the knowledge and againſt the will of England, and has a right to the unmoleſted enjoyment of her own created wealth.

" I will order, " ſays the ſpeech, " the eſtimates of the enſuing year " to be laid before you. I rely on your wiſdom and public ſpirit for " ſuch ſupplies as the circumſtances of our affairs ſhall be found to " require. Among the many ill conſequences which attend the con- " tinuation of the preſent war, I muſt ſincerely regret the additional " burdens which it muſt unavoidably bring upon my faithful ſub- " jects."

Strange! That a nation muſt run through ſuch a labyrinth of trou- ble, and expend ſuch a maſs of wealth to gain the wiſdom which an hour's reflection might have taught. The final ſuperiority of Ame- rica over every attempt which an iſland might make to conquer her, was as naturally marked in the conſtitution of things, as the future ability of a giant over a dwarf is delineated in his features while an infant. How far Providence, to accompliſh purpoſes, which no hu- man wiſdom could foreſee, permitted ſuch extraordinary errors, will

be believed by ſome and doubted by others, and ſtill a ſecret in the womb of time, muſt reſt till futurity ſhall give it birth.

" In the proſecution of this great and important conteſt," ſays the ſpeech, " in which we are engaged, I retain a firm confidence in the " PROTECTION OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE, and a per- " fect conviction in the juſtice of my cauſe, and I have no doubt, but, " that by the concurrence and ſupport of my parliament, by the va- " lour of my fleets and armies, and by a vigourous, animated, and " united exertion of the faculties and reſources of my people, I ſhall " be enabled to reſtore the bleſſings of a ſafe and honourable peace " to all my dominions."

The king of England is one of the readieſt believers in the world. In the beginning of the conteſt he paſſed an act to put America out of the protection of the crown of England, and though Providence, for ſeven years together hath put him out of HER protection, ſtill the man has no doubt. Like Pharoah on the edge of the Red ſea, he ſees not the plunge he is making, and precipitately drives acroſs the flood that is cloſing over his head.

I think it is a reaſonable ſuppoſition, that this part of the ſpeech was compoſed before the arrival of the news of the capture of Cornwallis: for it certainly has no relation to their condition at the time it was ſpoken. But, be this as it may, it is nothing to us. Our line is fixt. Our lot is caſt. And America, the child of fate, is arriving at maturity. We have nothing to do but by a ſpirited and quick exertion, to ſtand prepared for war or peace. Too great to yield, and too noble to inſult; ſuperior to misfortune, and generous in ſucceſs, let us untaintedly preſerve the character we have gained, and ſhow to future ages, an example of unequalled magnanimity. There is ſomething in the cauſe and conſequence of America that has drawn on her the attention of all mankind. The world has ſeen her brave. Her love of liberty; her ardour in ſupporting it; the juſtice of her claims, and the conſtancy of her fortitude has won her the eſteem of Europe, and attached to her intereſt the firſt power of that country.

Her ſituation now is ſuch, that to whatever point, paſt, preſent or to come ſhe caſts her eyes, new matter riſes to convince her ſhe is right. In her conduct towards her enemy, no reproachful ſentiment lurks in ſecret. No ſenſe of injuſtice is left upon the mind. Untainted with ambition and a ſtranger to revenge, her progreſs hath been marked by Providence, and ſhe, in every ſtage of the conflict has bleſt her with ſucceſs.

But let not America wrap herſelf up in deluſive hope and ſuppoſe the buſineſs done. The leaſt remiſsneſs in preparation, the leaſt relax in execution, will only ſerve to prolong the war and increaſe expences. If our enemies can draw conſolation from misfortune and exert themſelves upon deſpair, how much more ought we, who are to win a continent by the conqueſt and have already an earneſt of ſucceſs.

Having in the preceding part made my remarks on the ſeveral matters which the ſpeech contains, I ſhall now make my remarks on what it does not contain.

There is not a ſyllable in it reſpecting alliances. Either the injuſtice of Britain is too glaring, or her condition too deſperate, or both, for any neighbouring power to come to her ſupport. In the beginning of the conteſt, when ſhe had only America to contend with, ſhe hired aſſiſtance from Heſſe and other ſmaller ſtates of Germany, and for nearly three years did America, young, raw, undiſciplined and unprovided, ſtand againſt the power of Britain, aided by twenty thouſand foreign troops, and made a complete conqueſt of one entire army. The remembrance of thoſe things ought to inſpire us with confidence and greatneſs of mind, and carry us through every remaining difficulty with content and chearfulneſs. What are the little ſufferings of the preſent day, compared with the hardſhips that are paſt. There was a time, when we had neither houſe nor home in ſafety; when every hour was the hour of alarm and danger; when the mind, tortured with anxiety knew no repoſe, and every thing but hope and fortitude, was bidding us farewel.

It is of uſe to look back upon theſe things; to call to mind the times of trouble and the ſcenes of complicated anguiſh that are paſt and gone. Then every expence was cheap, compared with the dread of conqueſt and the miſery of ſubmiſſion. We did not ſtand debating upon trifles, nor contending about the neceſſary and unavoidable charges of defence. Every one bore his lot of ſuffering, and looked forward to happier days and ſcenes of reſt.

Perhaps one of the greateſt dangers which any country can be expoſed to ariſes from a kind of trifling which ſometimes ſteals upon the mind when it ſuppoſes the danger paſt; and this unſafe ſituation marks at this time the peculiar criſis of America. What would ſhe once have given, to have known that her condition at this day ſhould be what it now is? and yet we do not ſeem to place a proper value upon it, nor vigorouſly purſue the neceſſary meaſures to ſecure it. We know we cannot be defended, nor yet defend ourſelves, without

trouble and expence. We have no right to expect it; neither ought we to look for it. We are a people, who, in our situation, differ from all the world. We form one common floor of public good, and, whatever is our charge, it is paid for our own interest and upon our own account.

Misfortune and experience have now taught us system and method; and the arrangements for carrying on the war are reduced to rule and order. The quota of the several states are ascertained, and I intend in a future publication to shew what they are, and the necessity as well as the advantages of vigorously providing them.

In the mean time, I shall conclude this paper with an instance of *British clemency*, from Smollet's History of England, volume the 11th, page 239, printed in London. It will serve to shew how dismal is the situation of a conquered people, and that the only security is an effectual defence.

We all know that the Stuart family and the house of Hanover opposed each other for the crown of England. The Stuart family stood first in the line of succession, but the other was the most successful.

In July, 1745, Charles, the son of the exiled king, landed in Scotland, collected a small force, at no time exceeding five or six thousand men, and made some attempts to re-establish his claim. The late duke of Cumberland, uncle to the present king of England, was sent against him, and on the 16th of April following Charles was totally defeated at Culloden, in Scotland. Success and power are the only situations in which clemency can be shewn, and those who are cruel, because they are victorious, can, with the same facility, act any other degenerate characters.

"Immediately after the decisive action at Culloden, the duke of Cumberland took possession of Inverness; where six and thirty deserters, convicted by a court martial, were ordered to be executed: Then he detached several parties to ravage the country. One of these apprehended the lady Mackintosh, who was sent prisoner to Inverness, plundered her house, and drove away her cattle, though her husband was actually in the service of the government. The castle of lord Lovat was destroyed. The French prisoners were sent to Carlisle and Penrith: Kilmarnock, Balmerino, Cromartie, and his son the lord Macleod, were conveyed by sea to London; and those of an inferior rank were confined in different prisons. The marquis of Tullibardine together with a brother of the earl of Dunmore, and

Murray the pretender's ſecretary, were ſeized and tranſported to the Tower of London, to which the earl of Traquair had been committed on ſuſpicion; and the eldeſt ſon of lord Lovat was impriſoned in the caſtle of Edinburgh. In a word, all the gaols of Great-Britain, from the capital northwards, were filled with thoſe unfortunate captives; and great numbers of them were crowded together in the holds of ſhips, where they periſhed in the moſt deplorable manner, for want of air and exerciſe. Some rebel chiefs eſcaped in two French frigates that arrived on the coaſt of Lochaber about the end of April, and engaged three veſſels belonging to his Britannic majeſty, which they obliged to retire. Others embarked on board a ſhip on the coaſt of Buchan, and were conveyed to Norway, from whence they travelled to Sweden. In the month of May, the duke of Cumberland advanced with the army into the Highlands, as far as Fort-Auguſtus, where he encamped; and ſent off detachments on all hands, to hunt down the fugitives, and lay waſte the country with fire and ſword. The caſtles of Glengary and Lochiel were plundered and burned; every houſe, hut, or habitation, met with the ſame fate, without diſtinction; and all the cattle and proviſion were carried off; the men were either ſhot upon the mountains, like wild beaſts, or put to death in cold blood, without form of trial; the women, after having ſeen their huſbands and fathers murdered, were ſubjected to brutal violation, and then turned out naked, with their children, to ſtarve on the barren heaths. One whole family was incloſed in a barn, and conſumed to aſhes. Thoſe miniſters of vengeance were ſo alert in the execution of their office, that in a few days there was neither houſe, cottage, man, nor beaſt, to be ſeen within the compaſs of fifty miles; all was ruin, ſilence, and deſolation."

I have here preſented the reader with one of the moſt ſhocking inſtances of cruelty ever practiſed, and I leave it to reſt on his mind, that he may be fully impreſſed with a ſenſe of the deſtruction he has eſcaped in caſe Britain had conquered America; and likewiſe, that he may ſee and feel the neceſſity, as well for his own perſonal ſafety, as for the honour, the intereſt, the happineſs of the whole community, to omit or delay no one preparation neceſſary to ſecure the ground we ſo happily ſtand upon.

TO THE PEOPLE OF AMERICA.

On the Expences, Arrangements and Diſburſements for carrying on the War, and finiſhing it with Honour and Advantage.

When any neceſſity or occaſion has pointed out the convenience of addreſſing the public, I have never made it a conſideration whether the ſubject was popular or unpopular, but whether it was right or wrong; for that which is right will become popular, and that which is wrong, though by miſtake it may obtain the cry or faſhion of the day, will ſoon loſe the power of deluſion, and ſink into diſeſteem.

A remarkable inſtance of this happened in the caſe of Silas Deane; and I mention this circumſtance with the greater eaſe, becauſe the poiſon of this hypocriſy ſpread over the whole country, and every man, almoſt without exception, thought me wrong in oppoſing him. The beſt friends I then had, except Mr. Laurens, ſtood at a diſtance, and this tribute, which is due to his conſtancy, I pay to him with reſpect, and that the readier, becauſe he is not here to hear it. If it reaches him in his impriſonment, it will afford him an agreeable reflection.

"*As he roſe like a rocket, he would fall like the ſtick,*" is a metaphor which I applied to Mr. Deane in the firſt piece which I publiſhed reſpecting him, and he has exactly fulfilled the deſcription. The credit he ſo unjuſtly obtained from the public, he loſt in almoſt as ſhort a time. The deluſion periſhed as it fell, and he ſoon ſaw himſelf ſtripped of popular ſupport. His more intimate acquaintance began to doubt and to deſert him long before he left America, and at his departure he ſaw himſelf the object of general ſuſpicion. When arrived in France, he endeavoured to effect by treaſon what he had failed to accompliſh by fraud. His plans, ſchemes and projects, together with his expectation of being ſent to Holland to negociate a loan of money, had all miſcarried. He then began traducing and accuſing America of every crime, which could injure her reputation. "That ſhe was "a ruined country; that ſhe only meant to make a tool of France, "to get what money ſhe could out of her, and then to leave her, and "accommodate with Britain." Of all which, and much more, Colonel Laurens and myſelf, when in France, informed Dr. Franklin, who had not before heard of it. And to compleat the character of a traitor, he has, by letters to this country ſince, ſome of which, in his own hand writing, are now in the poſſeſſion of Congreſs, uſed every expreſſion and argument in his power to injure the reputation of France, and to adviſe America to renounce her alliance, and ſurrender

up her independence.* Thus in France, he abuſes America, and in his letters to America he abuſes France; and is endeavouring to create diſunion between the two countries, by the ſame arts of double-dealing by which he cauſed diſſentions among the Commiſſioners in Paris, and diſtractions in America. But his life has been fraud, and his character is that of a plodding, plotting, cringing mercenary, capable of any diſguiſe that ſuited his purpoſe. His final detection has very happily cleared up thoſe miſtakes, and removed thoſe uneaſineſſes, which his unprincipled conduct occaſioned. Every one now ſees him in the ſame light; for towards friends or enemies he acted with the ſame deception and injuſtice, and his name, like that of *Arnold*, ought now to be forgotten among us. As this is the firſt time I have mentioned him ſince my return from France, it is my intention it ſhall be the laſt. —From this digreſſion, which for ſeveral reaſons I thought neceſſary to give, I now proceed to the purport of my addreſs.

I conſider the war of America againſt Britain as the country's war, the public's war, or the war of the people in their own behalf, for the ſecurity of their natural rights, and the protection of their own property. It is not the war of Congreſs, the war of the Aſſemblies, or the war of Government, in any line whatever. The country firſt, by a mutual compact, reſolved to defend their rights and maintain their independence, *at the hazard of their lives and fortunes*. They elected their Repreſentatives, by whom they appointed their members to Congreſs, and ſaid, *act you for us, and we will ſupport you*. This is the true ground and principle of the war on the part of America, and, conſequently, there remains nothing to do, but for every one to fulfil his obligation.

It was next to impoſſible that a new country, engaged in a new undertaking, could ſet off ſyſtematically right at firſt. She ſaw not the extent of the ſtruggle ſhe was involved in, neither could ſhe avoid the beginning. She ſuppoſed every ſtep ſhe took, and every reſolu-

* *Mr. William Marſhal, of this city, formerly a pilot, who had been taken at ſea and carried to England, and got from thence to France, brought over letters from Mr. Deane to America, one of which was directed to* "Robert Morris, Eſq." *Mr. Morris ſent it unopened to Congreſs, and adviſed Mr. Marſhal to deliver the others there, which he did. The letters were of the ſame purport with thoſe which have been already publiſhed under the ſignature of* S. Deane, *to which they had frequent reference.*

tion ſhe formed, would bring her enemy to reaſon, and cloſe the conteſt. Thoſe failing, ſhe was forced into new meaſures; and theſe, like the former, being fitted to her expectations, and failing in their turn, left her continually unprovided and without ſyſtem. The enemy likewiſe was induced to proſecute the war, from the temporary expedients we adopted for carrying it on. We were continually expecting to ſee their credit exhauſted, and they were looking to ſee our currency fail; and thus, between their watching us and we them, the hopes of both have been deceived, and the childiſhneſs of the expectation has ſerved to increaſe the expence.

Yet who, through this wilderneſs of error, has been to blame? where is the man who can ſay, the fault has not in part been his? They were the natural unavoidable errors of the day. They were the errors of a whole country, which nothing but experience could detect, and time remove. Neither could the circumſtances of America admit of ſyſtem, till either the paper currency was fixed or laid aſide. No calculation of finance could be made on a medium failing without reaſon, and fluctuating without rule.

But there is one error which might have been prevented, and was not; and as it is not my cuſtom to flatter, but to ſerve mankind, I will ſpeak it freely. It certainly was the duty of every aſſembly on the continent to have known, at all times, what was the condition of its treaſury, and to have aſcertained at every period of depreciation, how much the real worth of the taxes fell ſhort of their nominal value. This knowledge, which might have been eaſily gained, would have enabled them to have kept their conſtituents well informed, which is one of the greateſt duties of repreſentation. They ought to have ſtudied and calculated the expences of the war, the quota of each State, and the conſequent proportion that would fall on each man's property for his defence; and this muſt eaſily have ſhewn to them, that a tax of an hundred pounds could not be paid by a buſhel of apples or an hundred of flour, which was often the caſe two or three years ago. But inſtead of this, which would have been plain and upright dealing, the little line of temporary popularity, the feather of an hour's duration, was too much purſued; and in this involved condition of things, every State, for the want of a little thinking, or a little information, ſuppoſed that it ſupported the whole expences of the war, when in fact it fell, by the time the tax was levied and collected, above three fourths ſhort of its own quota.

Impreſſed with a ſenſe of the danger to which the country was ex-

poſed by this lax method of doing buſineſs, and the prevailing errors of the day, I publiſhed, laſt October was a twelvemonth, *The Criſis Extraordinary*, on the revenues of America, and the yearly expence of carrying on the war. My eſtimation of the latter, together with the civil liſt of congreſs, and the civil liſt of the ſeveral ſtates, was two million pounds ſterling, which is very nearly nine millions of dollars.

Since that time, Congreſs have gone into a calculation, and have eſtimated the expences of the war department and the civil liſt of Congreſs (excluſive of the civil liſt of the ſeveral governments) at eight millions of dollars; and as the remaining million will be fully ſufficient for the civil liſt of the ſeveral States, the two calculations are exceedingly near each other.

The ſum of eight millions of dollars they have called upon the States to furniſh, and their quotas are as follows, which I ſhall preface with the reſolution itſelf.

By the United States in Congreſs aſſembled.

October 30th, 1781.

RESOLVED,

THAT the reſpective States be called upon to furniſh the Treaſury of the United States with their quotas of eighth millions of dollars, for the war department and civil liſt for the enſuing year, to be paid quarterly, in equal proportions, the firſt payment to be made on the firſt day of April next.

Reſolved, That a Committee, conſiſting of a member from each State, be appointed to apportion to the ſeveral States the quota of the above ſum.

November 2d.

The Committee, appointed to aſcertain the proportions of the ſeveral ſtates of the monies to be raiſed for the expences of the enſuing year, report the following reſolutions:

That the ſum of eight millions of dollars, as required to be raiſed by the reſolutions of the 30 th of October laſt, be paid by the States in the following proportion.

New-Hampſhire, - -	373,598
Maſſachuſetts. - - -	1307,596
Rhode-Iſland, - -	216,684
Connecticut - - - -	747,196
New-York - - -	373,598

New-Jerſey - - -	485,679
Pennſylvania, - -	1,120,794
Delaware, - - -	112,085
Maryland, - - - -	933,996
Virginia, - - -	1,307,594
North-Carolina, - -	622,677
South-Carolina, - - -	373,598
Georgia, - -	24,905
	8,000,000 Dollars.

Reſolved,

That it be recommended to the ſeveral States, to lay taxes for raiſing their quotas of money for the United States, ſeparate from thoſe laid for their own particular uſe.

On theſe reſolutions I ſhall offer ſeveral remarks.

Firſt. On the ſum itſelf, and the ability of the country.

Secondly. On the ſeveral quotas, and the nature of a union. And

Thirdly. On the manner of collection and expenditure.

Firſt. On the ſum itſelf, and the ability of the country. As I know my own calculation is as low as poſſible, and as the ſum called for by Congreſs, according to their calculation, agrees very nearly therewith, I am ſenſible it cannot poſſibly be lower. Neither can it be done for that, unleſs there is ready money to go to market with; and even in that caſe, it is only by the utmoſt management and economy that it can be made to do.

By the accounts which were laid before the Britiſh parliament laſt ſpring, it appeared that the charge of only ſubſiſting, that is feeding, their army in America, coſt annually four millions pounds ſterling, which is very nearly eighteen millions of dollars. Now if, for eight millions, we can feed, clothe, arm, provide for and pay an army ſufficient for our defence, the very compariſon ſhows that the money muſt be well laid out.

It may be of ſome uſe, either in debate or converſation, to attend to the progreſs of the expences of an army, becauſe it will enable us to ſee on what part any deficiency will fall.

The firſt thing is, to feed them and provide for the ſick.

Secondly, to clothe them.

Thirdly, to arm and furniſh them.

Fourthly, to provide means for removing them from place to place. And,

Fifthly, to pay them.

The first and second are absolutely necessary to them as men. The third and fourth are equally as necessary to them as an army. And the fifth is their just due. Now if the sum which shall be raised should fall short, either by the several acts of the States for raising it, or by the manner of collecting it, the deficiency will fall on the fifth head, the soldiers pay, which would be defrauding them, and eternally disgracing ourselves. It would be a blot on the councils, the country, and the revolution of America, and a man would hereafter be ashamed to own he had any hand in it.

But if the deficiency should be still shorter, it would next fall on the fourth head, *the means of removing the army from place to place;* and in this case, the army must either stand still where it can be of no use, or seize on horses, carts, waggons, or any means of transportation it can lay hold of; and in this instance the country suffers. In short every attempt to do a thing for less than it can be done for, is sure to become at last both a loss and a dishonour.

But the country cannot bear it say some. This has been the most expensive doctrine that ever was held out, and cost America millions of money for nothing. Can the country bear to be over-run, ravaged and ruined by an enemy, which will immediately follow where defence is wanting, and defence will ever be wanting where sufficient revenues are not provided. But this is only one part of the folly. The second is, that when the danger comes, invited in part by our not preparing against it, we have been obliged, in a number of instances, to expend double the sums, to do that which at first might have been done for half the money. But this is not all. A third mischief has been, that grain of all sorts, flour, beef, fodder, horses, carts, waggons, or whatever was absolutely or immediately wanted, have been taken without pay. Now, I ask, why was all this done, but from that extremely weak and expensive doctrine, *that the country could not bear it?* that is, that she could not bear, in the first instance, that which would have saved her twice as much at last; or, in proverbial language, that she could not bear to pay a penny to save a pound; the consequence of which has been, that she has paid a pound for a penny. Why are there so many unpaid certificates in almost every man's hands, but from the parsimony of not providing sufficient revenues? Besides, the doctrine contradicts itself; because, if the whole country cannot bear it, how is it possible that a part should? and yet this has been the case: For those things have been had; and they must be had; but the misfortune is, they have been had in a very unequal

manner and upon expenſive credit, whereas with ready money they might have been purchaſed for half the price, and no body diſtreſſed.

But there is another thought which ought to ſtrike us, which is, —How is the army to bear the want of food, clothing and other neceſſaries? The man who is at home, can turn himſelf a thouſand ways, and find as many means of eaſe, convenience or relief: But a ſoldier's life admits of none of thoſe: Their wants cannot be ſupplied from themſelves: For an army, though it is the defence of a ſtate, is at the ſame time the child of a country, and muſt be provided for in every thing.

And laſtly, The doctrine is falſe. There are not three millions of people, in any part of the univerſe, who live ſo well, or have ſuch a fund of ability as in America. The income of a common labourer, who is induſtrious, is equal to that of the generality of tradeſmen in England. In the mercantile line, I have not heard of one who could be ſaid to be a bankrupt ſince the war began, and in England they have been without number. In America almoſt every farmer lives on his own lands, and in England not one in a hundred does. In ſhort, it ſeems as if the poverty of that country had made them furious, and they were determined to riſk all to recover all.

Yet, notwithſtanding thoſe advantages on the part of America, true it is, that had it not been for the operation of taxes for our neceſſary defence, we had ſunk into a ſtate of ſloth and poverty: For there was more wealth loſt by neglecting to till the earth in the years 1776, 77 and 78, than the quota of the tax amounts to. That which is loſt by neglect of this kind, is loſt for ever; whereas that which is paid, and continues in that country, returns to us again; and at the ſame time that it provides us with defence, it operates not only as a ſpur but as a premium to our induſtry.

I ſhall now proceed to the ſecond head, viz. ON THE SEVERAL QUOTAS, AND THE NATURE OF A UNION.

There was a time when America had no other bond of union, than that of common intereſt and affection. The whole country flew to the relief of Boſton, and, making her cauſe their own, participated her cares and adminiſtered to her wants. The fate of war, ſince that day, has carried the calamity in a ten-fold proportion to the ſouthward; but in the mean time the union has been ſtrengthened by a legal compact of the States, jointly and ſeverally ratified, and that which before was choice, or the duty of affection, is now likewiſe the duty of legal obligation.

The union of America is the foundation ſtone of her independence; the rock on which it is built; and is ſomething ſo ſacred in her conſtitution, that we ought to watch every word we ſpeak, and every thought we think, that we injure it not, even by miſtake. When a multitude, extended, or rather ſcattered, over a continent, in the manner we are, mutually agree to form one common centre whereon the whole ſhall move, to accompliſh a particular purpoſe, all parts muſt act together and alike, or act not at all, and a ſtoppage in any one is a ſtoppage of the whole, at leaſt for a time.

Thus the ſeveral States have ſent Repreſentatives to aſſemble together in Congreſs, and they have empowered that body, which thus becomes their centre, and are no other than themſelves in repreſentation, to conduct and manage the war, while their conſtituents at home attend to the domeſtic cares of the country, their internal legiſlation, their farms, profeſſions or employments: For it is only by reducing complicated things to method and orderly connection that they can be underſtood with advantage, or purſued with ſucceſs.—Congreſs, by virtue of this delegation, eſtimates the expence, and apportions it out to the ſeveral parts of the empire according to their ſeveral abilities; and here the debate muſt end, becauſe each State has already had its voice, and the matter has undergone its whole portion of argument, and can no more be altered by any particular State, than a law of any State, after it has paſſed, can be altered by an individual. For with reſpect to thoſe things which immediately concern the union, and for which the union was purpoſely eſtabliſhed and is intended to ſecure, each State is to the United States what each individual is to the State he lives in. And it is on this grand point, this movement upon one centre, that our exiſtence as a nation, our happineſs as a people, and our ſafety as individuals, depend.

It may happen that ſome State or other may be ſomewhat over or under rated, but this cannot be much. The experience which has been had upon the matter has nearly aſcertained their ſeveral abilities. But even in this caſe, it can only admit of an appeal to the United States, but cannot authoriſe any State to make the alteration itſelf, any more than our internal government can admit an individual to do ſo in the caſe of an act of aſſembly; for if one State can do it, then may another do the ſame, and the inſtant this is done the whole is undone.

Neither is it ſuppoſable that any ſingle ſtate can be judge of all the comparative reaſons which may influence the collective body in

quotaing out the continent. The circumſtances of the ſeveral States are frequently varying, occaſioned by the accidents of war and commerce, and it will often fall upon ſome to help others, rather beyond what their exact proportion at another time might be; but even this aſſiſtance is as naturally and politically included in the idea of a union, as that of any particular aſſigned proportion; becauſe we know not whoſe turn it may be next to want aſſiſtance, for which reaſon that is the wiſeſt State which ſets the beſt example.

Though in matters of bounden duty and reciprocal affection, it is rather a degeneracy from the honeſty and ardour of the heart to admit any thing ſelfiſh to partake in the government of our conduct, yet in caſes where our duty, our affections, and our intereſt all coincide, it may be of ſome uſe to obſerve their union. The United States will become heir to an extenſive quantity of vacant land, and their ſeveral titles to ſhares and quotas thereof will naturally be adjuſted according to their relative quotas, during the war, excluſive of that inability which may unfortunately ariſe to any State by the enemy holding poſſeſſion of a part; but as this is a cold matter of intereſt, I paſs it by, and proceed to my third head, viz.

ON THE MANNER OF COLLECTION AND EXPENDITURE.

It hath been our error, as well as our misfortune, to blend the affairs of each State, eſpecially in money matters, with thoſe of the United States; whereas it is to our eaſe, convenience and intereſt to keep them ſeparate. The expences of the United States for carrying on the war, and the expences of each State for its own domeſtic government, are diſtinct things, and to involve them is a ſource of perplexity and a cloak for fraud. I love method, becauſe I ſee and am convinced of its beauty and advantage. It is that which makes all buſineſs eaſy and underſtood, and without which every thing becomes embarraſſed and difficult.

There are certain powers which the people of each State have delegated to their legiſlative and executive bodies, and there are other powers which the people of every State have delegated to Congreſs, among which is that of conducting the war, and, conſequently, of managing the expences attending it; for how elſe can that be managed, which concerns every State, but by a delegation from each. When a State has furniſhed its quota, it has an undoubted right to know how it has been applied, and it is as much the duty of Congreſs to in-

form the State of the one, as it is the duty of the State to provide the other.

In the reſolution of Congreſs already recited, it is recommended to the ſeveral States *to lay taxes for raiſing their quotas of money for the United States, ſeparate from thoſe laid for their own particular uſe.*

This is a moſt neceſſary point to be obſerved, and the diſtinction ſhould follow all the way through. They ſhould be levied, paid and collected ſeparately, and kept ſeparate in every inſtance. Neither have the civil officers of any State, or the government of that State, the leaſt right to touch that money which the people pay for the ſupport of their army and the war, any more than Congreſs has to touch that which each State raiſes for its own uſe.

This diſtinction will naturally be followed by another. It will occaſion every State to examine nicely into the expences of its civil liſt, and to regulate, reduce and bring it into better order than it has hitherto been; becauſe the money for that purpoſe muſt be raiſed apart, and accounted for to the public ſeparately. But while the monies of both were blended, the neceſſary nicety was not obſerved, and the poor ſoldier, who ought to have been the firſt, was the laſt who was thought of.

Another convenience will be, that the people, by paying the taxes ſeparately, will know what they are for; and will likewiſe know that thoſe which are for the defence of the country will ceaſe with the war, or ſoon after. For although, as I have before obſerved, the war is their own, and for the ſupport of their own rights and the protection of their own property, yet they have the ſame right to know, that they have to pay, and it is the want of not knowing that is often the cauſe of diſſatisfaction.

This regulation of keeping the taxes ſeparate has given riſe to a regulation in the office of finance, by which it is directed,

" That the receivers ſhall, at the end of every month, make out an exact account of the monies received by them reſpectively, during ſuch month, ſpecifying therein the names of the perſons from whom the ſame ſhall have been received, the dates and the ſums; which account they ſhall reſpectively cauſe to be publiſhed in one of the newſpapers of the State; to the end that every citizen may know how much of the monies collected from him, in taxes, is tranſmitted to the treaſury of the United States for the ſupport of the war; and alſo, that it may be known what monies have been at the order of the Superintendant of Finance. It being proper and neceſſary, that in a free coun-

try the people ſhould be as fully informed of the adminiſtration of their affairs as the nature of things will admit."

It is an agreeable thing to ſee a ſpirit of order and economy taking place, after ſuch a ſeries of errors and difficulties. A government or an adminiſtration, who means and acts honeſtly, has nothing to fear, and conſequently has nothing to conceal; and it would be of uſe if a monthly or quarterly account was to be publiſhed, as well of the expenditures as of the receipts. Eight millions of dollars muſt be huſbanded with an exceeding deal of care to make it do, and therefore, as the management muſt be reputable, the publication would be ſerviceable.

I have heard of petitions which have been preſented to the Aſſembly of this State (and probably the ſame may have happened in other States) praying to have the taxes lowered. Now the only way to keep taxes low is, for the United States to have ready money to go to market with; and though the taxes to be raiſed for the preſent year will fall heavy, and there will naturally be ſome difficulty in paying them, yet the difficulty, in proportion as money ſpreads about the country, will every day grow leſs, and in the end we ſhall ſave ſome millions of dollars by it. We ſee what a bitter, revengeful enemy we have to deal with, and any expence is cheap compared to their mercileſs paw. We have ſeen the unfortunate Carolineans hunted like partridges on the mountains, and it is only by providing means for our defence that we ſhall not be in the ſame condition. When we think or talk about taxes, we ought to recollect that we lie down in peace, and ſleep in ſafety; that we can follow our farms or ſtores, or other occupations, in proſperous tranquility; and that theſe ineſtimable bleſſings are procured to us by the taxes that we pay. In this view, our taxes are properly our inſurance-money; they are what we pay to be made ſafe, and in ſtrict policy are the beſt money we can lay out.

It was my intention to offer ſome remarks on the impoſt law of *five per cent.* recommended by Congreſs, and to be eſtabliſhed as a fund for the payment of the loan-office certificates and other debts of the United States; but I have already extended my piece beyond my intention. And as this fund will make our ſyſtem of finance compleat, and is ſtrictly juſt, and conſequently requires nothing but honeſty to do it, there needs but little to be ſaid upon it.

COMMON SENSE.

Philadelphia, March 5, 1782.

THE CRISIS.—NUMBER XI.

ON THE PRESENT STATE OF NEWS.

Philadelphia, May 22, 1782.

SINCE the arrival of two, if not three packets, in quick ſucceſſion, at New-York, from England, a variety of unconnected *news* has circulated through the country, and afforded as great a variety of ſpeculation.

That ſomething is the matter in the cabinet and councils of our enemies, on the other ſide of the water, is certain—that they have run their length of madneſs, and are under the neceſſity of changing their meaſures may eaſily be ſeen into; but to what this change of meaſures may amount, or how far it may correſpond with our intereſt, happineſs and duty, is yet uncertain; and from what we have hitherto experienced, we have too much reaſon to ſuſpect them in every thing.

I do not addreſs this publication ſo much to the people of America as to the Britiſh miniſtry, whoever they may be, for if it is their intention to promote any kind of negotiation, it is proper they ſhould know beforehand, that the United States have as much honour as bravery; and that they are no more to be ſeduced from their alliance than their allegiance; that their line of politics is formed, and not dependant, like that of their enemy, on chance and accident.

On our part, in order to know, at any time, what the Britiſh government will do, we have only to find out what they ought *not* to do, and this laſt will be their conduct. For ever changing and for ever wrong; too diſtant from America to improve circumſtances, and too unwiſe to foreſee them; ſcheming without principle, and executing without probability, their whole line of management has hitherto been blunder and baſeneſs. Every campaign is added to their loſs, and every year to their diſgrace; till unable to go on, and aſhamed to go back, their politics have come to a halt, and all their fine proſpects to a halter.

Could our affections forgive, or humanity forget, the wounds of an injured country—we might, under the influence of a momentary oblivion, ſtand ſtill and laugh. But they are engraven where no amuſement can conceal them, and of a kind for which there is no re-

compence. Can ye reſtore to us the beloved dead? Can ye ſay to the grave, Give up the murdered? Can ye obliterate from our memories thoſe who are no more? Think not then to tamper with our feelings by inſidious contrivance, nor ſuffocate our humanity by ſeducing us to diſhonour.

In March 1780, I publiſhed part of the Criſis, N°. VIII. in the newſpapers, but did not conclude it in the following papers, and the remainder has lain by me till the preſent day.

There appeared about that time ſome diſpoſition in the Britiſh cabinet to ceaſe the further proſecution of the war, and as I had formed my opinion, that whenever ſuch a deſign ſhould take place, it would be accompanied with a diſhonourable propoſition to America, reſpecting France, I had ſuppreſſed the remainder of that number, not to expoſe the baſeneſs of any ſuch propoſition. But the arrival of the next news from England, declared her determination to go on with the war, and conſequently as the political object I had then in view was not become a ſubject, it was unneceſſary in me to bring it forward, which is the reaſon it was never publiſhed.

The matter which I allude to in the unpubliſhed part I ſhall now make a quotation of, and apply it as the more enlarged ſtate of things, at this day, ſhall make convenient or neceſſary.

It was as follows:

"By the ſpeeches which have appeared from the Britiſh parliament, it is eaſy to perceive to what impolitic and imprudent exceſſes their paſſions and prejudices have, in every inſtance, carried them, during the preſent war. Provoked at the upright and honourable treaty between America and France, they imagined nothing more was neceſſary to be done to prevent its final ratification, than to promiſe, through the agency of their commiſſioners (Carliſle, Eden and Johnſton) a repeal of their once offenſive acts of parliament. The vanity of the conceit was as unpardonable as the experiment was impolitic. And ſo convinced am I of their wrong ideas of America, that I ſhall not wonder, if in their laſt ſtage of political phrenzy, they propoſe to her to break her alliance with France, and enter into one with them. Such a propoſition, ſhould it ever be made, and it has already been more than once hinted in parliament, would diſcover ſuch a diſpoſition to perfidiouſneſs, and ſuch diſregard of honour and morals, as would add the finiſhing vice to national corruption.—I do not mention this to put America on the watch, but to put England on her guard, that ſhe do not, in the looſeneſs of

her heart, envelope in disgrace every fragment of reputation."—Thus far the quotation.

By the complexion of some part of the news which has transpired through the New-York papers, it seems probable that this insidious era in the British politics is beginning to make its appearance. I wish it may not; for that which is a disgrace to human nature, throws something of a shade over all the human character, and the individual feels his share of the wound that is given to the whole.

The policy of Britain has ever been to divide America in some way or other. In the beginning of the dispute, she practised every art to prevent or destroy the union of the States, well knowing that could she once get them to stand singly, she could conquer them unconditionally. Failing in this project in America, she renewed it in Europe; and after the alliance had taken place, she made secret offers to France to induce her to give up America, and what is still more extraordinary, she at the same time made propositions to Doctor Franklin, then in Paris, the very court to which she was secretly applying, to draw off America from France. But this is not all.

On the 14th of September, 1778, the British court, through their secretary, lord Weymouth, made application to the marquis D'Almadovar the Spanish ambassador at London, to "ask the MEDIATION," for these were the words of the court of Spain, for the purpose of negociating a peace with France, leaving America (as I shall hereafter shew) out of the question. Spain readily offered her mediation, and likewise the city of Madrid as the place of conference, but withal, proposed that the United States of America should be invited to the treaty and considered as independent during the time the business was negociating. But this was not the view of England. She wanted to draw France from the war, that she might uninterruptedly pour out all her force and fury upon America: and being disappointed in this plan, as well through the open and generous conduct of Spain, as the determination of France, she refused the mediation she had solicited.

I shall now give some extracts from the justifying memorial of the Spanish court, in which she has set the conduct and character of Britain, with respect to America, in a clear and striking point of light.

The memorial, speaking of the refusal of the British court to meet in conference, with commissioners from the United States, who were to be considered as independent during the time of the conference, says,

" It is a thing very extraordinary and even ridiculous, that the court of London, who treats the colonies as independent, not only in acting, but of right, during the war, ſhould have a repugnance to treat them as ſuch only in acting during a truce of ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities. The convention of Saratoga: the reputing general Burgoyne as a lawful priſoner, in order to ſuſpend his trial; the exchange and liberating other priſoners made from the colonies; the having named commiſſioners to go and ſupplicate the Americans, at their own doors, requeſt peace of them, and treat with them and the congreſs; and finally, by a thouſand other acts of this ſort, authoriſed by the court of London, which have been, and are true ſigns of the acknowledgment of their independence.

" In aggravation to all the foregoing, at the ſame time the Britiſh cabinet anſwered the king of Spain in the terms already mentioned; they were inſinuating themſelves at the court of France by means of ſecret emiſſaries, and making very great offers to her to abandon the colonies and make peace with England. But there is yet more: for at this ſame time the Engliſh miniſtry were treating by means of another certain emiſſary with doctor Franklin, miniſter plenipotentiary from the colonies, reſiding at Paris, to whom they made various propoſals to diſunite them from France, and accommodate matters with England."

" From what has been obſerved it evidently follows, that the whole of the Britiſh politics was, to diſunite the two courts of Paris and Madrid, by means of the ſuggeſtions and offers ſhe ſeparately made to them; and alſo to ſeparate the colonies from their treaties and engagements entered into with France, and induce them to arm againſt the houſe of Bourbon, or MORE PROBABLY TO OPPRESS THEM WHEN THEY FOUND FROM BREAKING THEIR ENGAGEMENTS, THEY STOOD ALONE AND WITHOUT PROTECTORS."

" This therefore, is the net they laid for the American ſtates; that is to ſay, to tempt them with flattering and very magnificent promiſes to come to an accommodation with them, excluſive of any intervention of Spain or France, that the Britiſh miniſtry might always remain the arbiters of the fate of the colonies.

" But the Catholic king (the king of Spain) faithful on the one part to the engagements which bind him to the moſt Chriſtian king (the king of France) his nephew; juſt and upright on the other, to his own ſubjects, whom he ought to protect and guard againſt ſo

many infults; and finally, full of humanity and compaffion for the Americans and other individuals who fuffer in the prefent war; he is determined to purfue and profecute it, and to make all the efforts in his power, until he can obtain a folid and permanent peace, with full and fatisfactory fecurities that it fhall be obferved."

Thus far the memorial; a tranflation of which into Engliſh, may be feen in full, under the head of STATE PAPERS, in the Annual Regiſter, for 1779, page 367.

The extracts I have here given, ſerve to ſhew the various endeavours and contrivances of the enemy to draw France from her connection with America, and to prevail on her to make a ſeparate peace with England, leaving America totally out of the queſtion, and at the mercy of a mercileſs, unprincipled enemy. The opinion, likewiſe, which Spain has formed of the Britiſh cabinet character, for meanneſs and perfidiouſneſs, is ſo exactly the opinion of America, reſpecting it, that the memorial, in this inſtance, contains our own ſentiments and language; for people, however remote, who think alike will unavoidably ſpeak alike.

Thus we ſee the inſidious uſe which Britain endeavoured to make of the propoſitions for peace under the mediation of Spain—I ſhall now proceed to the ſecond propoſition under the mediation of the emperor of Germany and the empreſs of Ruſſia; the general out-line of which was, that a congreſs of the ſeveral powers at war ſhould meet at Vienna, in 1781, to ſettle preliminaries of peace.

I could wiſh myſelf at liberty to make uſe of all the information I am poſſeſſed of on this ſubject, but as there is a delicacy in the matter, I do not conceive it prudent, at leaſt at preſent, to make references and quotations in the ſame manner as I have done with reſpect to the mediation of Spain, who publiſhed the whole proceedings herſelf; and therefore, what comes from me, on this part of the buſineſs, muſt reſt on my own credit with the public, aſſuring them, that when the whole proceedings, relative to the propoſed congreſs at Vienna, ſhall appear, they ſhall find my account not only true but ſtudiouſly moderate.

We know that at the time this mediation was on the carpet, the expectations of the Britiſh king and miniſtry ran high with reſpect to the conqueſt of America. The Engliſh packet which was taken with the mail on board, and carried into l'Orient in France, contained letters from lord G. Germaine to ſir Henry Clinton, which expreſſed in the fulleſt terms the miniſterial idea of a total conqueſt. Copies

of thoſe letters were ſent to congreſs and publiſhed in the newſpapers of laſt year. Colonel Laurens brought over the originals, ſome of which, ſigned in the hand writing of the then ſecretary, Germaine, are now in my poſſeſſion.

Filled with theſe high ideas, nothing could be more inſolent towards America than the language of the Britiſh court on the propoſed mediation. A peace with France and Spain ſhe anxiouſly ſolicited; but America, as before, ſhould be left to her mercy, neither would ſhe hear any propoſition for admitting an agent from the United States into the congreſs of Vienna.

On the other hand, France, with an open, noble and manly determination, and the fidelity of a good ally, would hear no propoſition for a ſeparate peace, nor even meet in congreſs at Vienna, without an agent from America: and likewiſe, that the independent character of the United States, repreſented by the agent, ſhould be fully and unequivocally defined and ſettled before any conference ſhould be entered on. The reaſoning of the court of France on the ſeveral propoſitions of the two Imperial courts, which relate to us, is rather in the ſtile of an American than an ally, and ſhe advocated the cauſe of America as if ſhe had been America herſelf.—Thus the ſecond mediation, like the firſt, proved ineffectual.

But ſince that time a reverſe of fortune has overtaken the Britiſh arms, and all their high expectations are daſhed to the ground. The noble exertions to the ſouthward under general Greene; the ſucceſsful operations of the allied arms in the Cheſapeak; the loſs of moſt of their iſlands in the Weſt-Indies and Minorca in the Mediterranean; the perſevering ſpirit of Spain againſt Gibraltar; the expected capture of Jamaica; the failure of making a ſeparate peace with Holland, and the expence of an hundred millions ſterling, by which all theſe fine loſſes were obtained, have read them a loud leſſon of diſgraceful misfortune, and neceſſity has called on them to change their ground.

In this ſituation of confuſion and deſpair their preſent councils have no fixt character. It is now the hurricane months of Britiſh politics. Every day ſeems to have a ſtorm of its own, and they are ſcudding under the bare poles of hope. Beaten, but not humble; condemned, but not penitent; they act like men trembling at fate and catching at a ſtraw.—From this convulſion, in the entrails of their politics, it is more than probable, that the mountain groaning in labour, will bring forth a mouſe as to its ſize, and a monſter in its make. They will try on America the ſame inſidious arts they tried on France and Spain.

We ſometimes experience ſenſations to which language is not equal. The conception is too bulky to be born alive, and in the torture of thinking we ſtand dumb. Our feelings impriſoned by their magnitude, find no way out—and, in the ſtruggle of expreſſion every finger tries to be a tongue. The machinery of the body ſeems too little for the mind, and we look about for helps to ſhew our thoughts by.—Such muſt be the ſenſation of America, whenever Britain, teeming with corruption, ſhall propoſe to her to ſacrifice her faith.

But, excluſive of the wickedneſs, there is a perſonal offence contained in every ſuch attempt. It is calling us villains; for no man aſks another to act the villain unleſs he believes him inclined to be one. No man attempts to ſeduce a truly honeſt women. It is the ſuppoſed looſeneſs of her mind that ſtarts the thoughts of ſeduction, and he who offers it calls her a proſtitute. Our pride is always hurt by the ſame propoſitions which offend our principles; for when we are ſhocked at the crime we are wounded by the ſuſpicion of our compliance.

Could I convey a thought that might ſerve to regulate the public mind, I would not make the intereſt of the alliance the baſis of defending it. All the world are moved by intereſt, and it affords them nothing to boaſt of. But I would go a ſtep higher, and defend it on the ground of honour and principle. That our public affairs have flouriſhed under the alliance—that it was wiſely made and has been nobly executed—that by its aſſiſtance we are enabled to preſerve our country from conqueſt and expel thoſe who ſought our deſtruction—that it is our true intereſt to maintain it unimpaired, and that while we do ſo no enemy can conquer us;—are matters which experience has taught us, and the common good of ourſelves, abſtracted from principles of faith and honour, would lead us to maintain the connection.

But over and above the mere letter of the alliance, we have been nobly and generouſly treated, and have had the ſame reſpect and attention paid us, as if we had been an old eſtabliſhed country. To oblige and be obliged is fair work among mankind, and we want an opportunity of ſhewing to the world that we are a people ſenſible of kindneſs and worthy of confidence.—Character is to us, in our preſent circumſtances, of more importance than intereſt. We are a young nation, juſt ſtepping upon the ſtage of public life, and the eye of the world is upon us to ſee how we act. We have an enemy that is watching to deſtroy our reputation, and who will go any length to

gain some evidence against us, that may serve to render our conduct suspected, and our character odious; because, could she accomplish this, wicked as it is, the world would withdraw from us, as from a people not to be trusted, and our task would then become difficult.

There is nothing sets the character of a nation in a higher or lower light with others, than the faithfully fulfilling, or perfidiously breaking of treaties.--They are things not to be tampered with; and should Britain, which seems very probable, propose to seduce America into such an act of baseness, it would merit from her some mark of unusual detestation. It is one of those extraordinary instances in which we ought not to be contented with the bare negative of congress, because it is an affront on the multitude as well as on the government. It goes on the supposition that the public are not honest men, and that they may be managed by contrivance, though they cannot be conquered by arms. But, let the world and Britain know, that we are neither to be bought nor sold. That our mind is great and fixt; our prospect clear; and that we will support our character as firmly as our independence.

But I will go still farther, general Conway, who made the motion in the British parliament, for discontinuing *offensive* war in America, is a gentleman of an amiable character. We have no personal quarrel with him. But he feels not as we feel; he is not in our situation, and that alone, without any other explanation, is enough.

The British parliament supposes they have many friends in America, and that when all chance of conquest is over, they will be able to draw her from her alliance with France. Now, if I have any conception of the human heart, they will fail in this more than in any thing they have yet tried.

This part of the business is not a question of policy only but of honour and honesty; and the proposition will have in it something so visibly low and base that their partizans, if they have any, will be ashamed of it. Men are often hurt by a mean action who are not startled at a wicked one, and this will be such a confession of inability, such a declaration of servile thinking, that the scandal of it will ruin all their hopes.

In short, we have nothing to do but to go on with vigour and determination. The enemy is yet in our country. They hold New-York, Charleston and Savannah, and the very being in those places is an offence, and a part of offensive war, and until they can be driven from them or captured in them it would be folly in us to listen to an

idle tale.—I take it for granted that the Britiſh miniſtry are ſinking under the impoſſibility of carrying on the war. Let them then come to a fair and open peace with France, Spain, Holland and America in the manner ſhe ought to do; but until then we can have nothing to ſay to them.

COMMON SENSE.

A SUPERNUMERARY CRISIS.

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

IT is the nature of compaſſion to aſſociate with misfortune; and I addreſs this to you in behalf even of an enemy, a captain in the Britiſh ſervice, now on his way to the head-quarters of the American army, and unfortunately doomed to death for a crime not his own—A ſentence ſo extraordinary, an execution ſo repugnant to every human ſenſation, ought never to be told without the circumſtances which produced it: and as the deſtined victim is yet in exiſtence, and in your hands reſt his life or death, I ſhall briefly ſtate the caſe, and the melancholy conſequence.

Captain Huddy, of the Jerſey militia, was attacked in a ſmall fort on Tom's River, by a party of refugees in the Britiſh pay and ſervice, was made priſoner together with his company, carried to New-York and lodged in the provoſt of that city: about three weeks after which, he was taken out of the provoſt down to the water-ſide, put into a boat and brought again upon the Jerſey ſhore, and there, contrary to the practice of all nations but ſavages, was hung up on a tree, and left hanging till found by our people, who took him down and buried him.

The inhabitants of that part of the country where the murder was committed, ſent a deputation to General Waſhington with a full and certified ſtatement of the fact. Struck, as every human breaſt muſt be, with ſuch brutiſh outrage, and determined both to puniſh and prevent it for the future, the General repreſented the caſe to General Clinton, who then commanded, and demanded that the refugee officer who ordered and attended the execution, and whoſe name is Lippincut, ſhould be delivered up as a murderer; and in caſe of refuſal, that the perſon of ſome Britiſh officer ſhould ſuffer in his ſtead.

The demand, though not refuſed, has not been complied with; and the melancholy lot (not by ſelection, but by caſting lots) has fallen upon captain Aſgill, of the guards, who, as I have already mentioned, is on his way from Lancaſter to camp, a martyr to the general wickedneſs of the cauſe he engaged in, and the ingratitude of thoſe he has ſerved.

The firſt reflection which ariſes on this black buſineſs is, what ſort of men muſt Engliſhmen be, and what ſort of order and diſcipline do they preſerve in their army, when in the immediate place of their head-quarters, and under the eye and noſe of their commander in chief, a priſoner can be taken at pleaſure from his confinement, and his death made a matter of ſport.

The hiſtory of the moſt ſavage Indians does not produce inſtances exactly of this kind. They, at leaſt, have a formality in their puniſhments. With them it is the horridneſs of revenge, but with your army it is the ſtill greater crime, the horridneſs of diverſion.

The Britiſh generals who have ſucceeded each other, from the time of general Gage to yourſelf, have all affected to ſpeak in language they have no right to. In their proclamations, their addreſſes, their letters to general Waſhington, and their ſupplications to congreſs (for they deſerve no other name) they talk of Britiſh honour, Britiſh generoſity and Britiſh clemency, as if thoſe things were matters of fact; whereas, we whoſe eyes are open, who ſpeak the ſame language with yourſelves, many of whom were born on the ſame ſpot with you, and who can no more be miſtaken in your words than in your actions, can declare to all the world, that ſo far as our knowledge goes, there is not a more deteſtable character, nor a meaner or more barbarous enemy, than the preſent Britiſh one. With us, you have forfeited all pretenſions of reputation, and it is only holding you like a wild beaſt, afraid of your keepers, that you can be made manageable.—But to return to the point in queſtion.

Though I can think no man innocent who has lent his hand to deſtroy the country which he did not plant, and to ruin thoſe he could not enſlave, yet abſtracted from all ideas of right and wrong on the original queſtion, captain Aſgill, in the preſent caſe, is not the guilty man. The villain and the victim are here ſeparated characters. You hold the one and we the other. You diſown, or affect to diſown and reprobate the conduct of Lippincut, yet you give him a ſanctuary; and by ſo doing you as effectually become the executioner of Aſgill, as if you put the rope on his neck, and diſmiſſed him from the world.

Whatever your feelings on this extraordinary occaſion may be, are beſt known to yourſelf, Within the grave of our own mind lies buried the fate of Aſgill. He becomes the corpſe of your will, or the ſurvivor of your juſtice. Deliver up the one, and you ſave the other; withhold the one, and the other dies by your choice.

On our part the caſe is exceeding plain; AN OFFICER HAS BEEN TAKEN FROM HIS CONFINEMENT AND MURDERED, AND THE MURDERER IS WITHIN YOUR LINES. Your army have been guilty of a thouſand inſtances of equal cruelty, but they have been rendered equivocal, and ſheltered from perſonal detection. Here the crime is fixt; and is one of thoſe extraordinary caſes which can neither be denied nor palliated, and to which the cuſtom of war does not apply; for it never could be ſuppoſed that ſuch a brutal outrage would ever be committed. It is an original in the hiſtory of civilized barbarians, and is truly Britiſh.

On your part, you are accountable to us for the perſonal ſafety of the priſoners within your walls. Here can be no miſtake; they can neither be ſpies nor ſuſpected as ſuch; your ſecurity is not endangered, nor your operations ſubjected to miſcarriage, by men immured within a dungeon. They differ in every circumſtance from men in the field, and leave no pretence for ſeverity of puniſhment. But if to the diſmal condition of captivity with you, muſt be added the conſtant apprehenſions of death; if to be impriſoned is ſo nearly to be entombed; and, if after all, the murderers are to be protected and thereby the crime encouraged, wherein do you differ from Indians, either in conduct or character?

We can have no idea of your honour, or your juſtice, in any future tranſaction, of what nature it may be, while you ſhelter within your lines an outrageous murderer, and ſacrifice in his ſtead an officer of your own. If you have no regard to us, at leaſt ſpare the blood which it is your duty to ſave. Whether the puniſhment will be greater on him, who, in this caſe, innocently dies; or, on him whom ſad neceſſity forces to retaliate, is, in the nicety of ſenſation, an undecided queſtion? It reſts with you to prevent the ſufferings of both. You have nothing to do but to give up the murderer, and the matter ends.

But to protect him, be he who he may, is to patronize his crime, and to trifle it off by frivolous and unmeaning enquiries is to promote it. There is no declaration you can make, no promiſe you can give

that will obtain credit. It is the man and not the apology that is demanded.

You ſee yourſelf preſſed on all ſides to ſpare the life of your own officer, for die he will if you withhold juſtice. The murder of captain Huddy is an offence not to be borne with, and there is no ſecurity we can have that ſuch actions or ſimilar ones ſhall not be repeated, but by making the puniſhment fall upon yourſelves. To deſtroy the laſt ſecurity of captivity, and to take the unarmed, the unreſiſting priſoner to private and ſportive execution, is carrying barbarity too high for ſilence. The evil MUST be put an end to; and the choice of perſons reſts with you. But if your attachment to the guilty is ſtronger than to the innocent, you invent a crime that muſt deſtroy your character, and if the cauſe of your king needs to be ſo ſupported, for ever ceaſe, ſir, to torture our remembrance with the wretched phraſes of Britiſh honour, Britiſh generoſity, and Britiſh clemency.

From this melancholy circumſtance, learn, ſir, a leſſon of morality. The refugees are men whom your predeceſſors have inſtructed in wickedneſs, the better to fit them to their maſter's purpoſe. To make them uſeful they have made them vile, and the conſequence of their tutored villany is now deſcending on the heads of their encouragers. They have been trained like hounds to the ſcent of blood, and cheriſhed in every ſpecies of diſſolute barbarity. Their ideas of right and wrong are worn away in the conſtant habitude of repeated infamy, till like men practiſed in executions they feel not the value of another's life.

The taſk before you though painful is not difficult; give up the murderer, and ſave your officer, as the firſt outſet of a neceſſary reformation.

COMMON SENSE.

Philadelphia, May 31, 1782.

THE CRISIS.—NUMBER XII.

TO THE EARL OF SHELBURNE.

MY LORD,

A SPEECH, which has been printed in ſeveral of the Britiſh and New-York newſpapers, as coming from your lordſhip, in anſwer to one from the duke of Richmond, of the 10th of July laſt, contains expreſſions and opinions ſo new and ſingular, and ſo enveloped in myſterious reaſoning, that I addreſs this publication to you, for the purpoſe of giving them a free and candid examination. The ſpeech I allude to is in theſe words:

" His lordſhip ſaid, it had been mentioned in another place, that " he had been guilty of inconſiſtence. To clear himſelf of this, he " aſſerted that he ſtill held the ſame principles in reſpect to American " independence which he at firſt imbibed. He had been, and yet was " of opinion, whenever the parliament of Great-Britain acknow- " ledges that point, the ſun of England's glory is ſet for ever. " Such were the ſentiments he poſſeſſed on a former day, and ſuch " the ſentiments he continued to hold at this hour. It was the " opinion of lord Chatham, as well as many other able ſtateſmen. " Other noble lords, however, think differently; and as the majority " of the cabinet ſupport them, he acquieſced in the meaſure, diſſent- " ing from the idea; and the point is ſettled for bringing the matter " into the full diſcuſſion of parliament, where it will be candidly, " fairly, and impartially debated. The independence of America " would end in the ruin of England; and that a peace patched up " with France, would give that proud enemy the means of yet " trampling on this country. The ſun of England's glory he " wiſhed not to ſee ſet for ever; he looked for a ſpark at leaſt to " be left, which might in time light us up to a new day. But if " independence was to be granted, if parliament deemed that mea- " ſure prudent, he foreſaw, in his own mind, that England was un- " done. He wiſhed to God that he had been deputed to congreſs, " that he might plead the cauſe of that country as well as of this, " and that he might exerciſe whatever powers he poſſeſſed as an " orator, to ſave both from ruin, in a conviction to congreſs, that, " if their independence was ſigned, their liberties was gone for ever.

" Peace, his lordſhip added, was a deſirable object, but it muſt be " an honourable peace, and not an humiliating one, dictated by " France, or inſiſted on by America. It was very true, this king- " dom was not in a flouriſhing ſtate, it was impoveriſhed by war. " But if we were not rich, it was evident that France was poor. " If we were ſtraitened in our finances, the enemy were exhauſted " in their reſources. This was a great empire ; it abounded with " brave men, who were able and willing to fight in a common " cauſe ; the language of humiliation ſhould not, therefore, be the " language of Great-Britain. His lordſhip ſaid, that he was not " aſhamed nor afraid of thoſe expreſſions going to America. There " were numbers, great numbers there, who were of the ſame way of " thinking, in reſpect to that country being dependant on this, and " who, with his lordſhip, perceived ruin and independence linked to- " gether."

Thus far the ſpeech ; on which I remark—That his lordſhip is a total ſtranger to the mind and ſentiments of America ; that he has wrapped himſelf up in fond deluſion, that ſomething leſs than independence may, under his adminiſtration, be accepted; and he wiſhes himſelf ſent to congreſs, to prove the moſt extraordinary of all doctrines, which is, that *independence*, the ſublimeſt of all human conditions, is loſs of liberty.

In anſwer to which we may ſay, that in order to know what the contrary word *dependence* means, we have only to look back to thoſe years of ſevere humiliation, when the mildeſt of all petitions could obtain no other notice than the haughtieſt of all inſults; and when the baſe terms of unconditional ſubmiſſion were demanded, or undiſtinguiſhable deſtruction threatened. It is nothing to us that the miniſtry have been changed, for they may be changed again. The guilt of government is the crime of a whole country ; and the nation that can, though but for a moment, think and act as England has done, can never afterwards be believed or truſted. There are caſes in which it is as impoſſible to reſtore character to life, as it is to recover the dead. It is a phœnix that can expire but once, and from whoſe aſhes there is no reſurrection. Some offences are of ſuch a ſlight compoſition, that they reach no farther than the temper, and are created or cured by a thought. But the ſin of England has ſtruck the heart of America, and nature has not left it in our power to ſay we can forgive.

Your lordſhip wiſhes for an opportunity to plead before congreſs *the cauſe of England and America, and to ſave, as you ſay, both from ruin.*

That the country, which, for more than ſeven years has ſought our deſtruction, ſhould now cringe to ſolicit our protection, is adding the wretchedneſs of diſgrace to the miſery of diſappointment; and if England has the leaſt ſpark of ſuppoſed honour left, that ſpark muſt be darkened by aſking, and extinguiſhed by receiving, the ſmalleſt favour from America: for the criminal who owes his life to the grace and mercy of the injured, is more executed by living than he who dies.

But a thouſand pleadings, even from your lordſhip, can have no effect. Honour, intereſt, and every ſenſation of the heart, would plead againſt you. We are a people who think not as you think; and what is equally true, you cannot feel as we feel. The ſituations of the two countries are exceedingly different. We have been the ſeat of war; you have ſeen nothing of it. The moſt wanton deſtruction has been committed in our ſight; the moſt inſolent barbarity has been acted on our feelings. We can look round and ſee the remains of burnt and deſtroyed houſes, once the fair fruit of hard induſtry, and now the ſtriking monuments of Britiſh brutality. We walk over the dead whom we loved, in every part of America, and remember by whom they fell. There is ſcarcely a village but brings to life ſome melancholy thought, and reminds us of what we have ſuffered, and of thoſe we have loſt by the inhumanity of Britain. A thouſand images ariſe to us, which, from ſituation, you cannot ſee, and are accompanied by as many ideas which you cannot know; and therefore your ſuppoſed ſyſtem of reaſoning would apply to nothing, and all your expectations die of themſelves.

The queſtion, whether England ſhall accede to the independence of America, and which your lordſhip ſays is to undergo a parliamentary diſcuſſion, is ſo very ſimple, and compoſed of ſo few caſes, that it ſcarcely needs a debate.

It is the only way out of an expenſive and ruinous war, which has no object, and without which acknowledgment there can be no peace.

But your lordſhip ſays, "*The ſun of Great-Britain will ſet whenever ſhe acknowledges the independence of America.*" Whereas the metaphor would have been ſtrictly juſt, to have left the ſun wholly out of the figure, and have aſcribed her not acknowledging it to the influence of the moon.

But the expreſſion, if true, is the greateſt confeſſion of diſgrace that could be made, and furniſhes America with the higheſt notions of ſovereign independent importance. Mr. Wedderburne, about the year 1776, made uſe of an idea of much the ſame kind,—"*Relinquiſh*

" *America!* fays he—*What is it but to defire a giant to ſhrink ſponta-*
" *neouſly into a dwarf.*"

Alas! are thoſe people who call themſelves Engliſhmen, of ſo little internal conſequence, that when America is gone, or ſhuts her eyes upon them, their ſun is ſet, they can ſhine no more, but grope about in obſcurity, and contract into inſignificant animals? Was America, then, the giant of the empire, and England only her dwarf in waiting? Is the caſe ſo ſtrangely altered, that thoſe who once thought we could not live without them, now declare they cannot exiſt without us? Will they tell to the world, and that from their firſt miniſter of ſtate, that America is their all in all; that it is by her importance only they can live, and breath, and have a being? Will they, who threatened to bring us to their feet, bow themſelves at ours, and own that without us they are not a nation? Are they become ſo unqualified to debate on independence, that they have loſt all idea of it in themſelves, and are calling to the rocks and mountains of America to cover their inſignificance? Or, if America is loſt, is it manly to ſob over it like a child for its rattle, and invite the laughter of the world by declarations of diſgrace? Surely, the more conſiſtent conduct would be, to bear it without complaint; and to ſhew that England, without America, can preſerve her independence, and a ſuitable rank with other European powers. You were not contented while you had her, and to weep for her now is childiſh.

But lord Shelburne thinks that ſomething may yet be done. What that ſomething is, or how it is to be accompliſhed, is a matter in obſcurity. By arms there is no hope. The experience of nearly eight years, with the expence of an hundred million pounds ſterling, and the loſs of two armies, muſt poſitively decide that point. Beſides, the Britiſh have loſt their intereſt in America with the diſaffected. Every part of it has been tried. There is no new ſcene left for deluſion: and the thouſands who have been ruined by adhering to them, and have now to quit the ſettlements they had acquired, and be conveyed like tranſports to cultivate the deſerts of Auguſtine and Nova-Scotia, has put an end to all further expectations of aid.

If you caſt your eyes on the people of England, what have they to conſole themſelves with for the millions expended? or, what encouragement is there left to continue throwing good money after bad? America can carry on the war for ten years longer, and all the charges of government included, for leſs than you can defray the charges of war and government for one year. And I, who know both coun-

tries, know well, that the people of America can afford to pay their ſhare of the expence much better than the people of England can. Beſides, it is their own eſtates and property, their own rights, liberties and government, they are defending; and were they not do it, they would deſerve to loſe all, and none would pity them. The fault would be their own, and their puniſhment juſt.

The Britiſh army in America care not how long the war laſts. They enjoy an eaſy and indolent life. They fatten on the folly of one country and the ſpoils of another; and, between their plunder and their pay, may go home rich. But the caſe is very different with the labouring farmer, the working tradeſman, and the neceſſitous poor in England, the ſweat of whoſe brow goes day after day to feed, in prodigality and ſloth, the army that is robbing both them and us. Removed from the eye of that country that ſuppports them, and diſtant from the government that employs them, they cut and carve for themſelves, and there is none to call them to account.

But England will be ruined, ſays lord Shelburne, if America is independent.

Then, I ſay, is England already ruined, for America is already independent: and if lord Shelburne will not allow this, he immediately denies the fact which he infers. Beſides, to make England the mere creature of America, is paying too great a compliment to us, and too little to himſelf.

But the declaration is a rhapſody of inconſiſtence. For to ſay, as lord Shelburne has numberleſs times ſaid, that the war againſt America is ruinous, and yet to continue the proſecution of that ruinous war for the purpoſe of avoiding ruin, is a language which cannot be underſtood. Neither is it poſſible to ſee how the independence of America is to accompliſh the ruin of England after the war is over, and yet not affect it before. America cannot be more independent of her, nor a greater enemy to her, hereafter than ſhe now is; nor England derive leſs advantages from her than at preſent: why then is ruin to follow in the beſt ſtate of the caſe, and not in the worſt? and if not in the worſt, why is it to follow at all?

That a nation is to be ruined by peace and commerce, and fourteen or fifteen millions a-year leſs expences than before, is a new doctrine in politics. We have heard much clamour of national ſavings and economy; but ſurely the true economy would be, to ſave the whole charge of a ſilly, fooliſh, and headſtrong war; becauſe, compared with this, all other retrenchments are bawbles and trifles.

But is it poſſible that lord Shelburne can be ſerious in ſuppoſing the leaſt advantage can be obtained by arms, or that any advantage can be equal to the expence or the danger of attempting it? Will not the capture of one army after another ſatisfy him, but all muſt become priſoners? Muſt England ever be the ſport of hope and the victim of deluſion? Sometimes our currency was to fail; another time our army was to diſband: then whole provinces were to revolt. Such a general ſaid this and that; another wrote ſo and ſo; lord Chatham was of this opinion; and lord ſomebody elſe of another. To-day 20,000 Ruſſians and 30 Ruſſian ſhips of the line were to come; to-morrow the empreſs was abuſed without mercy or decency—Then the emperor of Germany was to be bribed with a million of money, and the king of Pruſſia was to do wonderful things. At one time it was, Lo here! and then it was, Lo there! Sometimes this power, and ſometimes that power, was to engage in the war, juſt as if the whole world was as mad and fooliſh as Britain. And thus, from year to year, has every ſtraw been catched at, and every Will-with-a-wiſp led them a new dance.

This year a ſtill newer folly is to take place. Lord Shelburne wiſhes to be ſent to congreſs, and he thinks that ſomething may be done.

Are not the repeated declarations of congreſs, and which all America ſupports, that they will not even hear any propoſals whatever, until the unconditional and unequivocal independence of America is recogniſed; are not, I ſay, theſe declarations anſwer enough?

But for England to receive any thing from America now, after ſo many inſults, injuries and outrages, acted towards us, would ſhew ſuch a ſpirit of meanneſs in her, that we could not but deſpiſe her for accepting it. And ſo far from lord Shelburne coming here to ſolicit it, it would be the greateſt diſgrace we could do them to offer it. England would appear a wretch indeed, at this time of day, to aſk or owe any thing to the bounty of America. Has not the name of Engliſhman blots enough upon it, without inventing more? Even Lucifer would ſcorn to reign in heaven by permiſſion, and yet an Engliſhmen can creep for only an entrance into America. Or, has a land of liberty ſo many charms, that to be a door-keeper in it is better than to be an Engliſh miniſter of ſtate?

But what can this expected ſomething be? or, if obtained, what can it amount to, but new diſgraces, contentions and quarrels? The people of America have for years accuſtomed themſelves to think

and ſpeak ſo freely and contemptuouſly of Engliſh authority, and the inveteracy is ſo deeply rooted, that a perſon inveſted with any authority from that country, and attempting to exerciſe it here, would have the life of a toad under a harrow. They would look on him as an interloper, to whom their compaſſion permitted a reſidence. He would be no more than the Mungo of a farce; and if he diſliked that, he muſt ſet off. It would be a ſtation of degradation, debaſed by our pity, and deſpiſed by our pride, and would place England in a more contemptible ſituation than any ſhe has yet ſuffered by the war. We have too high an opinion of ourſelves, ever to think of yielding again the leaſt obedience to outlandiſh authority; and for a thouſand reaſons, England would be the laſt country in the world to yield it to. She has been treacherous, and we know it. Her character is gone, and we have ſeen the funeral.

Surely ſhe loves to fiſh in troubled waters, and drink the cup of contention, or ſhe would not now think of mingling her affairs with thoſe of America. It would be like a fooliſh dotard taking to his arms the bride that deſpiſes him, or who has placed on his head the enſigns of her diſguſt. It is kiſſing the hand that boxes his ears, and propoſing to renew the exchange. The thought is as ſervile as the war was wicked, and ſhows the laſt ſcene of the drama as inconſiſtent as the firſt.

As America is gone, the only act of manhood is to *let her go*. Your lordſhip had no hand in the ſeparation, and you will gain no honour by temporiſing politics. Beſides, there is ſomething ſo exceedingly whimſical, unſteady, and even inſincere in the preſent conduct of England, that ſhe exhibits herſelf in the moſt diſhonourable colours.

On the ſecond of Auguſt laſt general Carlton and admiral Digby wrote to general Waſhington in theſe words:

"The reſolution of the houſe of commons, of the 27th of February "laſt, has been placed in your excellency's hands, and intimations "given at the ſame time that farther pacific meaſures were likely to "follow. Since which, until the preſent time, we have had no di-"rect communications from England; but a mail is now arrived, "which brings us very important information. We are acquainted, "ſir, *by authority*, that negociations for a general peace have already "commenced at Paris, and that Mr. Grenville is inveſted with full "powers to treat with all the parties at war, and is now at Paris in "the execution of his commiſſion. And we are farther, ſir, made "acquainted, *that his majeſty, in order to remove any obſtacles to that*

" *peace which he ſo ardently wiſhes to reſtore, has commanded his miniſ-*
" *ters to direct Mr. Grenville, that the independence of the Thirteen*
" *United Provinces, ſhould be propoſed by him in the firſt inſtance, inſtead*
" *of making it a condition of a general treaty.*"

Now, taking your preſent meaſures into view, and comparing them with the declaration in this letter, pray, what is the word of your king, or his miniſters, or the parliament, good for? Muſt we not look upon you as a confederated body of faithleſs, treacherous men, whoſe aſſurances are fraud, and their language deceit? What opinion can we poſſibly form of you, but that you are a loſt, abandoned, profligate nation, who ſport even with your own character, and are to be held by nothing but the bayonet or the halter?

To ſay, after this, *that the ſun of Great-Britain will be ſet whenever ſhe acknowledges the independence of America*, when the not doing it is the unqualified lie of government, can be no other than the language of ridicule, the jargon of inconſiſtency. There were thouſands in America who predicted the deluſion, and looked upon it as a trick of treachery, to take us from our guard, and draw off our attention from the only ſyſtem of finance, by which we can be called, or deſerve to be called, a ſovereign, independent people. The fraud, on your part, might be worth attempting, but the ſacrifice to obtain it is too high.

There are others who credited the aſſurance, becauſe they thought it impoſſible that men who had their characters to eſtabliſh, would begin it with a lie. The proſecution of the war by the former miniſtry was ſavage and horrid; ſince which it has been mean, trickiſh, and deluſive. The one went greedily into the paſſion of revenge, the other into the ſubtleties of low contrivance; till, between the crimes of both, there is ſcarcely left a man in America, be he whig or tory, who does not deſpiſe or deteſt the conduct of Britain.

The management of lord Shelburne, whatever may be his views, is a caution to us, and muſt be to the world, never to regard Britiſh aſſurances. A perfidy ſo notorious cannot be hid. It ſtands even in the public papers of New-York, with the names of Carlton and Digby affixed to it. It is a proclamation that the king of England is not to be believed: that the ſpirit of lying is the governing principle of the miniſtry. It is holding up the character of the houſe of commons to public infamy, and warning all men not to credit them. Such is the conſequence which lord Shelburne's management has brought upon his country.

After the authoriſed declarations contained in Carlton and

Digby's letter, you ought, from every motive of honour, policy, and prudence, to have fulfilled them, whatever might have been the event. It was the leaſt atonement you could poſſibly make to America, and the greateſt kindneſs you could do to yourſelves; for you will ſave millions by a general peace, and you will loſe as many by continuing the war.

COMMON SENSE.

Philadelphia, October 29, 1782.

P. S. The manuſcript copy of this letter is ſent your lordſhip, by the way of our head-quarters, to New-York, incloſing a late pamphlet of mine, addreſſed to the Abbe Raynal, which will ſerve to give your lordſhip ſome idea of the principles and ſentiments of America.

C. S.

THE LAST CRISIS.—NUMBER XIII.

Philadelphia, April 19, 1783.

"THE times that tried men's ſouls,"* are over—and the greateſt and compleateſt revolution the world ever knew, gloriouſly and happily accompliſhed.

But to paſs from the extremes of danger to ſafety—from the tumult of war, to the tranquility of peace, though ſweet in contemplation, requires a gradual compoſure of the ſenſes to receive it. Even calmneſs has the power of ſtunning, when it opens too inſtantly upon us. The long and raging hurricane that ſhould ceaſe in a moment, would leave us in a ſtate rather of wonder than enjoyment; and ſome moments of recollection muſt paſs, before we could be capable of taſting the full felicity of repoſe. There are but few inſtances, in which the mind is fitted for ſudden tranſitions: It takes in its pleaſures by reflection and compariſon, and thoſe muſt have time to act, before the reliſh for new ſcenes is complete.

In the preſent caſe—the mighty magnitude of the object—the various uncertainties of fate it has undergone—the numerous and complicated dangers we have ſuffered or eſcaped—the eminence we now

* "*Theſe are the times that try men's ſouls. Criſis, No. I. publiſhed December* 19, 1796.

ſtand on, and the vaſt proſpect before us, muſt all conſpire to impreſs us with contemplation.

To ſee it in our power to make a world happy—to teach mankind the art of being ſo—to exhibit on the theatre of the univerſe, a character hitherto unknown—and to have, as it were, a new creation entruſted to our hands, are honours that command reflection, and can neither be too highly eſtimated, nor too gratefully received.

In this pauſe then of recollection—while the ſtorm is ceaſing, and the long agitated mind vibrating to a reſt, let us look back on the ſcenes we have paſſed, and learn from experience what is yet to be done.

Never, I ſay, had a country ſo many openings to happineſs as this. Her ſetting out into life, like the riſing of a fair morning, was unclouded and promiſing. Her cauſe was good. Her principles juſt and liberal. Her temper ſerene and firm. Her conduct regulated by the niceſt ſteps, and every thing about her wore the mark of honour.

It is not every country (perhaps there is not another in the world) that can boaſt ſo fair an origin. Even the firſt ſettlement of America correſponds with the character of the revolution. Rome, once the proud miſtreſs of the univerſe, was originally a band of ruffians. Plunder and rapine made her rich, and her oppreſſion of millions made her great. But America needs never be aſhamed to tell her birth, nor relate the ſtages by which ſhe roſe to empire.

The remembrance then of what is paſt, if it operates rightly, muſt inſpire her with the moſt laudable of all ambition, that of adding to the fair fame ſhe began with. The world has ſeen her great in adverſity. Struggling, without a thought of yielding, beneath accumulated difficulties. Bravely, nay proudly, encountering diſtreſs, and riſing in reſolution as the ſtorm encreaſed. All this is juſtly due to her, for her fortitude has merited the character. Let then the world ſee that ſhe can bear proſperity: and that her honeſt virtue in time of peace, is equal to the braveſt virtue in time of war.

She is now deſcending to the ſcenes of quiet and domeſtic life. Not beneath the cypreſs ſhade of diſappointment, but to enjoy, in her own land, and under her own vine, the ſweet of her labours, and the reward of her toil—In this ſituation, may ſhe never forget that a fair national reputation, is of as much importance as independence. That it poſſeſſes a charm which wins upon the world, and makes even enemies civil.—That it gives a dignity which is often ſuperior to power, and commands a reverence where pomp and ſplendour fail.

It would be a circumſtance ever to be lamented and never to be forgotten, were a ſingle blot, from any cauſe whatever, ſuffered to fall on a revolution, which to the end of time muſt be an honour to the age that accompliſhed it : and which has contributed more to enlighten the world, and diffuſe a ſpirit of freedom and liberality among mankind, than any human event (if this may be called one) that ever preceded it.

It is not among the leaſt of the calamities of a long continued war, that it unhinges the mind from thoſe nice ſenſations which at other times appear ſo amiable. The continual ſpectacle of woe, blunts the finer feelings, and the neceſſity of bearing with the ſight, renders it familiar. In like manner, are many of the moral obligations of ſociety weakened, till the cuſtom of acting by neceſſity, becomes an apology where it is truly a crime. Yet let but a nation conceive rightly of its character, and it will be chaſtly juſt in protecting it. None ever began with a fairer than America, and none can be under a greater obligation to preſerve it.

The debt which America has contracted, compared with the cauſe ſhe has gained, and the advantages to flow from it, ought ſcarcely to be mentioned. She has it in her choice to do, and to live, as happily, as ſhe pleaſes. The world is in her hands. She has no foreign power to monopolize her commerce, perplex her legiſlation, or control her proſperity. The ſtruggle is over, which muſt one day have happened, and, perhaps, never could have happened at a better time.*

* *That the revolution began at the exact period of time beſt fitted to the purpoſe, is ſufficiently proved by the event—But the great hinge on which the whole machine turned is the* UNION OF THE STATES: *and this union was naturally produced by the inability of any one ſtate to ſupport itſelf againſt any foreign enemy without the aſſiſtance of the reſt.*

Had the ſtates ſeverally been leſs able than they were when the war began, their united ſtrength would not have been equal to the undertaking, and they muſt in all human probability, have failed—And on the other hand, had they ſeverally been more able. they might not have ſeen, or, what is more, might not have felt the neceſſity of uniting ; and either by attempting to ſtand alone, or in ſmall confederacies, would have been ſeparately conquered.

Now, as we cannot ſee a time (and many years muſt paſs away before it can arrive) when the ſtrength of any one ſtate, or ſeveral united, can be equal to the whole of the preſent United States, and as we have ſeen the

And inſtead of a domineering maſter, ſhe has gained an *ally*, whoſe exemplary greatneſs, and univerſal liberality, have extorted a confeſſion even from her enemies.

With the bleſſings of peace, independence, and an univerſal commerce, the ſtates individually and collectively, will have leiſure and opportunity to regulate and eſtabliſh their domeſtic concerns, and to put it beyond the power of calumny to throw the leaſt reflection on their honour. Character is much eaſier kept than recovered, and that man, if any ſuch there be, who, from any ſiniſter views, or littleneſs of ſoul, lends unſeen his hand to injure it, contrives a wound it will never be in his power to heal.

As we have eſtabliſhed an inheritance for poſterity, let that inheritance deſcend, with every mark of an honourable conveyance. The little it will coſt, compared with the worth of the ſtates, the greatneſs

extreme difficulty of collectively proſecuting the war to a ſucceſsful iſſue, and preſerving our national importance in the world, therefore, from the experience we have had and the knowledge we have gained, we muſt, unleſs we make a waſte of wiſdom, be ſtrongly impreſſed with the advantage, as well as the neceſſity of ſtrengthening that happy union which has been our ſalvation, and without which we ſhould have been a ruined people.

While I was writing this note, I caſt my eye on the pamphlet COMMON SENSE, *from which I ſhall make an extract, as it applies exactly to the caſe. It is as follows:*

" *I have never met with a man, either in England or America, who* " *hath not confeſſed his opinion that a ſeparation between the countries* " *would take place one time or other: And there is no inſtance in which* " *we have ſhewn leſs judgment, than in endeavouring to deſcribe, what* " *we call, the ripeneſs or fitneſs of the continent for independence.*

" *As all men allow the meaſure, and differ only in their opinion of the* " *time, let us, in order to remove miſtakes, take a general ſurvey of things,* " *and endeavour, if poſſible, to find out the* VERY TIME. *But we need not* " *to go far, the enquiry ceaſes at once, for,* THE TIME HATH FOUND US. " *The general concurrence, the glorious union of all things prove the fact.*

" *It is not in numbers, but in a union, that our great ſtrength lies. The* " *continent is juſt arrived at that pitch of ſtrength, in which no ſingle co-* " *lony is able to ſupport itſelf, and the whole, when united, can accompliſh* " *the matter; and either more or leſs than this, might be fatal in its ef-* " *fects.*"

of the object, and the value of national character, will be a profitable exchange.

But that which muſt more forcibly ſtrike a thoughtful penetrating mind, and which includes and renders eaſy all inferior concerns, is the UNION OF THE STATES. On this, our great national character depends. It is this which muſt give us importance abroad and ſecurity at home. It is through this only that we are, or can be nationally known in the world. It is the flag of the United States which renders our ſhips and commerce ſafe on the ſeas, or in a foreign port. Our Mediterranean paſſes muſt be obtained under the ſame ſtile. All our treaties whether of alliance, peace or commerce, are formed under the ſovereignty of the United States, and Europe knows us by no other name or title.

The diviſion of the empire into ſtates is for our own convenience, but abroad this diſtinction ceaſes. The affairs of each ſtate are local. They can go no farther than to itſelf. And were the whole worth of even the richeſt of them expended in revenue, it would not be ſufficient to ſupport ſovereignty againſt a foreign attack. In ſhort, we have no other national ſovereignty than as United States. It would even be fatal for us if we had—too expenſive to be maintained, and impoſſible to be ſupported. Individuals or individual ſtates may call themſelves what they pleaſe; but the world, and eſpecially the world of enemies, is not to be held in awe by the whiſtling of a name. Sovereignty muſt have power to protect all the parts that compoſe and conſtitute it: and as UNITED STATES we are equal to the importance of the title, but otherwiſe we are not. Our union well and wiſely regulated and cemented, is the cheapeſt way of being great—the eaſieſt way of being powerful, and the happieſt invention in government which the circumſtances of America can admit of—Becauſe it collects from each ſtate, that which, by being inadequate, can be of no uſe to it, and forms an aggregate that ſerves for all.

The ſtates of Holland are an unfortunate inſtance of the effects of individual ſovereignty. Their diſjointed condition expoſes them to numerous intrigues, loſſes, calamities and enemies; and the almoſt impoſſibility of bringing their meaſures to a deciſion, and that deciſion into execution, is to them, and would be to us, a ſource of endleſs misfortune.

It is with confederated ſtates as with individuals in ſociety; ſomething muſt be yielded up to make the whole ſecure. In this view of things we gain by what we give, and draw an annual intereſt greater

than the capital.—I ever feel myſelf hurt when I hear the union, that great palladium of our liberty and ſafety, the leaſt irreverently ſpoken of. It is the moſt ſacred thing in the conſtitution of America, and that which every man ſhould be moſt proud and tender of. Our citizenſhip in the United States is our national character. Our citizenſhip in any particular ſtate is only our local diſtinction. By the latter we are known at home, by the former to the world. Our great title is, AMERICANS—our inferior one varies with the place.

So far as my endeavours could go, they have all been directed to conciliate the affections, unite the intereſts and draw and keep the mind of the country together; and the better to aſſiſt in this foundation-work of the revolution, I have avoided all places of profit or office, either in the ſtate I live in, or in the United States; kept myſelf at a diſtance from all parties and party connections, and even diſregarded all private and inferior concerns: and when we take into view the great work we have gone through, and feel, as we ought to feel, the juſt importance of it, we ſhall then ſee, that the little wranglings and indecent contentions of perſonal parley, are as diſhonourable to our characters, as they are injurious to our repoſe.

It was the cauſe of America that made me an author. The force with which it ſtruck my mind, and the dangerous condition the country appeared to me in, by courting an impoſſible and an unnatural reconciliation with thoſe who were determined to reduce her, inſtead of ſtriking out into the only line that could cement and ſave her, A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, made it impoſſible for me, feeling as I did, to be ſilent: and if, in the courſe of more than ſeven years, I have rendered her any ſervice, I have likewiſe added ſomething to the reputation of literature, by freely and diſintereſtedly employing it in the great cauſe of mankind, and ſhewing there may be genius without proſtitution.

Independence always appeared to me practicable and probable; provided the ſentiment of the country could be formed and held to the object: and there is no inſtance in the world, where a people ſo extended, and wedded to former habits of thinking, and under ſuch a variety of circumſtances, were ſo inſtantly and effectually pervaded, by a turn in politics, as in the caſe of independence, and who ſupported their opinion, undiminiſhed, through ſuch a ſucceſſion of good and ill fortune, till they crowned it with ſucceſs.

But as the ſcenes of war are cloſed, and every man preparing for

home and happier times, I therefore take my leave of the ſubject. I have moſt ſincerely followed it from beginning to end, and through all its turns and windings: and whatever country I may hereafter be in, I ſhall always feel an honeſt pride at the part I have taken and acted, and a gratitude to Nature and Providence for putting it in my power to be of ſome uſe to mankind.

COMMON SENSE.

A SUPERNUMERARY CRISIS.

TO THE PEOPLE OF AMERICA.

IN "*Rivington's New-York Gazette*," of December 6th, is a publication, under the appearance of a letter from London, dated September 30th; and is on a ſubject which demands the attention of the United States.

The Public will remember, that a treaty of commerce between the United States and England was ſet on foot laſt ſpring, and that until the ſaid treaty could be completed, a bill was brought into the Britiſh parliament, by the then chancellor of the exchequer, Mr. Pitt, to admit and legalize (as the caſe then required) the commerce of the United States into the Britiſh ports and dominions. But neither the one nor the other has been completed. The commercial treaty is either broken off, or remains as it began; and the bill in parliament has been thrown aſide. And in lieu thereof, a ſelfiſh ſyſtem of Engliſh politics has ſtarted up, calculated to fetter the commerce of America, by engroſſing to England the carrying trade of the American produce to the Weſt-India iſlands.

Among the advocates for this laſt meaſure is Lord Sheffield, a Member of the Britiſh Parliament, who has publiſhed a pamphlet entituled, "*Obſervations on the Commerce of the American States.*" The pamphlet has two objects; the one is, to allure the Americans to purchaſe Britiſh manufactures; and the other, to ſpirit up the Britiſh Parliament to prohibit the Citizens of the United States from trading to the Weſt-India Iſlands.

Viewed in this light, the pamphlet, though in ſome parts dextrouſly written, is an abſurdity. It offends, in the very act of endeavouring to ingratiate; and his Lordſhip, as a politician, ought not to have ſuf-

fered the two objects to have appeared together. The letter alluded to contains extracts from the pamphlet, with high encomiums on Lord Sheffield, for laboriously endeavouring (as the letter ſtiles it) "to "ſhew the mighty advantages of retaining the carrying trade."

Since the publication of this pamphlet in England, the commerce of the United States to the Weſt-Indies in American veſſels, has been prohibited; and all intercourſe, except in Britiſh bottoms, the property of, and navigated by Britiſh ſubjects, cut off.

That a country has a right to be as fooliſh as it pleaſes, has been proved by the practice of England for many years paſt: In her iſland ſituation, ſequeſtered from the world, ſhe forgets that her whiſpers are heard by other nations; and in her plans of politics and commerce, ſhe ſeems not to know, that other votes are neceſſary beſides her own. America would be equally as fooliſh as Britain, were ſhe to ſuffer ſo great a degradation on her flag, and ſuch a ſtroke on the freedom of her commerce, to paſs without a balance.

We admit the right of any nation to prohibit the commerce of another into its own dominions, where there are no treaties to the contrary; but as this right belongs to one ſide, as well as the other, there is always a way left to bring avarice and inſolence to reaſon.

But the ground of ſecurity which Lord Sheffield has choſen to erect his policy upon, is of a nature which ought, and I think muſt awaken, in every American, a juſt and ſtrong ſenſe of national dignity. Lord Sheffield appears to be ſenſible, that in adviſing the Britiſh nation and Parliament to engroſs to themſelves ſo great a part of the carrying trade of America, he is attempting a meaſure which cannot ſucceed, if the politics of the United States be properly directed to counteract the aſſumption.

But, ſays he, in his pamphlet, "*It will be a long time before the* "*American States can be brought to act as a nation, neither are they to* "*be feared as ſuch by us.*"

What is this more or leſs than to tell us, that while we have no national ſyſtem of commerce, the Britiſh will govern our trade by their own laws and proclamations as they pleaſe. The quotation diſcloſes a truth too ſerious to be overlooked, and too miſchievous not to be remedied.

Among other circumſtances which led them to this diſcovery, none could operate ſo effectually, as the injudicious, uncandid and indecent oppoſition made by ſundry perſons in a certain ſtate, to the recommendations of Congreſs laſt winter, for an import duty of five per

cent. It could not but explain to the Britiſh a weakneſs in the national power of America, and encourage them to attempt reſtrictions on her trade, which otherwiſe they would not have dared to hazard. Neither is there any ſtate in the union, whoſe policy was more miſdirected to its intereſt than the ſtate I allude to, becauſe her principal ſupport is the carrying trade, which Britain, induced by the want of a well-centered power in the United States to protect and ſecure, is now attempting to take away. It fortunately happened (and to no ſtate in the union more than the ſtate in queſtion) that the terms of peace were agreed on before the oppoſition appeared, otherwiſe, there needs not a doubt, that if the ſame idea of the diminiſhed authority of America had occurred to them at that time as has occurred to them ſince, but they would have made the ſame graſp at the fiſheries, as they have done at the carrying trade.

It is ſurpriſing that an authority which can be ſupported with ſo much eaſe, and ſo little expence, and capable of ſuch extenſive advantages to the country, ſhould be cavilled at by thoſe whoſe duty it is to watch over it, and whoſe exiſtence as a people depends upon it. But this, perhaps, will ever be the caſe, till ſome misfortune awakens us into reaſon, and the inſtance now before us is but a gentle beginning of what America muſt expect, unleſs ſhe guards her union with nicer care and ſtricter honour. United, ſhe is formidable, and that with the leaſt poſſible charge a nation can be ſo: Separated, ſhe is a medley of individual nothings, ſubject to the ſport of foreign nations.

It is very probable that the ingenuity of commerce may have found out a method to evade and ſupercede the intentions of the Britiſh, in interdicting the trade with the Weſt-India iſlands. The language of both being the ſame, and their cuſtoms well underſtood, the veſſels of one country may, by deception, paſs for thoſe of another. But this would be a practice too debaſing for a ſovereign people to ſtoop to, and too profligate not to be diſcountenanced. An illicit trade, under any ſhape it can be placed, cannot be carried on without a violation of truth. America is now ſovereign and independent, and ought to act all her affairs in a regular ſtile of character. She has the ſame right to ſay that no Britiſh veſſel ſhall enter her ports, or that no Britiſh manufactures ſhall be imported, but in American bottoms, the property of, and navigated by American ſubjects, as Britain has to ſay the ſame thing reſpecting the Weſt-Indies. Or ſhe may lay a duty of ten, fifteen or twenty ſhillings per ton (excluſive of other duties) on every Britiſh veſſel coming from any port of the Weſt-Indies,

where ſhe is not admitted to trade, the ſaid tonnage to continue as long on her ſide as the prohibition continues on the other.

But it is only by acting in union, that the uſurpations of foreign nations on the freedom of trade can be counteracted, and ſecurity extended to the commerce of America. And when we view a flag, which to the eye is beautiful, and to contemplate its riſe and origin inſpires a ſenſation of ſublime delight, our national honour muſt unite with our intereſt to prevent injury to the one, or inſult to the other.

COMMON SENSE.

New-York, December 9, 1783.

PUBLIC GOOD:

BEING

AN EXAMINATION

INTO

The Claim of Virginia to the vacant Weſtern Territory,

AND OF THE

Right of the United States to the ſame.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

PROPOSALS

FOR

LAYING OFF A NEW STATE,

TO BE APPLIED AS A FUND FOR CARRYING ON THE WAR, OR REDEEMING THE NATIONAL DEBT.

WRITTEN IN THE YEAR 1780.

THE PREFACE.

THE following pages are on a ſubject hitherto little underſtood but highly intereſting to the United States.

They contain an inveſtigation of the claims of Virginia to the vacant weſtern territory, and of the right of the United States to the ſame; with ſome outlines of a plan for laying out a new ſtate, to be applied as a fund, for carrying on the war, or redeeming the national debt.

The reader, in the courſe of this publication, will find it ſtudiouſly plain, and, as far as I can judge, perfectly candid. What materials I could get at I have endeavoured to place in a clear line, and deduce ſuch arguments therefrom as the ſubject required. In the proſecution of it, I have conſidered myſelf as an advocate for the right of the ſtates, and taken no other liberty with the ſubject than what a counſel would, and ought to do, in behalf of a client.

I freely confeſs that the reſpect I had conceived, and ſtill preſerve, for the character of Virginia, was a conſtant check upon thoſe fallies of imagination, which are fairly and advantageouſly indulged againſt an enemy, but ungenerous when againſt a friend.

If there is any thing I have omitted or miſtaken, to the injury of the intentions of Virginia or her claims, I ſhall gladly rectify it; or if there is any thing yet to add, ſhould the ſubject require it, I ſhall as cheerfully undertake it; being fully convinced, that to have matters fairly diſcuſſed, and properly underſtood, is a principal means of preſerving harmony and perpetuating friendſhip.

THE AUTHOR.

PUBLIC GOOD.

WHEN we take into view the mutual happineſs and united intereſts of the ſtates of America, and conſider the important conſequences to ariſe from a ſtrict attention of each, and of all, to every thing which is juſt, reaſonable, and honourable; or the evils that will follow from an inattention to thoſe principles; there cannot, and ought not, to remain a doubt, but that the governing rule of *right* and mutual good muſt in all public caſes finally preſide.

The hand of Providence has caſt us into one common lot, and accompliſhed the independence of America, by the unanimous conſent of the ſeveral parts, concurring at once in time, manner and circumſtances. No ſuperiority of intereſt, at the expence of the reſt, induced the one, more than the other, into the meaſure. Virginia and Maryland, it is true, might foreſee, that their ſtaple commodity, tobacco, by being no longer monopolized by Britain, would bring them a better price abroad: for as the tax on it in England was treble its firſt purchaſe from the planter, and they being now no longer compelled to ſend it under that obligation, and in the reſtricted manner they formerly were; it is eaſy to ſee, that the article, from the alteration of the circumſtances of trade, will, and daily does, turn out to them with additional advantages.

But this being a natural conſequence, produced by that common freedom and independence of which all are partakers, is therefore an advantage they are intitled to, and on which the reſt of the ſtates can congratulate them without feeling a wiſh to leſſen, but rather to extend it. To contribute to the encreaſed proſperity of another, by the ſame means which occaſion our own, is an agreeable reflection; and the more valuable any article of export becomes, the more riches will be introduced into and ſpread over the continent.

Yet this is an advantage which thoſe two ſtates derive from the independence of America, ſuperior to the local circumſtances of the

reſt; and of the two it more particularly belongs to Virginia than Maryland, becauſe the ſtaple commodity of a conſiderable part of Maryland is flour, which, as it is an article that is the growth of Europe as well as of America, cannot obtain a foreign market but by underſelling, or at leaſt by limiting it to the current price abroad. But tobacco commands its own price. It is not a plant of almoſt univerſal growth, like wheat. There are but few ſoils and climes that produce it to advantage, and before the cultivation of it in Virginia and Maryland, the price was from four to ſixteen ſhillings ſterling a pound in England.*

But the condition of the vacant weſtern territory of America makes a very different caſe to that of the circumſtances of trade in any of the ſtates. Thoſe very lands, formed, in contemplation, the fund by which the debt of America would in a courſe of years be redeemed. They were conſidered as the common right of all; and it is only till lately that any pretenſion of claims had been made to the contrary.

That difficulties and differences will ariſe in communities, ought always to be looked for. The oppoſition of intereſts, real or ſuppoſed; the variety of judgments; the contrariety of temper; and, in ſhort, the whole compoſition of man, in his individual capacity, is tinctured with a diſpoſition to contend; but in his ſocial capacity there is either a right which, being proved, terminates the diſpute, or a reaſonableneſs in the meaſure, where no direct right can be made out, which decides or compromiſes the matter.

As I ſhall have frequent occaſion to mention the word *right*, I wiſh to be clearly underſtood in my definition of it. There are various ſenſes in which this term is uſed, and cuſtom has, in many of them, afforded it an introduction contrary to its true meaning. We are ſo naturally inclined to give the utmoſt degree of force to our own caſe, that we call every pretenſion, however founded, *a right;* and by this means the term frequently ſtands oppoſed to juſtice and reaſon.

After Theodore was elected king of Corſica, not many years ago, by the mere choice of the natives, for their own convenience in oppoſing the Genoeſe, he went over into England, run himſelf into debt, got himſelf into jail, and on his releaſe therefrom by the benefit of an act of inſolvency, he ſurrendered up, what he called *his* kingdom of Corſica, as a part of his perſonal property, for the uſe of his creditors;

* *See ſir Dalby Thomas's Hiſtorical Account of the Riſe and Growth of the Weſt-India Colonies.*

ſome of whom may hereafter call this a charter, or by any other name more faſhionable, and ground thereon what they may term a *right* to the ſovereignty and property of Corſica But does not juſtice abhor ſuch an action, both in him and them, under the proſtituted name of a *right*, and muſt not laughter be excited where ever it is told?

A right, to be truly ſo, muſt be right in itſelf: yet many things have obtained the name of rights, which are originally founded in wrong. Of this kind are all rights by mere conqueſt, power or violence. In the cool moments of reflection we are obliged to allow, that the mode by which ſuch right is obtained, is not the beſt ſuited to that ſpirit of univerſal juſtice which ought to preſide equally over all mankind. There is ſomething in the eſtabliſhment of ſuch a right that we wiſh to ſlip over as eaſily as poſſible, and ſay as little about as can be. But in the caſe of a *right founded in right* the mind is carried cheerfully into the ſubject, feels no compunction, ſuffers no diſtreſs, ſubjects its ſenſations to no violence, nor ſees any thing in its way which requires an artificial ſmoothing.

From this introduction I proceed to examine into the claims of Virginia; firſt as to the right, ſecondly as to the reaſonableneſs, and laſtly as to the conſequences.

The name, *Virginia*, originally bore a different meaning to what in does now. It ſtood in the place of the word North-America, and ſeems to have been intended as a name comprehenſive of all the Engliſh ſettlements or colonies on the continent, and not deſcriptive of any one as diſtinguiſhing it from the reſt. All to the ſouthward of Cheſapeake, as low as the gulf of Mexico, was called South-Virginia, and all to the northward North-Virginia, in a ſimilar line of diſtinction, as we now call the whole continent North and South-America.*

The firſt charter or patent was to ſir Walter Rawleigh by Queen Elizabeth, of England, in the year 1583, and had neither name nor bounds. Upon ſir Walter's return, the name *Virginia*, was given to the whole country, including the now United States. Conſequently the preſent Virginia, either as a province or a ſtate, can ſet up no excluſive claim to the weſtern territory under this patent, and that for two reaſons; firſt, becauſe the words of the patent run *to ſir Walter Rawleigh, and ſuch perſons as he ſhould nominate, themſelves and their ſucceſſors*; which is a line of ſucceſſion Virginia does not pretend to ſtand in; and ſecondly, becauſe a prior queſtion would ariſe, namely,

* *Oldmixon's Hiſtory of Virginia.*

who are to be underſtood by Virginians under this patent? and the anſwer would be, all the inhabitants of America, from New-England to Florida.

This patent, therefore, would deſtroy their excluſive claim, and inveſt the right collectively in the thirteen ſtates.

But it unfortunately happened, that the ſettlers under this patent, partly from miſconduct, the oppoſition of the Indians, and other calamities, diſcontinued the proceſs, and the patent became extinct.

After this, James the firſt, who, in the year 1602, ſucceeded Elizabeth, iſſued a new patent, which I come next to deſcribe.

This patent differed from the former in this eſſential point, that it had limits, whereas the other had none: the former was intended to promote diſcoveries wherever they could be made, which accounts why no limits were affixed, and this to ſettle diſcoveries already made, which likewiſe aſſigns a reaſon why limits ſhould be deſcribed.

In this patent were incorporated two companies, called the South-Virginia company, and the North-Virginia company, and ſometimes the London company, and the Plymouth company.

The South-Virginia or London company was compoſed chiefly of London adventurers; the North-Virginia or Plymouth company was made up of adventurers from Plymouth in Devonſhire, and other perſons of the weſtern parts of England.

Though they were not to fix together, yet they were allowed to chooſe their places of ſettlement any where on the coaſt of America, then called Virginia, between the latitudes of 34 and 45 degrees, which was a range of 760 miles: the ſouth company was not to go below 34 degrees, nor the north company above 45 degrees. But the patent expreſſed, that as ſoon as they had made their choice, each was to become limited to 50 miles each way on the coaſt, and 100 up the country; ſo that the grant to each company was a ſquare of 100 miles, and no more. The North-Virginia or Plymouth company ſettled to the eaſtward, and in the year 1614 changed the name, and called that part New-England. The South-Virginia or London company ſettled near Cape Henry.

This then cannot be the patent of boundleſs extent, and that for two reaſons; firſt, becauſe the limits are deſcribed, namely, a ſquare of 100 miles; and ſecondly, becauſe there were two companies of equal rights included in the ſame patent.

Three years after this, that is, in the year 1609, the South-Virginia company applied for new powers from the crown of England, which

were granted them in a new patent, and the boundaries of the grant enlarged; and this is the charter or patent on which ſome of the preſent Virginians ground their pretenſion to boundleſs territory.

The firſt reflection that preſents itſelf on this enlargement of the grant is, that it muſt be ſuppoſed to bear ſome intended degree of reaſonable compariſon to that which it ſuperſeded. The former could not be greater than a ſquare of one huudred miles; and this new one being granted in the lieu of that, and that within the ſpace of three years, and by the ſame perſon, James the firſt, who was never famed either for profuſion or generoſity, cannot, on a review of the time and circumſtances of the grant, be ſuppoſed a very extravagant or very extraordinary one. If a ſquare of one hundred miles was not ſufficiently large, twice that quantity was as much as could well be expected or ſolicited: but to ſuppoſe that he, who had caution enough to confine the firſt grant within moderate bounds, ſhould in ſo ſhort a ſpace as three years, ſuperſede it by another grant of many million times greater content, is, on the face of the affair, a circumſtantial nullity.

Whether this patent or charter was in exiſtence or not at the time the revolution commenced, is a matter I ſhall hereafter ſpeak to, and confine myſelf in this place to the limits which the ſaid patent or charter lays down. The words are as follow:

" Beginning from the cape or point of land called Cape or Point " Comfort, thence all along the ſea coaſt to the NORTHWARD " 200 miles and from the ſaid point or Cape Comfort, all along the " ſea coaſt to the *ſouthward* 200 miles; and all that ſpace or circuit " of land lying from the ſea coaſt of the precinct aforeſaid up into the " land throughout, from ſea to ſea, WEST and *northweſt*."

The firſt remark I ſhall offer on the words of this grant is, that they are uncertain, obſcure and unintelligible, and may be conſtrued into ſuch a variety of contradictory meanings as to leave at laſt no meaning at all.

Whether the two hundred miles each way, from Cape Comfort were to be on a *ſtraight* line, or aſcertained by following the indented *line of the coaſt*, that is, " *all along the ſea coaſt*," in and out as the coaſt lay, cannot now be fully determined; becauſe, as either will admit of ſuppoſition, and nothing but ſuppoſition can be produced, therefore neither can be taken as poſitive. Thus far may be ſaid, that had it been intended to be a ſtraight line, the word *ſtraight* ought to have been inſerted, which would have made the matter clear; but as no inference

can well be drawn to the advantage of that which does *not appear* againſt that which *does*, therefore the omiſſion implies negatively in favour of the coaſt indented line, or that the 400 miles were to be traced on the windings of the coaſt, that is, "*all long the ſea coaſt.*"

But what is meant by the words "*weſt and northweſt*" is ſtill more unintelligible. Whether they mean a weſt line and a northweſt line, or whether they apply to the general lying of the land from the Atlantic, without regard to lines, cannot again be determined. But if they are ſuppoſed to mean lines to be run, then a new difficulty of more magnitude than all the reſt ariſes; namely, from which end of the extent on the coaſt is the weſt line and the northweſt line to be ſet off? as the difference in the content of the grant, occaſioned by tranſpoſing them is many hundred millions of acres; and either includes or excludes a far greater quantity of land then the whole thirteen United States contain.

In ſhort, there is not a boundary in this grant that is clear, fixt and defined. The coaſt line is uncertain, and that being the baſe on which the others are to be formed, renders the whole uncertain. But even if this line was admitted, in either ſhape, the other boundaries would ſtill be on ſuppoſition, till it might be ſaid there is no boundary at all, and conſequently no charter; for words which deſcribe nothing can give nothing.

The advocates for the Virginia claim, laying hold of theſe ambiguities, have explained the grant thus:

Four hundred miles on the ſea coaſt, and from the South point a weſt line to the great South Sea, and from the north point a northweſt line to the ſaid South Sea. The figure which theſe lines produce will be thus:



But why, I aſk, muſt the weſt land line be ſet off from the ſouth point, any more than from the north point? The grant or patent does not ſay from which it ſhall be, neither is it clear that a line is the thing intended by the words: but admitting it is, on what grounds do the claimants proceed in making this choice? the anſwer, I preſume, is eaſily given, namely, becauſe it is the moſt beneficial explanation to themſelves they can poſſibly make; as it takes in many thouſand times more extent of country than any other explanation would. But this, though it be a very good reaſon to them, is a very bad reaſon to us; and though it may do for the claimants to hope upon, will not anſwer to plead upon; eſpecially to the very people, who, to confirm the partiality of the claimants' choice, muſt relinquiſh their own right and intereſt.

Why not ſet off the weſt land line from the north end of the coaſt line, and the northweſt line from the ſouth end of the ſame? There is ſome reaſon why this ſhould be the conſtruction, and none why the other ſhould.

Firſt, becauſe, if the line of two hundred miles each way from Cape Comfort, be traced by following the indented line of the coaſt, which ſeems to be the implied intention of the words, and a weſt line be ſet off from the north end, and a northweſt line from the ſouth end, theſe lines will all unite (which the other conſtruction never can) and form a complete triangle, the content of which will be about twenty-nine or thirty millions of acres, or ſomething larger than Pennſylvania: and

Secondly, becauſe this conſtruction is following the order of the lines as expreſſed in the grant; for the *firſt* mentioned *coaſt* line, which is that to the *northward* of Cape Comfort, and the *firſt* mentioned *land* line, which is the *weſt* line, have a numerical relation, being the firſt mentioned of each; and implies, that the weſt line was to be ſet off from the *north* point and *not* from the ſouth point: and conſequently the *two laſt* mentioned of each have the ſame numerical relation, and again implies that the *northweſt* line was to be ſet off from the *ſouth* point, and not from the *north* point. But why the claimants ſhould break through the order of the lines, and, contrary to implication, join the *firſt* mentioned of the *one*, to the laſt mentioned of the other, and thereby produce a ſhapeleſs monſter, for which there is no name nor any parallel in the world, either as to extent of ſoil and ſovereignty, is a conſtruction that cannot be ſupported.

The figure produced by following the order of the lines is as follows.

N. B. If the reader will caſt his eye again over the words of the patent on page 235, he will perceive the numerical relation alluded to, by obſerving, that the firſt mentioned coaſt line and the firſt mentioned land line are diſtinguiſhed by CAPITALS. And the laſt mentioned of each by *italics*, which I have choſen to do to illuſtrate the explanation.



200 S. 200 N.

I preſume that if four hundred miles be traced by following the inflexes of any ſea ſhore, that the two extremes will not be more than three hundred miles diſtant from each other, on a ſtraight line. Therefore to find the content of a triangle whoſe baſe is three hundred miles, multiply the length of the baſe into half the perpendicular, which, in this caſe, is the weſt line, and the product will be anſwer:

300 miles length of the baſe.
150 half the perpendicular (ſuppoſing it a right angled triangle).

15000
300

45,000 content of the grant in ſquare miles.
640 acres in a ſquare mile.

1800000
270000

28,800,000 content in ſquare acres.

Now will any one undertake to say, that this explanation is not as fairly drawn (if not more so) from the words themselves, as any other that can be offered, because it is not only justified by the exact words of the patent, grant, or charter, or any other name by which it may be called, but by their implied meaning; and is likewise of such a content, as may be supposed to have been intended; whereas the claimants' explanation is without bounds, and beyond every thing that is reasonable. Yet after all, who can say what were the precise meaning of terms and expressions so loosely formed, and capable of such a variety of contradictory interpretations?

Had the order of the lines been otherwise than they are in the patent, the reasonableness of the thing must have directed the manner in which they should be connected: but as the claim is founded in unreasonableness, and that unreasonableness endeavoured to be supported by a transposition of the lines, there remains no pretence for the claim to stand on.

Perhaps those who are interested in the claimants' explanation will say that as the South Sea is spoken of, the lines must be as they explain them, in order to reach it.

To this I reply; first, that no man then knew how far it was from the Atlantic to the South Sea, as I shall presently show, but believed it to be but a short distance: and,

Secondly, that the uncertain and ambiguous manner in which the South Sea is alluded to (for it is not mentioned by name, but only "*from sea to sea*"), serves to perplex the patent, and not to explain it: and as no right can be founded on an ambiguity, but on some proof cleared of ambiguity, therefore the allusive introduction of "sea to sea" can yield no service to the claim.

There is likewise an ambiguous mention made of *two lands* in this patent, as well as of two *seas*; viz. and all that "*space or circuit of* "*land* lying from the sea coast of the precinct aforesaid up into the "*land throughout from sea to sea.*"

On which I remark, that the two *lands* here mentioned have the appearance of a major and a minor, or the greater out of which the less is to be taken: and the term from "*sea to sea*" may be said to apply descriptively to the *land throughout*, and not to the *space or circuit of land patented to the company*: in a similar manner that the former patent described a major of 706 miles extent, out of which the minor, or square of one hundred miles, was to be chosen.

But to suppose, that because the South Sea is darkly alluded to, it

muſt therefore (at whatever diſtance it might be, which then nobody knew, or for whatever purpoſe it might be introduced) be made a certain boundary, and that without regard to the reaſonableneſs of the matter, or the order in which the lines are arranged, which is the only implication the patent gives for ſetting off the land lines, is a ſuppoſition that contradicts every thing which is reaſonable.

The figure produced by following the order of the lines will be compleat in itſelf, let the diſtance to the South Sea be more or leſs; becauſe, if the *land throughout from ſea to ſea* had not been ſufficiently extenſive to admit the weſt land line and and the northweſt land line to cloſe, the South Sea, in that caſe, would have eventually become a boundary: but if the extent of the *land throughout from ſea to ſea*, was ſo great, that the lines cloſed without reaching the ſaid South Sea, the figure was compleat without it.

Wherefore, as the order of the lines, when raiſed on the indented coaſt line, produces a regular figure of reaſonable dimenſions, and of about the ſame content, though not of the ſame ſhape, which Virginia now holds within the Allegany Mountains; and by tranſpoſing them another figure is produced, for which there is no name, and cannot be compleated, as I ſhall preſently explain, and of an extent greater than one half of Europe, it is needleſs to offer any other arguments to ſhew that the order of the lines muſt be the rule, if any rule can be drawn from the words, for aſcertaining from which point the weſt line and northweſt line were to be ſet off. Neither is it poſſible to ſuppoſe any other rule could be followed; becauſe a northweſt line ſet off two hundred miles above Cape Comfort, would not only never touch the South Sea, but would form a ſpiral line of infinite windings round the globe, and after paſſing over the northern parts of America and the frozen ocean, and then into the northern parts of Aſia, would, when eternity ſhould end and not before, terminate in the north-pole.

This is the only manner in which I can expreſs the effect of a northweſt line, ſet off as above; becauſe as its direction muſt always be between the north and the weſt, it conſequently can never get into the pole nor yet come to a reſt, and on the principle that matter or ſpace is capable of being eternally divided, muſt proceed on for ever.

But it was a prevailing opinion, at the time this patent was obtained, that the South Sea was at no great diſtance from the Atlantic, and therefore it was needleſs, under that ſuppoſition to regard which way the lines ſhould be run; neither need we wonder at this error in the

Engliſh government reſpecting America then, when we ſee ſo many and ſuch glaring ones now, for which there are leſs excuſe.

Some circumſtances favoured this miſtake. Admiral ſir Francis Drake not long before this, had, from the top of a mountain in the iſthmus of Darien, which is the centre of North and South America, ſeen both the South Sea and the Atlantic; the width of the part of the continent where he then was, not being above 70 miles, whereas its width oppoſite Cheſapeake-bay is as great, if not greater, than in any other part, being from *ſea to ſea*, about the diſtance it is from America to England. But this could not then be known, becauſe only two voyages had been made acroſs the South Sea; the one by the ſhip in which Magellan ſailed, who died in his paſſage, and which was the firſt ſhip that ſailed round the world, and the other by ſir Francis Drake: but as neither of theſe ſailed into a northern latitude in that ocean, high enough to fix the longitude of the weſtern coaſt of America from the eaſtern, the diſtance acroſs was entirely on ſuppoſition, and the errors they then ran into appear laughable to us who now know what the diſtance is.

That the company expected to come at the South Sea without much trouble or travelling, and that the great body of land which intervened, ſo far from being their view in obtaining the charter, became their diſappointment, may be collected from a circumſtance mentioned in Stith's Hiſtory of Virginia.

He relates, that, in the year 1608, which was at the time the company were ſoliciting this patent, they fitted up in England "a barge "for captain Newport," (who was afterwards one of the joint deputy governors under the very charter we are now treating of) "which, for convenience of carriage, might be taken into five pieces, "and with which he and his company were inſtructed to go up "James River as far as the falls thereof, to diſcover the country of the "Monakins, and from thence they were to proceed, *carrying their "barge beyond the falls to convey them to the South Sea;* being ordered "not to return without a lump of gold, or a certainty of the ſaid "ſea."

And Hutchinſon, in his Hiſtory of New-England, which was called North-Virginia at the time this patent was obtained, ſays, "the geo- "graphy of this part of America was leſs underſtood than at preſent. "A line to the Spaniſh ſettlements was imagined much ſhorter than "it really was. Some of Chaplain's people, in the beginning of the "laſt century, who had been but a few days march from Quebec, re-

" turned with great joy, ſuppoſing that from the top of a high moun-
" tain, they had diſcovered *the South Sea.*"

From theſe matters, which are evidences on record, it appears that the adventurers had no knowledge of the diſtance it was to the South Sea, but ſuppoſed it to be no great way from the Atlantic; and alſo that great extent of territory was not their object, but a ſhort communication with the ſouthern ocean, by which they might get into the neighbourhood of the Gold Coaſt, and likewiſe carry on a commerce with the Eaſt-Indies.

Having thus ſhewn the confuſed and various interpretations this charter is ſubject to, and that it may be made to mean any thing and nothing; I now proceed to ſhow, that, let the limits of it be more or leſs, the preſent Virginia does not, and cannot, as a matter of right, inherit under it.

I ſhall open this part of the ſubject by putting the following caſe:

Either Virginia ſtands in ſucceſſion to the London company, to whom the charter was granted, or to the crown of England. If to the London company, then it becomes her, as an outſet in the matter, to ſhew who they were, and likewiſe that they were in poſſeſſion to the commencement of the revolution.—If to the crown, then the charter is of conſequence ſuperſeded; becauſe the crown did not poſſeſs territories by charter, but by prerogative without charter. The notion of the crown chartering to itſelf is a nullity; and in this caſe, the unpoſſeſſed lands, be they little or much, are in the ſame condition as if they never had been chartered at all; and the ſovereignty of them devolves to the ſovereignty of the United States.

The charter or patent of 1609 as well as that of 1606 was to ſir Thomas Gates, ſir George Summers, the Reverend Richard Hackluit, prebend of Weſtminſter, and others; and the government was then proprietary. Thoſe proprietors, by virtue of the charter of 1709, choſe lord Delaware for their governor, and ſir Thomas Gates, ſir George Summers, and captain Newport (the perſon who was to go with a boat to the South Sea,) joint deputy governors.

Was this the form of government either as to ſoil or conſtitution at the time the preſent revolution commenced? if not, the charter was not in *being;* for it matters not to us how it came to be *out of being*, ſo long as the preſent Virginians, or their anceſtors, neither are nor were ſufferers by the change then made.

But ſuppoſe it could be proved to be in being, which it cannot, becauſe *being* in a charter is power, it would only prove a right in be-

half of the London company of adventurers, but how that right is to be diſpoſed of is another queſtion. We are not defending the right of the London company, deceaſed 150 years ago, but taking up the matter at the place where we found it, and ſo far as the authority of the crown of England was exerciſed when the revolution commenced.

The charter was a contract between the crown of England and thoſe adventurers for their own emolument, and not between the crown and the people of Virginia; and whatever was the occaſion of the contract becoming void, or ſurrendered up, or ſuperſeded, makes no part of the queſtion now. It is ſufficient that when the United States ſucceeded to ſovereignty they found no ſuch contract in exiſtence or even in litigation. They found Virginia under the authority of the crown of England, both as to ſoil and government, ſubject to quit-rents to the crown and not to the company, and had been ſo for upwards of 150 years: and that an inſtrument or deed of writing, of a private nature, as all proprietary contracts are ſo far as land is concerned, and which is now only hiſtorically known, and in which Virginia was no party, and to which no ſucceſſion in any line can be proved, and has ceaſed for 150 years, ſhould now be raked from oblivion and held up as a charter whereon to aſſume a right to boundleſs territory, and that by a perverſion of the order of it, is ſomething very ſingular and extraordinary.

If there was any innovation on the part of the crown, the conteſt reſted between the crown and the proprietors, the London company, and not between Virginia and the ſaid crown. It was not her charter; it was the company's charter, and the only parties in the caſe were the crown and the company.

But why, if Virginia contends for the immutability of charters, has ſhe ſelected this in preference to the two former ones? All her arguments ariſing from this principle muſt go to the firſt charter and not to the laſt; but by placing them to the laſt, inſtead of the firſt, ſhe admits a fact againſt her principle; becauſe, in order to eſtabliſh the laſt, ſhe proves the firſt to be vacated by the ſecond in the ſpace of 23 years, the ſecond to be vacated by the third in the ſpace of 3 years; and why the third ſhould not be vacated by the fourth form of government, iſſuing from the ſame power with the former two and which took place about 25 years after, and continued in being for 150 years ſince, and under which all her public and private buſineſs was tranſacted, her purchaſes made, her warrants for ſurvey and patents for land obtained, is too myſterious to account for.

Either the re-aſſumption of the London company's charter into the hands of the crown was an uſurpation, or it was not. If it was, then, ſtrictly ſpeaking, is every thing which Virginia has done under that uſurpation illegal, and ſhe may be ſaid to have lived in the moſt curious ſpecies of rebellion ever known; rebellion againſt the London company of adventurers. For if the charter to the company (for it was not to the Virginians) ought to be in being now, it ought to have been in being then; and why ſhe ſhould admit its vacation then and reject it now, is unaccountable; or why ſhe ſhould eſteem her purchaſes of lands good which were *then* made contrary to this charter, and now contend for the operation of the ſame charter to poſſeſs [illegible] by, are circumſtances which cannot be reconciled.

But whether the charter, as it is called, ought to be extinct or not, cannot make a queſtion with us. All the parties concerned in it are deceaſed, and no ſucceſſors, in any regular line of ſucceſſion, appear to claim. Neither the London company of adventurers, their heirs or aſſigns, were in poſſeſſion of the exerciſe of this charter at the commencement of the revolution; and therefore the ſtate of Virginia does not, in point of fact, ſucceed to and inherit from the company.

But ſay they, we ſucceed to and inherit from the crown of England, which was the immediate poſſeſſor of the ſovereignty at the time we entered, and had been ſo for 150 years.

To ſay this, is to ſay there is no charter at all. A charter is an aſſurance from one party to another, and cannot be from the ſame party to itſelf.

But before I enter further on this caſe I ſhall conciſely ſtate how this charter came to be re-aſſumed by the power which granted it, the crown of England.

I have already ſtated that it was a proprietary charter, or grant, to ſir Thomas Gates and others, who were called the London company, and ſometimes the South-Virginia company, to diſtinguiſh them from thoſe who ſettled to the eaſtward (now New England) and were then called the North-Virginia or Plymouth company.

Oldmixon's Hiſtory of Virginia (in his account of the Britiſh empire in America) publiſhed in the year 1708, gives a conciſe progreſs of the affair. He attributes it to the miſconduct, contentions and miſmanagement of the proprietors, and their innovations upon the Indians, which had ſo exaſperated them, that they fell on the ſettlers and deſtroyed at one time 334 men, women and children.

"Some time after this maſſacre, ſays he, ſeveral gentlemen in Eng-

land procured grants of land from the company, and others came over on their private accounts to make ſettlements; among the former was one captain Martin, who was named to be of the council. This man raiſed ſo many differences among them, that new diſtractions followed, which the Indians obſerving, took heart and once more fell upon the ſettlers on the borders, deſtroying, without pitying either age, ſex, or condition.

"Theſe and other calamities being chiefly imputed to the miſmanagement of the proprietors, whoſe loſſes had ſo diſcouraged moſt of their beſt members, that they ſold their ſhares, and Charles the firſt on his acceſſion to the throne diſſolved the company, and took the colony into his own immediate direction. He appointed the governor and council himſelf, ordered all patents and proceſs to iſſue in his own name, and reſerved a quit-rent of two ſhillings ſterling for every hundred acres."

Thus far our author. Now it is impoſſible for us at this diſtance of time to ſay what were all the exact cauſes of the change; neither have we any buſineſs with it. The company might ſurrender it, or they might not, or they might forfeit it by not fulfilling conditions, or they might ſell it, or the crown might, as far as we know, take it from them. But what are either of theſe caſes to Virginia, or any other which can be produced. She was not a party in the matter. It was not her charter, neither can ſhe ingraft any right upon it, or ſuffer any injury under it.

If the charter was vacated it muſt have been by the London company; if it was ſurrendered it muſt be by the ſame; and if it was ſold nobody elſe could ſell it, and if it was taken from them nobody elſe could loſe it; and yet Virginia calls this her charter, which it was not within her power to hold, to ſell, to vacate, or to loſe.

But if ſhe puts her right upon the ground that it never was ſold, ſurrendered, loſt, or vacated, by the London company, ſhe admits that if they *had* ſold, ſurrendered, loſt, or vacated it, that it would have become extinct, and to her no charter at all. And in this caſe, the only thing to prove is the fact, which is, has this charter been the rule of government, and of purchaſing or procuring unappropriated lands in Virginia, from the time it was granted to the time of the revolution? Anſwer—the charter has not been the rule of government, nor of purchaſing and procuring lands, neither has any lands been purchaſed or procured under its ſanction or authority for upwards of 150 years.

But if ſhe goes a ſtep further, and ſays, that they could not vacate, ſurrender, ſell, or loſe it, by any act they could do, ſo neither could they vacate, ſurrender, ſell, or loſe that of 1606, which was three years prior to this; and this argument, ſo far from eſtabliſhing the charter of 1609, would deſtroy it; and in its ſtead confirm the preceding one which limited the company to a ſquare of 100 miles. And if ſhe ſtill goes back to that of ſir Walter Rawleigh, *that* only places her in the light of Americans in common with all.

The only fact that can be clearly proved is, that the crown of England exerciſed the power of dominion and government in Virginia, and of the diſpoſal of the lands, and that the charter had neither been the rule of government or purchaſing land for upwards of 150 years, and this places Virginia in ſucceſſion to the crown and not to the company. Conſequently it proves a lapſe of the charter into the hands of the crown by ſome means or other.

Now to ſuppoſe that the charter could return into the hands of the crown and yet remain in force, is to ſuppoſe that a man could be bound by a bond of obligation to himſelf.

Its very *being* in the hands of the crown from which it iſſued, is a ceſſation of its exiſtence; and an effectual unchartering all that part of the grant which was not before diſpoſed of. And conſequently the ſtate of Virginia ſtanding thus in ſucceſſion to the crown, can be entitled to no more extent of country as a ſtate under the union, than what it poſſeſſed as a province under the crown. And all lands exterior to theſe bounds, as well of Virginia as the reſt of the ſtates, devolve, in the order of ſucceſſion, to the ſovereignty of the United States, for the benefit of all.

And this brings the caſe to what were the limits of Virginia as a province under the crown of England.

Charter it had none. Its limits then reſted at the diſcretion of the authority to which it was ſubject. Maryland and Pennſylvania became its boundary to the eaſtward and northward, and North-Carolina to the ſouthward, therefore the boundary to the weſtward was the only principal line to be aſcertained.

As Virginia from a proprietary ſoil and government was become what then bore the name of a royal one, the extent of the province, as the order of things then ſtood (for ſomething muſt always be admitted whereon to form a beginning) was wholly at the diſpoſal of the crown of England, who might enlarge, or diminiſh, or erect new governments to the weſtward, by the ſame authoritative right that Vir-

ginia now can divide a county into two; if too large, or too inconvenient.

To say, as has been said, that Pennsylvania, Maryland and North-Carolina, were taken out of Virginia, is no more than to say, they were taken out of America; because Virginia was the common name of all the country, north and south: and to say they were taken out of the chartered limits of Virginia, is likewise to say nothing; because after the dissolution or extinction of the proprietary company, there was nobody to whom any provincial limits became chartered. The extinction of the company was the extinction of the chartered limits. The patent could not survive the company, because it was to them a right, which, when they expired ceased to be any body's else in their stead.

But to return to the western boundary of Virginia at the commencement of the revolution.

Charters, like proclamations, were the sole act of the crown, and if the former were adequate to fix limits to the lands which it gave away, sold, or otherwise disposed of, the latter were equally adequate to fix limits or divisions to those which it retained; and therefore, the western limits of Virginia, as the proprietary company was extinct and consequently the patent with it, must be looked for in the line of proclamations.

I am not fond of quoting these old remains of former arrogance, but as we must begin somewhere, and as the states have agreed to regulate the right of each state to territory, by the condition each stood in with the crown of England at the commencement of the revolution, we have no other rule to go by; and any rule which can be agreed on is better than none.

From the proclamation then of 1763, the western limits of Virginia, as a province under the crown of England, are described so as not to extend beyond the heads of any of the rivers which empty themselves into the Atlantic, and consequently the limits did not pass over the Allegany Mountain.

Extract from the proclamation of 1763 so far as respects boundary:

" AND WHEREAS it is *just* and *reasonable*, and *essential to our interest*, and the security of our colonies, that the several nations or tribes of Indians, with whom we are connected, and who live under our protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the possession of such parts of our dominions and territories, *as, not having being ceded to, or purchased by us, are reserved to them or any of them as their hunt-*

ing grounds; we do therefore, with the advice of our privy council, declare it to be our royal will and pleaſure that no governor, or commander in chief, in any of our colonies of Quebec, Eaſt Florida, or Weſt-Florida, do preſume upon any pretence whatever, to grant warrants of ſurvey, or paſs any patents for lands beyond the bounds of their reſpective governments, as deſcribed in their commiſſions: As ALSO that no governor or commander in chief of our colonies or plantations in America, do preſume, for the preſent, and until our further pleaſure be known, to grant warrants of ſurvey or paſs patents for any lands *beyond the heads or ſources of any of the rivers which fall into the Atlantic ocean from the weſt or northweſt*, or upon any lands whatever, *which not having been ceded to, or purchaſed by us, as aforeſaid, are reſerved unto the ſaid Indians or any of them.*

"And we do further declare it to be our royal will and pleaſure, for the preſent, as aforeſaid, to reſerve under our ſovereignty, protection and dominion, *for the uſe of the ſaid Indians all the lands and territories*, not included within the limits of our ſaid three new governments, or within the limits of the territory granted to the Hudſon's-Bay company; as alſo, *all the lands and territories lying to the weſtward of the ſources of the rivers, which fall into the ſea from the weſt and northweſt as aforeſaid;* and we do hereby ſtrictly forbid, on pain of our diſpleaſure, all our loving ſubjects from making any purchaſes or ſettlements whatever, or taking poſſeſſion of any of the lands above reſerved, without our eſpecial leave and licence for that purpoſe firſt obtained.

"And we do further ſtrictly enjoin and require all perſons whatever, who have either wilfully or inadvertently ſeated themſelves upon any lands within the countries above deſcribed, or upon any other lands, *which, not having been ceded to, or purchaſed by us*, are ſtill reſerved to the ſaid Indians, as aforeſaid, forthwith to remove themſelves from ſuch ſettlements."

It is eaſy for us to underſtand, that the frequent and plauſible mention of the Indians was only ſpecioufneſs to create an idea of the humanity of government. The object and intention of the proclamation was the weſtern boundary, which is here ſignified not to extend beyond the heads of the rivers: and theſe, then, are the weſtern limits which Virginia had as a province under the crown of Britain.

And agreeable to the intention of this proclamation and the limits deſcribed thereby, lord Hillſborough, then ſecretary of ſtate in England, addreſſed an official letter of the 31ſt of July, 1770, to lord Bottetourt, at that time governor of Virginia, which letter was laid before

the council of Virginia by Mr. president Nelson, and by him answered on the 18th of October in the same year, of which the following are extracts:

"On the evening of the day your lordship's letter to the governor was delivered to me (as it contains matters of great variety and importance), it was read in council, and, together with the several papers inclosed, it hath been maturely considered, and I now trouble your lordship with theirs as well as my own opinion upon the subject or them.

"We do not presume to say to whom our gracious sovereign shall grant his vacant lands," and "with respect to the establishment of a *new colony on the back of Virginia*, it is a subject of too great political importance for me to presume to give an opinion upon, however, permit me, my lord, to observe, that when that part of the country shall become sufficiently populated it may be a wise and prudent measure."

On the death of lord Bottetourt, lord Dunmore was appointed to the government, and he, either from ignorance of the subject, or other motives, made a grant of some lands on the Ohio to certain of his friends and favourites, which produced the following letter from lord Dartmouth, who succeeded lord Hillsborough as secretary of state:

"I think fit to inclose your lordship a copy of lord Hillsborough's letter to lord Bottetourt, of the 31st of July, 1770, the receipt of which was acknowledged by Mr. president Nelson, a few days before lord Bottetourt's death, and appears by his answer to it, to have been laid before the council. That board, therefore, could not be ignorant of what has passed here upon Mr. Walpole's application, nor of the king's express command, contained in lord Hillsborough's letter, that no lands should be granted beyond the limits of the royal proclamation of 1763, until the king's further pleasure was signified; and I have only to observe, that it must have been a very extraordinary neglect in them not to have informed your lordship of that letter and those orders."

On these documents I shall make no remarks. They are their own evidence, and shew what the limits of Virginia were while a British province; and as there was then no other authority by which they could be fixed, and as the grant to the London company could not be a grant to any but themselves, and of consequence ceased to be when they ceased to exist, it remained a matter of choice in the crown, on its re-assumption of the lands, to limit or divide them into separate go-

vernments, as it judged beſt, and from which there was not, and could not, in the order of government, be any appeal. Neither was Virginia, as a province, affected by it, becauſe the monies, in any caſe, ariſing from the ſale of lands, did not go into her treaſury; and whether to the crown or to the proprietors was to her indifferent. And it is likewiſe evident, from the ſecretary's letter, and the preſident's anſwer, that it was in contemplation to lay out a new colony on the *back* of Virginia, between the Allegany Mountains and the Ohio.

Having thus gone through the ſeveral charters, or grants, and their relation to each other, and ſhewn that Virginia cannot ſtand in ſucceſſion to a private grant, which has been extinct for upwards of 150 years—and that the weſtern limits of Virginia, at the commencement of the revolution, were at the heads of the rivers emptying themſelves into the Atlantic, none of which are beyond the Allegany Mountains; I now proceed to the ſecond part, namely,

The reaſonableneſs of her claims.

Virginia, as a Britiſh province, ſtood in a different ſituation with the crown of England to any of the other provinces, becauſe ſhe had no aſcertained limits, but ſuch as aroſe from the laying off new provinces and the proclamation of 1763. For the ſame name, Virginia, as I have before mentioned, was the general name of all the country, and the dominion out of which the ſeveral governments were laid off: and in ſtrict propriety, conformable to the origin of names, the province of Virginia was taken out of the dominion of Virginia. For the term, *dominion*, could not appertain to the province, which retained the name of Virginia, but to the crown, and from thence was applied to the whole country, and ſignified its being an appendage to the crown of England, as they now ſay, "*our dominion of Wales.*"

It is not poſſible to ſuppoſe there could exiſt an idea that Virginia, as a Britiſh province, was to be extended to the South Sea at the diſtance of three thouſand miles. The dominion, as appertaining at that time to the crown, might be claimed to extend ſo far, but as a province the thought was not conceivable, nor the practice poſſible.

And it is more than probable, that the deception made uſe of to obtain the patent of 1609 by repreſenting the South Sea to be near where the Allegany Mountains are, was one cauſe of its becoming extinct; and it is worthy of remarking, that no hiſtory (at leaſt that I have met with) mentions any diſpute or litigation, between the crown and the company in conſequence of the extinction of the patent, and the re-aſſumption of the lands; and therefore the negative

evidence corroborating with the poſitive, make it, as certain as ſuch a caſe can poſſibly be, that either the company received a compenſation for the patent, or quitted it quietly, aſhamed of the impoſition they had acted, and their ſubſequent mal-adminiſtration. Men are not inclined to give up a claim where there is any ground to contend on, and the ſilence in which the patent expired is a preſumptive proof that its fate, from whatever cauſe, was juſt.

There is one general policy which ſeems to have prevailed with the Engliſh in laying off new governments, which was, not to make them larger than their own country, that they might the eaſier hold them manageable: This was the caſe with every one except Canada, the extenſion of whoſe limits was for the politic purpoſe of recognizing new acquiſition of territory, not immediately convenient for colonization.

But, in order to give this matter a chance through all its caſes, I will admit what no man can ſuppoſe, which is, that there is an Engliſh charter that fixes Virginia to extend from the Atlantic to the South Sea, and contained within a due weſt line, ſet off two hundred miles below Cape Comfort, and a northweſt line, ſet off two hundred miles above it. Her ſide, then, on the Atlantic (according to an explanation given in Mr. Bradford's paper of September 29, 1779, by an advocate for the Virginia claims) will be four hundred miles; her ſide to the ſouth three thouſand; her ſide to the weſt four thouſand; and her northweſt line about five thouſand; and the quantity of land contained within theſe dimenſions will be almoſt 4,000,000,000, that is four thouſand million of acres, which is more than ten times the quantity contained within the preſent United States, and above an hundred times greater than the kingdom of England.

To reaſon on a caſe like this, is ſuch a waſte of time, and ſuch an exceſs of folly, that it ought not to be reaſoned upon. It is impoſſible to ſuppoſe that any patent to private perſons could be ſo intentionally abſurd, and the claim, grounded thereon, is as wild as any thing the imagination of man ever conceived.

But if, as I before mentioned, there was a charter which bore ſuch an explanation, and that Virginia ſtood in ſucceſſion to it, what would that be to us, any more than the will of Alexander, had he taken it in his head to have bequeathed away the world? Such a charter, or grant muſt have been obtained by impoſition and a falſe repreſentation of the country, or granted in error, or both; and in any of, or all, theſe caſes, the United States muſt reject the matter as ſomething they

cannot know, for the merits will not bear an argument, and the pretenſion of right ſtands upon no better ground.

Our caſe is an original one; and many matters attending it muſt be determined on their own merits and reaſonableneſs. The territory of the reſt of the ſtates is, in general, within known bounds of moderate extent, and the quota which each ſtate is to furniſh towards the expence and ſervice of the war, muſt be aſcertained upon ſome rule of compariſon. The number of inhabitants of each ſtate formed the firſt rule; and it was naturally ſuppoſed that thoſe numbers bore nearly the ſame proportion to each other, which the territory of each ſtate did. Virginia, on this ſcale, would be about one fifth larger than Pennſylvania, which would be as much dominion as any ſtate could manage with happineſs and convenience.

When I firſt began this ſubject, my intention was to be extenſive on the merits, and conciſe on the matter of right; inſtead of which, I have been extenſive on the matter of right, and conciſe on the merits of reaſonableneſs: and this alteration in my deſign aroſe, conſequentially, from the nature of the ſubject; for as a reaſonable thing the claim can be ſupported by no argument, and therefore needs none to refute it; but as there is a ſtrange propenſity in mankind to ſhelter themſelves under the ſanction of a right, however unreaſonable that ſuppoſed right may be, I found it moſt conducive to the intereſt of the caſe, to ſhew, that the right ſtands upon no better grounds than the reaſon. And ſhall therefore proceed to make ſome obſervations on,

The conſequences of the claim.

The claim being unreaſonable in itſelf and ſtanding on no ground of right, but ſuch as, if true, muſt from the quarter it is drawn be offenſive, has a tendency to create diſguſt and ſour the minds of the reſt of the ſtates. Thoſe lands are capable, under the management of the United States, of repaying the charges of the war, and ſome of them, as I ſhall hereafter ſhow, may, I preſume, be made an immediate advantage of.

I diſtinguiſh three different deſcriptions of lands in America at the commencement of the revolution. Proprietary or chartered lands, as was the caſe in Pennſylvania: Crown lands, within the deſcribed limits of any of the crown governments; and crown reſiduary lands, that were without, or beyond the limits of any province; and thoſe laſt were held in reſerve whereon to erect new governments and lay out new provinces; as appears to have been the deſign by lord Hillſborough's letter and the preſident's anſwer, wherein he ſays "with

" reſpect to the eſtabliſhment of a *new* colony on the *back* of Vir-
" ginia, it is a ſubject of too great political importance for me to
" preſume to give an opinion upon; however, permit me, my lord,
" to obſerve, that when that part of the country, ſhall become popu-
" lated it may be a wiſe and prudent meaſure."

The expreſſion is a " *new colony* on the *back* of Virginia;" and referred to lands between the heads of the rivers and the Ohio. This is a proof that thoſe lands were not conſidered within, but beyond, the limits of Virginia as a colony; and the other expreſſion in the letter is equally deſcriptive, namely, " *We do not preſume to ſay to whom* " *our gracious ſovereign ſhall grant his vacant lands.*" Certainly then, the ſame right, which, at that time, reſted in the crown, reſts now in the more ſupreme authority of the United States; and therefore, addreſſing the preſident's letter to the circumſtances of the revolution, it will run thus:

" We do not preſume to ſay to whom the *ſovereign United States* ſhall grant their vacant lands, and with reſpect to the ſettlement of a *new colony* on the *back* of Virginia, it is a matter of too much political importance for me to give an opinion upon; however, permit me to obſerve, that when that part of the country ſhall become populated it may be a wiſe and prudent meaſure."

It muſt occur to every perſon, on reflection, that thoſe lands are too diſtant to be within the government of any of the preſent ſtates; and, I may preſume to ſuppoſe, that were a calculation juſtly made, Virginia has loſt more by the decreaſe of taxables, than ſhe has gained by what lands ſhe has made ſale of; therefore, ſhe is not only doing the reſt of the ſtates wrong in point of equity, but herſelf and them an injury in point of ſtrength, ſervice and revenue.

It is only the United States, and not any ſingle ſtate, that can lay off new ſtates and incorporate them in the union by repreſentation; therefore, the ſituation which the ſettlers on thoſe lands will be in, under the aſſumed right of Virginia, will be harzardous and diſtreſſing, and they will feel themſelves at laſt like aliens to the commonwealth of Iſrael, their habitations unſafe and their title precarious.

And when men reflect on that peace, harmony, quietude and ſecurity, which is neceſſary to proſperity, eſpecially in making new ſettlements, and think that when the war ſhall be ended, their happineſs and ſafety will depend on a union with the ſtates, and not a ſcattered people, unconnected with, and politically unknown to the reſt, they will feel but little inclination to put themſelves in a ſituation, which

however ſolitary and recluſe, it may appear at preſent, will then be uncertain and unſafe and their troubles will have to begin where thoſe of the United States ſhall end.

It is probable that ſome of the inhabitants of Virginia may be inclined to ſuppoſe, that the writer of this, by taking up the ſubject in the manner he has done, is arguing unfriendly againſt their intereſt. To this he wiſhes to reply;

That the moſt extraordinary part of the whole is, that Virginia ſhould countenance ſuch a claim. For it is worthy of obſerving, that, from the beginning of the conteſt with Britain, and long after, there was not a people in America who diſcovered, through all the variety and multiplicity of public buſineſs, a greater fund of true wiſdom, fortitude, and diſintereſtedneſs, than the then colony of Virginia. They were loved—They were reverenced. Their inveſtigation of the aſſumed rights of Britain had a ſagacity which was uncommon. Their reaſonings were piercing, difficult to be equalled and impoſſible to be refuted, and their public ſpirit was exceeded by none. But ſince this unfortunate land-ſcheme has taken place, their powers ſeem to be abſorbed; a torpor has overſhaded them and every one aſks, What is become of Virginia?

It ſeldom happens that the romantic ſchemes of extenſive dominion are of any ſervice to a government, and never to a people. They aſſuredly end at laſt in loſs, trouble, diviſion and diſappointment. And was even the title of Virginia good, and the claim admiſſible, ſhe would derive more laſting and real benefit by participating it, than by attempting the management of an object ſo infinitely beyond her reach. Her ſhare with the reſt, under the ſupremacy of the United States, which is the only authority adequate to the purpoſe, would be worth more to her, than what the whole would produce under the management of herſelf alone. And that for ſeveral reaſons:

Firſt, becauſe her claim not being admiſſible nor yet manageable, ſhe cannot make a good title to the purchaſers, and conſequently can get but little for the lands.

Secondly, becauſe the diſtance the ſettlers will be at from her, will immediately put them out of all government and protection, ſo far, at leaſt as relates to Virginia: and by this means ſhe will render her frontiers a refuge to deſperadoes, and a hiding-place from juſtice; and the conſequence will be perpetual unſafety to her own peace, and that of the neighbouring ſtates.

Thirdly, becauſe her quota of expence for carrying on the war, admitting her to engroſs ſuch an immenſity of territory, would be greater than ſhe can either ſupport or ſupply, and could not be leſs, upon a reaſonable rule of proportion, than nine-tenths of the whole. And,

Laſtly, becauſe ſhe muſt ſooner or later relinquiſh them, and therefore to ſee her own intereſt wiſely at firſt, is preferable to the alternative of finding it out by misfortune at laſt.

I have now gone through my examination of the claims of Virginia, in every caſe which I propoſed; and for ſeveral reaſons wiſh the lot had fallen to another perſon.

But as this is a moſt important matter, in which all are intereſted, and the ſubſtantial good of Virginia not injured but promoted, and as few men have leiſure, and ſtill fewer have inclination, to go into intricate inveſtigation, I have at laſt ventured on the ſubject.

The ſucceſſion of the United States to the vacant weſtern territory is a right they originally ſat out upon; and in the pamphlet *Common Senſe*, I frequently mentioned thoſe lands as a national fund for the benefit of all; therefore reſuming the ſubject, where I then left off, I ſhall conclude with conciſely reducing to ſyſtem what I then only hinted.

In my laſt piece, *The Criſis Extraordinary*, I eſtimated the annual amount of the charge of war and the ſupport of the ſeveral governments at two million pounds ſterling, and the peace eſtabliſhment at three quarters of a million, and, by a compariſon of the taxes of this country with thoſe of England, proved that the whole yearly expence to us, to defend the country, is but a third of what Britain would have drawn from us by taxes, had ſhe ſucceeded in her attempt to conquer; and our peace eſtabliſhment only an eighth part; and likewiſe ſhewed, that it was within the ability of the ſtates to carry on the whole of the war by taxation, without having recourſe to any other modes or funds. To have a clear idea of taxation is neceſſary to every country, and the more funds we can diſcover and organize, the leſs will be the hope of the enemy, and the readier their diſpoſition to peace, which it is now *their* intereſt more than *ours* to promote.

I have already remarked, that only the United States and not any particular ſtate can lay off new ſtates and incorporate them in the union by repreſentation; keeping, therefore, this idea in view, I aſk, might not a ſubſtantial fund be quickly created by laying off a new

ſtate, ſo as to contain between twenty and thirty millions of acres, and opening a land-office in all the countries in Europe for hard money, and in this country for ſupplies in kind, at a certain price.

The tract of land that ſeems beſt adapted to anſwer this purpoſe is contained between the Allegany Mountain and the river Ohio, as far north as the Pennſylvania line, thence extending down the ſaid river to the falls thereof, thence due ſouth into the latitude of the North-Carolina line, and thence caſt to the Allegany Mountain aforeſaid—I, the more readily, mention this tract, becauſe it is fighting the enemy at their own weapons, as it includes the ſame ground on which a new colony would have been erected, for the emolument of the crown of England, as appears by lord Hillſborough's and Dartmouth's letters, had not the revolution prevented its being carried into execution.

It is probable there may be ſome ſpots of private property within this tract, but to incorporate them into ſome government will render them more profitable to the owners, and the condition of the ſcattered ſettlers more eligible and happy than at preſent.

If twenty millions of acres of this new ſtate be patented and ſold at twenty pounds ſterling per hundred acres, they will produce four million pounds ſterling, which, if applied to continental expences only, will ſupport the war for three years, ſhould Britain be ſo unwiſe to herſelf to proſecute it againſt her own direct intereſt and againſt the intereſt and policy of all Europe. The ſeveral ſtates will then have to raiſe taxes for their internal government only, and the continental taxes as ſoon as the fund begins to operate, will leſſen, and if ſufficiently productive, will ceaſe.

Lands are the real riches of all the habitable world, and the natural funds of America. The funds of other countries are, in general, artificially conſtructed; the creatures of neceſſity and contrivance; dependant upon credit, and always expoſed to hazard and uncertainty. But lands can neither be annihilated nor loſe their value; on the contrary, they univerſally riſe with population, and rapidly ſo; when under the ſecurity of effectual government. But this it is impoſſible for Virginia to give, and, therefore, that which is capable of defraying the expences of the empire, will, under the management of any ſingle ſtate, produce only a fugitive ſupport to wandering individuals.

I ſhall now enquire into the effects which the laying out a new ſtate, under the authority of the United States, will have upon Virginia.

It is the very circumſtance ſhe ought to, and muſt, wiſh for, when ſhe examines the matter through all its caſes and conſequences.

The preſent ſettlers being beyond her reach, and her ſuppoſed authority over them remaining in herſelf, they will appear to her as revolters, and ſhe to them as oppreſſors; and this will produce ſuch a ſpirit of mutual diſlike, that in a little time a total diſagreement will take place, to the diſadvantage of both.

But under the authority of the United States the matter is manageable, and Virginia will be eaſed of a diſagreeable conſequence.

Beſides this, a ſale of the lands, continentally, for the purpoſe of ſupporting the expence of the war, will ſave her a greater ſhare of taxes, than what the ſmall ſale ſhe could make herſelf, and the ſmall price ſhe could get for them, would produce.

She would likewiſe have two advantages which no other ſtate in the union enjoys; firſt, a frontier ſtate for her defence againſt the incurſions of the Indians; and the ſecond is, that the laying out and peopling a new ſtate on the back of an old one, ſituated as ſhe is, is doubling the quantity of its trade.

The new ſtate, which is here propoſed to be laid out, may ſend its exports down the Miſſiſippi, but its imports muſt come through Cheſapeak Bay, and conſequently Virginia will become the market for the new ſtate; becauſe, though there is a navigation from it, there is none into it, on account of the rapidity of the Miſſiſippi.

There are certain circumſtances that will produce certain events whether men think of them or not. The events do not depend upon thinking, but are the natural conſequence of acting; and according to the ſyſtem which Virginia has gone upon, the iſſue will be, that ſhe will get involved with the back ſettlers in a contention about *rights* till they diſpute with her own claims; and, ſoured by the contention, will go to any other ſtate for their commerce; both of which may be prevented, a perfect harmony eſtabliſhed, the ſtrength of the ſtates encreaſed, and the expences of the war defrayed, by ſettling the matter now on the plan of a general right; and every day it is delayed the difficulty will be encreaſed and the advantages leſſened.

But if it ſhould happen, as it poſſibly may, that the war ſhould end before the money which the new ſtate may produce be expended, the remainder of the lands therein may be ſet apart to reimburſe thoſe, whoſe houſes have been burnt by the enemy, as this is a ſpecies of ſuffering which it was impoſſible to prevent, becauſe houſes are not

moveable property: and it ought not to be, that becauſe we cannot do every thing, that we ought not to do what we can.

Having ſaid thus much on the ſubject, I think it neceſſary to remark, that the proſpect of a new fund, ſo far from abating our endeavours in making every immediate proviſion for the ſupply of the army, ought to quicken us therein; for ſhould the ſtates ſee it expedient to go upon the meaſure, it will be at leaſt a year before it can be productive. I the more freely mention this, becauſe, there is a dangerous ſpecies of popularity, which, I fear, ſome men are ſeeking from their conſtituents by giving them grounds to believe, that if they are elected they will lighten the taxes; a meaſure, which, in the preſent ſtate of things, cannot be done without expoſing the country to the ravages of the enemy by diſabling the army from defending it.

Where knowledge is a duty, ignorance is a crime; and if any man whoſe duty it was to know better has encouraged ſuch an expectation, he has either deceived himſelf or them: beſides, no country can be defended without expence, and let any man compare his portion of temporary inconveniences ariſing from taxations, with the real diſtreſſes of the army for the want of ſupplies, and the difference is not only ſufficient to ſtrike him dumb, but make him thankful that worſe conſequences have not followed.

In advancing this doctrine, I ſpeak with an honeſt freedom to the country; for as it is their good to be defended, ſo it is their intereſt to provide that defence, at leaſt, till other funds can be organized.

As the laying out new ſtates will ſome time or other be the buſineſs of the country, and as it is yet a new buſineſs to us; and as the influence of the war has ſcarcely afforded leiſure for reflecting on diſtant circumſtances, I ſhall throw together a few hints for facilitating that meaſure, whenever it may be proper for adopting it.

The United States now ſtanding on the line of ſovereignty, the vacant territory is their property collectively, but the perſons by whom it may hereafter be peopled will have an equal right with ourſelves; and therefore, as new ſtates ſhall be laid off and incorporated with the preſent, they will become partakers of the remaining territory with us who are already in poſſeſſion. And this conſideration ought to heighten the value of lands to new emigrants; becauſe, in making the purchaſes, they not only gain an immediate property, but become initiated into the right and heirſhip of the ſtates to a property in reſerve, which is an additional advantage to what any purchaſers under the late government of England enjoyed.

The ſetting off the boundary of any new ſtate will naturally be the firſt ſtep, and as it muſt be ſuppoſed not to be peopled at the time it is laid off, a conſtitution muſt be formed, by the United States, as the rule of government in any new ſtate, for a certain term of years (perhaps ten) or until the ſtate become peopled to a certain number of inhabitants; after which, the whole and ſole right of modelling their government to reſt with themſelves.

A queſtion may ariſe, whether a new ſtate ſhould immediately poſſeſs an equal right with the preſent ones in all caſes which may come before congreſs.

This, experience will beſt determine; but at firſt view of the matter it appears thus; that it ought to be immediately incorporated into the union on the ground of a family right, ſuch a ſtate ſtanding in the line of a younger child of the ſame ſtock; but as new emigrants will have ſomething to learn when they firſt come to America, and a new ſtate requiring aid rather than capable of giving it, it might be moſt convenient to admit its immediate repreſentation into congreſs, there to ſit, hear and debate, on all queſtions and matters, but not to vote on any till after the expiration of ſeven years.

I ſhall in this place take the opportunity of renewing a hint which I formerly threw out in the pamphlet *Common Senſe*, and which the ſeveral ſtates will, ſooner or later, ſee the convenience, if not the neceſſity, of adopting; which is, that of electing a continental convention, for the purpoſe of forming a continental conſtitution, defining and deſcribing the powers and authority of congreſs.

Thoſe of entering into treaties, and making peace, they naturally poſſeſs, in behalf of the ſtates, for their ſeparate as well as their united good, but the internal control and dictatorial powers of congreſs are not ſufficiently defined, and appear to be too much in ſome caſes, and too little in others; and therefore, to have them marked legally out will give additional energy to the whole, and new confidence to the ſeveral parts.

LETTER

ADDRESSED TO THE

ABBE RAYNAL,

ON THE

AFFAIRS OF *NORTH-AMERICA*.

IN WHICH

THE MISTAKES IN THE ABBE'S ACCOUNT

OF THE

REVOLUTION OF *AMERICA*

ARE CORRECTED AND CLEARED UP.

BY THOMAS PAINE, M. A.

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, AND AUTHOR OF THE PAMPHLET

AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, ENTITLED, OR SIGNED,

"COMMON SENSE."

INTRODUCTION.

A LONDON tranſlation of an original work in French, by the Abbe Raynal, which treats of the revolution of North-America, having been re-printed in Philadelphia and other parts of the continent, and as the diſtance at which the Abbe is placed from the American theatre of war and politics, has occaſioned him to miſtake ſeveral facts, or, miſconceive the cauſes or principles by which they were produced; the following tract, therefore, is publiſhed with a view to rectify them, and prevent even accidental errors intermixing with hiſtory, under the ſanction of time and ſilence.

The editor of the London edition has entitled it, "*The Revolution of America*, by the ABBE RAYNAL," and the American printers have followed the example. But I have underſtood, and I believe my information juſt, that the piece, which is more properly reflexions on the revolution, was unfairly purloined from the printer which the Abbe employed, or from the manuſcript copy, and is only part of a larger work then in the preſs, or preparing for it. The perſon who procured it, appears to have been an Engliſhman, and though, in an advertiſement prefixt to the London edition, he has endeavoured to gloſs over the embezzlement with profeſſions of patriotiſm, and to ſoften it with high encomiums on the author, yet the action, in any view, in which it can be placed, is illiberal and unpardonable.

"In the courſe of his travels," ſays he, "the tranſlator happily "ſucceeded in obtaining a copy of this exquiſite little piece, which "has not yet made its appearance from any preſs. He publiſhes a "French edition, in favour of thoſe who feel its eloquent reaſoning "more forcibly in its native language, at the ſame time with the "following tranſlation of it; in which he has been deſirous, perhaps

" in vain, that all the warmth, the grace, the ſtrength, the dignity " of the original, ſhould not be loſt. And he flatters himſelf, that " the indulgence of the illuſtrious hiſtorian will not be wanting to a " man, who, of his own motion, has taken the liberty to give this " compoſition to the public, only from a ſtrong perſuaſion, that its " momentous argument will be uſeful, in a critical conjuncture, to " that country which he loves with an ardour, that can be exceeded " only by the nobler flame, which burns in the boſom of the philan- " thropic author, for the freedom and happineſs of all the countries " upon earth."

This plauſibility of ſetting off a diſhonourable action, may paſs for patriotiſm and ſound principles with thoſe who do not enter into its demerits, and whoſe intereſt is not injured nor their happineſs affected thereby. But it is more than probable, notwithſtanding the declarations it contains, that the copy was obtained for the ſake of profiting by the ſale of a new and popular work, and that the profeſſions are but a garb to the fraud.

It may with propriety be remarked, that in all countries where literature is protected, and it never can flouriſh where it is not, the works of an author are his legal property ; and to treat letters in any other light than this, is to baniſh them from the country or ſtrangle them in the birth.—The embezzlement from the Abbe Raynal, was, it is true, committed by one country upon another, and therefore ſhows no defect in the laws of either. But it is nevertheleſs a breach of civil manners and literary juſtice ; neither can it be any apology, that becauſe the countries are at war, literature ſhall be entitled to depredation.*

But the foreſtalling the Abbe's publication by London editions,

* *The ſtate of literature in America muſt one day become a ſubject of legiſlative conſideration. Hitherto it hath been a diſintereſted volunteer in the ſervice of the revolution, and no man thought of profits : but when peace ſhall give time and opportunity for ſtudy, the country will deprive itſelf of the honour and ſervice of letters and the improvement of ſcience, unleſs ſufficient laws are made to prevent depredations on literary property. —It is well worth remarking, that Ruſſia, who but a few years ago was ſcarcely known in Europe, owes a large ſhare of her preſent greatneſs to the cloſe attention ſhe has paid, and the wiſe encouragement ſhe has given, to every branch of ſcience and learning ; and we have almoſt the ſame inſtance in France, in the reign of Lewis the XIV.*

both in French and Engliſh, and thereby not only defrauding him and throwing an expenſive publication on his hands by anticipating the ſale, are only the ſmaller injuries which ſuch conduct may occaſion. A man's opinions, whether written or in thought, are his own until he pleaſes to publiſh them himſelf; and it is adding cruelty to injuſtice, to make him the author of what future reflection, or better information, might occaſion him to ſuppreſs or amend. There are declarations and ſentiments in the Abbe's piece, which, for my own part, I did not expect to find, and ſuch as himſelf, on a reviſal, might have ſeen occaſion to change; but the anticipated piracy effectually prevented him the opportunity, and precipitated him into difficulties, which, had it not been for ſuch ungenerous fraud, might not have happened.

This mode of making an author appear before his time, will appear ſtill more ungenerous, when we conſider how exceedingly few men there are in any country, who can at once, and without the aid of reflection and reviſal, combine warm paſſions with a cool temper, and the full expanſion of the imagination with the natural and neceſſary gravity of judgment, ſo as to be rightly balanced within themſelves, and to make a reader feel, fancy, and underſtand juſtly at the ſame time. To call three powers of the mind into action at once, in a manner that neither ſhall interrupt, and that each ſhall aid and vigorate the other, is a talent very rarely poſſeſſed.

It often happens that the weight of an argument is loſt by the wit of ſetting it off; or the judgment diſordered by an intemperate irritation of the paſſions: yet a certain degree of animation muſt be felt by the writer, and raiſed in the reader, in order to intereſt the attention; and a ſufficient ſcope given to the imagination, to enable it to create in the mind a ſight of the perſons, characters and circumſtances of the ſubject: for without theſe the judgment will feel little or no excitement to office, and its determinations will be cold, ſluggiſh, and imperfect. But if either or both of the two former are raiſed too high, or heated too much, the judgment will be joſtled from its ſeat, and the whole matter, however important in itſelf, will diminiſh into a pantomime of the mind, in which we create images that promote no other purpoſe than amuſement.

The Abbe's writings bear evident marks of that extenſion and rapidneſs of thinking and quickneſs of ſenſation, which of all others require reviſal, and the more particularly ſo, when applied to the living characters of nations or individuals in a ſtate of war. The

leaſt miſinformation or miſconception leads to ſome wrong concluſion, and an error believed becomes the progenitor of others.—And as the Abbe has ſuffered ſome inconveniences in France by miſtating certain circumſtances of the war, and the characters of the parties therein, it becomes ſome apology for him that thoſe errors were precipitated into the world by the avarice of an ungenerous enemy.

LETTER

ADDRESSED TO THE

ABBE RAYNAL.

TO an author of ſuch diſtinguiſhed reputation as the Abbe Raynal, it might very well become me to apologize for the preſent undertaking; but, as *to be right* is the firſt wiſh of philoſophy, and the firſt principle of hiſtory, he will, I preſume, accept from me a declaration of my motives, which are thoſe of doing juſtice, in preference to any complimental apology, I might otherwiſe make.—The Abbe, in the courſe of his work, has, in ſome inſtances, extolled without a reaſon, and wounded without a cauſe. He has given fame where it was not deſerved, and withheld it where it was juſtly due; and appears to be ſo frequently in and out of temper with his ſubjects and parties, that few or none of them are deciſively and uniformly marked.

It is yet too ſoon to write the hiſtory of the revolution, and whoever attempts it precipitately, will unavoidably miſtake characters and circumſtances, and involve himſelf in error and difficulty. Things, like men, are ſeldom underſtood rightly at firſt ſight. But the Abbe is wrong even in the foundation of his work; that is, he has miſconceived and miſtated the cauſes which produced the rupture between England and her then colonies, and which led on, ſtep by ſtep, unſtudied and uncontrived on the part of America, to a revolution, which has engaged the attention, and affected the intereſt, of Europe.

To prove this, I ſhall bring forward a paſſage, which, though placed towards the latter part of the Abbe's work, is more intimately

connected with the beginning; and in which, ſpeaking of the original cauſe of the diſpute, he declares himſelf in the following manner—

" None," ſays he, " of thoſe energetic cauſes, which have pro-
" duced ſo many revolutions upon the globe, exiſted in North-Ame-
" rica. Neither religion nor laws had there been outraged. The
" blood of martyrs or patriots had not there ſtreamed from ſcaffolds.
" Morals had not there been inſulted. Manners, cuſtoms, habits,
" no object dear to nations, had there been the ſport of ridicule.
" Arbitrary power had not there torn any inhabitant from the arms
" of his family and his friends, to drag him to a dreary dungeon.
" Public order had not been there inverted. The principles of ad-
" miniſtration had not been changed there; and the maxims of go-
" vernment had there always remained the ſame. The whole queſ-
" tion was reduced to the knowing whether the mother country had,
" or had not, a right to lay, directly or indirectly, a ſlight tax upon
" the colonies."

On this extraordinary paſſage, it may not be improper, in general terms, to remark, that none can feel like thoſe who ſuffer; and that for a man to be a competent judge of the provocative, or as the Abbe ſtiles them, the energetic cauſes of the revolution, he muſt have reſided in America.

The Abbe in ſaying that the ſeveral particulars he has enumerated, did not exiſt in America, and neglecting to point out the particular period, in which he means they did not exiſt, reduces thereby his declaration to a nullity, by taking away all meaning from the paſſage. They did not exiſt in 1763, and they all exiſted before 1776; conſequently as there was a time when they did *not*, and another, when they *did* exiſt, the *time when* conſtitutes the eſſence of the fact, and not to give it, is to withhold the only evidence, which proves the declaration right or wrong, and on which it muſt ſtand or fall. But the declaration as it now appears, unaccompanied by time, has an effect in holding out to the world, that there was no real cauſe for the revolution, becauſe it denies the exiſtence of all thoſe cauſes, which are ſuppoſed to be juſtifiable, and which the Abbe ſtiles energetic.

I confeſs myſelf exceedingly at a loſs to find out the time to which the Abbe alludes; becauſe, in another part of the work, in ſpeaking of the ſtamp act, which was paſſed in 1764, he ſtyles it " an *uſurpation* of the Americans' *moſt precious and ſacred rights*." Conſequently he here admits the moſt energetic of all cauſes, that is, *an uſurpation of their moſt precious and ſacred rights*, to have exiſted in America twelve

years before the declaration of independence, and ten years before the breaking out of hoſtilities.—The time, therefore, in which the paragraph is true, muſt be antecedent to the ſtamp act, but as at that time there was no revolution nor any idea of one, it conſequently applies without a meaning; and as it cannot, on the Abbe's own principle, be applied to any time *after* the ſtamp act, it is therefore a wandering ſolitary paragraph, connected with nothing and at variance with every thing.

The ſtamp act, it is true, was repealed in two years after it was paſſed, but it was immediately followed by one of infinitely more miſchievous magnitude; I mean the declaratory act, which aſſerted the right, as it was ſtyled, of the Britiſh parliament, "*to bind America in all caſes whatſoever.*"

If then the ſtamp act was an uſurpation of the Americans' moſt precious and ſacred rights, the declaratory act left them no right at all; and contained the full grown ſeeds of the moſt deſpotic government ever exerciſed in the world. It placed America not only in the loweſt, but in the baſeſt ſtate of vaſſalage; becauſe it demanded an unconditional ſubmiſſion in every thing, or as the act expreſſes it, *in all caſes whatſoever:* And what renders this act the more offenſive, is, that it appears to have been paſſed as an act of mercy; truly then may it be ſaid, that *the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel.*

All the original charters from the crown of England, under the faith of which, the adventurers from the old world ſettled in the new, were by this act diſplaced from their foundations; becauſe, contrary to the nature of them, which was that of a compact, they were now made ſubject to repeal or alteration at the mere will of one party only. The whole condition of America was thus put into the hands of the parliament or the miniſtry, without leaving to her the leaſt right in any caſe whatſoever.

There is no deſpotiſm to which this iniquitous law did not extend; and though it might have been convenient in the execution of it, to have conſulted manners and habits, the principle of the act made all tyranny legal. It ſtopt no where. It went to every thing. It took in with it the whole life of a man, or, if I may ſo expreſs it, an eternity of circumſtances. It is the nature of law to require obedience, but this demanded ſervitude; and the condition of an American, under the operation of it, was not that of a ſubject, but a vaſſal. Tyranny has often been eſtabliſhed *without* law and ſometimes *againſt* it, but the hiſtory of mankind does not produce another in-

ſtance, in which it has been eſtabliſhed *by* law. It is an audacious outrage upon civil government, and cannot be too much expoſed, in order to be ſufficiently deteſted.

Neither could it be ſaid after this, that the legiſlature of that country any longer made laws for this, but that it gave out commands; for wherein differed an act of parliament conſtructed on this principle, and operating in this manner, over an unrepreſented people, from the orders of a military eſtabliſhment.

The parliament of England, with reſpect to America, was not ſeptennial but *perpetual*. It appeared to the latter a body always in being. Its election or its expiration were to her the ſame as if its members ſucceeded by inheritance, or went out by death, or lived for ever, or were appointed to it as a matter of office. Therefore, for the people of England to have any juſt conception of the mind of America, reſpecting this extraordinary act, they muſt ſuppoſe all election and expiration in that country to ceaſe for ever, and the preſent parliament, its heirs, &c. to be perpetual; in this caſe, I aſk, what would the moſt clamorous of them think, were an act to be paſſed, declaring the right of *ſuch a parliament* to bind *them* in all caſes whatſoever? For this word *whatſoever* would go as effectually to their *magna charta*, *bill of rights*, *trial by juries*, &c. as it went to the charters and forms of government in America.

I am perſuaded, that the gentleman to whom I addreſs theſe remarks, will not, after the paſſing this act, ſay, "that the *principles* of "adminiſtration had not been *changed* in America, and that the max-"ims of government had there been *always the ſame*." For here is, in principle, a total overthrow of the whole; and not a ſubverſion only, but an annihilation of the foundation of liberty, and abſolute domination eſtabliſhed in its ſtead.

The Abbe likewiſe ſtates the caſe exceedingly wrong and injuriouſly, when he ſays, "that *the whole* queſtion was reduced to the "knowing whether the mother country had, or had not, a right to "lay, directly or indirectly, a *ſlight* tax upon the colonies."—This was *not the whole* of the queſtion; neither was the *quantity* of the tax the object either to the miniſtry or to the Americans. It was the principle, of which the tax made but a part, and the quantity ſtill leſs, that formed the ground on which America oppoſed.

The tax on tea, which is the tax here alluded to, was neither more or leſs than an experiment to eſtabliſh the practice of the declaratory law upon; modelled into the more faſhionable phraſe *of the univerſal*

ſupremacy of parliament. For until this time the declaratory law had lain dormant, and the framers of it had contented themſelves with barely declaring an opinion.

Therefore the *whole* queſtion with America, in the opening of the diſpute, was, ſhall we be bound in all caſes whatſoever by the Britiſh parliament, or ſhall we not? For ſubmiſſion to the tea or tax act implied an acknowledgment of the declaratory act, or, in other words, of the univerſal ſupremacy of parliament, which as they never intended to do, it was neceſſary they ſhould oppoſe it, in its firſt ſtage of execution.

It is probable the Abbe has been led into this miſtake by peruſing detached pieces in ſome of the American newſpapers; for, in a caſe where all were intereſted, every one had a right to give his opinion; and there were many, who, with the beſt intentions, did not chooſe the beſt, nor indeed the true ground, to defend their cauſe upon. They felt themſelves right by a general impulſe, without being able to ſeparate, analyze and arrange the parts.

I am ſomewhat unwilling to examine too minutely into the whole of this extraordinary paſſage of the Abbe, leſt I ſhould appear to treat it with ſeverity; otherwiſe I could ſhew that not a ſingle declaration is juſtly founded: For inſtance, the reviving an obſolete act of the reign of Henry the eighth, and fitting it to the Americans, by authority of which they were to be ſeized and brought from America to England, and there impriſoned and tried for any ſuppoſed offences, was, in the worſt ſenſe of the words, *to tear them, by the arbitrary power of parliament, from the arms of their families and friends, and drag them not only to dreary but diſtant dungeons.* Yet this act was contrived ſome years before the breaking out of hoſtilities. And again, though the blood of martyrs and patriots had not ſtreamed on the ſcaffolds, it ſtreamed in the ſtreets, in the maſſacre of the inhabitants of Boſton, by the Britiſh ſoldiery in the year 1770.

Had the Abbe ſaid that the cauſes which produced the revolution in America were originally *different* from thoſe w hich produced revolutions in other parts of the globe, he had been right. Here the value and quality of liberty, the nature of government and the dignity of man, were known and underſtood, and the attachment of the Americans to theſe principles, produced the revolution as a natural and almoſt unavoidable conſequence. They had no particular family to ſet up or pull down. Nothing of perſonality was incorporated with their cauſe. They ſtarted even-handed with each

other, and went no faſter into the ſeveral ſtages of it, than they were driven by the unrelenting and imperious conduct of Britain. Nay, in the laſt act, the declaration of independence, they had nearly been too late; for had it not been declared at the exact time it was, I ſee no period in their affairs ſince, in which it could have been declared with the ſame effect, and probably not at all.

But the object being formed before the reverſe of fortune took place, that is, before the operations of the gloomy campaign of 1776, their honour, their intereſt, their every thing called loudly on them to maintain it; and that glow of thought and energy of heart, which even a diſtant proſpect of independence inſpires, gave confidence to their hopes and reſolution to their conduct, which a ſtate of dependence could never have reached. They looked forward to happier days and ſcenes of reſt, and qualified the hardſhips of the campaign by contemplating the eſtabliſhment of their new born ſyſtem.

If on the other hand we take a review of what part Britain has acted, we ſhall find every thing which ought to make a nation bluſh. The moſt vulgar abuſe, accompanied by that ſpecies of haughtineſs, which diſtinguiſhes the hero of a mob from the character of a gentleman; it was equally as much from her manners as from her injuſtice that ſhe loſt the colonies. By the latter ſhe provoked their principles, by the former ſhe wore out their temper; and it ought to be held out as an example to the world, to ſhew, how neceſſary it is to conduct the buſineſs of government with civility. In ſhort, other revolutions may have originated in caprice or generated in ambition; but here, the moſt unoffending humility was tortured into rage, and the infancy of exiſtence made to weep.

A union ſo extenſive, continued and determined, ſuffering with patience and never in deſpair, could not have been produced by common cauſes. It muſt be ſomething capable of reaching the whole ſoul of man and arming it with perpetual energy. In vain is it to look for precedents among the revolutions of former ages, to find out, by compariſon, the cauſes of this. The ſpring, the progreſs, the object, the conſequences, nay, the men, their habits of thinking, and all the circumſtances of the country are different. Thoſe of other nations are, in general, little more than the hiſtory of their quarrels. They are marked by no important character in the annals of events; mixt in the maſs of general matters, they occupy but a common page; and while the chief of the ſucceſsful partizans ſtept into power, the plundered multitude ſat down and ſorrowed. Few, very few of them are

accompanied with reformation, either in government or manners; many of them with the moſt conſummate profligacy. Triumph on the one ſide and miſery on the other were the only events. Pains, puniſhments, torture, and death were made the buſineſs of mankind, until compaſſion, the faireſt aſſociate of the heart, was driven from its place, and the eye, accuſtomed to continual cruelty, could behold it without offence.

But as the principles of the preſent revolution differed from thoſe which preceded it, ſo likewiſe has the conduct of America both in government and war. Neither the foul finger of diſgrace nor the bloody hand of vengeance has hitherto put a blot upon her fame. Her victories have received luſtre from a greatneſs of lenity; and her laws been permitted to ſlumber, where they might juſtly have awakened to puniſh. War, ſo much the trade of the world, has here been only the buſineſs of neceſſity; and when the neceſſity ſhall ceaſe, her very enemies muſt confeſs, that as ſhe drew the ſword in her juſt defence, ſhe uſed it without cruelty and ſheathed it without revenge.

As it is not my deſign to extend theſe remarks to a hiſtory, I ſhall now take my leave of this paſſage of the Abbe, with an obſervation, which, until ſomething unfolds itſelf to convince me otherwiſe, I cannot avoid believing to be true;—which is, that it was the fixt determination of the Britiſh cabinet to quarrel with America at all events.

They (the members who compoſed the cabinet) had no doubt of ſucceſs, if they could once bring it to the iſſue of a battle, and they expected from a conqueſt, what they could neither propoſe with decency, nor hope for by negociation. The charters and conſtitutions of the colonies were become to them matters of offence, and their rapid progreſs in property and population were diſguſtingly beheld as the growing and natural means of independence. They ſaw no way to retain them long but by reducing them in time. A conqueſt would at once have made them both lords and landlords; and put them in poſſeſſion both of the revenue and the rental. The whole trouble of government would have ceaſed in a victory, and a final end been put to remonſtrance and debate. The experience of the ſtamp act had taught them how to quarrel with the advantages of cover and convenience, and they had nothing to do but to renew the ſcene, and put contention into motion. They hoped for a rebellion, and they made one. They expected a declaration of independence and they were not diſappointed. But after this, they looked for victory, and they obtained a defeat.

If this be taken as the generating cauſe of the conteſt, then is every part of the conduct of the Britiſh miniſtry conſiſtent from the commencement of the diſpute, until the ſigning the treaty of Paris, after which, conqueſt becoming doubtful, they retreated to negociation, and were again defeated.

Though the Abbe poſſeſſes and diſplays great powers of genius, and is a maſter of ſtyle and language, he ſeems not to pay equal attention to the office of an hiſtorian. His facts are coldly and careleſsly ſtated. They neither inform the reader nor intereſt him. Many of them are erroneous, and moſt of them defective and obſcure. It is undoubtedly both an ornament and a uſeful addition to hiſtory, to accompany it with maxims and reflections. They afford likewiſe an agreeable change to the ſtyle and a more diverſified manner of expreſſion; but it is abſolutely neceſſary that the root from whence they ſpring, or the foundation on which they are raiſed, ſhould be well attended to, which in this work they are not. The Abbe haſtens through his narrations as if he was glad to get from them, that he may enter the more copious field of eloquence and imagination.

The actions of Trenton and Princeton, in New-Jerſey, in December 1776, and January following, on which the fate of America ſtood for a while trembling on the point of ſuſpence, and from which the moſt important conſequences followed, are compriſed within a ſingle paragraph, faintly conceived, and barren of character, circumſtance and deſcription.

"On the 25th of December," ſays the Abbe, "they (the Ame-
"ricans) croſſed the Delaware, and fell *accidentally* upon Trenton,
"which was occupied by fifteen hundred of the twelve thouſand
"Heſſians, ſold in ſo baſe a manner by their avaricious maſter, to
"the king of Great-Britain. This corps was *maſſacred*, taken, or
"diſperſed. Eight days after, three Engliſh regiments were, in like
"manner, driven, from Princeton, but after having better ſupported
"their reputation than the foreign troops in their pay."

This is all the account which is given of theſe moſt intereſting events. The Abbe has preceded them by two or three pages on the military operations of both armies, from the time of general Howe's arriving before New-York from Halifax, and the vaſt reinforcements of Britiſh and foreign troops with lord Howe from England. But in theſe, there is ſo much miſtake, and ſo many omiſſions, that, to ſet them right, muſt be the buſineſs of hiſtory and not of a letter. The action of Long-Iſland is but barely hinted at, and the operations at

the White-plains wholly omitted: as are likewiſe the attack and loſs of Fort Waſhington, with a garriſon of about two thouſand five hundred men, and the precipitate evacuation of Fort Lee, in conſequence thereof; which loſſes were in a great meaſure the cauſe of the retreat, through the Jerſies to the Delaware, a diſtance of about ninety miles. Neither is the manner of the retreat deſcribed; which, from the ſeaſon of the year, the nature of the country, the nearneſs of the two armies (ſometimes within ſight and ſhot of each other, for ſuch a length of way) the rear of the one employed in pulling down bridges, and the van of the other in building them up, muſt neceſſarily be accompanied with many intereſting circumſtances.

It was a period of diſtreſſes. A criſis rather of danger than of hope. There is no deſcription can do it juſtice; and even the actors in it, looking back upon the ſcene, are ſurpriſed how they got through; and at a loſs to account for thoſe powers of the mind and ſprings of animation, by which they withſtood the force of accumulated misfortune.

It was expected, that the time for which the army was inliſted, would carry the campaign ſo far into the winter, that the ſeverity of the ſeaſon, and the conſequent condition of the roads, would prevent any material operation of the enemy, until the new army could be raiſed for the next year. And I mention it, as a matter worthy of attention, by all future hiſtorians, that the movements of the American army, until the attack upon the Heſſian poſt at Trenton, the 26th of December, are to be conſidered as operating to effect no other principal purpoſe than delay, and to wear away the campaign under all the diſadvantages of an unequal force, with as little misfortune as poſſible.

But the loſs of the garriſon at Fort Waſhington on the 16th of November, and the expiration of the time of a conſiderable part of the army, ſo early as the 30th of the ſame month, and which were to be followed by almoſt daily expirations afterwards, made retreat the only final expedient. To theſe circumſtances may be added the forlorn and deſtitute condition of the few that remained; for the garriſon of Fort Lee, which compoſed almoſt the whole of the retreat, had been obliged to abandon it ſo inſtantaneouſly, that every article of ſtores and baggage was left behind, and in this deſtitute condition, without tent or blanket, and without any other utenſils to dreſs their proviſion, than what they procured by the way, they

performed a march of about ninety miles, and had the addreſs and management to prolong it to the ſpace of nineteen days.

By this unexpected or rather unthought of turn of affairs, the country was in an inſtant ſurpriſed into confuſion, and found an enemy within its bowels, without an army to oppoſe him. There were no ſuccours to be had, but from the free-will offering of the inhabitants. All was choice and every man reaſoned for himſelf.

It was in this ſituation of affairs, equally calculated to confound or to inſpire, that the gentleman, the merchant, the farmer, the tradeſman and the labourer mutually turned from all the conveniences of home, to perform the duties of private ſoldiers and undergo the ſeverities of a winter campaign. The delay, ſo judiciouſly contrived on the retreat, afforded time for the volunteer reinforcements to join general Waſhington on the Delaware.

The Abbe is likewiſe wrong in ſaying, that the American army fell *accidentally* on Trenton. It was the very object for which general Waſhington croſſed the Delaware in the dead of the night and in the midſt of ſnow, ſtorms, and ice; and which he immediately re-croſſed with his priſoners, as ſoon as he had accompliſhed his purpoſe. Neither was the intended enterprize a ſecret to the enemy, information having been ſent of it by letter, from a Britiſh officer at Princeton, to colonel Rolle, who commanded the Heſſians at Trenton, which letter was afterwards found by the Americans. Nevertheleſs the poſt was completely ſurpriſed. A ſmall circumſtance, which had the appearance of miſtake on the part of the Americans, led to a more capital and real miſtake on the part of Rolle.

The caſe was this. A detachment of twenty or thirty Americans had been ſent acroſs the river, from a poſt a few miles above, by an officer unacquainted with the intended attack; theſe were met by a body of Heſſians, on the night to which the information pointed, which was Chriſtmas night, and repulſed. Nothing farther appearing, and the Heſſians, miſtaking this for the advanced party, ſuppoſed the enterprize diſconcerted, which at that time was not began, and under this idea, returned to their quarters; ſo that, what might have raiſed an alarm, and brought the Americans into an ambuſcade, ſerved to take off the force of an information and promote the ſucceſs of the enterpriſe. Soon after day-light general Waſhington entered the town, and after a little oppoſition, made himſelf maſter of it, with upwards of nine hundred priſoners.

This combination of equivocal circumſtances, falling within what the Abbe ſtiles, "*the wide empire of chance*," would have afforded a fine field for thought, and I wiſh, for the ſake of that elegance of reflexion he is ſo capable of uſing, that he had known it.

But the action at Princeton was accompanied by a ſtill greater embarraſſment of matters, and followed by more extraordinary conſequences. The Americans, by a happy ſtroke of generalſhip, in this inſtance, not only deranged and defeated all the plans of the Britiſh, in the intended moment of execution, but drew from their poſts the enemy they were not able to drive, and obliged them to cloſe the campaign. As the circumſtance is a curioſity in war, and not well underſtood in Europe, I ſhall, as conciſely as I can, relate the principal parts; they may ſerve to prevent future hiſtorians from error, and recover from forgetfulneſs a ſcene of magnificent fortitude.

Immediately after the ſurpriſe of the Heſſians at Trenton, general Waſhington re-croſſed the Delaware; which at this place is about three quarters of a mile over, and re-aſſumed his former poſt on the Pennſylvania ſide. Trenton remained unoccupied, and the enemy were poſted at Princeton, twelve miles diſtant, on the road towards New-York. The weather was now growing very ſevere, and as there were very few houſes near the ſhore where general Waſhington had taken his ſtation, the greateſt part of his army remained out in the woods and fields. Theſe, with ſome other circumſtances, induced the re-croſſing the Delaware and taking poſſeſſion of Trenton. It was undoubtedly a bold adventure, and carried with it the appearance of defiance, eſpecially when we conſider the panic-ſtruck condition of the enemy on the loſs of the Heſſian poſt. But in order to give a juſt idea of the affair, it is neceſſary, I ſhould deſcribe the place.

Trenton is ſituated on a riſing ground, about three quarters of a mile diſtant from the Delaware, on the eaſtern or Jerſey ſide; and is cut into two diviſions by a ſmall creek or rivulet, ſufficient to turn a mill which is on it, after which it empties itſelf at nearly right angles into the Delaware. The upper diviſion, which is to to the northeaſt, contains about ſeventy or eighty houſes, and the lower about forty or fifty. The ground on each ſide this creek, and on which the houſes are, is likewiſe riſing, and the two diviſions preſent an agreeable proſpect to each other, with the creek between, on which there is a ſmall ſtone bridge of one arch.

Scarcely had general Waſhington taken poſt here, and before the ſeveral parties of militia, out on detachments, or on their way, could

be collected, than the British, leaving behind them a strong garrison at Princeton, marched suddenly and entered Trenton at the upper or northeast quarter. A party of the Americans skirmished with the advanced party of the British, to afford time for removing the stores and baggage, and withdrawing over the bridge.

In a little time the British had possession of one half of the town, general Washington of the other; and the creek only separated the two armies. Nothing could be a more critical situation than this, and if ever the fate of America depended on the event of a day, it was now. The Delaware was filling fast with large sheets of driving ice, and was impassible; so that no retreat into Pennsylvania could be effected, neither is it possible, in the face of an enemy, to pass a river of such extent. The roads were broken and rugged with the frost, and the main road was occupied by the enemy.

About four o'clock a party of the British approached the bridge, with a design to gain it, but were repulsed. They made no more attempts, though the creek itself is passable any where between the bridge and the Delaware. It runs in a rugged natural made-ditch, over which a person may pass with little difficulty, the stream being rapid and shallow. Evening was now coming on, and the British, believing they had all the advantages they could wish for, and that they could use them when they pleased, discontinued all further operations, and held themselves prepared to make the attack next morning.

But the next morning produced a scene as elegant as it was unexpected. The British were under arms and ready to march to action, when one of their light-horse from Princeton came furiously down the street, with an account that general Washington had that morning attacked and carried the British post at that place, and was proceeding on to seize the magazine at Brunswick; on which the British, who were then on the point of making an assault on the evacuated camp of the Americans, wheeled about, and in a fit of consternation marched for Princeton.

This retreat is one of those extraordinary circumstances, that in future ages may probably pass for fable. For it will with difficulty be believed, that two armies, on which such important consequences depended, should be crouded into so small a space as Trenton, and that the one, on the eve of an engagement, when every ear is supposed to be open, and every watchfulness employed, should move completely from the ground, with all its stores, baggage, and artillery,

unknown and even unſuſpected by the other. And ſo entirely were the Britiſh deceived, that when they heard the report of the cannon and ſmall arms at Princeton, they ſuppoſed it to be thunder, though in the depth of winter.

General Waſhington, the better to cover and diſguiſe his retreat from Trenton, had ordered a line of fires to be lighted up in front of his camp. Theſe not only ſerved to give an appearance of going to reſt, and continuing that deception, but they effectually concealed from the Britiſh whatever was acting behind them, for flame can no more be ſeen through than a wall, and in this ſituation, it may with ſome propriety be ſaid, they became a pillar of fire to the one army, and a pillar of a cloud to the other: after this, by a circuitous march of about eighteen miles, the Americans reached Princeton early in the morning.

The number of priſoners taken were between two and three hundred, with which general Waſhington immediately ſet off. The van of the Britiſh army from Trenton entered Princeton about an hour after the Americans had left it, who continuing their march for the remainder of the day, arrived in the evening at a convenient ſituation, wide of the main road to Brunſwick, and about ſixteen miles diſtant from Princeton.—But ſo wearied and exhauſted were they, with the continual and unabated ſervice and fatigue of two days and a night, from action to action, without ſhelter and almoſt without refreſhment, that the bare and frozen ground, with no other covering than the ſky, became to them a place of comfortable reſt. By theſe two events, and with but a little comparative force to accompliſh them, the Americans cloſed with advantage, a campaign, which, but a few days before, threatened the country with deſtruction. The Britiſh army, apprehenſive for the ſafety of their magazines at Brunſwick, eighteen miles diſtant, marched immediately for that place, where they arrived late in the evening, and from which they made no attempts to move, for nearly five months.

Having thus ſtated the principal outlines of theſe two moſt intereſting actions, I ſhall now quit them, to put the Abbe right in his miſtated account of the debt and paper money of America, wherein, ſpeaking of theſe matters, he ſays,

"Theſe ideal riches were rejected. The more the multiplication "of them was urged by want, the greater did their depreciation "grow. The congreſs was indignant at the affront given to its "money, and declared all thoſe to be traitors to their country,

" who ſhould not receive it as they would have received gold it-
" ſelf.

" Did not this body know, that prepoſſeſſions are no more to be
" controlled than feelings are? Did it not perceive that, in the
" preſent criſis, every rational man would be afraid of expoſing his
" fortune? Did it not ſee, that at the beginning of a republic, it
" permitted to itſelf the exerciſe of ſuch acts of deſpotiſm as are un-
" known even in the countries which are moulded to, and become
" familiar with, ſervitude and oppreſſion? Could it pretend that it
" did not puniſh a want of confidence with the pains which would
" have been ſcarcely merited by revolt and treaſon? Of all this
" was the congreſs well aware. But it had no choice of means.
" Its deſpiſed and deſpicable ſcraps of paper were actually thirty
" times below their original value, when more of them were ordered
" to be made. On the 13th of September, 1779, there was of this
" paper among the public, to the amount of 35,544,155l. The
" ſtate owed moreover 8,385,356l. without reckoning the particular
" debts of ſingle provinces."

In the above recited paſſages, the Abbe ſpeaks as if the United States had contracted a debt of upwards of forty million pounds ſterling, beſides the debts of the individual ſtates. After which, ſpeaking of foreign trade with America, he ſays, that " thoſe coun-
" tries in Europe, which are truly commercial ones, knowing that
" North-America had been reduced to contract debts, at the epoch
" even of her greateſt proſperity, wiſely thought that, in her preſent
" diſtreſs, ſhe would be able to pay but very little, for what might
" be carried to her."

I know it muſt be extremely difficult to make foreigners underſtand the nature and circumſtances of our paper money, becauſe there are natives, who do not underſtand it themſelves. But with us its fate is now determined. Common conſent has conſigned it to reſt with that kind of regard, which the long ſervice of inanimate things inſenſibly obtains from mankind. Every ſtone in the bridge, that has carried us over, ſeems to have a claim upon our eſteem. But this was a corner ſtone, and its uſefulneſs cannot be forgotten. There is ſomething in a grateful mind, which extends itſelf even to things that can neither be benefited by regard, nor ſuffer by neglect: —But ſo it is; and almoſt every man is ſenſible of the effect.

But to return. The paper money, though iſſued from congreſs under the name of dollars, did not come from that body always at

that value. Thoſe which were iſſued the firſt year, were equal to gold and ſilver. The ſecond year leſs, the third ſtill leſs, and ſo on, for nearly the ſpace of five years: at the end of which, I imagine, that the whole value, at which Congreſs might pay away the ſeveral emiſſions, taking them together, was about ten or twelve millions pounds ſterling.

Now as it would have taken ten or twelve millions ſterling of taxes to carry on the war for five years, and, as while this money was iſſuing and likewiſe depreciating down to nothing, there were none, or few valuable taxes paid; conſequently the event to the public was the ſame, whether they ſunk ten or twelve millions of expended money, by depreciation, or paid ten or twelve millions by taxation; for as they did not do both, and choſe to do one, the matter which, in a general view, was indifferent. And therefore, what the Abbe ſuppoſes to be a debt, has now no exiſtence; it having been paid, by every body conſenting to reduce, at his own expence, from the value of the bills continually paſſing among themſelves, a ſum, equal to nearly what the expence of the war was for five years.

Again. The paper money having now ceaſed, and the depreciation with it, and gold and ſilver ſupplied its place, the war will now be carried on by taxation, which will draw from the public a conſiderable leſs ſum than what the depreciation drew; but as while they pay the former, they do not ſuffer the latter, and as when they ſuffered the latter, they did not pay the former, the thing will be nearly equal, with this moral advantage, that taxation occaſions frugality and thought, and depreciation produced diſſipation and careleſſneſs.

And again. If a man's portion of taxes comes to leſs than what he loſt by the depreciation, it proves the alteration is in his favour. If it comes to more, and he is juſtly aſſeſſed, it ſhews that he did not ſuſtain his proper ſhare of depreciation, becauſe the one was as operatively his tax as the other.

It is true, that it never was intended, neither was it foreſeen, that the debt contained in the paper currency ſhould ſink itſelf in this manner; but as by the voluntary conduct of all and of every one it has arrived at this fate, the debt is paid by thoſe who owed it. Perhaps nothing was ever ſo univerſally the act of a country as this. Government had no hand in it. Every man depreciated his own money by his own conſent, for ſuch was the effect, which the raiſing the nominal value of goods produced. But as by ſuch reduction he ſuſtained a loſs equal to what he muſt have paid to ſink it by taxation,

therefore the line of juſtice is to conſider his loſs by the depreciation as his tax for that time, and not to tax him when the war is over, to make that money good in any other perſon's hands, which became nothing in his own.

Again. The paper currency was iſſued for the expreſs purpoſe of carrying on the war. It has performed that ſervice, without any other material charge to the public, while it laſted. But to ſuppoſe, as ſome did, that, at the end of the war, it was to grow into gold or ſilver, or become equal thereto, was to ſuppoſe that we were to *get* two hundred millions of dollars by *going to war*, inſtead of *paying* the coſt of carrying it on.

But if any thing in the ſituation of America, as to her currency or her circumſtances, yet remains not underſtood, then let it be remembered, that this war is the public's war; the people's war; the country's war. It is *their* independence that is to be ſupported; *their* property that is to be ſecured; *their* country that is to be ſaved. Here, government, the army, and the people, are mutually and reciprocally one. In other wars, kings may loſe their thrones, and their dominions; but here, the loſs muſt fall on the majeſty of the multitude, and the property they are contending to ſave. Every man being ſenſible of this, he goes to the field, or pays his portion of the charge, as the ſovereign of his own poſſeſſions; and when he is conquered a monarch falls.

The remark, which the Abbe in the concluſion of the paſſage has made, reſpecting America contracting debts in the time of her proſperity (by which he means, before the breaking out of hoſtilities), ſerves to ſhow, though he has not made the application, the very great commercial difference between a dependant and an independent country. In a ſtate of dependance, and with a fettered commerce, though with all the advantages of peace, her trade could not balance itſelf, and ſhe annually run into debt. But now, in a ſtate of independence, though involved in war, ſhe requires no credit; her ſtores are full of merchandize, and gold and ſilver are become the currency of the country. How theſe things have eſtabliſhed themſelves are difficult to account for: But they are facts, and facts are more powerful than arguments.

As it is probable this letter will undergo a republication in Europe, the remarks here thrown together will ſerve to ſhew the extreme folly of Britain in reſting her hopes of ſucceſs on the extinction of our paper currency. The expectation is at once ſo childiſh and for-

lorn, that it places her in the laughable condition of a famiſhed lion watching for prey at a ſpider's web.

From this account of the currency, the Abbe proceeds to ſtate the condition of America in the winter 1777, and the ſpring following; and cloſes his obſervations with mentioning the treaty of alliance, which was ſigned in France, and the propoſitions of the Britiſh miniſtry, which were rejected in America. But in the manner in which the Abbe has arranged his facts, there is a very material error, that not only he, but other European hiſtorians have fallen into; none of them having aſſigned the true cauſe why the Britiſh propoſals were rejected, and all of them have aſſigned a wrong one.

In the winter 1778, and ſpring following, congreſs were aſſembled at York-town, in Pennſylvania, the Britiſh were in poſſeſſion of Philadelphia, and general Waſhington with the army were encamped in huts at the Valley-Forge, twenty-five miles diſtant therefrom. To all, who can remember, it was a ſeaſon of hardſhip, but not deſpair; and the Abbe, ſpeaking of this period and its inconveniences, ſays,

" A multitude of privations, added to ſo many other misfortunes, " might make the Americans regret their former tranquility, and in- " cline them to an accommodation with England. In vain had the peo- " ple been bound to the new government by the ſacredneſs of oaths " and the influence of religion. In vain had endeavours been uſed " to convince them that it was impoſſible to treat ſafely with a coun- " try, in which one parliament might overturn, what ſhould have been " eſtabliſhed by another. In vain had they been threatened with the " eternal reſentment of an exaſperated and vindictive enemy. It was " poſſible that theſe diſtant troubles might not be balanced by the " weight of preſent evils.

" So thought the Britiſh miniſtry, when they ſent to the new " world public agents, authorized to offer every thing except inde- " pendence to theſe very Americans, from whom they had two years " before exacted an unconditional ſubmiſſion. It is not improbable " but, that by this plan of conciliation, a few months ſooner, ſome " effect might have been produced. But at the period, at which it " was propoſed by the court of London, it was rejected with diſdain, " becauſe this meaſure appeared but as an argument of fear and weak- " neſs. The people were already re-aſſured. The congreſs, the " generals, the troops, the bold and ſkilful men, in each colony had " poſſeſſed themſelves of the authority; every thing had recovered " its firſt ſpirit. *This was the effect of a treaty of friendſhip and com-*

" *merce between the United States and the court of Verſailles, ſigned the* " *6th of February*, 1778."

On this paſſage of the Abbe's I cannot help remarking, that, to unite time with circumſtance, is a material nicety in hiſtory; the want of which frequently throws it into endleſs confuſion and miſtake, occaſions a total ſeparation between cauſes and conſequences, and connects them with others they are not immediately, and ſometimes not at all, related to.

The Abbe, in ſaying that the offers of the Britiſh miniſtry " were " rejected with diſdain," is *right*, as to the *fact*, but *wrong* as to the *time;* and this error in the time, has occaſioned him to be miſtaken in the cauſe.

The ſigning the treaty of Paris the 6th of February, 1778, could have no effect on the mind or politics of America, until it was *known in America;* and therefore, when the Abbe ſays, that the rejection of the Britiſh offers was in conſequence of the alliance, he muſt mean, that it was in conſequence of the alliance, *being known* in America; which was not the caſe: and by this miſtake he not only takes from her the reputation, which her unſhaken fortitude in that trying ſituation deſerves, but is likewiſe led very injuriouſly to ſuppoſe, that had ſhe *not known* of the treaty, the offers would probably have been accepted; whereas ſhe knew nothing of the treaty at the time of the rejection, and conſequently did not reject them on that ground.

The propoſitions or offers above mentioned were contained in two bills brought into the Britiſh parliament by lord North on the 17th of February, 1778. Thoſe bills were hurried through both houſes with unuſual haſte, and before they had gone through all the cuſtomary forms of parliament, copies of them were ſent over to lord Howe and general Howe, then in Philadelphia, who were likewiſe commiſſioners. General Howe ordered them to be printed in Philadelphia, and ſent copies of them by a flag to general Waſhington, to be forwarded to congreſs at York-town, where they arrived the 21ſt of April, 1778. Thus much for the arrival of the bills in America.

Congreſs, as is their uſual mode, appointed a committee from their own body, to examine them and report thereon. The report was brought in the next day (the twenty-ſecond), was read, and unanimouſly agreed to, entered on their journals, and publiſhed for the information of the country. Now this report muſt be the rejection to which the Abbe alludes, becauſe congreſs gave no other formal opinion on thoſe bills and propoſitions: And on a ſubſequent appli-

cation from the Britiſh commiſſioners, dated the 27th of May, and received at York-town the 6th of June, congreſs immediately referred them for an anſwer to their printed reſolves of the 22d of April. Thus much for the rejection of the offers.

On the 2d of May, that is, eleven days after the above rejection was made, the treaty between the United States and France arrived at York-town; and until this moment congreſs had not the leaſt notice or idea, that ſuch a meaſure was in any train of execution. But leſt this declaration of mine ſhould paſs only for aſſertion, I ſhall ſupport it by proof, for it is material to the character and principle of the revolution to ſhow, that no condition of America, ſince the declaration of independence, however trying and ſevere, ever operated to produce the moſt diſtant idea of yielding it up either by force, diſtreſs, artifice or perſuaſion. And this proof is the more neceſſary, becauſe it was the ſyſtem of the Britiſh miniſtry at this time, as well as before and ſince, to hold out to the European powers that America was unfixt in her reſolutions and policy; hoping by this artifice to leſſen her reputation in Europe, and weaken the confidence which thoſe powers or any of them might be inclined to place in her.

At the time theſe matters were tranſacting, I was ſecretary in the foreign department of congreſs. All the *political* letters from the American commiſſioners reſted in my hands, and all that were officially written went from my office; and ſo far from congreſs knowing any thing of the ſigning the treaty, at the time they rejected the Britiſh offers, they had not received a line of information from their commiſſioners at Paris on any ſubject whatever for upwards of a twelvemonth. Probably the loſs of the port of Philadelphia and the navigation of the Delaware, together with the danger of the ſeas, covered at this time with Britiſh cruiſers, contributed to the diſappointment.

One packet, it is true, arrived at York-town in January preceding, which was about three months before the arrival of the treaty; but, ſtrange as it may appear, every letter had been taken out, before it was put on board the veſſel which brought it from France, and blank white paper put in their ſtead.

Having thus ſtated the time when the propoſals from the Britiſh commiſſioners were firſt received, and likewiſe the time when the treaty of alliance arrived, and ſhewn that the rejection of the former was eleven days prior to the arrival of the latter, and without the leaſt knowledge of ſuch circumſtance have taken place or being about

to take place; the rejection, therefore, muſt, and ought to be attributed to the fixt unvaried ſentiments of America reſpecting the enemy ſhe is at war with, and her determination to ſupport her independence to the laſt public effort, and not to any new circumſtance in her favour, which at that time ſhe did not and could not know of.

Beſides, there is a vigour of determination and ſpirit of defiance in the language of the rejection (which I here ſubjoin), which derive their greateſt glory by appearing before the treaty was known; for that, which is bravery in diſtreſs becomes inſult in proſperity: And the treaty placed America on ſuch a ſtrong foundation, that had ſhe then known it, the anſwer which ſhe gave, would have appeared rather as an air of triumph, than as the glowing ſerenity of fortitude.

Upon the whole, the Abbe appears to have entirely miſtaken the matter; for inſtead of attributing the rejection of the propoſitions to *our knowledge* of the treaty of alliance; he ſhould have attributed the origin of them in the Britiſh cabinet, to *their knowledge* of that event. And then the reaſon why they were hurried over to America in the ſtate of bills, that is, before they were paſſed into acts, is eaſily accounted for, which is, that they might have the chance of reaching America before any knowledge of the treaty ſhould arrive, which they were lucky enough to do, and there met the fate they ſo richly merited. That theſe bills were brought into the Britiſh parliament after the treaty with France was ſigned, is proved from the dates: The treaty being on the 6th, and the bills the 17th of February. And that the ſigning the treaty was known in parliament, when the bills were brought in, is likewiſe proved by a ſpeech of Mr. Charles Fox, on the ſaid 17th of February, who, in reply to lord North, informed the houſe of the treaty being ſigned, and challenged the miniſter's knowledge of the ſame fact.*

* *In* CONGRESS, *April 22d*, 1788.

" *The committee to whom was referred the general's letter of the* 18*th, containing a certain printed paper ſent from Philadelphia, purporting to be the draught of a bill for declaring the* intentions *of the parliament of Great-Britain, as to the* exerciſe *of what they are pleaſed to term their* right *of impoſing taxes within theſe United States; and alſo the draught of a bill to enable the king of Great-Britain to appoint commiſſioners, with powers to treat, conſult and agree upon the means of quieting certain diſorders within the ſaid ſtates, beg leave to obſerve.*

" *That the ſaid paper being induſtriouſly circulated by emiſſaries of the*

Though I am not furprifed to fee the Abbe miftaken in matters of hiftory, acted at fo great a diftance from his fphere of immediate obfervation, yet I am more than furprifed to find him wrong

enemy, in a partial and fecret manner, the fame ought to be forthwith printed for the public information.

" *The committee cannot afcertain whether the contents of the faid paper have been framed in Philadelphia, or in Great-Britain, much lefs whether the fame are really and truly intended to be brought into the parliament of that kingdom, or whether the faid parliament will confer thereon the ufual folemnities of their laws. But are inclined to believe this will happen, for the following reafons :*

" *1ft. Becaufe their general hath made divers feeble efforts to fet on foot fome kind of treaty during the laft winter, though, either from a miftaken idea of his own dignity and importance, the want of information, or fome other caufe, he hath not made application to thofe who are inveſted with a proper authority.*

" *2dly. Becaufe they fuppofe that the fallacious idea of a ceffation of hoſtilities will render theſe ſtates remiſs in their preparations for war.*

" *3dly. Becaufe believing the Americans wearied with war, they fuppofe we will accede to their terms for the fake of peace.*

" *4thly. Becaufe they fuppofe that our negociations may be fubject to a like corrupt influence with their debates.*

" *5thly. Becaufe they expect from this ſtep the fame effects they did from what one of their miniſters thought proper to call his* conciliatory motion, *viz. that it will prevent foreign powers from giving aid to theſe ſtates ; that it will lead their own ſubjects to continue a little longer the preſent war ; and that it will detach ſome weak men in America from the cauſe of freedom and virtue.*

" *6thly. Becaufe their king, from his own ſhewing, hath reaſon to apprehend that his fleets and armies, inſtead of being employed againſt the territories of theſe ſtates, will be neceſſary for the defence of his own dominions. And,*

" *7thly. Becaufe the impracticability of ſubjugating this country being every day more and more manifeſt, it is their intereſt to extricate themſelves from the war upon any terms.*

" *The committee beg leave further to obſerve, that, upon a ſuppoſition the matters contained in the ſaid paper will really go into the Britiſh ſtatute books, they ſerve to ſhew, in a clear point of view, the weakneſs and wickedneſs of the enemy.*

(or at leaft what appears fo to me) in the well-enlightened field of philofophical reflection. Here the materials are his own; created by himfelf; and the error therefore, is an act of the mind.

" Their weaknefs.

" 1*ft. Becaufe they formerly declared, not only that they had a right to bind the inhabitants of thefe ftates in all cafes whatfoever, but alfo that the faid inhabitants fhould* abfolutely *and* unconditionally *fubmit to the exercife of that right. And this fubmiffion they have endeavoured to exact by the fword. Receding from this claim, therefore, under the prefent circumftances, fhews their inability to enforce it.*

" 2*dly. Becaufe their prince hath heretofore rejected the humbleft petitions of the repreſentatives of America, praying to be conſidered as ſubjects, and protected in the enjoyment of peace, liberty and ſafety; and hath waged a moſt cruel war againſt them, and employed the ſavages to butcher innocent women and children. But now the ſame prince pretends to treat with thoſe very repreſentatives, and grant to the* arms *of America what he refuſed to her* prayers.

" 3*dly. Becauſe they have uniformly laboured to conquer this continent, rejecting every idea of accommodation propoſed to them, from a confidence in their own ſtrength. Wherefore it is evident, from the change in their mode of attack, that they have loſt this confidence. And,*

" 4*thly. Becauſe the conſtant language, ſpoken not only by their miniſters, but by the moſt public and authentic acts of the nation, hath been, that it is incompatible with their dignity to treat with the Americans while they have arms in their hands. Notwithſtanding which, an offer is now about to be made for treaty.*

" The wickednefs and inſincerity *of the enemy appear from the following conſiderations:*

" 1*ſt. Either the* bills *now to be paſſed contain a direct or indirect ceſſion of a part of their former claims, or they do not. If they do, then it is acknowledged that they have ſacrificed many brave men in an unjuſt quarrel. If they do not, then they are calculated to deceive America into terms, to which neither argument before the war, nor force ſince, could procure her aſſent.*

" 2*dly. The firſt of theſe* bills *appears, from the title, to be a declaration of the* intentions *of the Britiſh parliament concerning the exerciſe of the* right of impoſing taxes *within theſe ſtates. Wherefore, ſhould theſe ſtates treat under the ſaid bill, they would* indirectly *acknowledge that right, to obtain which acknowledgment the preſent war hath been avowedly undertaken and proſecuted on the part of Great-Britain.*

Hitherto my remarks have been confined to circumſtances; the order in which they aroſe, and the events they produced. In

" *3dly. Should ſuch pretended right be ſo acquieſced in, then, of conſequence, the ſame might be exerciſed whenever the Britiſh parliament ſhould find themſelves in a different* temper *and* diſpoſition; *ſince it muſt depend upon thoſe, and ſuch like contingencies, how far men will act according to their former* intentions.

" *4thly. The ſaid firſt bill, in the body thereof, containeth no new matter, but is preciſely the ſame with the motion before-mentioned, and liable to all the objections which lay againſt the ſaid motion, excepting the following particular, viz. that* by the motion *actual taxation was to be ſuſpended, ſo long as America ſhould give as much as the ſaid parliament might think proper: Whereas,* by the propoſed bill, *it is to be ſuſpended, as long as future parliaments continue of the ſame mind with the preſent.*

" *5thly. From the ſecond bill it appears, that the Britiſh king may, if he pleaſes, appoint commiſſioners to* treat *and* agree *with thoſe, whom they pleaſe, about a variety of things therein mentioned. But ſuch treaties and agreements are to be of no validity without the concurrence of the ſaid parliament, except ſo far as they relate to the* ſuſpenſion *of hoſtilities, and of certain of their acts, the granting of pardons, and the appointing of governors to theſe ſovereign, free and independent ſtates. Wherefore the ſaid parliament have reſerved to themſelves, in* expreſs words, *the power of ſetting aſide any ſuch treaty, and taking the advantage of any circumſtances which may ariſe to ſubject this continent to their uſurpations.*

" *6thly. The ſaid bill, by holding forth a tender of pardon, implies a criminality in our juſtifiable reſiſtance, and conſequently, to treat under it would be an implied acknowledgment, that the inhabitants of theſe ſtates were, what Britain has declared them to be,* Rebels.

" *7thly. The inhabitants of theſe ſtates being claimed by them as ſubjects, they may infer, from the nature of the negociation now pretended to be ſet on foot, that the ſaid inhabitants would of right be afterwards bound by ſuch laws as they ſhould make. Wherefore any agreement entered into on ſuch negociation might at any future time be repealed. And,*

" *8thly. Becauſe the ſaid bill purports, that the commiſſioners therein mentioned may treat with private individuals; a meaſure highly derogatory to the dignity of national character.*

" *From all which it appears evident to your committee, that the ſaid bills are intended to operate upon the hopes and fears of the good people of theſe ſtates, ſo as to create diviſions among them, and a defection from the*

thefe, my information being better than the Abbe's, my taſk was eaſy. How I may ſucceed in controverting matters of ſentiment and

common cauſe, now by the bleſſing of Divine Providence drawing near to a favourable iſſue. That they are the ſequel of that inſidious plan, which from the days of the ſtamp act down to the preſent time, hath involved this country in contention and bloodſhed. And that, as in other caſes ſo in this, although circumſtances may force them at times to recede from their unjuſtifiable claims, there can be no doubt but they will as heretofore, upon the firſt favourable occaſion, again diſplay that luſt of domination, which hath rent in twain the mighty empire of Britain.

" *Upon the whole matter, the committee beg leave to report it as their opinion, that as the Americans united in this arduous conteſt upon principles of common intereſt, for the defence of common rights and priveleges, which union hath been cemented by common calamities and by mutual good offices and affection, ſo the great cauſe for which they contend, and in which all mankind are intereſted, muſt derive its ſucceſs from the continuance of that union. Wherefore any man or body of men, who ſhould preſume to make any ſeparate or partial convention or agreement with commiſſioners under the crown of Great-Britain, or any of them, ought to be conſidered and treated as open and avowed enemies of the United States.*

" *And further your committee beg leave to report it as their opinion, that theſe United States cannot with propriety, hold any conference or treaty with* any *commiſſioners on the part of Great-Britain, unleſs they ſhall, as a preliminary thereto, either withdraw their fleets and armies, or elſe, in poſitive and expreſs terms, acknowledge the independence of the ſaid ſtates.*

" *And inaſmuch as it appears to be the deſign of the enemies of theſe ſtates to lull them into a fatal ſecurity—to the end that they may act with becoming weight and importance, it is the opinion of your committee, that the ſeveral ſtates be called upon to uſe the moſt ſtrenuous exertions to have their reſpective quotas of continental troops in the field as ſoon as poſſible, and that all the militia of the ſaid ſtates be held in readineſs, to act as occaſion may require.*"

The following is the anſwer of congreſs to the ſecond application of the commiſſioners:

" York-Town, June 6, 1778.

" *Sir,*

" *I have had the honour of laying your letter of the 3d inſtant, with the acts of the Britiſh parliament which came incloſed, before congreſs;*

opinion, with one whom years, experience, and long eſtabliſhed reputation have placed in a ſuperior line, I am leſs confident in; but as they fall within the ſcope of my obſervations it would be improper to paſs them over.

From this part of the Abbe's work to the latter end, I find ſeveral expreſſions, which appear to me to ſtart, with a cynical complexion, from the path of liberal thinking, or at leaſt they are ſo involved as to loſe many of the beauties which diſtinguiſh other parts of the performance.

The Abbe having brought his work to the period when the treaty of alliance between France and the United States commenced, proceeds to make ſome remarks thereon.

"In ſhort," ſays he, "philoſophy whoſe firſt ſentiment is the deſire "to ſee all governments juſt and all people happy, in caſting her eyes "upon this alliance of a monarchy, with a people, who are defend- "ing their liberty, *is curious to know its motive. She ſees, at once, "too clearly, that the happineſs of mankind has no part in it.*"

Whatever train of thinking or of temper the Abbe might be in, when he penned this expreſſion, matters not. They will neither qualify the ſentiment, nor add to its defect. If right, it needs no apology; if wrong, it merits no excuſe. It is ſent into the world as an opinion of philoſophy, and may be examined without regard to the author.

It ſeems to be a defect, connected with ingenuity, that it often

and I am inſtructed to acquaint you, ſir, that they have already expreſſed their ſentiments upon bills, not eſſentially different from thoſe acts, in a publication of the 22d of April laſt.

"*Be aſſured, ſir, when the king of Great-Britain ſhall be ſeriouſly diſpoſed to put an end to the unprovoked and cruel war waged againſt theſe United States, congreſs will readily attend to ſuch terms of peace, as may conſiſt with the honour of independent nations, the intereſt of their conſtituents, and the ſacred regard they mean to pay to treaties. I have the honour to be, ſir,*

Your moſt obedient, and
moſt humble ſervant,
HENRY LAURENS,
Preſident of congreſs."

His Excellency
Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. Philadelphia.

employs itſelf more in matters of curioſity, than uſefulneſs. Man muſt be the privy counſellor of fate, or ſomething is not right. He muſt know the ſprings, the whys and wherefores of every thing, or he ſits down unſatisfied. Whether this be a crime, or only a caprice of humanity, I am not enquiring into. I ſhall take the paſſage as I find it, and place my objections againſt it.

It is not ſo properly the *motives* which *produced* the alliance, as the *conſequences* which are to be *produced from it*, that mark out the field of philoſophical reflection. In the one we only penetrate into the barren cave of ſecrecy, where little can be known, and every thing may be miſconceived; in the other, the mind is preſented with a wide extended proſpect of vegetative good, and ſees a thouſand bleſſings budding into exiſtence.

But the expreſſion, even within the compaſs of the Abbe's meaning, ſets out with an error, becauſe it is made to declare that, which no man has authority to declare. Who can ſay that the happineſs of mankind made *no part of the motives* which produced the alliance? To be able to declare this, a man muſt be poſſeſſed of the mind of all the parties concerned, and know that their motives were ſomething elſe.

In proportion as the independence of America became contemplated and underſtood, the local advantages of it to the immediate actors, and the numerous benefits it promiſed to mankind, appeared to be every day increaſing; and we ſaw not a temporary good for the preſent race only, but a continued good to all poſterity; theſe motives, therefore, added to thoſe which preceded them, became the motives on the part of America, which led her to propoſe and agree to the treaty of alliance, as the beſt effectual method of extending and ſecuring happineſs; and therefore, with reſpect to us, the Abbe is wrong.

France, on the other hand, was ſituated very differently to America. She was not acted upon by neceſſity to ſeek a friend, and therefore her motive in becoming one, has the ſtrongeſt evidence of being good, and that which is ſo, muſt have ſome happineſs for its object. With regard to herſelf, ſhe ſaw a train of conveniences worthy her attention. By leſſening the power of an enemy, whom at the ſame time, ſhe fought neither to deſtroy nor diſtreſs, ſhe gained an advantage without doing an evil, and created to herſelf a new friend by aſſociating with a country in misfortune. The ſprings of thought that lead to actions of this kind, however political they

may be, are nevertheleſs naturally beneficent; for in all cauſes, good or bad, it is neceſſary there ſhould be a fitneſs in the mind, to enable it to act in character with the object: Therefore as a bad cauſe cannot be proſecuted with a good motive, ſo nether can a good cauſe be long ſupported by a bad one; and as no man acts without a motive, therefore in the preſent inſtance, as they cannot be bad, they muſt be admitted to be good. But the Abbe ſets out upon ſuch an extended ſcale, that he overlooks the degrees by which it is meaſured, and rejects the beginning of good, becauſe the end comes not out at once.

It is true that bad motives may in ſome degree be brought to ſupport a good cauſe or proſecute a good object; but it never continues long, which is not the caſe with France; for either the object will reform the mind, or the mind corrupt the object, or elſe not being able, either way, to get into uniſon, they will ſeparate in diſguſt: And this natural, though unperceived progreſs of aſſociation or contention between the mind and the object, is the ſecret cauſe of fidelity or defection. Every object a man purſues, is, for the time, a kind of miſtreſs to his mind: if both are good or bad, the union is natural; but if they are in reverſe, and neither can ſeduce nor yet reform the other, the oppoſition grows into diſlike and a ſeparation follows.

When the cauſe of America firſt made her appearance on the ſtage of the univerſe, there were many, who, in the ſtyle of adventurers and fortune-hunters, were dangling in her train, and making their court to her with every profeſſion of honour and attachment. They were loud in her praiſe and oſtentatious in her ſervice. Every place echoed with their ardour or their anger, and they ſeemed like men in love. But, alas! they were fortune-hunters. Their expectations were excited, but their minds were unimpreſſed; and finding her not to their purpoſe, nor themſelves reformed by her influence, they ceaſed their ſuit, and in ſome inſtances deſerted and betrayed her.

There were others, who at firſt beheld her with indifference, and unacquainted with her character were cautious of her company. They treated her as one, who, under the fair name of Liberty, might conceal the hideous figure of Anarchy, or the gloomy monſter of Tyranny. They knew not what ſhe was. If fair, ſhe was fair indeed. But ſtill ſhe was ſuſpected, and though born among us appeared to be a ſtranger.

Accident with ſome, and curioſity with others, brought on a diſtant acquaintance. They ventured to look at her. They felt an

inclination to ſpeak to her. One intimacy led to another, till the ſuſpicion wore away and a change of ſentiment ſtole gradually upon the mind; and having no ſelf-intereſt to ſerve, no paſſion of diſhonour to gratify, they became enamoured of her innocence, and unaltered by misfortune or uninfluenced by ſucceſs, ſhared with fidelity in the varieties of her fate.

This declaration of the Abbe's reſpecting motives, has led me, unintendedly, into a train of metaphyſical reaſoning; but there was no other avenue by which it could ſo properly be approached. To place preſumption againſt preſumption, aſſertion againſt aſſertion, is a mode of oppoſition that has no effect; and therefore the more eligible method was to ſhew, that the declaration does not correſpond with the natural progreſs of the mind, and the influence it has upon our conduct.—I ſhall now quit this part and proceed to what I have before ſtated, namely, that it is not ſo properly the motives which produced the alliance, as the conſequences to be produced from it, that mark out the field of philoſophical reflection.

It is an obſervation I have already made in ſome former publications, that the circle of civilization is yet incomplete. A mutuality of wants have formed the individuals of each country into a kind of national ſociety, and here the progreſs of civiliization has ſtopt. For it is eaſy to ſee, that nations with regard to each other (notwithſtanding the ideal civil law, which every one explains as it ſuits him) are like individuals in a ſtate of nature. They are regulated by no fixt principle, governed by no compulſive law, and each does independently what it pleaſes or what it can.

Were it poſſible we could have known the world when in a ſtate of barbariſm, we might have concluded that it never could be brought into the order we now ſee it. The untamed mind was then as hard, if not harder, to work upon in its individual ſtate, than the national mind is in its preſent one. Yet we have ſeen the accompliſhment of the one, why then ſhould we doubt that of the other?

There is a greater fitneſs in mankind to extend and complete the civiliization of nations with each other at this day, than there was to begin it with the unconnected individuals at firſt; in the ſame manner that it is ſomewhat eaſier to put together the materials of a machine after they are formed, than it was to form them from original matter. The preſent condition of the world differing ſo exceedingly from what it formerly was, has given a new caſt to the mind of man, more than what he appears to be ſenſible of. The wants of the indi-

vidual which firſt produced the idea of ſociety, are now augmented into the wants of the nation, and he is obliged to ſeek from another country what before he fought from the next perſon.

Letters, the tongue of the world, have in ſome meaſure brought all mankind acquainted, and by an extenſion of their uſes are every day promoting ſome new friendſhip. Through them diſtant nations become capable of converſation, and loſing by degrees the awkwardneſs of ſtrangers, and the moroſeneſs of ſuſpicion, they learn to know and underſtand each other. Science, the partiſan of no country, but the beneficent patroneſs of all, has liberally opened a temple where all may meet. Her influence on the mind, like the ſun on the chilled earth, has long been preparing it for higher cultivation and further improvement. The philoſopher of one country ſees not an enemy in the philoſopher of another: He takes his ſeat in the temple of ſcience, and aſks not who ſits beſide him.

This was not the condition of the barbarian world. Then the wants of man were few and the objects within his reach. While he could acquire theſe, he lived in a ſtate of individual independence; the conſequence of which was, there were as many nations as perſons, each contending with the other, to ſecure ſomething which he had, or to obtain ſomething which he had not. The world had then no buſineſs to follow, no ſtudies to exerciſe the mind. Their time was divided between ſloth and fatigue. Hunting and war were their chief occupations; ſleep and food their principal enjoyments.

Now it is otherwiſe. A change in the mode of life has made it neceſſary to be buſy; and man finds a thouſand things to do now which before he did not. Inſtead of placing his ideas of greatneſs in the rude atchievements of the ſavage, he ſtudies arts, ſciences, agriculture and commerce, the refinements of the gentleman, the principles of ſociety, and the knowledge of the philoſopher.

There are many things which in themſelves are neither morally good nor bad, but they are productive of conſequences, which are ſtrongly marked with one or other of theſe characters. Thus commerce, though in itſelf a moral nullity, has had a conſiderable influence in tempering the human mind. It was the want of objects in the ancient world, which occaſioned in them ſuch a rude and perpetual turn for war. Their time hung on their hands without the means of employment. The indolence they lived in afforded leiſure for miſchief, and being all idle at once, and equal in their circumſtances, they were eaſily provoked or induced to action.

But the introduction of commerce furniſhed the world with objects, which, in their extent, reach every man and give him ſomething to think about and ſomething to do; by theſe his attention is mechanically drawn from the purſuits, which a ſtate of indolence and an unemployed mind occaſioned, and he trades with the ſame countries, which former ages, tempted by their productions, and too indolent to purchaſe them, would have gone to war with.

Thus, as I have already obſerved, the condition of the world being materially changed by the influence of ſcience and commerce, it is put into a fitneſs not only to admit of, but to deſire, an extenſion of civilization. The principal and almoſt only remaining enemy, it now has to encounter, is *prejudice;* for it is evidently the intereſt of mankind to agree and make the beſt of life. The world has undergone its diviſions of empire, the ſeveral boundaries of which are known and ſettled. The idea of conquering countries, like the Greeks and Romans, does not now exiſt; and experience has exploded the notion of going to war for the ſake of profit. In ſhort, the objects for war are exceedingly diminiſhed, and there is now left ſcarcely any thing to quarrel about, but what ariſes from that demon of ſociety, prejudice, and the conſequent ſullenneſs and untractableneſs of the temper.

There is ſomething exceedingly curious in the conſtitution and operation of prejudice. It has the ſingular ability of accommodating itſelf to all the poſſible varieties of the human mind. Some paſſions and vices are but thinly ſcattered among mankind, and find only here and there a fitneſs of reception. But prejudice, like the ſpider, makes every where its home. It has neither taſte nor choice of place, and all that it requires is room. There is ſcarcely a ſituation, except fire or water, in which a ſpider will not live. So, let the mind be as naked as the walls of an empty and forſaken tenement, gloomy as a dungeon, or ornamented with the richeſt abilities of thinking, let it be hot, cold, dark, or light, lonely or inhabited, ſtill prejudice, if undiſturbed, will fill it with cobwebs, and live, like the ſpider, where there ſeems nothing to live on. If the one prepares her food by poiſoning it to her palate and her uſe, the other does the ſame; and as ſeveral of our paſſions are ſtrongly characterized by the animal world, prejudice may be denominated the ſpider of the mind.

Perhaps no two events ever united ſo intimately and forcibly to combat and expel prejudice, as the revolution of America and the alliance with France. Their effects are felt, and their influence already extends as well to the old world as the new. Our ſtyle and

manner of thinking have undergone a revolution, more extraordinary than the political revolution of the country. We ſee with other eyes; we hear with other ears; and think with other thoughts, than thoſe we formerly uſed. We can look back on our own prejudices, as if they had been the prejudices of other people. We now ſee and know they were prejudices and nothing elſe; and relieved from their ſhackles enjoy a freedom of mind, we felt not before. It was not all the argument, however powerful, nor all the reaſoning, however elegant, that could have produced this change, ſo neceſſary to the extenſion of the mind, and the cordiality of the world, without the two circumſtances of the revolution and the alliance.

Had America dropt quietly from Britain, no material change, in ſentiment, had taken place. The ſame notions, prejudices, and conceits, would have governed in both countries, as governed them before, and ſtill the ſlaves of error and education, they would have travelled on in the beaten track of vulgar and habitual thinking. But brought about by the means it has been, both with regard to ourſelves, to France, and England, every corner of the mind is ſwept of its cobwebs, poiſon, and duſt, and made fit for the reception of generous happineſs.

Perhaps there never was an alliance on a broader baſis, than that between America and France, and the progreſs of it is worth attending to. The countries had been enemies, not properly of themſelves, but through the medium of England. They, originally, had no quarrel with each other, nor any cauſe for one, but what aroſe from the intereſt of England and her arming America againſt France. At the ſame time, the Americans at a diſtance from, and unacquainted with the world, and tutored in all the prejudices which governed thoſe who governed them, conceived it their duty to act as they were taught. In doing this, they expended their ſubſtance, to make conqueſts, not for themſelves but for their maſters, who in return treated them as ſlaves.

A long ſucceſſion of inſolent ſeverity, and the ſeparation finally occaſioned by the commencement of hoſtilities at Lexington, on the 19th of April, 1775, naturally produced a new diſpoſition of thinking. As the mind cloſed itſelf towards England, it opened itſelf towards the world, and our prejudices like our oppreſſions underwent, though leſs obſerved, a mental examination; until we found the former as inconſiſtent with reaſon and benevolence, as the latter were repugnant to our civil and political rights.

While we were thus advancing by degrees into the wide field of extended humanity, the alliance with France was concluded. An alliance not formed for the mere purpose of a day, but on just and generous grounds, and with equal and mutual advantages; and the easy affectionate manner in which the parties have since communicated, has made it an alliance not of courts only but of countries. There is now an union of mind as well as of interest; and our hearts as well as our prosperity call on us to support it.

The people of England not having experienced this change, had likewise no idea of it. They were hugging to their bosoms the same prejudices we were trampling beneath our feet; and they expected to keep a hold upon America, by that narrowness of thinking, which America disdained. What they were proud of, we despised; and this is a principal cause why all their negociations, constructed on this ground, have failed. We are now really another people, and cannot again go back to ignorance and prejudice. The mind once enlightened cannot again become dark. There is no possibility, neither is there any term to express the supposition by, of the mind, *un*knowing any thing it already knows; and therefore all attempts on the part of England, fitted to the former habit of America, and on the expectation of their applying now, will be like persuading a seeing man to become blind, and a sensible one to turn an ideot. The first of which is unnatural, and the other impossible.

As to the remark which the Abbe makes on the one country being a monarchy and the other a republic, it can have no essential meaning. Forms of government have nothing to do with treaties. The former are the internal police of the countries severally; the latter, their external police jointly: and so long as each performs its part, we have no more right or business to know how the one or the other conducts its domestic affairs, than we have to enquire into the private concerns of a family.

But had the Abbe reflected for a moment, he would have seen, that courts or the governing powers of all countries, be their forms what they may, are relatively republics with each other. It is the first and true principle of alliancing. Antiquity may have given precedence, and power will naturally create importance, but their equal right is never disputed. It may likewise be worthy of remarking, that a monarchical country can suffer nothing in its popular happiness by allyingwith a republican one; and republican governments have never been destroyed by their external connections, but by some in-

ternal convulſion or contrivance. France has been in alliance with the republic of Swiſſerland for more than two hundred years, and ſtill Swiſſerland retains her original form as entire as if ſhe had been allied with a republic like herſelf; therefore this remark of the Abbe goes to nothing. Beſides it is beſt mankind ſhould mix. There is ever ſomething to learn either of manners or principle; and it is by a free communication, without regard to domeſtic matters, that friendſhip is to be extended, and prejudice deſtroyed all over the world.

But notwithſtanding the Abbe's high profeſſions in favour of liberty, he appears ſometimes to forget himſelf, or that his theory is rather the child of his fancy than of his judgment: For in almoſt the ſame inſtant that he cenſures the alliance as not originally or ſufficiently calculated for the happineſs of mankind, he, by a figure of implication, accuſes France for having acted ſo generouſly and unreſervedly in concluding it. "Why did they (ſays he, meaning the "court of France) tie themſelves down by an inconſiderate treaty to "conditions with the Congreſs, which they might themſelves have "held in dependence by ample and regular ſupplies."

When an author undertakes to treat of public happineſs, he ought to be certain that he does not miſtake paſſion for right, nor imagination for principle. Principle, like truth, needs no contrivance. It will ever tell its own tale, and tell it the ſame way. But where this is not the caſe, every page muſt be watched, recollected, and compared, like an invented ſtory.

I am ſurpriſed at this paſſage of the Abbe. It means nothing or it means ill; and in any caſe it ſhews the great difference between ſpeculative and practical knowledge. A treaty according to the Abbe's language would have neither duration nor affection; it might have laſted to the end of the war, and then expired with it. But France, by acting in a ſtyle ſuperior to the little politics of narrow thinking, has eſtabliſhed a generous fame and won the love of a country ſhe was before a ſtranger to. She had to treat with a people who thought as nature taught them; and, on her own part, ſhe wiſely ſaw, there was no preſent advantage to be obtained by unequal terms, which could balance the more laſting ones that might flow from a kind and generous beginning.

From this part the Abbe advances into the ſecret tranſactions of the two cabinets of Verſailles and Madrid reſpecting the independence of America; through which I mean not to follow him. It is a circumſtance ſufficiently ſtriking without being commented on, that the

former union of America with Britain produced a power, which in her hands, was becoming dangerous to the world: And there is no improbability in ſuppoſing, that had the latter known as much of the ſtrength of the former, before ſhe began the quarrel as ſhe has known ſince, that inſtead of attempting to reduce her to unconditional ſubmiſſion, ſhe would have propoſed to her the conqueſt of Mexico. But from the countries ſeparately, Spain has nothing to apprehend, though from their union ſhe had more to fear than any other power in Europe,

The part which I ſhall more particularly confine myſelf to, is that wherein the Abbe takes an opportunity of complimenting the Britiſh miniſtry with high encomiums of admiration, on their rejecting the offered mediation of the court of Madrid, in 1779.

It muſt be remembered that before Spain joined France in the war, ſhe undertook the office of a mediator and made propoſals to the Britiſh king and miniſtry ſo exceedingly favourable to their intereſt, that had they been accepted, would have become inconvenient, if not inadmiſſible, to America. Theſe propoſals were nevertheleſs rejected by the Britiſh cabinet; on which the Abbe ſays,—

"It is in ſuch a circumſtance as this; it is in the time when noble "pride elevates the ſoul ſuperior to all terror; when nothing is ſeen "more dreadful than the ſhame of receiving the law, and when there "is no doubt or heſitation which to chooſe, between ruin and diſ-"honour; it is then, that the greatneſs of a nation is diſplayed. I "acknowledge however that men, accuſtomed to judge of things by "the event, call great and perilous reſolutions, heroiſm or madneſs, "according to the good or bad ſucceſs with which they have been "attended. If then, I ſhould be aſked, what is the name which "ſhall in years to come be given to the firmneſs, which was in this mo-"ment exhibited by the Engliſh, I ſhall anſwer that I do not know. "But that which it deſerves I know. I know that the annals of the "world hold out to us but rarely, the auguſt and majeſtic ſpectacle of "a nation, which chooſes rather to renounce its duration than its "glory."

In this paragraph the conception is loſty and the expreſſion elegant, but the colouring is too high for the original, and the likeneſs fa'ls through an exceſs of graces. To fit the powers of thinking and the turn of language to the ſubject, ſo as to bring out a clear concluſion that ſhall hit the point in queſtion and nothing elſe, is the true criterion of writing. But the greater part of the Abbe's writ-

ings (if he will pardon me the remark) appear to me uncentral and burdened with variety. They repreſent a beautiful wilderneſs without paths; in which the eye is diverted by every thing, without being particularly directed to any thing; and in which it is agreeable to be loſt, and difficult to find the way out.

Before I offer any other remark on the ſpirit and compoſition of the above paſſage, I ſhall compare it with the circumſtance it alludes to.

The circumſtance then does not deſerve the encomium. The rejection was not prompted by her fortitude but her vanity. She did not view it as a caſe of deſpair or even of extreme danger, and conſequently the determination to renounce her duration rather than her glory, cannot apply to the condition of her mind. She had then high expectations of ſubjugating America, and had no other naval force againſt her than France; neither was ſhe certain that rejecting the mediation of Spain would combine that power with France. New mediations might ariſe more favourable than thoſe ſhe had refuſed. But if they ſhould not, and Spain ſhould join, ſhe ſtill ſaw that it would only bring out her naval force againſt France and Spain, which was not wanted and could not be employed againſt America, and habits of thinking had taught her to believe herſelf ſuperior to both.

But in any caſe to which the conſequence might point, there was nothing to impreſs her with the idea of renouncing her duration. It is not the policy of Europe to ſuffer the extinction of any power, but only to lop off or prevent its dangerous encreaſe. She was likewiſe freed by ſituation from the internal and immediate horrors of invaſion; was rolling in diſſipation and looking for conqueſts; and though ſhe ſuffered nothing but the expence of war, ſhe ſtill had a greedy eye to magnificent reimburſement.

But if the Abbe is delighted with high and ſtriking ſingularities of character, he might, in America, have found ample field for encomium. Here was a people, who could not know what part the world would take for, or againſt them; and who were venturing on an untried ſcheme, in oppoſition to a power, againſt which more formidable nations had failed. They had every thing to learn but the principles which ſupported them, and every thing to procure that was neceſſary for their defence. They have at times ſeen themſelves as low as diſtreſs could make them, without ſhewing the leaſt ſtagger in their fortitude; and been raiſed again by the moſt unexpected events, without diſcovering an unmanly diſcompoſure of joy. To heſitate or to deſpair are conditions equally unknown in America. Her

mind was prepared for every thing; becauſe her original and final reſolution of ſucceeding or periſhing included all poſſible circumſtances.

The rejection of the Britiſh propoſitions in the year 1778, circumſtanced as America was at that time, is a far greater inſtance of unſhaken fortitude than the refuſal of the Spaniſh mediation by the court of London: And other hiſtorians, beſides the Abbe, ſtruck with the vaſtneſs of her conduct therein, have, like himſelf, attributed it to a circumſtance, which was then unknown, the alliance with France. Their error ſhews their idea of its greatneſs; becauſe, in order to account for it, they have ſought a cauſe ſuited to its magnitude, without knowing that the cauſe exiſted in the principles of the country.*

But this paſſionate encomium of the Abbe is deſervedly ſubject to moral and philoſophical objections. It is the effuſion of wild thinking, and has a tendency to prevent that humanity of reflection which the criminal conduct of Britain enjoins on her as a duty.—It is a laudanum to courtly iniquity.—It keeps in intoxicated ſleep the conſcience of a nation; and more miſchief is effected by wrapping up guilt in ſplendid excuſe, than by directly patronizing it.

Britain is now the only country which holds the world in diſturbance and war; and inſtead of paying compliments to the exceſs of her crimes, the Abbe would have appeared much more in character, had he put to her, or to her monarch, this ſerious queſtion—

Are there not miſeries enough in the world, too difficult to be encountered and too pointed to be borne, without ſtudying to enlarge the liſt and arming it with new deſtruction? Is life ſo very long that it is neceſſary, nay even a duty, to ſhake the ſand and haſten out the period of duration? Is the path ſo elegantly ſmooth, ſo decked

* *Extract from* "A ſhort Review of the preſent Reign," in England. Page 45, in the new Annual Regiſter, for the year 1780.

"*The commiſſioners, who, in conſequence of lord North's conciliatory* "*bills, went over to America, to propoſe terms of peace to the colonies,* "*were wholly unſucceſsful. The conceſſions which formerly would have* "*been received with the utmoſt gratitude, were rejected with diſdain.* "*Now was the time of American pride and haughtineſs. It is proba-* "*ble, however, that it was not pride and haughtineſs alone that dictated* "*the reſolutions of congreſs, but a diſtruſt of the ſincerity of the offers of* "*Britain, a determination not to give up their independence, and,* above "all, the engagements into which they had entered by their late "treaty with France."

on every fide and carpeted with joys, that wretchedneſs is wanted to enrich it as a foil? Go aſk thine aching heart, when ſorrow from a thouſand cauſes wounds it, go aſk thy ſickened ſelf, when every medicine fails, whether this be the caſe or not?

Quitting my remarks on this head, I proceed to another, in which the Abbe has let looſe a vein of ill nature, and, what is ſtill worſe, of injuſtice.

After cavilling at the treaty, he goes on to characterize the ſeveral parties combined in the war. "Is it poſſible," ſays the Abbe, "that a ſtrict union ſhould long ſubſiſt amongſt confederates of cha- "racters ſo oppoſite as the haſty, light, diſdainful Frenchman, the "jealous, haughty, ſly, ſlow, circumſpective Spaniard, and the Ame- "rican, who is ſecretly ſnatching looks at the mother country, and "would rejoice, were they compatible with his independence, at the "diſaſters of his allies?"

To draw fooliſh portraits of each other, is a mode of attack and repriſal, which the greater part of mankind are fond of indulging. The ſerious philoſopher ſhould be above it, more eſpecially in caſes from which no poſſible good can ariſe, and miſchief may, and where no received provocation can palliate the offence.—The Abbe might have invented a difference of character for every country in the world, and they in return might find others for him, till in the war of wit all real character is loſt. The pleaſantry of one nation or the gravity of another may, by a little pencilling, be diſtorted into whimſical features, and the painter become as much laughed at as the painting.

But why did not the Abbe look a little deeper and bring forth the excellencies of the ſeveral parties?—Why did he not dwell with pleaſure on that greatneſs of character, that ſuperiority of heart, which has marked the conduct of France in her conqueſts, and which has forced an acknowledgment even from Britain?

There is one line, at leaſt (and many others might be diſcovered) in which the confederates unite; which is, that of a rival eminence in their treatment of their enemies. Spain in her conqueſt of Minorca and the Bahama-Iſlands, confirms this remark. America has been invariable in her lenity from the beginning of the war, notwithſtanding the high provocations ſhe has experienced. It is England only who has been inſolent and cruel.

But why muſt America be charged with a crime undeſerved by her conduct, more ſo by her principles, and which, if a fact, would be fatal to her honour. I mean the want of attachment to her allies,

or rejoicing in their diſaſters. She, it is true, has been aſſiduous in ſhewing to the world that ſhe was not the aggreſſor towards England, and that the quarrel was not of her ſeeking, or, at that time, even of her wiſhing. But to draw inferences from her candour, and even from her juſtification, to ſtab her character by (and I ſee nothing elſe from which they can be ſuppoſed to be drawn) is unkind and unjuſt.

Does her rejection of the Britiſh propoſitions in 1778, before ſhe knew of any alliance with France, correſpond with the Abbe's deſcription of her mind? Does a ſingle inſtance of her conduct ſince that time juſtify it?—But there is a ſtill better evidence to apply to, which is, that of all the mails, which, at different times, have been waylaid on the road, in divers parts of America, and taken and carried into New-York, and from which the moſt ſecret and confidential private letters, as well as thoſe from authority, have been publiſhed, not one of them, I repeat it, not a ſingle one of them, gave countenance to ſuch charge.

This is not a country where men are under government reſtraint in ſpeaking; and if there is any kind of reſtraint, it ariſes from a fear of popular reſentment. Now, if nothing in her private or public correſpondence favours ſuch a ſuggeſtion, and if the general diſpoſition of the country is ſuch as to make it unſafe for a man to ſhow an appearance of joy at any diſaſter to her ally, on what grounds, I aſk, can the accuſation ſtand? What company the Abbe may have kept in France, we cannot know; but this we know, that the account he gives does not apply to America.

Had the Abbe been in America at the time the news arrived of the diſaſter of the fleet under count de Graſſe in the Weſt-Indies, he would have ſeen his vaſt miſtake. Neither do I remember any inſtance, except the loſs of Charleſton, in which the public mind ſuffered more ſevere and pungent concern, or underwent more agitations of hope and apprehenſion as to the truth or falſhood of the report. Had the loſs been all our own, it could not have had a deeper effect, yet it was not one of theſe caſes which reached to the independence of America.

In the geographical account which the Abbe gives of the thirteen ſtates, he is ſo exceedingly erroneous, that to attempt a particular refutation would exceed the limits I have preſcribed to myſelf. And as it is a matter neither political, hiſtorical, nor ſentimental, and which can always be contradicted by the extent and natural circumſtances of the country, I ſhall paſs it over; with this additional

remark, that I never yet saw an European description of America that was true, neither can any person gain a just idea of it, but by coming to it.

Though I have already extended this letter beyond what I at first proposed, I am, nevertheless, obliged to omit many observations, I originally designed to have made. I wish there had been no occasion for making any. But the wrong ideas which the Abbe's work had a tendency to excite, and the prejudicial impressions they might make, must be an apology for my remarks, and the freedom with which they are done.

I observe the Abbe has made a sort of epitome of a considerable part of the pamphlet *Common Sense*, and introduced it in that form into his publication. But there are other places where the Abbe has borrowed freely from the said pamphlet without acknowledging it. The difference between society and government, with which the pamphlet opens, is taken from it, and in some expressions almost literally, into the Abbe's work as if originally his own; and through the whole of the Abbe's remarks on this head, the idea in Common Sense is so closely copied and pursued, that the difference is only in words, and in the arrangement of the thoughts, and not in the thoughts themselves. *

* COMMON SENSE.	ABBE RAYNAL.
"*Some writers have so confounded society with government, as to leave little or no distinction between them; whereas they are not only different, but have different origins.*"	"*Care must be taken not to confound together society with government. That they may be known distinctly, their origin should be considered.*"
"*Society is produced by our wants and governments by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness* positively; *by uniting our affections—the latter* negatively, *by restraining our vices.*"	"*Society originates in the wants of men, government in their vices. Society tends always to good; government ought always to tend to the repressing of evil.*"

In the following paragraphs there is less likeness in the language, but the ideas in the one are evidently copied from the other.

"*In order to gain a clear and just idea of the design and end of government, let us suppose a small*	"*Man thrown, as it were, by chance upon the globe, surrounded by all the evils of nature, obliged*

But as it is time I ſhould come to the concluſion of my letter, I ſhall forbear all further obſervations on the Abbe's work, and take a conciſe view of the ſtate of public affairs, ſince the time in which that performance was publiſhed.

number of perſons, meeting in ſome ſequeſtered part of the earth, unconnected with the reſt; they will then repreſent the peopling of any country or of the world. In this ſtate of natural liberty, ſociety will be their firſt thought. A thouſand motives will excite them thereto. The ſtrength of one man is ſo unequal to his wants, and his mind ſo unfitted for perpetual ſolitude, that he is ſoon obliged to ſeek aſſiſtance of another, who, in his turn, requires the ſame. Four or five united would be able to raiſe a tolerable dwelling in the midſt of a wilderneſs; but one *man might labour out the common period of life, without accompliſhing any thing; when he had felled his timber, he could not remove it, nor erect it after it was removed; hunger, in the mean time would urge him from his work, and every different want call him a different way. Diſeaſe, nay even misfortune, would be death; for though neither might be immediately mortal, yet either of them would diſable him from living, and reduce him to a ſtate in which he might rather be ſaid to periſh than to die.—Thus neceſſity, like a gravitating power, would form our newly arrived emigrants into ſociety, the reciprocal bleſſings of which, would ſuperſede and render the obligations of continually to defend and protect his life againſt the ſtorms and tempeſts of the air, againſt the inundations of water, againſt the fire of volcanoes, againſt the intemperance of frigid and torrid zones, againſt the ſterility of the earth which refuſes him aliment, or its baneful fecundity, which makes poiſon ſpring up beneath his feet; in ſhort againſt the claws and teeth of ſavage beaſts, who diſpute with him his habitation and his prey, and, attacking his perſon, ſeem reſolved to render themſelves rulers of this globe, of which he thinks himſelf to be the maſter: Man, in this ſtate, alone and abandoned to himſelf, could do nothing for his preſervation. It was neceſſary, therefore, that he ſhould unite himſelf, and aſſociate with his like, in order to bring together their ſtrength and intelligence in common ſtock. It is by this union that he has triumphed over ſo many evils, that he has faſhioned this globe to his uſe, reſtrained the rivers, ſubjugated the ſeas, inſured his ſubſiſtence, conquered a part of the animals in obliging them to ſerve him, and driven others far from his empire, to the depths of deſerts or of woods, where their number diminiſhes from age to age.—What a man alone would not have been able to effect, men have executed in con-*

A mind habited to actions of meanneſs and injuſtice, commits them without reflection, or with a very partial one; for on what other ground than this, can we account for the declaration of war againſt the Dutch. To gain an idea of the politics which actuated the Britiſh miniſtry to this meaſure, we muſt enter into the opinion which they, and the Engliſh in general, had formed of the temper of the Dutch nation; and from thence infer what their expectation of the conſequences would be.

Could they have imagined that Holland would have ſeriouſly made a common cauſe with France, Spain, and America, the Britiſh miniſtry would never have dared to provoke them. It would have been a madneſs in politics to have done ſo; unleſs their views were to haſten on a period of ſuch emphatic diſtreſs, as ſhould juſtify the conceſſions which they ſaw they muſt one day or other make to the world, and for which they wanted an apology to themſelves.—There is a temper in ſome men which ſeeks a pretence for ſubmiſſion. Like a ſhip diſabled in action, and unfitted to continue it, it waits the approach of a ſtill larger one to ſtrike to, and feels relief at the opportunity. Whether this is greatneſs or littleneſs of mind, I am not enquiring into. I ſhould ſuppoſe it to be the latter, becauſe it proceeds from the want of knowing how to bear misfortune in its original ſtate.

But the ſubſequent conduct of the Britiſh cabinet has ſhewn that this was not their plan of politics, and conſequently their motives muſt be ſought for in another line.

law and government unneceſſary, while they remained perfectly juſt to each other. But as nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice, it will unavoidably happen, that in proportion as they ſurmount the firſt difficulties of emigration, which bound them together in a common cauſe, they will begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each other, and this remiſſneſs will point out the neceſſity of eſtabliſhing ſome form of government to ſupply the defect of moral virtue."

cert; and altogether they preſerve their work. Such is the origin, ſuch the advantages, and the end of ſociety.—Government owes its birth to the neceſſity of preventing and repreſſing the injuries which the aſſociated individuals had to fear from one another. It is the centinel who watches, in order that the common labourers be not diſturbed."

The truth is, that the Britiſh had formed a very humble opinion of the Dutch nation. They looked on them as a people who would ſubmit to any thing; that they might inſult them as they liked, plunder them as they pleaſed, and ſtill the Dutch dared not to be provoked.

If this be taken as the opinion of the Britiſh cabinet, the meaſure is eaſily accounted for; becauſe it goes on the ſuppoſition, that when, by a declaration of hoſtilities, they had robbed the Dutch of ſome millions ſterling (and to rob them was popular) they could make peace with them again whenever they pleaſed, and on almoſt any terms the Britiſh miniſtry ſhould propoſe. And no ſooner was the plundering committed, than the accommodation was ſet on foot, and failed.

When once the mind loſes the ſenſe of its own dignity, it loſes, likewiſe, the ability of judging of it in another. And the American war has thrown Britain into ſuch a variety of abſurd ſituations, that, arguing from herſelf, ſhe ſees not in what conduct national dignity conſiſts in other countries. From Holland ſhe expected duplicity and ſubmiſſion, and this miſtake aroſe from her having acted, in a number of inſtances during the preſent war, the ſame character herſelf.

To be allied to, or connected with Britain, ſeems to be an unſafe and impolitic ſituation. Holland and America are inſtances of the reality of this remark. Make thoſe countries the allies of France or Spain, and Britain will court them with civility, and treat them with reſpect; make them her own allies, and ſhe will inſult and plunder them. In the firſt caſe, ſhe feels ſome apprehenſions at offending them, becauſe they have ſupport at hand; in the latter, thoſe apprehenſions do not exiſt. Such, however, has hitherto been her conduct.

Another meaſure which has taken place ſince the publication of the Abbe's work, and likewiſe ſince the time of my beginning this letter, is the change in the Britiſh miniſtry. What line the new cabinet will purſue reſpecting America, is at this time unknown; neither is it very material, unleſs they are ſeriouſly diſpoſed to a general and honourable peace.

Repeated experience has ſhewn, not only the impracticability of conquering America, but the ſtill higher impoſſibility of conquering her mind, or recalling her back to her former condition of thinking. Since the commencement of the war, which is now approaching to

eight years, thouſands and tens of thouſands have advanced, and are daily advancing into the firſt ſtage of manhood, who know nothing of Britain but as a barbarous enemy, and to whom the independence of America appears as much the natural and eſtabliſhed government of the country, as that of England does to an Engliſhman. And on the other hand, thouſands of the aged, who had Britiſh ideas, have dropped, and are daily dropping, from the ſtage of buſineſs and life. The natural progreſs of generation and decay operates every hour to the diſadvantage of Britain. Time and death, hard enemies to contend with, fight conſtantly againſt her intereſt; and the bills of mortality, in every part of America, are the thermometers of her decline. The children in the ſtreets are from their cradle bred to conſider her as their only foe. They hear of her cruelties; of their fathers, uncles, and kindred killed; they ſee the remains of burnt and deſtroyed houſes, and the common tradition of the ſchool they go to, tells them, *thoſe things were done by the Britiſh.*

Theſe are circumſtances which the mere Engliſh ſtate politician, who conſiders man only in a ſtate of manhood, does not attend to. He gets entangled with parties coeval or equal with himſelf at home, and thinks not how faſt the riſing generation in America is growing beyond his knowledge of them, or they of him. In a few years all perſonal remembrance will be loſt, and who is king or miniſter in England, will be little known and ſcarcely enquired after.

The new Britiſh adminiſtration is compoſed of perſons who have ever been againſt the war, and who have conſtantly reprobated all the violent meaſures of the former one. They conſidered the American war as deſtructive to themſelves, and oppoſed it on that ground. But what are theſe things to America? She has nothing to do with Engliſh parties. The ins and the outs are nothing to her. It is the whole country ſhe is at war with, or muſt be at peace with.

Were every miniſter in England a *Chatham*, it would now weigh little or nothing in the ſcale of American politics. Death has preſerved to the memory of this ſtateſman *that fame*, which he, by living, would have loſt. His plans and opinions, towards the latter part of his life, would have been attended with as many evil conſequences, and as much reprobated here, as thoſe of Lord North; and, conſidering him a wiſe man, they abound with inconſiſtencies amounting to abſurdities.

It has apparently been the fault of many in the late minority, to ſuppoſe, that America would agree to certain terms with them, were

they in place, which ſhe would not ever liſten to from the then adminiſtration. This idea can anſwer no other purpoſe than to prolong the war; and Britain may, at the expence of many more millions, learn the fatality of ſuch miſtakes. If the new miniſtry wiſely avoid this hopeleſs policy, they will prove themſelves better pilots, and wiſer men, than they are conceived to be; for it is every day expected to ſee their bark ſtrike upon ſome hidden rock and go to pieces.

But there is a line in which they may be great. A more brilliant opening needs not to preſent itſelf; and it is ſuch a one, as true magnanimity would improve, and humanity rejoice in.

A total reformation is wanted in England. She wants an expanded mind,—an heart which embraces the univerſe. Inſtead of ſhutting herſelf up in an iſland, and quarrelling with the world, ſhe would derive more laſting happineſs, and acquire more real riches, by generouſly mixing with it, and bravely ſaying, I am the enemy of none. It is not now a time for little contrivances or artful politics. The European world is too experienced to be impoſed upon, and America too wiſe to be duped. It muſt be ſomething new and maſterly that muſt ſucceed. The idea of ſeducing America from her independence, or corrupting her from her alliance, is a thought too little for a great mind, and impoſſible for any honeſt one, to attempt. Whenever politics are applied to debauch mankind from their integrity, and diſſolve the virtues of human nature, they become deteſtable; and to be a ſtateſman upon this plan, is to be a commiſſioned villain. He who aims at it, leaves a vacancy in his character, which may be filled up with the worſt of epithets.

If the diſpoſition of England ſhould be ſuch, as not to agree to a general and honourable peace, and that the war muſt, at all events, continue longer, I cannot help wiſhing, that the alliances which America has or may enter into, may become the only objects of the war. She wants an opportunity of ſhewing to the world, that ſhe holds her honour as dear and ſacred as her independence, and that ſhe will in no ſituation forſake thoſe, whom no negociations could induce to forſake her. Peace, to every reflective mind, is a deſirable object; but *that peace* which is accompanied with a ruined character, becomes a crime to the ſeducer, and a curſe upon the ſeduced.

But where is the impoſſibility or even the great difficulty of England forming a friendſhip with France and Spain, and making it a national virtue to renounce for ever thoſe prejudiced inveteracies it

has been her cuſtom to cheriſh; and which, while they ſerve to ſink her with an encreaſing enormity of debt, by involving her in fruitleſs wars, become likewiſe the bane of her repoſe, and the deſtruction of her manners. We had once the fetters that ſhe has now, but experience has ſhewn us the miſtake, and thinking juſtly has ſet us right.

The true idea of a great nation is that which extends and promotes the principles of univerſal ſociety. Whoſe mind riſes above the atmoſpheres of local thoughts, and conſiders mankind, of whatever nation or profeſſion they may be, as the work of one Creator. The rage for conqueſt has had its faſhion, and its day. Why may not the amiable virtues have the ſame? The Alexanders and Cæſars of antiquity have left behind them their monuments of deſtruction, and are remembered with hatred; while theſe more exalted characters, who firſt taught ſociety and ſcience, are bleſt with the gratitude of every age and country. Of more uſe was *one* philoſopher, though a heathen, to the world, than all the heathen conquerors that ever exiſted.

Should the preſent revolution be diſtinguiſhed by opening a new ſyſtem of extended civilization, it will receive from Heaven the higheſt evidence of approbation; and as this is a ſubject to which the Abbe's powers are ſo eminently ſuited, I recommend it to his attention, with the affection of a friend, and the ardour of a univerſal citizen.

POSTSCRIPT.

Since cloſing the foregoing letter, ſome intimations reſpecting a general peace have made their way to America. On what authority or foundation they ſtand, or how near or remote ſuch an event may be, are circumſtances I am not enquiring into. But as the ſubject muſt ſooner or later become a matter of ſerious attention, it may not be improper, even at this early period, candidly to inveſtigate ſome points that are connected with it, or lead towards it.

The independence of America is at this moment as firmly eſtabliſhed as that of any other country in a ſtate of war. It is not length of time, but power that gives ſtability. Nations at war know nothing of each other on the ſcore of antiquity. It is their preſent and immediate ſtrength, together with their connexions, that muſt ſupport them. To which we may add, that a right which originated

to-day, is as much a right, as if it had the ſanction of a thouſand years; and therefore the independence and preſent governments of America are in no more danger of being ſubverted, becauſe they are modern, than that of England is ſecure, becauſe it is ancient.

The politics of Britain, ſo far as they reſpected America, were originally conceived in idiotiſm, and acted in madneſs. There is not a ſtep which bears the ſmalleſt trace of rationality. In her management of the war, ſhe has laboured to be wretched, and ſtudied to be hated; and in all her former propoſitions for accommodation, ſhe has diſcovered a total ignorance of mankind, and of thoſe natural and unalterable ſenſations, by which they are ſo generally governed. How ſhe may conduct herſelf in the preſent or future buſineſs of negociating a peace, is yet to be proved.

He is a weak politician who does not underſtand human nature, and penetrate into the effect which meaſures of government will have upon the mind. All the miſcarriages of Britain have ariſen from this defect. The former miniſtry acted as if they ſuppoſed mankind, to be *without a mind*; and the preſent miniſtry, as if America was *without a memory*. The one muſt have ſuppoſed we were incapable of feeling; and the other, that we could not remember injuries.

There is likewiſe another line in which politicians miſtake, which is that of not rightly calculating, or rather of misjudging, the conſequence which any given circumſtance will produce. Nothing is more frequent, as well in common as in political life, than to hear people complain, that ſuch or ſuch means produced an event directly contrary to their intentions. But the fault lies in their not judging rightly what the event would be; for the means produced only its proper and natural conſequences.

It is very probable that in a treaty of peace, Britain will contend for ſome poſt or other in North-America, perhaps Canada or Halifax, or both: And I infer this from the known deficiency of her politics, which have ever yet made uſe of means, whoſe natural event was againſt both her intereſt and her expectation. But the queſtion with her ought to be, whether it is worth her while to hold them, and what will be the conſequence.

Reſpecting Canada, one or other of the two following will take place, viz. If Canada ſhould people, it will revolt; and if it do not people, it will not be worth the expence of holding. And the ſame may be ſaid of Halifax, and the country round it. But Canada *never*

will people; neither is there any occaſion for contrivances on one ſide or the other, for nature alone will do the whole.

Britain may put herſelf to great expences in ſending ſettlers to Canada: but the deſcendants of thoſe ſettlers will be Americans, as other deſcendants have been before them. They will look round and ſee the neighbouring ſtates ſovereign and free, reſpected abroad and trading at large with the world; and the natural love of liberty, the advantages of commerce, the bleſſings of independence, and of a happier climate, and a richer ſoil, will draw them ſouthward; and the effect will be, that Britain will ſuſtain the expence, and America reap the advantage.

One would think that the experience which Britain has had of America, would entirely ſicken her of all thoughts of continental colonization, and any part which ſhe might retain, will only become to her a field of jealouſy and thorns, of debate and contention, for ever ſtruggling for privileges, and meditating revolt. She may form new ſettlements, but they will be for us; they will become part of the United States of America; and that againſt all her contrivances to prevent it, or without any endeavours of ours to promote it. In the firſt place ſhe cannot draw from them a revenue, until they are able to pay one, and when they are ſo, they will be above ſubjection. Men ſoon become attached to the ſoil they live upon, and incorporated with the proſperity of the place: and it ſignifies but little what opinions they come over with, for time, intereſt, and new connexions will render them obſolete, and the next generation know nothing of them.

Were Britain truly wiſe, ſhe would lay hold of the preſent opportunity to diſentangle herſelf from all continental embarraſſments in North-America, and that not only to avoid future broils and troubles, but to ſave expences. To ſpeak explicitly on the matter, I would not, were I an European power, have Canada, under the condition that Britain muſt retain it, could it be given to me. It is one of thoſe kind of dominions that is, and ever will be, a conſtant charge upon any foreign holder.

As to Halifax, it will become uſeleſs to England after the preſent war, and the loſs of the United States. A harbour, when the dominion is gone, for the purpoſe of which only it was wanted, can be attended only with expence. There are, I doubt not, thouſands of people in England, who ſuppoſe, that theſe places are a profit to the nation, whereas they are directly the contrary, and inſtead of producing any revenue, a conſiderable part of the revenue of England is annually drawn off, to ſupport the expence of holding them.

Gibraltar is another inſtance of national ill-policy. A poſt which in time of peace is not wanted, and in time of war is of no uſe, muſt at all times be uſeleſs. Inſtead of affording protection to a navy, it requires the aid of one to maintain it. To ſuppoſe that Gibraltar commands the Mediterranean, or the paſs into it, or the trade of it, is to ſuppoſe a detected falſehood; becauſe though Britain holds the poſt, ſhe has loſt the other three, and every benefit ſhe expected from it. And to ſay that all this happens becauſe it is beſieged by land and water, is to ſay nothing, for this will always be the caſe in time of war, while France and Spain keep up ſuperior fleets, and Britain holds the place. So that, though, as an impenetrable inacceſſible rock, it may be held by the one, it is always in the power of the other to render it uſeleſs and exceſſively chargeable.

I ſhould ſuppoſe that one of the principal objects of Spain in beſieging it, is to ſhow to Britain, that though ſhe may not take it, ſhe can command it, that is ſhe can ſhut it up, and prevent its being uſed as a harbour, though not a garriſon.—But the ſhort way to reduce Gibraltar is to attack the Britiſh fleet; for Gibraltar is as dependent on a fleet for ſupport, as a bird is on its wing for food, and when wounded there it ſtarves.

There is another circumſtance which the people of England have not only not attended to, but ſeem to be utterly ignorant of, and that is, the difference between permanent power and accidental power, conſidered in a national ſenſe.

By permanent power, I mean, a natural, inherent and perpetual ability in a nation, which though always in being, may not be always in action, or not always advantageouſly directed; and by accidental power, I mean, a fortunate or accidental diſpoſition or exerciſe of national ſtrength, in whole or in part.

There undoubtedly was a time when any one European nation, with only eight or ten ſhips of war, equal to the preſent ſhips of the line, could have carried terror to all others, who had not began to build a navy, however great their natural ability might be for that purpoſe: But this can be conſidered only as accidental, and not as a ſtandard to compare permanent power by, and could laſt no longer than until thoſe powers built as many or more ſhips than the former. After this a larger fleet was neceſſary, in order to be ſuperior; and a ſtill larger would again ſuperſede it. And thus mankind have gone on building fleet upon fleet, as occaſion or ſituation dictated. And this reduces it to an original queſtion, which is: Which power can

build and man the largeſt number of ſhips? The natural anſwer to which, is, that power which has the largeſt revenue and the greateſt number of inhabitants, provided its ſituation of coaſt affords ſufficient conveniences.

France being a nation on the continent of Europe, and Britain an iſland in its neighbourhood, each of them derived different ideas from their different ſituations. The inhabitants of Britain could carry on no foreign trade, nor ſtir from the ſpot they dwelt upon, without the aſſiſtance of ſhipping; but this was not the caſe with France. The idea therefore of a navy did not ariſe to France from the ſame original and immediate neceſſity which produced it to England. But the queſtion is, that when both of them turn their attention, and employ their revenues the ſame way, which can be ſuperior?

The annual revenue of France is nearly double that of England, and her number of inhabitants more than twice as many. Each of them has the ſame length of coaſt on the channel, beſides which, France has ſeveral hundred miles extent on the Bay of Biſcay, and an opening on the Mediterranean: And every day proves that practice and exerciſe make ſailors as well as ſoldiers in one country as well as another.

If then Britain can maintain an hundred ſhips of the line, France can as well ſupport an hundred and fifty, becauſe her revenues and her population are as equal to the one, as thoſe of England are to the other. And the only reaſon why ſhe has not done it, is becauſe ſhe has not till very lately attended to it. But when ſhe ſees, as ſhe now ſees, that a navy is the firſt engine of power, ſhe can eaſily accompliſh it.

England very falſely, and ruinouſly for herſelf, infers, that becauſe ſhe had the advantage of France, while France had the ſmaller navy, that for that reaſon it is always to be ſo. Whereas it may be clearly ſeen, that the ſtrength of France has never yet been tried on a navy, and that ſhe is able to be as ſuperior to England in the extent of a navy, as ſhe is in the extent of her revenues and her population. And England may lament the day, when, by her inſolence and injuſtice, ſhe provoked in France a maritime diſpoſition.

It is in the power of the combined fleets to conquer every iſland in the Weſt-Indies, and reduce all the Britiſh navy in thoſe places. For were France and Spain to ſend their whole naval force in Europe to thoſe iſlands, it would not be in the power of Britain to follow them with an equal force. She would ſtill be twenty or thirty

ſhips inferior, were ſhe to ſend every veſſel ſhe had, and in the mean time all the foreign trade of England would lay expoſed to the Dutch.

It is a maxim, which, I am perſuaded, will ever hold good, and more eſpecially in naval operations, that a great power ought never to move in detachments, if it can poſſibly be avoided; but to go with its whole force to ſome important object, the reduction of which ſhall have a deciſive effect upon the war. Had the whole of the French and Spaniſh fleets in Europe come laſt ſpring to the Weſt-Indies, every iſland had been their own, Rodney their priſoner and his fleet their prize. From the United States the combined fleets can be ſupplied with proviſions, without the neceſſity of drawing them from Europe, which is not the caſe with England.

Accident has thrown ſome advantages in the way of England, which, from the inferiority of her navy, ſhe had not a right to expect. For though ſhe has been obliged to fly before the combined fleets, yet Rodney has twice had the fortune to fall in with detached ſquadrons, to which he was ſuperior in numbers: The firſt off Cape St. Vincent, where he had nearly two to one, and the other in the Weſt-Indies, where he had a majority of ſix ſhips. Victories of this kind almoſt produce themſelves. They are won without honour, and ſuffered without diſgrace: And are aſcribable to the chance of meeting, nor to the ſuperiority of fighting. For the ſame admiral, under whom they were obtained, was unable, in three former engagements, to make the leaſt impreſſion on a fleet conſiſting of an equal number of ſhips with his own, and compounded for the events by declining the actions.*

To conclude, if it may be ſaid that Britain has numerous enemies, it likewiſe proves that ſhe has given numerous offences. Inſolence is ſure to provoke hatred, whether in a nation or an individual. The want of manners in the Britiſh court may be ſeen even in its birth-days' and new-years' odes, which are calculated to infatuate the vulgar, and diſguſt the man of refinement: And her former overbearing rudeneſs, and inſufferable injuſtice on the ſeas, have made every commercial nation her foe. Her fleets were employed as engines of prey; and acted on the ſurface of the deep the character which the ſhark does beneath it.——On the other hand, the combined powers are

* *See the accounts, either Engliſh or French, of three actions, in the Weſt-Indies, between count de Guichen and admiral Rodney, in* 1780.

taking a popular part, and will render their reputation immortal, by eſtabliſhing the perfect freedom of the ocean, to which all countries have a right, and are intereſted in accompliſhing. The ſea is the world's highway; and he who arrogates a prerogative over it, tranſgreſſes the right, and juſtly brings on himſelf the chaſtiſement of nations.

Perhaps it might be of ſome ſervice to the future tranquility of mankind, were an article introduced into the next general peace, that no one nation ſhould, in time of peace, exceed a certain number of ſhips of war. Something of this kind ſeems neceſſary; for according to the preſent faſhion, half the world will get upon the water, and there appears to be no end to the extent to which navies may be carried. Another reaſon is, that navies add nothing to the manners or morals of a people. The ſequeſtered life which attends the ſervice, prevents the opportunities of ſociety, and is too apt to occaſion a coarſeneſs of ideas and of language, and that more in ſhips of war than in commercial employ; becauſe in the latter they mix more with the world, and are nearer related to it. I mention this remark as a general one: and not applied to any one country more than to another.

Britain has now had the trial of above ſeven years, with an expence of nearly an hundred million pounds ſterling; and every month in which ſhe delays to conclude a peace, coſts her another million ſterling, over and above her ordinary expences of government, which are a million more; ſo that her total *monthly* expence is two million pounds ſterling, which is equal to the whole *yearly* expence of America, all charges included. Judge then who is beſt able to continue it.

She has likewiſe many atonements to make to an injured world, as well in one quarter as in another. And inſtead of purſuing that temper of arrogance, which ſerves only to ſink her in the eſteem, and entail on her the diſlike, of all nations, ſhe would do well to reform her manners, retrench her expences, live peaceably with her neighbours, and think of war no more.

Philadelphia, Auguſt 21, 1782.

DISSERTATIONS

ON

GOVERNMENT,

THE

AFFAIRS OF THE BANK,

AND

PAPER-MONEY.

DISSERTATIONS

ON

GOVERNMENT,

THE

AFFAIRS OF THE BANK,

AND

PATER-NONER.

PREFACE.

I HERE preſent the Public with a new performance. Some parts of it are more particularly adapted to the ſtate of Pennſylvania, on the preſent ſtate of its affairs: But there are others which are on a larger ſcale. The time beſtowed on this work has not been long, the whole of it being written and printed during the ſhort receſs of the aſſembly.

As to parties, merely conſidered as ſuch, I am attached to no particular one. There are ſuch things as right and wrong in the world, and ſo far as theſe are parties againſt each other, the ſignature of COMMON SENSE is properly employed.

THOMAS PAINE.

Philadelphia, Feb. 18, 1786.

DISSERTATIONS

On Government, the Affairs of the Bank, &c.

EVERY Government, let its form be what it may, contains within itſelf a principle common to all, which is, that of a ſovereign power, or a power over which there is no control, and which controls all others: And as it is impoſſible to conſtruct a form of government in which this power does not exiſt, ſo there muſt of neceſſity be a place, if it may be ſo called, for it to exiſt in.

In Deſpotic Monarchies this power is lodged in a ſingle perſon, or ſovereign. His will is law; which he declares, alters, or revokes as he pleaſes, without being accountable to any power for ſo doing. Therefore, the only modes of redreſs, in countries ſo governed, are by petition or inſurrection. And this is the reaſon we ſo frequently hear of inſurrections in deſpotic governments; for as there are but two modes of redreſs, this is one of them.

Perhaps it may be ſaid that as the united reſiſtance of the people is able, by force, to control the will of the ſovereign, that, therefore, the controlling power lodges in them: but it muſt be underſtood that I am ſpeaking of ſuch powers only as are conſtituent parts of the government, not of thoſe powers which are externally applied to reſiſt and overturn it.

In Republics, ſuch as thoſe eſtabliſhed in America, the ſovereign power, or the power over which there is no control and which controls all others, remains where nature placed it; in the people; for the people in America are the fountain of power. It remains there as a matter of right, recognized in the conſtitutions of the country, and the exerciſe of it is conſtitutional and legal.——This ſovereignty

is exercised in electing and deputing a certain number of persons to represent and act for the whole, and who, if they do not act right, may be displaced by the same power that placed them there, and others elected and deputed in their stead, and the wrong measures of former representatives corrected and brought right by this means. Therefore the republican form and principle leaves no room for insurrection, because it provides and establishes a rightful means in its stead.

In countries under a despotic form of government, the exercise of this power is an assumption of sovereignty; a wresting it from the person in whose hand their form of government has placed it, and the exercise of it is there styled rebellion. Therefore the despotic form of government knows no intermediate space between being slaves and being rebels.

I shall in this place offer an observation which, though not immediately connected with my subject, is very naturally deduced from it, which is, That the nature, if I may so call it, of a government over any people may be ascertained from the modes which the people pursue to obtain redress; for like causes will produce like effects. And therefore the government which Britain attempted to erect over America could be no other than a despotism, because it left to the Americans no other modes of redress than those which are left to people under despotic governments, petition and resistance: And the Americans, without ever attending to a comparison on the case, went into the same steps which such people go into, because no other could be pursued: And this similarity of effects leads up to, and ascertains, the similarity of the causes or governments which produced them.

But to return.——The repository where the sovereign power is placed is the first criterion of distinction between a country under a despotic form of government and a free country. In a country under a despotic government, the sovereign is the only free man in it. ——In a republic, the people retaining the sovereignty themselves, naturally and necessarily retain freedom with it: For, wherever the sovereignty is, there must the freedom be; the one cannot be in one place and the other in another.

As the repository where the sovereign power is lodged is the first criterion of distinction; the second is the principles on which it is administered.

A despotic government knows no principle but WILL. Whatever the sovereign wills to do, the government admits him the inherent right, and the uncontrolled power of doing. He is restrained

by no fixed rule of right and wrong, for he makes the right and wrong himſelf and as he pleaſes.—If he happens (for a miracle may happen) to be a man of conſummate wiſdom, juſtice and moderation, of a mild affectionate diſpoſition, diſpoſed to buſineſs, and underſtanding and promoting the general good, all the beneficial purpoſes of government will be anſwered under his adminiſtration, and the people ſo governed may, while this is the caſe, be proſperous and eaſy. But as there can be no ſecurity that this diſpoſition will laſt, and this adminiſtration continue, and ſtill leſs ſecurity that his ſucceſſor ſhall have the ſame qualities and purſue the ſame meaſures; therefore no people exerciſing their reaſon and underſtanding their rights, would, of their own choice, inveſt any one man with ſuch a power.

Neither is it conſiſtent to ſuppoſe the knowledge of any one man competent to the exerciſe of ſuch a power. A Sovereign of this ſort, is brought up in ſuch a diſtant line of life, and lives ſo remote from the people, and from a knowledge of every thing which relates to their local ſituations and intereſts, that he can know nothing from experience and obſervation, and all which he does know he muſt be told. Sovereign power without ſovereign knowledge, that is, a full knowledge of all the matters over which that power is to be exerciſed, is a ſomething which contradicts itſelf.

There is a ſpecies of ſovereign power in a ſingle perſon, which is very proper when applied to a commander in chief over an army, ſo far as relates to the military government of an army, and the condition and purpoſe of an army conſtitute the reaſon why it is ſo.

In an army every man is of the ſame profeſſion, that is, he is a ſoldier, and the commander in chief is a ſoldier too: therefore the knowledge neceſſary to the exerciſe of the power is within himſelf. By underſtanding what a ſoldier is, he comprehends the local ſituation, intereſt and duty of every man within, what may be called, the dominion of his command; and therefore the condition and circumſtances of an army make a fitneſs for the exerciſe of the power.

The purpoſe likewiſe, or object of an army, is another reaſon: for this power in a commander in chief, though exerciſed over the army, is not exerciſed againſt it; but is exerciſed through or over the army againſt the enemy. Therefore the enemy, and not the people, is the object it is directed to. Neither is it exerciſed over an army, for the purpoſe of raiſing a revenue from it, but to promote its combined intereſt, condenſe its powers, and give it capacity for action.

But all these reasons cease when sovereign power is transferred from the commander of an army to the commander of a nation, and entirely loses its fitness when applied to govern subjects following occupations, as it governs soldiers following arms. A nation is quite another element, and every thing in it differs not only from each other, but all of them differ from those of an army. A nation is composed of distinct unconnected individuals, following various trades, employments and pursuits: continually meeting, crossing, uniting, opposing and separating from each other as accident, interest and circumstance shall direct.—An army has but one occupation and but one interest.

Another very material matter in which an army and a nation differ, is that of temper. An army may be said to have but one temper; for, however the *natural* temper of the persons composing the army may differ from each other, there is a second temper takes place of the first: a temper formed by discipline, mutuality of habits, union of objects and pursuits, and the style of military manners: but this can never be the case among all the individuals of a nation. Therefore the fitness, arising from those circumstances, which dispose an army to the command of a single person, and the fitness of a single person to that command, is not to be found either in one or the other, when we come to consider them as a sovereign and a nation.

Having already shewn what a despotic government is, and how it is administered, I now come to shew what the administration of a republic is.

The administration of a republic is supposed to be directed by certain fundamental principles of right and justice, from which there cannot, because there ought not to, be any deviation; and whenever any deviation appears, there is a kind of stepping out of the republican principle, and an approach towards the despotic one. This administration is executed by a select number of persons, periodically chosen by the people, and act as representatives and in behalf of the whole, and who are supposed to enact the same laws, and pursue the same line of administration, as the whole of the people would do were they assembled together.

The PUBLIC GOOD is to be their object. It is therefore necessary to understand what Public Good is.

Public Good is not a term opposed to the good of individuals; on the contrary, it is the good of every individual collected. It is the good of all, because it is the good of every one: for as the public body

is every individual collected, so the public good is the collected good of those individuals.

The foundation-principle of Public Good is justice, and wherever justice is impartially administered the public good is promoted; for as it is to the good of every man that no injustice be done to him, so likewise it is to his good that the principle which secures him should not be violated in the person of another, because such a violation weakens *his* security, and leaves to chance what ought to be to him a rock to stand on.

But in order to understand more minutely, how the Public Good is to be promoted, and the manner in which the representatives are to act to promote it, we must have recourse to the original or first principles, on which the people formed themselves into a republic.

When a people agree to form themselves into a republic (for the word REPUBLIC means the PUBLIC GOOD, or the good of the whole, in contradistinction to the despotic form, which makes the good of the sovereign, or of one man, the only object of the government) when, I say, they agree to do this, it is to be understood, that they mutually resolve and pledge themselves to each other, rich and poor alike, to support and maintain this rule of equal justice among them. They therefore renounce not only the despotic form, but the despotic principle, as well of governing as of being governed by mere Will and Power, and substitute in its place a government of justice.

By this mutual compact the citizens of a republic put it out of their power, that is, they renounce, as detestable, the power of exercising, at any future time, any species of despotism over each other, or doing a thing, not right in itself, because a majority of them may have strength of numbers sufficient to accomplish it.

In this pledge and compact* lies the foundation of the republic: and the security to the rich and the consolation to the poor is, that

* *This pledge and compact is contained in the Declaration of Rights prefixed to the constitution, and is as follows*——

I. That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

II. That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding: And that no man ought or of right can be compelled to attend

what each man has is his own; that no despotic sovereign can take it from him, and that the common cementing principle which holds all the parts of a republic together, secures him likewise from the despotism of numbers: For despotism may be more effectually acted by many over a few than by one man over all.

any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and consent: Nor can any man, who acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship: And that no authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control, the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship.

III. That the people of this state have the sole, exclusive and inherent right of governing and regulating the internal police of the same.

IV. That all power being originally inherent in, and consequently derived from, the people; therefore all officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them.

V. That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family or set of men, who are a part only of that community: and that the community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish government in such manner as shall be by that community judged most conducive to the public weal.

VI. That those who are employed in the legislative and executive business of the state may be restrained from oppression, the people have a right, at such periods as they may think proper, to reduce their public officers to a private station, and supply the vacancies by certain and regular elections.

VII. That all elections ought to be free; and that all free men having a sufficient evident common interest with, and attachment to the community, have a right to elect officers, or to be elected into office.

VIII. That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards the expence of that protection, and yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent thereto: But no part of a man's property can be justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal representatives: Nor can any man who

Therefore, in order to know how far the power of an aſſembly, or a houſe of repreſentatives can act in adminiſtering the affairs of a republic, we muſt examine how far the power of the people extends under the original compact they have made with each other; for the power of the repreſentatives is in many caſes leſs, but never can be greater than that of the people repreſented; and whatever the

is conſcientiouſly ſcrupulous of bearing arms, be juſtly compelled thereto, if he will pay ſuch equivalent: Nor are the people bound by any laws, but ſuch as they have in like manner aſſented to, for their common good.

IX. That in all proſecutions for criminal offences, a man hath a right to be heard by himſelf and his council, to demand the cauſe and nature of his accuſation, to be confronted with the witneſſes, to call for evidence in his favour, and a ſpeedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the country, without the unanimous conſent of which jury he cannot be found guilty: Nor can he be compelled to give evidence againſt himſelf: Nor can any man be juſtly deprived of his liberty, except by the laws of the land, or the judgment of his peers.

X. That the people have a right to hold themſelves, their houſes, papers, and poſſeſſions free from ſearch or ſeizure; and therefore warrants without oaths or affirmations firſt made, affording a ſufficient foundation for them, and whereby any officer or meſſenger may be commanded or required to ſearch ſuſpected places, or to ſeize any perſon or perſons, his or their property, not particularly deſcribed, are contrary to that right, and ought not to be granted.

XI. That in controverſies reſpecting property, and in ſuits between man and man, the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held ſacred.

XII. That the people have a right to freedom of ſpeech, and of writing, and publiſhing their ſentiments; therefore the freedom of the preſs ought not to be reſtrained.

XIII. That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themſelves and the ſtate; and as ſtanding armies in the time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up: And that the military ſhould be kept under ſtrict ſubordination to, and governed by, the civil power.

XIV. That a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to juſtice, moderation, temperance, induſtry and frugality are abſolutely neceſſary to preſerve the bleſſings of liberty and keep a government free: The people ought therefore to pay particular attention to theſe points in the choice of officers and repreſentatives, and have a right to exact

people in their mutual original compact have renounced the power of doing towards, or acting over each other, the representatives cannot assume the power to do, because, as I have already said, the power of the representatives cannot be greater than that of the people they represent.

In this place it naturally presents itself that the people in their original compact of equal justice or first principles of a republic, renounced as despotic, detestable and unjust, the assuming a right of breaking and violating their engagements, contracts and compacts with, or defrauding, imposing or tyrannizing over, each other, and therefore the representatives cannot make an act to do it for them, and any such an act would be an attempt to depose, not the personal sovereign, but the sovereign principle of the republic, and to introduce despotism in its stead.

It may in this place be proper to distinguish between that species of sovereignty which is claimed and exercised by despotic monarchs, and that sovereignty which the citizens of a republic inherit and retain.——The sovereignty of a despotic monarch assumes the power of making wrong right, or right wrong, as he pleases or as it suits him. The sovereignty in a republic is exercised to keep right and wrong in their proper and distinct places, and never to suffer the one to usurp the place of the other. A republic, properly understood, is a sovereignty of justice, in contradistinction to a sovereignty of will.

Our experience in republicanism is yet so slender, that it is much to be doubted, whether all our public laws and acts are consistent with or can be justified on, the principles of a republican government.

We have been so much habited to act in committees at the commencement of the dispute, and during the interregnum of government, and in many cases since, and to adopt expedients warranted by

a due and constant regard to them, from their legislators and magistrates, in the making and executing such laws as are necessary for the good-government of the state.

XV. That all men have a natural inherent right to emigrate from one state to another that will receive them, or to form a new state in vacant countries, or in such countries as they can purchase, whenever they think that thereby they may promote their own happiness.

XVI. That the people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, by address, petition, or remonstrance.

neceſſity, and to permit to ourſelves a diſcretionary uſe of power, ſuited to the ſpur and exigency of the moment, that a man transferred from a committee to a ſeat in the legiſlature imperceptibly takes with him the ideas and habits he has been accuſtomed to, and continues to think like a committee-man inſtead of a legiſlator, and to govern by ſpirit rather than by the rule of the conſtitution and the principles of the republic.

Having already ſtated that the power of the repreſentatives can never exceed the power of the people whom they repreſent, I now proceed to examine more particularly, what the power of the repreſentatives is.

It is, in the firſt place, the power of acting as legiſlators in making laws—and in the ſecond place, the power of acting in certain caſes, as agents or negociators for the commonwealth, for ſuch purpoſes as the circumſtances of the commonwealth require.

A very ſtrange confuſion of ideas, dangerous to the credit, ſtability, and the good and honour of the commonwealth, has ariſen, by confounding thoſe two diſtinct powers and things together, and blending every act of the aſſembly, of whatever kind it may be, under one general name of "*Laws of the Commonwealth*," and thereby creating an opinion (which is truly of the deſpotic kind) that every ſucceeding aſſembly has an equal power over every tranſaction, as well as law, done by a former aſſembly.

All laws are acts, but all acts are not laws. Many of the acts of the aſſembly are acts of agency or negociation, that is, they are acts of contract and agreement, on the part of the ſtate, with certain perſons therein mentioned, and for certain purpoſes therein recited. An act of this kind, after it has paſſed the houſe, is of the nature of a deed or contract, ſigned, ſealed and delivered; and ſubject to the ſame general laws and principles of juſtice as all other deeds and contracts are: For in a tranſaction of this kind, the ſtate ſtands as an individual, and can be known in no other character in a court of juſtice.

By "LAWS," as diſtinct from the agency tranſactions, or matters of negociation, are to be comprehended all thoſe public acts of the aſſembly or commonwealth, which have a univerſal operation, or apply themſelves to every individual of the commonwealth. Of this kind are the laws for the diſtribution and adminiſtration of juſtice, for the preſervation of the peace, for the ſecurity of property, for raiſing the neceſſary revenue by juſt proportions, &c. &c.

Acts of this kind are properly LAWS, and they may be altered and amended or repealed, or others ſubſtituted in their places, as experience ſhall direct, for the better effecting the purpoſe for which they were intended: and the right and power of the aſſembly to do this, is derived from the right and power which the people, were they all aſſembled together, inſtead of being repreſented, would have to do the ſame thing: becauſe, in acts or laws of this kind, there is no other party than the public. The law, or the alteration, or the repeal, is for themſelves;—and whatever the effects may be, it falls on themſelves;—if for the better, they have the benefit of it—if for the worſe, they ſuffer the inconvenience. No violence to any one is here offered——no breach of faith is here committed. It is therefore one of theſe rights and powers which is within the ſenſe, meaning and limits of the original compact of juſtice which they formed with each other as the foundation-principle of the republic, and being one of thoſe rights and powers, it devolves on their repreſentatives by delegation.

As it is not my intention (neither is it within the limits aſſigned to this work) to define every ſpecies of what may be called LAWS (but rather to diſtinguiſh that part in which the repreſentatives act as agents or negociators for the ſtate, from the legiſlative part), I ſhall paſs on to diſtinguiſh and deſcribe thoſe acts of the aſſembly which are acts of agency or negociation, and to ſhew that as they are different in their nature, conſtruction and operation from legiſlative acts, ſo likewiſe the power and authority of the aſſembly over them, after they are paſſed, is different.

It muſt occur to every perſon on the firſt reflection, that the affairs and circumſtances of a commonwealth require other buſineſs to be done beſides that of making laws, and conſequently, that the different kinds of buſineſs cannot all be claſſed under one name, or be ſubject to one and the ſame rule of treatment.——But to proceed——

By agency tranſactions, or matters of negociation, done by the aſſembly, are to be comprehended all that kind of public buſineſs, which the aſſembly, as repreſentatives of the republic, tranſact in its behalf, with certain perſon or perſons, or part or parts of the republic, for purpoſes mentioned in the act, and which the aſſembly confirm and ratify on the part of the commonwealth, by affixing to it the ſeal of the ſtate.

An act of this kind, differs from a law of the before mentioned kind; becauſe here are two parties and there but one, and the par-

ties are bound to perform different and diſtinct parts: whereas, in the before mentioned law, every man's part was the ſame.

Theſe acts, therefore, though numbered among the laws, are evidently diſtinct therefrom, and are not of the legiſlative kind. The former are laws for the government of the commonwealth; theſe are tranſactions of buſineſs, ſuch as, ſelling and conveying an eſtate belonging to the public, or buying one; acts for borrowing money, and fixing with the lender the terms and mode of payment; acts of agreement and contract, with certain perſon or perſons, for certain purpoſes; and, in ſhort, every act in which two parties, the ſtate being one, are particularly mentioned or deſcribed, and in which the form and nature of a bargain or contract is comprehended. ——Theſe, if for cuſtom and uniformity ſake we call by the name of LAWS, they are not laws for the government of the commonwealth, but for the government of the contracting parties, as all deeds and contracts are; and are not, properly ſpeaking, acts of the aſſembly, but joint acts, or acts of the aſſembly in behalf of the commonwealth on one part, and certain perſons therein mentioned on the other part.

Acts of this kind are diſtinguiſhable into two claſſes.—

Firſt, thoſe wherein the matters inſerted in the act have already been ſettled and adjuſted between the ſtate on one part, and the perſons therein mentioned on the other part. In this caſe the act is the completion and ratification of the contract or matters therein recited. It is in fact a deed ſigned, ſealed and delivered.

Secondly, thoſe acts wherein the matters have not been already agreed upon, and wherein the act only holds forth certain propoſitions and terms to be accepted of and acceded to.

I ſhall give an inſtance of each of thoſe acts. Firſt—The ſtate wants the loan of a ſum of money—certain perſons make an offer to government to lend that ſum, and ſend in their propoſals: the government accept theſe propoſals and all the matters of the loan and the payment are agreed on; and an act is paſſed, according to the uſual form of paſſing acts, ratifying and confirming this agreement. This act is final.

In the ſecond caſe,—The ſtate, as in the preceding one, wants a loan of money—the aſſembly paſſes an act holding forth the terms on which it will borrow and pay: This act has no force, until the propoſitions and terms are accepted of and acceded to by ſome perſon or perſons, and when thoſe terms are accepted of and complied with, the act is binding on the ſtate.——But if at the meeting of

the next aſſembly, or any other, the whole ſum intended to be borrowed, ſhould not be borrowed, that aſſembly may ſtop where they are, and diſcontinue proceeding with the loan, or make new propoſitions and terms for the remainder; but ſo far as the ſubſcriptions have been filled up, and the terms complied with, it is, as in the firſt caſe, a ſigned deed: and in the ſame manner are all acts, let the matters in them be what they may, wherein, as I have before mentioned, the ſtate on one part, and certain individuals on the other part, are parties in the act.

If the ſtate ſhould become a bankrupt, the creditors, as in all caſes of bankruptcy, will be ſufferers; they will have but a dividend for the whole: but this is not a diſſolution of the contract, but an accommodation of it, ariſing from neceſſity. And ſo in all caſes of acts of this kind, if an inability takes place on either ſide, the contract cannot be performed, and ſome accommodation muſt be gone into or the matter falls through of itſelf.

It may likewiſe happen, though it ought not to happen, that in performing the matters, agreeably to the terms of the act, inconveniences, unforeſeen at the time of making the act, may ariſe to either or both parties: in this caſe, thoſe inconveniences may be removed by the mutual conſent and agreement of the parties, and each find its benefit in ſo doing: For in a republic it is the harmony of its parts that conſtitutes their ſeveral and mutual good.

But the acts themſelves are legally binding, as much as if they had been made between two private individuals. The greatneſs of one party cannot give it a ſuperiority of advantage over the other. The ſtate, or its repreſentatives, the aſſembly, has no more power over an act of this kind, after it is paſſed, than if the ſtate was a private perſon. It is the glory of a republic to have it ſo, becauſe it ſecures the individual from becoming the prey of power, and prevents MIGHT overcoming RIGHT.

If any difference or diſpute ariſe afterwards between the ſtate and the individuals with whom the agreement is made, reſpecting the contract, or the meaning, or extent of any of the matters contained in the act, which may affect the property or intereſt of either, ſuch difference or diſpute muſt be judged of, and decided upon, by the laws of the land, in a court of juſtice and trial by jury; that is, by the laws of the land already in being at the time ſuch act and contract was made.——No law made afterwards can apply to the caſe, either directly, or by conſtruction or implication: For ſuch a law

would be a retrospective law, or a law made after the fact, and cannot even be produced in court as applying to the case before it for judgment.

That this is justice, that it is the true principle of republican government, no man will be so hardy as to deny:—If, therefore, a lawful contract or agreement, sealed and ratified, cannot be affected or altered by any act made afterwards, how much more inconsistent and irrational, despotic and unjust would it be, to think of making an act with the professed intention of breaking up a contract already signed and sealed.

That it is possible an assembly, in the heat and indiscretion of party, and meditating on power rather than on the principle by which all power in a republican government is governed, that of equal justice, may fall into the error of passing such an act, is admitted;—but it would be an actless act, an act that goes for nothing, an act which the courts of justice, and the established laws of the land, could know nothing of.

Because such an act would be an act of one party only, not only without, but against the consent of the other; and, therefore, cannot be produced to affect a contract made between the two.—That the violation of a contract should be set up as a justification to the violator, would be the same thing as to say, that a man by breaking his promise is freed from the obligation of it, or that by transgressing the laws he exempts himself from the punishment of them.

Besides the constitutional and legal reasons why an assembly cannot, of its own act and authority, undo or make void a contract made between the state (by a former assembly) and certain individuals, may be added, what may be called, the natural reasons, or those reasons which the plain rules of common sense point out to every man. Among which are the following:

The principals, or real parties, in the contract, are the state and the persons contracted with. The assembly is not a party, but an agent in behalf of the state, authorized and empowered to transact its affairs.

Therefore it is the state that is bound on one part and certain individuals on the other part, and the performance of the contract, according to the conditions of it, devolves on succeeding assemblies, not as principals, but as agents.

Therefore, for the next or any other assembly to undertake to dissolve the state from its obligation is an assumption of power of

a novel and extraordinary kind—It is the ſervant attempting to free his maſter.

The election of new aſſemblies following each other makes no difference in the nature of the thing. The ſtate is ſtill the ſame ſtate. —The public is ſtill the ſame body. Theſe do not annually expire though the time of an aſſembly does. Theſe are not new-created every year, nor can they be diſplaced from their original ſtanding; but are a perpetual permanent body, always in being and ſtill the ſame.

But if we adopt the vague inconſiſtent idea that every new aſſembly has a full and complete authority over every act done by the ſtate in a former aſſembly, and confound together laws, contracts and every ſpecies of public buſineſs, it will lead us into a wilderneſs of endleſs confuſion and unſurmountable difficulties. It would be declaring an aſſembly deſpotic for the time being.——Inſtead of a government of eſtabliſhed principles adminiſtered by eſtabliſhed rules, the authority of government by being ſtrained ſo high, would, by the ſame rule, be reduced proportionably as low, and would be no other than that of a committee of the ſtate acting with diſcretionary powers for one year. Every new election would be a new revolution, or it would ſuppoſe the public of the former year dead and a new public riſen in its place.

Having now endeavoured to fix a preciſe idea to, and diſtinguiſh between, legiſlative acts and acts of negociation and agency, I ſhall proceed to apply this diſtinction to the caſe now in diſpute, reſpecting the charter of the bank.

The charter of the bank, or what is the ſame thing, the act for incorporating it, is to all intents and purpoſes an act of negociation and contract, entered into, and confirmed, between the ſtate on one part, and certain perſons mentioned therein on the other part. The purpoſe for which the act was done on the part of the ſtate is therein recited, viz. the ſupport which the finances of the country would derive therefrom. The incorporating clauſe is the condition or obligation on the part of the ſtate; and the obligation on the part of the bank, is, "that nothing contained in that act ſhall be conſtrued to authoriſe the ſaid corporation to exerciſe any powers in this ſtate repugnant to the laws or conſtitution thereof."

Here are all the marks and evidences of a contract. The parties ——the purport——and the reciprocal obligations.

That it is a contract, or a joint act, is evident from its being in the

power of either of the parties to have forbidden or prevented its being done. The ſtate could not force the ſtockholders of the bank to be a corporation, and therefore as their conſent was neceſſary to the making the act, their diſſent would have prevented its being made; ſo on the other hand, as the bank could not force the ſtate to incorporate them, the conſent or diſſent of the ſtate would have had the ſame effect to *do*, or to prevent its being done; and as neither of the parties could make the act alone, for the ſame reaſon can neither of them diſſolve it alone: But this is not the caſe with a law or act of legiſlation, and therefore the difference proves it to be an act of a different kind.

The bank may forfeit the charter by delinquency, but the delinquency muſt be proved and eſtabliſhed by a legal proceſs in a court of juſtice and trial by jury; for the ſtate, or the aſſembly, is not to be a judge in its own caſe, but muſt come to the laws of the land for judgment; for that which is law for the individual, is likewiſe law for the ſtate.

Before I enter farther into this affair, I ſhall go back to the circumſtances of the country and the condition the government was in, for ſome time before, as well as at the time it entered into this engagement with the bank, and this act of incorporation was paſſed: For the government of this ſtate, and I ſuppoſe the ſame of the reſt, were then in want of two of the moſt eſſential matters which governments could be deſtitute of.——Money and credit.

In looking back to thoſe times, and bringing forward ſome of the circumſtances attending them, I feel myſelf entering on unpleaſant and diſagreeable ground; becauſe ſome of the matters which the attack on the bank now make neceſſary to ſtate, in order to bring the affair fully before the public, will not add honour to thoſe who have promoted that meaſure, and carried it through the late houſe of aſſembly; and for whom, though my own judgment and opinion on the caſe oblige me to differ from, I retain my eſteem, and the ſocial remembrance of times paſt. But, I truſt, thoſe gentlemen will do me the juſtice to recollect my exceeding earneſtneſs with them, laſt ſpring, when the attack on the bank firſt broke out; for it clearly appeared to me one of thoſe overheated meaſures, which, neither the country at large, nor their own conſtituents, would juſtify them in when it came to be fully and clearly underſtood: for however high a party meaſure may be carried in an aſſembly, the people out of doors are all the while following their ſeveral occupations and employments, minding their farms and their buſineſs, and take their own time and

leiſure to judge of public meaſures; the conſequence of which is, that they often judge in a cooler ſpirit than their repreſentatives act in.

It may be eaſily recollected that the preſent bank was preceded by, and roſe out of, a former one, called the Pennſylvania bank, which began a few months before; the occaſion of which I ſhall briefly ſtate.

In the ſpring 1780, the Pennſylvania aſſembly was compoſed of many of the ſame members, and nearly all of the ſame connection, which compoſed the late houſe that began the attack on the bank. I ſerved as clerk of the aſſembly of 1780, which ſtation I reſigned at the end of the year and accompanied a much lamented friend, the late Colonel John Laurens, on an embaſſy to France.

The ſpring of 1780 was marked with an accumulation of misfortunes. The reliance placed on the defence of Charleſton failed and exceedingly lowered or rather depreſſed the ſpirits of the country. The meaſures of government, from the want of money, means and credit, dragged on like a heavy loaded carriage without wheels, and were nearly got to what a countryman would underſtand by a dead pull.

The aſſembly of that year met by adjournment at an unuſual time, the tenth of May, and what particularly added to the affliction, was, that ſo many of the members, inſtead of ſpiriting up their conſtituents to the moſt nervous exertions, came to the aſſembly furniſhed with petitions to be exempt from paying taxes. How the public meaſures were to be carried on, the country defended, and the army recruited, clothed, fed, and paid, when the only reſource, and that not half ſufficient, that of taxes, ſhould be relaxed to almoſt nothing, was a matter too gloomy to look at. A language very different from that of petitions ought at this time to have been the language of every one. A declaration to have ſtood forth with their lives and fortunes, and a reprobation of every thought of partial indulgence would have founded much better than petitions.

While the aſſembly was ſitting a letter from the commander in chief was received by the executive council and tranſmitted to the houſe. The doors were ſhut and it fell officially to me to read.

In this letter the naked truth of things was unfolded. Among other informations the general ſaid, that notwithſtanding his confidence in the attachment of the army to the cauſe of the country, the diſtreſſes of it, from the want of every neceſſary which men could be deſtitute of, were ariſen to ſuch a pitch, that the appearance of mu-

tiny and diſcontent were ſo ſtrongly marked on the countenance of the army that he dreaded the event of every hour.

When the letter was read I obſerved a deſpairing ſilence in the houſe. No body ſpoke for a conſiderable time. At length a member of whoſe fortitude to withſtand misfortunes I had a high opinion, roſe: "If," ſaid he, "the account in that letter is a true ſtate of "things, and we are in the ſituation there repreſented, it appears to "me in vain to contend the matter any longer. We may as well "give up at firſt as at laſt."

The gentleman who ſpoke next, was (to the beſt of my recollection) a member from Bucks county, who, in a cheerful note, endeavoured to diſſipate the gloom of the houſe——"Well, well," ſaid he, "don't let "the houſe deſpair, if things are not ſo well as we wiſh, we muſt "endeavour to make them better." And on a motion for adjournment, the converſation went no farther.

There was now no time to loſe, and ſomething abſolutely neceſſary to be done, which was not within the immediate power of the houſe to do; for what with the depreciation of the currency, the ſlow operation of taxes, and the petitions to be exempt therefrom, the treaſury was moneyleſs, and the government creditleſs.

If the aſſembly could not give the aſſiſtance which the neceſſity of the caſe immediately required, it was very proper the matter ſhould be known by thoſe who either could or would endeavour to do it. To conceal the information within the houſe, and not provide the relief which that information required, was making no uſe of the knowledge and endangering the public cauſe. The only thing that now remained, and was capable of reaching the caſe, was private credit, and the voluntary aid of individuals; and under this impreſſion, on my return from the houſe, I drew out the ſalary due to me as clerk, incloſed five hundred dollars in a letter to a gentleman in this city, in part of the whole, and wrote fully to him on the ſubject of our affairs.

The gentleman to whom this letter was addreſſed is Mr. Blair M'Clenaghan. I mentioned to him, that notwithſtanding the current opinion that the enemy were beaten from before Charleſton, there were too many reaſons to believe the place was then taken and in the hands of the enemy: the conſequence of which would be, that a great part of the Britiſh force would return, and join that at New-York. That our own army required to be augmented, ten thouſand men, to be able to ſtand againſt the combined force of the

enemy. I informed Mr. M'Clenaghan of General Waſhington's letter, the extreme diſtreſſes he was ſurrounded with, and the abſolute occaſion there was for the citizens to exert themſelves at this time, which there was no doubt they would do, if the neceſſity was made known to them; for that the ability of government was exhauſted. I requeſted Mr. M'Clenaghan, to propoſe a voluntary ſubſcription among his friends, and added, that I had encloſed five hundred dollars as my mite thereto, and that I would encreaſe it as far as the laſt ability would enable me to go.*

The next day Mr. M'Clenaghan informed me, he had communicated the contents of the letter at a meeting of gentlemen at the coffee-houſe, and that a ſubſcription was immediately began—that Mr. Robert Morris and himſelf had ſubſcribed two hundred pounds each, in hard money, and that the ſubſcription was going very ſucceſsfully on.—This ſubſcription was intended as a donation, and to be given in bounties to promote the recruiting ſervice. It is dated June 8th, 1780. The original ſubſcription liſt is now in my poſſeſſion—it amounts to four hundred pounds hard money, and one hundred and one thouſand three hundred and ſixty pounds continental.

While this ſubſcription was going forward, information of the loſs of Charleſton arrived,† and on a communication from ſeveral members of congreſs to certain gentlemen of this city, of the encreaſing diſtreſſes and dangers then taking place, a meeting was held of the ſubſcribers, and ſuch other gentleman who choſe to attend, at the city tavern. This meeting was on the 17th of June, nine days after the ſubſcriptions had began.

At this meeting it was reſolved to open a ſecurity ſubſcription, to the amount of three hundred thouſand pounds, Pennſylvania currency, in real money; the ſubſcribers to execute bonds to the amount of their ſubſcriptions, and to form a bank thereon for ſupplying the army. This being reſolved on and carried into execution the plan of the firſt ſubſcriptions was diſcontinued, and this extended one eſtabliſhed in its ſtead.

By means of this bank the army was ſupplied through the cam-

* *Mr. M'Clenaghan being now returned from Europe, has my conſent to ſhew the letter to any gentleman who may be inclined to ſee it.*

† *Colonel Tennant, aid to General Lincoln, arrived the 14th of June, with diſpatches of the capitulation of Charleſton.*

paign, and being at the same time recruited, was enabled to maintain its ground: And on the appointment of Mr. Morris to be superintendant of the finances the spring following, he arranged the system of the present bank, stiled the bank of North-America, and many of the subscribers of the former bank transferred their subscriptions into this.

Towards the establishment of this bank, congress passed an ordinance of incorporation December 21st, 1781, which the government of Pennsylvania recognized by sundry matters: And afterwards, on an application from the president and directors of the bank, through the mediation of the executive council, the assembly agreed to, and passed the state act of incorporation April 1st, 1782.

Thus arose the bank——produced by the distress of the times and the enterprising spirit of patriotic individuals.——Those individuals furnished and risked the money, and the aid which the government contributed was that of incorporating them.——It would have been well if the state had made all its bargains and contracts with as much true policy as it made this; for a greater service for so small a consideration, that only of an act of incorporation, has not been obtained since the government existed.

Having now shewn how the bank originated, I shall proceed with my remarks.

The sudden restoration of public and private credit, which took place on the establishment of the bank is an event as extraordinary in itself as any domestic occurrence during the progress of the revolution.

How far a spirit of envy might operate to produce the attack on the bank during the sitting of the late assembly, is best known and felt by those who began or promoted that attack. The bank had rendered services which the assembly of 1780 could not, and acquired an honour which many of its members might be unwilling to own, and wish to obscure.

But surely every wise government, acting on the principles of patriotism and public good, would cherish an institution capable of rendering such advantages to the community. The establishment of the bank in one of the most trying vicissitudes of the war, its zealous services in the public cause, its influence in restoring and supporting credit, and the punctiality with which all its business has been transacted, are matters, that so far from meriting the treatment it met with from the late assembly, are an honour to the state, and what the body of her citizens may be proud to own.

But the attack on the bank, as a chartered inſtitution, under the protection of its violators, however criminal it may be as an error of government, or impolitic as a meaſure of party, is not to be charged on the conſtituents of thoſe who made the attack. It appears from every circumſtance that has come to light, to be a meaſure which that aſſembly contrived of itſelf. The members did not come charged with the affair from their conſtituents. There was no idea of ſuch a thing when they were elected or when they met. The haſty and precipitate manner in which it was hurried through the houſe, and the refuſal of the houſe to hear the directors of the bank in its defence, prior to the publication of the repealing bill for public conſideration, operated to prevent their conſtituents comprehending the ſubject: Therefore, whatever may be wrong in the proceedings lies not at the door of the public. The houſe took the affair on its own ſhoulders, and whatever blame there is lies on them.

The matter muſt have been prejudged and predetermined by a majority of the members out of the houſe, before it was brought into it. The whole buſineſs appears to have been fixed at once, and all reaſoning or debate on the caſe rendered uſeleſs.

Petitions from a very *inconſiderable* number of perſons ſuddenly procured, and ſo privately done, as to be a ſecret among the few that ſigned them, were preſented to the houſe and read twice in one day, and referred to a committee of the houſe to *enquire* and report thereon. I here ſubjoin the petition * and the report, and

* *Minutes of the aſſembly, March* 21, 1785.

Petitions from a conſiderable number of the inhabitants of Cheſter *county were read, repreſenting that the bank eſtabliſhed at* Philadelphia *has fatal effects upon the community; that whilſt men are enabled, by means of the bank, to receive near three times the rate of common intereſt, and at the ſame time to receive their money at very ſhort warning, whenever they have occaſion for it, it will be impoſſible for the huſbandman or mechanic to borrow on the former terms of legal intereſt and diſtant payments of the principal; that the beſt ſecurity will not enable the perſon to borrow; that experience clearly demonſtrates the miſchievous conſequences of this inſtitution to the fair trader; that impoſtors have been enabled to ſupport themſelves in a fictitious credit, by means of a temporary punctuality at the bank, until they have drawn in their honeſt neighbours to truſt them with their property, or to pledge their credit as ſureties, and have been finally involved in ruin and diſtreſs; that they have repeatedly ſeen the ſtop-*

ſhall exerciſe the right and privilege of a citizen in examining their merits, not for the purpoſe of oppoſition, but with a deſign of making an intricate affair more generally and better underſtood.

So far as my private judgment is capable of comprehending the ſubject, it appears to me, that the committee were unacquainted with, and have totally miſtaken, the nature and buſineſs of a bank, as well as the matter committed to them, conſidered as a proceeding of government.

They were inſtructed by the houſe to *enquire* whether the bank eſtabliſhed at Philadelphia was compatible with the public ſafety.

It is ſcarcely poſſible to ſuppoſe the inſtructions meant no more than that they were to enquire of one another. It is certain they made no enquiry at the bank, to inform themſelves of the ſituation of its affairs, how they were conducted, what aids it had rendered the public cauſe, or whether any; nor do the committee produce in their report a ſingle fact or circumſtance to ſhew they made any enquiry at all, or whether the rumours then circulated were true or falſe; but content themſelves with modelling the inſinuations of the petitions into a report and giving an opinion thereon.

It would appear from the report, that the committee either conceived that the houſe had already determined how it would act without regard to the caſe, and that they were only a committee for form ſake, and to give a colour of enquiry without making any, or that the caſe was referred to them, *as law-queſtions are ſometimes referred to law-officers, for an opinion only.*

ping of diſcounts at the bank, operate on the trading part of the community, with a degree of violence ſcarcely inferior to that of a ſtagnation of the blood in the human body, hurrying the wretched merchant who hath debts to pay into the hands of griping uſurers; that the directors of the bank may give ſuch preference in trade, by advances of money, to their particular favourites, as to deſtroy that equality which ought to prevail in a commercial country; that paper-money has often proved beneficial to the ſtate, but the bank forbids it, and the people muſt acquieſce: therefore, and in order to reſtore public confidence and private ſecurity, they pray that a bill may be brought in and paſſed into a law for repealing the law for incorporating the bank.

March 28.

The report of the committee, read March 25, *on the petitions from the counties of* Cheſter *and* Berks, *and the city of* Philadelphia *and its vi-*

This method of doing public bufinefs ferves exceedingly to miflead a country.——When the conftituents of an aflembly hear that an

civity, praying the act of aflembly, whereby the bank was eftablifhed at Philadelphia, *may be repealed, was read the fecond time as follows, viz.*

The committee to whom were referred the petitions concerning the bank eftablifhed at Philadelphia, *and who were inftructed to enquire whether the faid bank be compatible with the public fafety, and that equality which ought ever to prevail between the individuals of a republic, beg leave to report, that it is the opinion of this committee, that the faid bank, as at prefent eftablifhed, is in every view incompatible with the public fafety: that in the prefent ftate of our trade, the faid bank has a direct tendency to banifh a great part of the fpecie from the country, fo as to produce a fcarcity of money, and to collect into the hands of the ftockholders of the faid bank almoft the whole of the money which remains amongft us. That the accumulation of enormous wealth in the hand of a fociety, who claim perpetual duration, will neceffarily produce a degree of influence and power, which cannot be entrufted in the hands of any fet of men whatfoever, without endangering the public fafety. That the faid bank, in its corporate capacity, is empowered to hold eftates to the amount of ten millions of dollars, and by the tenor of the prefent charter, is to exift for ever, without being obliged to yield any emolument to the government, or to be at all dependant upon it. That the great profits of the bank, which will daily increafe as money grows fcarcer, and which already far exceed the profits of European banks, have tempted foreigners to veft their money in this bank, and thus to draw from us large fums for intereft.*

That foreigners will doubtlefs be more and more induced to become ftockholders, until the time may arrive when this enormous engine of power may become fubject to foreign influence; this country may be agitated with the politics of European courts, and the good people of America *reduced once more into a ftate of fubordination, and dependance upon fome one or other of the European powers. That at beft, if it were even confined to the hands of Americans, it would be totally deftructive of that equality which ought to prevail in a republic. We have nothing in our free and equal government capable of balancing the influence which this bank muft create; and we fee nothing which in the courfe of a few years, can prevent the directors of the bank, from governing Pennfylvania. Already we have felt its influence indirectly interfering in the meafures of the legiflature. Already the houfe of aflembly, the reprefentatives of the people, have been threatened, that the credit of our paper currency will be blafted by the bank:*

enquiry into any matter is directed to be made, and a committee appointed for that purpose, they naturally conclude that the enquiry *is made*, and that the future proceedings of the house are in consequence of the matters, facts, and information obtained by means of that enquiry.——But here is a committee of enquiry making no enquiry at all, and giving an opinion on a case without enquiring into it. This proceeding of the committee would justify an opinion that it was not their wish to *get*, but to *get over* information, and lest the enquiry should not suit their wishes, omitted to make any. The subsequent conduct of the house, in resolving not to hear the directors of the bank on their application for that purpose, prior to the publication of the bill for the consideration of the people, strongly corroborates this opinion: For why should not the house hear them, unless it was apprehensive, that the bank, by such a public opportunity, would produce proofs of its services and usefulness, that would not suit the temper and views of its opposers?

But if the house did not wish or choose to hear the defence of the bank, it was no reason their constituents should not. The constitution of this state, in lieu of having two branches of legislature, has substituted, that "To the end that laws before they are enacted may "be more *maturely considered*, and the inconvenience of *hasty determi-* "*nations* as much as possible prevented, all bills of a public nature "shall be printed for the consideration of the people."*——The people, therefore, according to the constitution, stand in the place of another house; or, more properly speaking, are a house in their

and if this growing evil continues we fear the time is not very distant, when the bank will be able to dictate to the legislature, what laws to pass and what to forbear.

Your committee therefore beg leave farther to report the following resolution to be adopted by the house, viz.

Resolved, *that a committee be appointed to bring in a bill to repeal the act of assembly, passed the first day of* April, 1782, *entitled*, "An act to "incorporate the subscribers to the bank of *North-America*;" *and also to repeal one other act of assembly, passed the* 18*th of* March, 1782, *entitled*, "An act for preventing and punishing the counterfeiting of "the common seal, bank-bills and bank-notes of the president, direc- "tors and company, of the bank of *North-America*, and for the other "purposes therein mentioned."

* *Constitution, section the* 15*th.*

own right——But in this inſtance the aſſembly arrogates the whole power to itſelf, and places itſelf as a bar to ſtop the neceſſary information ſpreading among the people.——The application of the bank to be heard before the bill was publiſhed for public conſideration had two objects.——Firſt, to the houſe,—and ſecondly, through the houſe to the people, who are as another houſe. It was as a defence in the firſt inſtance, and as an appeal in the ſecond. But the aſſembly abſorbs the right of the people to judge; becauſe, by refuſing to hear the defence, they barred the appeal.——Were there no other cauſe which the conſtituents of that aſſembly had for cenſuring its conduct, than the exceeding unfairneſs, partiality, and arbitrarineſs with which this buſineſs was tranſacted, it would be cauſe ſufficient.

Let the conſtituents of aſſemblies differ, as they may, reſpecting certain peculiarities in the *form* of the conſtitution, they will all agree in ſupporting its *principles*, and in reprobating unfair proceedings and deſpotic meaſures. Every conſtituent is a member of the republic, which is a ſtation of more conſequence to him than being a member of a party, and though they may differ from each other in their choice of perſons to tranſact the public buſineſs, it is of equal importance to all parties that the buſineſs be done on right principles: Otherwiſe our laws and acts, inſtead of being founded in juſtice, will be founded in party, and be laws and acts of retaliation; and inſtead of being a republic of free citizens, we ſhall be alternately tyrants and ſlaves.—But to return to the report.——

The report begins by ſtating that, "The committee to whom "were referred the petitions concerning the bank eſtabliſhed at "Philadelphia, and who were inſtructed to *enquire* whether the ſaid "bank be compatible with the public ſafety, and that equality which "ought ever to prevail between the individuals of a republic, beg "leave to report" (not that they have made any *enquiry*, but) "that it is the *opinion* of this committee, that the ſaid bank, as at "preſent eſtabliſhed, is, in every view, incompatible with the public "ſafety."——But why is it ſo? Here is an opinion unfounded and unwarranted. The committee have begun their report at the wrong end; for an opinion, when given as a matter of judgment, is an action of the mind which follows a fact, but here it is put in the room of one.

The report then ſays, "That in the preſent ſtate of our trade, "the ſaid bank has a direct tendency to baniſh a great part of the "ſpecie from the country, and to collect into the hands of the

" ſtockholders of the bank almoſt the whole of the money which re-
" mains among us."

Here is another mere aſſertion, juſt like the former, without a ſingle fact or circumſtance to ſhew why it is made or whereon it is founded.——Now the very reverſe, of what the committee aſſerts, is the natural conſequence of a bank.——Specie may be called the ſtock in trade of the bank, it is therefore its intereſt to prevent it from wandering out of the country, and to keep a conſtant ſtanding ſupply to be ready for all domeſtic occaſions and demands. Were it true that the bank has a direct tendency to baniſh the ſpecie from the country, there would ſoon be an end to the bank; and, therefore, the committee have ſo far miſtaken the matter, as to put their fears in the place of their wiſhes: For if it is to happen as the committee ſtates, let the bank alone and it will ceaſe of itſelf, and the repealing act need not have been paſſed.

It is the intereſt of the bank that people ſhould keep their caſh there, and all commercial countries find the exceeding great convenience of having a general repoſitory for their caſh.—But ſo far from baniſhing it, there are no two claſſes of people in America who are ſo much intereſted in preſerving hard money in the country as the bank and the merchant. Neither of them can carry on their buſineſs without it. Their oppoſition to the paper-money of the late aſſembly was becauſe it has a direct effect, as far as it is able, to baniſh the ſpecie and that without providing any means for bringing more in.

The committee muſt have been aware of this, and therefore choſe to ſpread the firſt alarm, and groundleſs as it was to truſt to the deluſion.

As the keeping the ſpecie in the country is the intereſt of the bank, ſo it has the beſt opportunities of preventing its being ſent away, and the earlieſt knowledge of ſuch a deſign. While the bank is the general depoſitory of caſh, no great ſums can be obtained without getting it from thence, and as it is evidently prejudicial to its intereſt to advance money to be ſent abroad, becauſe in this caſe, the money cannot by circulation return again; the bank, therefore, is intereſted in preventing what the committee would have it ſuſpected of promoting.

It is to prevent the exportation of caſh and to retain it in the country that the bank has on ſeveral occaſions ſtopt the diſcounting notes till the danger has been paſſed. * The firſt part, there-

* *The petitions ſay, " That they have repeatedly ſeen the ſtopping of*

fore, of the aſſertion, that of baniſhing the ſpecie, contains an apprehenſion as needleſs as it is groundleſs, and which, had the committee underſtood, or been the leaſt informed of the nature of a bank, they could not have made. It is very probable that ſome of the oppoſers to the bank are thoſe perſons who have been diſappointed in their attempt to obtain ſpecie for this purpoſe, and now cloak their oppoſition under other pretences.

I now come to the ſecond part of the aſſertion, which is, that when the bank has baniſhed a great part of the ſpecie from the country, " it will collect into the hands of the ſtockholders almoſt

diſcounts at the bank, operate on the trading part of the community, with a degree of violence ſcarcely inferior to that of a ſtagnation of the blood in the human body, hurrying the wretched merchant who hath debts to pay into the hands of griping uſurers."

As the perſons who ſay or ſigned this, live ſomewhere in Cheſter county, they are not, from ſituation, certain of what they ſay. Thoſe petitions have every appearance of being contrived for the purpoſe of bringing the matter on. The petition and the report have ſtrong evidence in them of being both drawn up by the ſame perſon: for the report is as clearly the echo of the petition as ever the addreſs of the Britiſh parliament was the echo of the king's ſpeech.

Beſides the reaſon I have already given for occaſionally ſtopping diſcounting notes at the bank, there are other neceſſary reaſons. It is for the purpoſe of ſettling accounts. Short reckonings make long friends. The bank lends its money for ſhort periods, and by that means aſſiſts a great many different people: and if it did not ſometimes ſtop diſcounting as a means of ſettling with the perſons it has already lent its money to, thoſe perſons would find a way to keep what they had borrowed longer than they ought, and prevent others being aſſiſted. It is a fact, and ſome of the committee know it to be ſo, that ſundry of thoſe perſons who then oppoſed the bank acted this part.

The ſtopping the diſcounts do not, and cannot, operate to call in the loans ſooner than the time for which they were lent, and therefore the charge is falſe that " it hurries men into the hands of griping uſurers:"—and the truth is, that it operates to keep them from thence.

If petitions are to be contrived to cover the deſigns of a houſe of aſſembly and give a pretence for its conduct, or if a houſe is to be led by the noſe by the idle tale of any fifty or ſixty ſigners to a petition, it is time for the public to look a little cloſer into the conduct of its repreſentatives.

" the whole of the money which remains among us."—But how, or by what means, the bank is to accompliſh this wonderful feat, the committee have not informed us. Whether people are to give their money to the bank for nothing, or whether the bank is to charm it from them as a rattleſnake charms a ſquirrel from a tree, the committee have left us as much in the dark about it as they were themſelves.

Is it poſſible the committee ſhould know ſo very little of the matter, as not to know that no part of the money which at any time may be in the bank belongs to the ſtockholders? not even the original capital which they put in is any part of it their own until every perſon who has a demand upon the bank is paid, and if there is not a ſufficiency for this purpoſe, on the balance of loſs and gain, the original money of the ſtockholders muſt make up the deficiency.

The money which at any time may be in the bank is the property of every man who holds a bank-note, or depoſits caſh there, or who has a juſt demand upon it from the city of Philadelphia up to Fort Pitt, or to any part of the United States; and he can draw the money from it when he pleaſes. Its being in the bank, does not in the leaſt make it the property of the ſtockholders, any more than the money in the ſtate treaſury is the property of the ſtate treaſurer. They are only ſtewards over it for thoſe who pleaſe to put it, or let it remain there: And, therefore, this ſecond part of the aſſertion is ſomewhat ridiculous.

The next paragraph in the report is, " That the accumulation of " *enormous wealth* in the hands of a *ſociety* who claim perpetual du- " ration, will neceſſarily produce a degree of influence and power " which cannot be entruſted in the hands of any ſet of men whatſo- " ever" (the committee I preſume excepted) " without endanger- " ing the public ſafety."——There is an air of ſolemn fear in this paragraph which is ſomething like introducing a ghoſt in a play to keep people from laughing at the players.

I have already ſhewn that whatever wealth there may be, at any time, in the bank, is the property of thoſe who have demands upon the bank, and not the property of the ſtockholders. As a ſociety they hold no property, and moſt probably never will, unleſs it ſhould be a houſe to tranſact their buſineſs in, inſtead of hiring one. Every half year the bank ſettles its accounts, and each individual ſtockholder takes his dividend of gain or loſs to himſelf, and the bank begins the next half year in the ſame manner it began the firſt, and ſo on,

This being the nature of a bank, there can be no accumulation of wealth among them as a ſociety.

For what purpoſe the word "*ſociety*" is introduced into the report I do not know, unleſs it be to make a falſe impreſſion upon people's minds. It has no connection with the ſubject, for the bank is not a ſociety, but a company, and denominated ſo in the charter. There are ſeveral religious ſocieties incorporated in this ſtate, which hold property as the right of thoſe ſocieties, and to which no perſon can belong that is not of the ſame religious profeſſion. But this is not the caſe with the bank. The bank is a company for the promotion and convenience of commerce, which is a matter in which all the ſtate is intereſted, and holds no property in the manner which thoſe ſocieties do.

But there is a direct contradiction in this paragraph to that which goes before it. The committee, there, accuſes the bank of baniſhing the ſpecie, and here, of accumulating enormous ſums of it.——So here are two enormous ſums of ſpecie; one enormous ſum going out, and another enormous ſum remaining.——To reconcile this contradiction, the committee ſhould have added to their report, *that they ſuſpected the bank had found out the philoſopher's ſtone, and kept it a ſecret.*

The next paragraph is, "that the ſaid bank, in its corporate capa-
"city, is empowered to hold eſtates to the amount of ten millions of
"dollars, and by the tenor of the preſent charter is to exiſt for ever,
"without being obliged to yield any emolument to the government,
"or be at leaſt dependant on it."

The committee have gone ſo vehemently into this buſineſs, and ſo completely ſhewn their want of knowledge in every point of it, as to make, in the firſt part of this paragraph, a fear of what, the greater fear is, will never happen. Had the committee known any thing of banking, they muſt have known, that the objection againſt banks has been (not that they held great eſtates, but) that they held none; that they had no real, fixed, and viſible property, and that it is the maxim and practice of banks not to hold any.

The honourable chancellor Livingſton, late ſecretary for foreign affairs, did me the honour of ſhewing, and diſcourſing with me on, a plan of a bank he had drawn up for the ſtate of New-York. In this plan it was made a condition or obligation, that whatever the capital of the bank amounted to in ſpecie, there ſhould be added twice as much in real eſtates. But the mercantile intereſt rejected the propoſition.

It was a very good piece of policy in the aſſembly which paſſed the charter act, to add the clauſe to empower the bank to purchaſe and hold real eſtates. It was as an inducement to the bank to do it, becauſe ſuch eſtates being held as the property of the bank would be ſo many mortgages to the public in addition to the money capital of the bank.

But the doubt is that the bank will not be induced to accept the opportunity. The bank has exiſted five years and has not purchaſed a ſhilling of real property: and as ſuch property or eſtates cannot be purchaſed by the bank but with the intereſt money which the ſtock produces, and as that is divided every half year among the ſtockholders, and each ſtockholder chooſes to have the management of his own dividend, and if he lays it out in purchaſing an eſtate to have that eſtate his own private property, and under his own immediate management, there is no expectation, ſo far from being any fear, that the clauſe will be accepted.

Where knowledge is a duty, ignorance is a crime; and the committee are criminal in not underſtanding this ſubject better. Had this clauſe not been in the charter, the committee might have reported the want of it as a defect, in not empowering the bank to hold eſtates as a real ſecurity to its creditors: but as the complaint now ſtands, the accuſation of it is, that the charter empowers the bank to *give real ſecurity* to its creditors. A complaint never made, heard of, or thought of before.

The ſecond article in this paragraph is, "that the bank, according "to the tenor of the preſent charter, is to exiſt for ever."——Here I agree with the committee, and am glad to find that among ſuch a liſt of errors and contradictions there is one idea which is not wrong, although the committee have made a wrong uſe of it.

As we are not to live for ever ourſelves, and other generations are to follow us, we have neither the power nor the right to govern them, or to ſay how they ſhall govern themſelves. It is the ſummit of human vanity, and ſhews a covetouſneſs of power beyond the grave, to be dictating to the world to come. It is ſufficient that we do that which is right in our own day, and leave them with the advantage of good examples.

As the generations of the world are every day both commencing and expiring, therefore, when any public act of this ſort is done it naturally ſuppoſes the age of that generation to be then beginning, and the time contained between coming of age, and the natural end

of life, in the extent of time it has a right to go to, which may be about thirty years; for though many may die before, others will live beyond; and the mean time is equally fair for all generations.

If it was made an article in the conſtitution, that all laws and acts ſhould ceaſe of themſelves in thirty years, and have no legal force beyond that time, it would prevent their becoming too numerous and voluminous, and ſerve to keep them within view and in a compact compaſs. Such as were proper to be continued, would be enacted again, and thoſe which were not, would go into oblivion. There is the ſame propriety that a nation ſhould fix a time for a full ſettlement of its affairs, and begin again from a new date, as that an individual ſhould; and to keep within the diſtance of thirty years would be a convenient period.

The Britiſh, from the want of ſome general regulation of this kind, have a great number of obſolete laws; which, though out of uſe and forgot, are not out of force, and are occaſionally brought up for ſharping purpoſes, and innocent unwary perſons trepanned thereby.

To extend this idea ſtill further,—it would probably be a conſiderable improvement in the political ſyſtem of nations, to make all treaties of peace for a limited time. It is the nature of the mind to feel uneaſy under the idea of a condition perpetually exiſting over it, and to excite in itſelf apprehenſions that would not take place were it not from that cauſe.

Were treaties of peace made for, and renewable every, ſeven or ten years, the natural effect would be, to make peace continue longer than it does under the cuſtom of making peace for ever. If the parties felt or apprehended any inconveniences under the terms already made, they would look forward to the time when they ſhould be eventually relieved therefrom, and might renew the treaty on improved conditions. This opportunity periodically occurring, and the recollection of it always exiſting, would ſerve as a chimney to the political fabric, to carry off the ſmoke and fume of national fire. It would naturally abate, and honourably take off, the edge and occaſion for fighting; and however the parties might determine to do it, when the time of the treaty ſhould expire, it would then ſeem like fighting in cool blood: The fighting temper would be diſſipated before the fighting time arrived, and negociation ſupply its place. To know how probable this may be, a man need do no more than obſerve the progreſs of his own mind on any private circumſtance

similar in its nature to a public one.——But to return to my subject.——

To give limitation is to give duration: and though it is not a justifying reason, that because an act or contract is not to last for ever, that it shall be broken or violated to-day, yet, where no time is mentioned, the omission affords an opportunity for the abuse. When we violate a contract on this pretence, we assume a right that belongs to the next generation; for though they, as a following generation, have the right of altering or setting it aside, as not being concerned in the making it, or not being done in their day, we, who made it, have not that right; and, therefore, the committee, in this part of their report, have made a wrong use of a right principle; and as this clause in the charter might have been altered by the consent of the parties, it cannot be produced to justify the violation.——And were it not altered there would be no inconvenience from it. The term "for ever" is an absurdity that would have no effect. The next age will think for itself by the same rule of right that we have done, and not admit any assumed authority of ours to encroach upon the system of their day. Our *for ever* ends where their *for ever* begins.

The third article in this paragraph is, that the bank holds its charter "without being obliged to yield any emolument to the government."

Ingratitude has a short memory. It was on the failure of the government to support the public cause, that the bank originated. It crept in as a support when some of the persons then in the government, and who now oppose the bank, were apparently on the point of abandoning the cause, not from disaffection, but from despair. While the expences of the war were carried on by emissions of continental money, any set of men, in government, might carry it on. The means being provided to their hands, required no great exertions of fortitude or wisdom: But when this means failed, they would have failed with it, had not a public spirit awakened itself with energy out of doors. It was easy times to the governments while continental money lasted. The dream of wealth supplied the reality of it; but when the dream vanished, the government did not awake.

But what right has the government to expect any emolument from the bank? Does the committee mean to set up acts and charters for sale, or what do they mean? Because it is the practice of the British

miniſtry to grind a toll out of every public inſtitution they can get a power over, is the ſame practice to be followed here?

The war being now ended, and the bank having rendered the ſervice expected, or rather hoped for, from it, the principal public uſe of it, at this time, is for the promotion and extenſion of commerce. The whole community derives benefit from the operation of the bank. It facilitates the commerce of the country. It quickens the means of purchaſing and paying for country-produce, and haſtens on the exportation of it. The emolument, therefore, being to the community, it is the office and duty of government to give protection to the bank.

Among many of the principal conveniences ariſing from the bank, one of them is, that it gives a kind of life to, what would otherwiſe be, dead money. Every merchant and perſon in trade, has always in his hands ſome quantity of caſh, which conſtantly remains with him; that is, he is never entirely without: This remnant money, as it may be called, is of no uſe to him till more is collected to it. He can neither buy produce nor merchandize with it, and this being the caſe with every perſon in trade, there will be (though not all at the ſame time) as many of thoſe ſums lying uſeleſsly by, and ſcattered throughout the city, as there are perſons in trade, beſides many that are not in trade.

I ſhould not ſuppoſe the eſtimation over-rated, in conjecturing, that half the money in the city, at any one time, lies in this manner. By collecting thoſe ſcattered ſums together, which is done by means of the bank, they become capable of being uſed, and the quantity of circulating caſh is doubled, and by the depoſitors alternately lending them to each other, the commercial ſyſtem is invigorated: and as it is the intereſt of the bank to preſerve this money in the country for domeſtic uſes only, and as it has the beſt opportunity of doing ſo, the bank ſerves as a centinel over the ſpecie.

If a farmer, or a miller, comes to the city with produce, there are but few merchants that can individually purchaſe it with ready money of their own; and thoſe few would command nearly the whole market for country produce: But, by means of the bank, this monopoly is prevented, and the chance of the market enlarged. It is very extraordinary that the late aſſembly ſhould promote monopolizing; yet ſuch would be the effect of ſuppreſſing the bank; and it is much to the honour of thoſe merchants, who are capable, by their fortunes, of becoming monopolizers, that they ſupport the bank. In this caſe,

honour operates over intereſt. They were the perſons who firſt ſet up the bank, and their honour is now engaged to ſupport what it is their intereſt to put down.

If merchants, by this means, or farmers, by ſimilar means, among themſelves, can mutually aid and ſupport each other, what has the government to do with it? What right has it to expect emolument from aſſociated induſtry, more than from individual induſtry? It would be a ſtrange ſort of a government, that ſhould make it illegal for people to aſſiſt each other, or pay a tribute for doing ſo.

But the truth is, that the government has already derived emoluments, and very extraordinary ones. It has already received its full ſhare, by the ſervices of the bank during the war; and it is every day receiving benefits, becauſe whatever promotes and facilitates commerce, ſerves likewiſe to promote and facilitate the revenue.

The laſt article in this paragraph is, "That the bank is not the "leaſt dependant on the government."

Have the committee ſo ſoon forgot the principles of republican government and the conſtitution, or are ſo little acquainted with them, as not to know, that this article in their report partakes of the nature of treaſon? Do they not know, that freedom is deſtroyed by dependance, and the ſafety of the ſtate endangered thereby? Do they not ſee, that to hold any part of the citizens of the ſtate, as yearly penſioners on the favour of an aſſembly, is ſtriking at the root of free elections?

If other parts of their report diſcover a want of knowledge on the ſubject of banks, this ſhews a want of principle in the ſcience of government.

Only let us ſuppoſe this dangerous idea carried into practice, and then ſee what it leads to. If corporate bodies are, after their incorporation, to be annually dependant on an aſſembly for the continuance of their charter, the citizens, which compoſe thoſe corporations, are not free. The government holds an authority and influence over them, in a manner different from what it does over other citizens, and by this means deſtroys that equality of freedom, which is the bulwark of the republic and the conſtitution.

By this ſcheme of government any party, which happens to be uppermoſt in a ſtate, will command all the corporations in it, and may create more for the purpoſe of extending that influence. The dependant borough-towns in England are the rotten part of their government, and this idea of the committee has a very near relation to it.

" If you do not do so and so," expressing what was meant, " take care of your charter," was a threat thrown out against the bank. But as I do not wish to enlarge on a disagreeable circumstance, and hope that what is already said, is sufficient to shew the anti-constitutional conduct and principles of the committee, I shall pass on to the next paragraph in the report.——Which is,——

" That the great profits of the bank, which will daily encrease as " money grows scarcer, and which already far exceed the profits of " European banks, have tempted foreigners to vest their money in " this bank, and thus to draw from us large sums for interest."

Had the committee understood the subject, some dependance might be put on their opinion, which now cannot. Whether money will grow scarcer, and whether the profits of the bank will increase, are more than the committee know, or are judges sufficient to guess at. The committee are not so capable of taking care of commerce, as commerce is capable of taking care of itself. The farmer understands farming, and the merchant understands commerce; and as riches are equally the object of both, there is no occasion that either should fear that the other will seek to be poor. The more money the merchant has, so much the better for the farmer, who has produce to sell; and the richer the farmer is, so much the better for the merchant, when he comes to his store.

As to the profits of the bank, the stockholders must take their chance for it. It may some years be more and others less, and upon the whole may not be so productive as many other ways that money may be employed. It is the convenience which the stockholders, as commercial men, derive from the establishment of the bank, and not the mere interest they receive, that is the inducement to them. It is the ready opportunity of borrowing alternately of each other that forms the principal object: And as they pay as well as receive a great part of the interest among themselves, it is nearly the same thing, both cases considered at once, whether it is more or less.

The stockholders are occasionally depositors and sometimes borrowers of the bank. They pay interest for what they borrow, and receive none for what they deposit; and were a stockholder to keep a nice account of the interest he pays for the one and loses upon the other, he would find, at the year's end, that ten per cent upon his stock would probably not be more than common interest upon the whole, if so much.

As to the committee complaining " that foreigners by vesting

"their money in the bank will draw large ſums from us for intereſt," it is like a miller complaining in a dry ſeaſon, that ſo much water runs into his dam that ſome of it runs over.

Could thoſe foreigners draw this intereſt without putting in any capital, the complaint would be well founded; but as they muſt firſt put money in before they can draw any out, and as they muſt draw many years before they can draw even the numerical ſum they put in at firſt, the effect, for at leaſt twenty years to come, will be directly contrary to what the committee ſtates: Becauſe we draw *capitals* from them and they only *intereſt* from us, and as we ſhall have the uſe of the money all the while it remains with us, the advantage will always be in our favour.——In framing this part of the report, the committee muſt have forgot which ſide of the Atlantic they were on, for the caſe would be as they ſtate it if we put money into their bank inſtead of their putting it into ours.

I have now gone through, line by line, every objection againſt the bank, contained in the firſt half of the report; what follows may be called, *The Lamentations of the Committee*, and a lamentable puſillanimous degrading affair it is.—It is a public affront, a reflection upon the ſenſe and ſpirit of the whole country. I ſhall give the remainder together as it ſtands in the report, and then my remarks.

The Lamentations are, "That foreigners will doubtleſs be more "and more induced to become ſtockholders, until the time may ar- "rive when this *enormous* engine of power may become ſubject to "foreign influence, this country may be agitated by the politics of "European courts, and the good people of America reduced once "more into a ſtate of ſubordination and dependance upon ſome one "or other of the European powers. That at beſt, if it were even "confined to the hands of Americans, it would be totally deſtructive "of that equality which ought to prevail in a republic. We have "nothing in our free and equal government capable of balancing the "influence which this bank muſt create; and we ſee nothing which "in the courſe of a few years can prevent the directors of the bank "from governing Pennſylvania. Already we have felt its influ- "ence indirectly interfering in the meaſures of the legiſlature. "Already the houſe of aſſembly, the repreſentatives of the people, "have been threatened, that the credit of our paper currency will "be blaſted by the bank; and if this growing evil continues, we "fear the time is not very diſtant when the bank will be able to dic- "tate to the legiſlature, what laws to paſs and what to forbear."

When the ſky falls we ſhall be all killed. There is ſomething ſo ridiculouſly grave, ſo wide of probability, and ſo wild, confuſed and inconſiſtent in the whole compoſition of this long paragraph, that I am at a loſs how to begin upon it.——It is like a drowning man crying fire! fire!

This part of the report is made up of two dreadful predictions. The firſt is, that if foreigners purchaſe bank ſtock we ſhall be all ruined:—The ſecond is, that if the Americans keep the bank to themſelves, we ſhall be alſo ruined.

A committee of fortune-tellers is a novelty in government: and the gentlemen by giving this ſpecimen of their art, have ingeniouſly ſaved their honour on one point, which is, that though people may ſay they are not bankers, nobody can ſay they are not conjurors.—There is, however, one conſolation left, which is, that the committee do not know *exactly* how long it may be; ſo there is ſome hope that we may all be in heaven when this dreadful calamity happens upon earth.

But to be ſerious, if any ſerioufneſs is neceſſary on ſo laughable a ſubject.—If the ſtate ſhould think there is any thing improper in foreigners purchaſing bank ſtock, or any other kind of ſtock or funded property (for I ſee no reaſon why bank ſtock ſhould be particularly pointed at) the legiſlature have authority to prohibit it. It is a mere political opinion that has nothing to do with the charter or the charter with that; and therefore the firſt dreadful prediction vaniſhes.

It has always been a maxim in politics, founded on, and drawn from, natural cauſes and conſequences, that the more foreign countries which any nation can intereſt in the proſperity of its own ſo much the better. Where the treaſure is, there will the heart be alſo; and therefore when foreigners veſt their money with us, they naturally inveſt their good wiſhes with it; and it is we that obtain an influence over them, not they over us.——But the committee ſat out ſo very wrong at firſt that the further they travelled the more they were out of their way; and now they are got to the end of their report they are at the utmoſt diſtance from their buſineſs.

As to the ſecond dreadful part, that of the bank overturning the government, perhaps the committee meant that at the next general election themſelves might be turned out of it, which has partly been the caſe; not by the influence of the bank, for it had none, not even enough to obtain the permiſſion of a hearing from government, but

by the influence of reaſon and the choice of the people, who moſt probably reſent the undue and unconſtitutional influence which that houſe and the committee were aſſuming over the privileges of citizenſhip.

The committee might have been ſo modeſt as to have confined themſelves to the bank, and not thrown a general odium on the whole country. Before the events can happen which the committee predict, the electors of Pennſylvania muſt become dupes, dunces and cowards, and therefore when the committee predict the dominion of the bank they predict the diſgrace of the people.

The committee having finiſhed their report proceed to give their advice, which is,

"That a committee be appointed to bring in a bill to repeal the "act of aſſembly paſſed the firſt day of April, 1782, entitled, "*An act to incorporate the ſubſcribers to the bank of North-America,*" "and alſo to repeal one other act of the aſſembly paſſed the 18th of "March, 1782, entitled, "*An act for preventing and puniſhing the "counterfeiting of the common ſeal, bank bills, and bank notes of the pre-"ſident, directors and company of the bank of North-America, and for "other purpoſes therein mentioned.*"

There is ſomething in this ſequel to the report that is perplexed and obſcure.

Here are two acts to be repealed. One is, the incorporating act. The other, the act for preventing and puniſhing the counterfeiting of the common ſeal, bank bills, and bank notes of the preſident, directors and company of the bank of North America.

It would appear from the committee's manner of arranging them (were it not for the difference of their dates) that the act for puniſhing the counterfeiting the common ſeal, &c. of the bank, followed the act of incorporation, and that the common ſeal there referred to is a common ſeal which the bank held in conſequence of the aforeſaid incorporating act.—But the caſe is quite otherwiſe. The act for puniſhing the counterfeiting the common ſeal, &c. of the bank, was paſſed prior to the incorporating act, and refers to the common ſeal which the bank held in conſequence of the charter of congreſs, and the ſtyle which the act expreſſes, of preſident, directors and company of the bank of North-America, is the corporate ſtyle which the bank derives under the congreſs charter.

The puniſhing act, therefore, hath two diſtinct legal points. The one is, an authoritative public recognition of the charter of congreſs. The ſecond is, the puniſhment it inflicts on counterfeiting.

The legiſlature may repeal the puniſhing part, but it cannot undo the recognition, becauſe no repealing act can ſay that the ſtate *has not* recognized. The recognition is a mere matter of fact, and no law or act can undo a fact or put it, if I may ſo expreſs it, in the condition it was before it exiſted The repealing act therefore does not reach the full point the committee had in view; for even admitting it to be a repeal of the ſtate charter, it ſtill leaves another charter recognized in its ſtead.—The charter of congreſs, ſtanding merely on itſelf, would have a doubtful authority, but the recognition of it by the ſtate gives it legal ability. The repealing act, it is true, ſets aſide the puniſhment but does not bar the operation of the charter of congreſs as a charter recognized by the ſtate, and therefore the committee did their buſineſs but by halves.

I have now gone entirely through the report of the committee, and a more irrational, inconſiſtent, contradictory report will ſcarcely be found on the journals of any legiſlature in America.

How the repealing act is to be applied, or in what manner it is to operate, is a matter yet to be determined. For admitting a queſtion of law to ariſe, whether the charter, which that act attempts to repeal, is a law of the land in the manner which laws of univerſal operation are, or of the nature of a contract made between the public and the bank (as I have already explained in this work) the repealing act does not and cannot decide the queſtion, becauſe it is the repealing act that makes the queſtion, and its own fate is involved in the deciſion. It is a queſtion of law and not a queſtion of legiſlation, and muſt be decided on in a court of juſtice and not by a houſe of aſſembly.

But the repealing act, by being paſſed prior to the deciſion of this point, aſſumes the power of deciding it, and the aſſembly in ſo doing erects itſelf unconſtitutionally into a tribunal of judicature, and abſorbs the authority and right of the courts of juſtice into itſelf.

Therefore the operation of the repealing act, in its very outſet, requires injuſtice to be done. For it is impoſſible on the principles of a republican government and the conſtitution, to paſs an act to forbid any of the citizens the right of appealing to the courts of juſtice on any matter in which his intereſt or property is affected; but the firſt operation of this act goes to ſhut up the courts of juſtice, and holds them ſubſervient to the aſſembly. It either commands or influences them not to hear the caſe, or to give judgment on it on the mere will of one party only.

I wiſh the citizens to awaken themſelves on this ſubject.—Not becauſe the bank is concerned, but becauſe their own conſtitutional rights and privileges are involved in the event. It is a queſtion of exceeding great magnitude; for if an aſſembly is to have this power, the laws of the land and the courts of juſtice are but of little uſe.

Having now finiſhed with the report, I proceed to the third and laſt ſubject—that of paper-money.—

I remember a German farmer expreſſing as much in a few words as the whole ſubject requires: "*money is money and paper is paper.*" ——All the invention of man cannot make them otherwiſe. The alchymiſt may ceaſe his labours, and the hunter after the philoſopher's ſtone go to reſt, if paper can be metamorphoſed into gold and ſilver, or made to anſwer the ſame purpoſe in all caſes.

Gold and ſilver are the emiſſions of nature: paper is the emiſſion of art. The value of gold and ſilver is aſcertained by the quantity which nature has made in the earth. We cannot make that quantity more or leſs than it is, and therefore the value being dependant upon the quantity, depends not on man.——Man has no ſhare in making gold or ſilver; all that his labours and ingenuity can accompliſh is, to collect it from the mine, refine it for uſe and give it an impreſſion, or ſtamp it into coin.

Its being ſtamped into coin adds conſiderably to its convenience but nothing to its value. It has then no more value than it had before. Its value is not in the impreſſion but in itſelf. Take away the impreſſion and ſtill the ſame value remains. Alter it as you will, or expoſe it to any misfortune that can happen, ſtill the value is not diminiſhed. It has a capacity to reſiſt the accidents that deſtroy other things. It has, therefore, all the requiſite qualities that money can have, and is a fit material to make money of; and nothing which has not all thoſe properties, can be fit for the purpoſe of money.

Paper, conſidered as a material whereof to make money, has none of the requiſite qualities in it. It is too plentiful, and too eaſily come at. It can be had any where, and for a trifle.

There are two ways in which I ſhall conſider paper.

The only proper uſe for paper, in the room of money, is to write promiſſory notes and obligations of payment in ſpecie upon. A piece of paper, thus written and ſigned, is worth the ſum it is given for, if the perſon who gives it is able to pay it; becauſe, in this caſe, the law will oblige him. But if he is worth nothing, the paper-note

is worth nothing. The value, therefore, of such a note, is not in the note itself, for that is but paper and promise, but in the man who is obliged to redeem it with gold or silver.

Paper, circulating in this manner, and for this purpose, continually points to the place and person where, and of whom, the money is to be had, and at last finds its home; and, as it were, unlocks its master's chest and pays the bearer.

But when an assembly undertake to issue paper *as* money, the whole system of safety and certainty is overturned, and property set afloat. Paper-notes given and taken between individuals as a promise of payment is one thing, but paper issued by an assembly *as* money is another thing. It is like putting an apparition in the place of a man; it vanishes with looking at and nothing remains but the air.

Money, when considered as the fruit of many years industry, as the reward of labour, sweat and toil, as the widow's dowry and children's portion, and as the means of procuring the necessaries, and alleviating the afflictions of life, and making old age a scene of rest, has something in it sacred that is not to be sported with, or trusted to the airy bubble of paper-currency.

By what power or authority an assembly undertake to make paper-money is difficult to say. It derives none from the constitution, for that is silent on the subject. It is one of those things which the people have not delegated, and which, were they at any time assembled together, they would not delegate. It is, therefore, an assumption of power which an assembly is not warranted in, and which may, one day or other, be the means of bringing some of them to punishment.

I shall enumerate some of the evils of paper-money and conclude with offering means for preventing them.

One of the evils of paper-money is, that it turns the whole country into stock-jobbers. The precariousness of its value and the uncertainty of its fate continually operate, night and day, to produce this destructive effect. Having no real value in itself it depends for support upon accident, caprice and party, and as it is the interest of some to depreciate and of others to raise its value, there is a continual invention going on that destroys the morals of the country.

It was horrid to see and hurtful to recollect how loose the principles of justice were let by means of the paper emissions during the war. The experience then had, should be a warning to any assembly how they venture to open such a dangerous door again.

As to the romantic if not hypocritical tale, that a virtuous people

need no gold and silver and that paper will do as well, requires no other contradiction than the experience we have seen. Though some well-meaning people may be inclined to view it in this light, it is certain that the sharper always talks this language.

There are a set of men who go about making purchases upon credit, and buying estates they have not wherewithal to pay for; and having done this, their next step is to fill the news-papers with paragraphs of the scarcity of money and the necessity of a paper-emission, then to have it made a legal tender under the pretence of supporting its credit; and when out, to depreciate it as fast as they can, get a deal of it for a little price and cheat their creditors; and this is the concise history of paper-money schemes.

But why, since the universal custom of the world has established money as the most convenient medium of traffic and commerce, should paper be set up in preference to gold and silver? The productions of nature are surely as innocent as those of art; and in the case of money, are abundantly, if not infinitely, more so. The love of gold and silver may produce covetousness, but covetousness, when not connected with dishonesty, is not properly a vice. It is frugality run to an extreme.

But the evils of paper-money have no end. Its uncertain and fluctuating value is continually awakening or creating new schemes of deceit. Every principle of justice is put to the rack and the bond of society dissolved: The suppression therefore of paper-money might very properly have been put into the act for preventing vice and immorality.

The pretence for paper-money has been, that there was not a sufficiency of gold and silver. This, so far from being a reason for paper-emissions, is a reason against them.

As gold and silver are not the productions of North-America, they are, therefore, articles of importation; and if we set up a paper-manufactory of money, it amounts, as far as it is able, to prevent the importation of hard money, or to send it out again as fast as it comes in; and by following this practice we shall coutinually banish the specie, till we have none left, and be continually complaining of the grievance instead of remedying the cause.

Considering gold and silver as articles of importation, there will in time, unless we prevent it by paper-emissions, be as much in the country as the occasions of it require, for the same reasons there are as much of other imported articles. But as every yard of cloth manu-

factured in the country occaſions a yard the leſs to be imported, ſo it is by money, with this difference, that in the one caſe we manufacture the thing itſelf and in the other we do not. We have cloth for cloth, but we have only paper-dollars for ſilver ones.

As to the aſſumed authority of any aſſembly in making paper-money, or paper of any kind, a legal tender, or in other language, a compulſive payment, it is a moſt preſumptuous attempt at arbitrary power. There can be no ſuch power in a republican government: The people have no freedom, and property no ſecurity where this practice can be acted: And the committee who ſhall bring in a report for this purpoſe, or the member who moves for it, and he who ſeconds it merit impeachment, and ſooner or later may expect it.

Of all the various ſorts of baſe coin, paper-money is the baſeſt. It has the leaſt intrinſic value of any thing that can be put in the place of gold and ſilver. A hobnail or a piece of wampum far exceeds it. And there would be more propriety in making thoſe articles a legal tender than to make paper ſo.

It was the iſſuing baſe coin and eſtabliſhing it as a tender, that was one of the principal means of finally overthrowing the power of the Stuart family in Ireland. The article is worth reciting as it bears ſuch a reſemblance to the progreſs practiſed on paper-money.

" Braſs and copper of the baſeſt kind, old cannon, broken bells, " houſhold utenſils were aſſiduouſly collected; and from every pound " weight of ſuch vile materials, valued at four-pence, pieces were " coined and circulated to the amount of five pounds nominal value. " By the firſt proclamation they were made current in all payments " to and from the king and the ſubjects of the realm, except in du- " ties on the importation of foreign goods, money left in truſt, or " due by mortgage, bills or bonds; and *James* promiſed that when " the money ſhould be decried, he would receive it in all payments or " make full ſatisfaction in gold and ſilver. The nominal value was " afterwards raiſed by ſubſequent proclamations, the original reſtric- " tions removed, and this baſe money was ordered to be received in " all kinds of payments. As braſs and copper grew ſcarce it was " made of ſtill viler materials, of tin and pewter, and old debts of " one thouſand pounds were diſcharged by pieces of vile metal, " amounting to thirty ſhillings in intrinſic value."*—Had king James thought of paper, he needed not to have been at the trouble

* *Leland's Hiſtory of Ireland, vol. iv. p.* 265.

or expence of collecting brafs and copper, broken bells and houſhold utenſils.

The laws of a country ought to be the ſtandard of equity, and calculated to impreſs on the minds of the people the moral as well as the legal obligations of reciprocal juſtice. But tender-laws, of any kind, operate to deſtroy morality, and to diſſolve by the pretence of law what ought to be the principle of law to ſupport, reciprocal juſtice between man and man: and the puniſhment of a member who ſhould move for ſuch a law ought to be DEATH.

When the recommendation of congreſs, in the year 1780, for repealing the tender-laws was before the aſſembly of Pennſylvania, on caſting up the votes, for and againſt bringing in a bill to repeal thoſe laws, the numbers were equal, and the caſting vote reſted on the ſpeaker, colonel Bayard. "I give my vote," ſaid he, "for the "repeal, from a conſciouſneſs of juſtice; the tender-laws operate "to eſtabliſh iniquity by law."—But when the bill was brought in, the houſe rejected it, and the tender-laws continued to be the means of fraud.

If any thing had, or could have, a value equal to gold and ſilver, it would require no tender-law; and if it had not that value it ought not to have ſuch a law; and, therefore, all tender-laws are tyrannical and unjuſt, and calculated to ſupport fraud and oppreſſion.

Moſt of the advocates for tender-laws are thoſe who have debts to diſcharge, and who take refuge in ſuch a law, to violate their contracts and cheat their creditors. But as no law can warrant the doing an unlawful act, therefore the proper mode of proceeding, ſhould any ſuch laws be enacted in future, will be to impeach and execute the members who moved for and ſeconded ſuch a bill, and put the debtor and the creditor in the ſame ſituation they were in, with reſpect to each other, before ſuch a law was paſſed. Men ought to be made to tremble at the idea of ſuch a barefaced act of injuſtice. It is in vain to talk of reſtoring credit, or to complain that money cannot be borrowed at legal intereſt, until every idea of tender-laws is totally and publicly reprobated and extirpated from among us.

As to paper-money, in any light it can be viewed, it is at beſt a bubble. Conſidered as property, it is inconſiſtent to ſuppoſe that the breath of an aſſembly, whoſe authority expires with the year, can give to paper the value and duration of gold. They cannot even engage that the next aſſembly ſhall receive it in taxes. And by the precedent (for authority there is none) that any one aſſembly makes

paper-money, another may do the ſame, until confidence and credit are totally expelled, and all the evils of depreciation acted over again. The amount, therefore, of paper-money is this, That it is the illegitimate offspring of aſſemblies, and when their year expires they leave a vagrant on the hands of the public.

Having now gone through the three ſubjects propoſed in the title to this work, I ſhall conclude with offering ſome thoughts on the preſent affairs of the ſtate.

My idea of a ſingle legiſlature was always founded on a hope, that whatever perſonal parties there might be in the ſtate, they would all unite and agree in the general principles of good government—that theſe party differences would be dropt at the treſhold of the ſtate-houſe, and that the public good or the good of the whole, would be the governing principle of the legiſlature within it.

Party diſpute, taken on this ground, would only be, who ſhould have the honour of making the laws; not what the laws ſhould be. But when party operates to produce party laws, a ſingle houſe is a ſingle perſon, and ſubject to the haſte, raſhneſs and paſſion of individual ſovereignty. At leaſt, it is an ariſtocracy.

The form of the preſent conſtitution is now made to trample on its principles, and the conſtitutional members are anti-conſtitutional legiſlators. They are fond of ſupporting the form for the ſake of the power, and they dethrone the principle to diſplay the ſceptre.

The attack of the late aſſembly on the bank, diſcovers ſuch a want of moderation and prudence, of impartiality and equity, of fair and candid enquiry and inveſtigation, of deliberate and unbiaſſed judgment, and ſuch a raſhneſs of thinking and vengeance of power as is inconſiſtent with the ſafety of the republic. It was judging without hearing, and execution without trial.

By ſuch raſh, injudicious and violent proceedings the intereſt of the ſtate is weakened, its proſperity diminiſhed and its commerce and its ſpecie baniſhed to other places.—Suppoſe the bank had not been in an immediate condition to have ſtood ſuch a ſudden attack, what a ſcene of inſtant diſtreſs would the raſhneſs of that aſſembly have brought upon this city and ſtate. The holders of bank-notes, whoever they might be, would have been thrown into the utmoſt confuſion and difficulties. It is no apology to ſay the houſe never thought of this, for it was their duty to have thought of every thing.

But by the prudent and provident management of the bank (though unſuſpicious of the attack) it was enabled to ſtand the run

upon it without ſtopping payment a moment, and to prevent the evils and miſchiefs taking place which the raſhneſs of the aſſembly had a direct tendency to bring on; a trial that ſcarcely a bank in Europe, under a ſimilar circumſtance, could have ſtood through.

I cannot ſee reaſon ſufficient to believe that the hope of the houſe to put down the bank was placed on the withdrawing the charter, ſo much as on the expectation of producing a bankruptcy on the bank, by ſtarting a run upon it. If this was any part of their project it was a very wicked one, becauſe hundreds might have been ruined to gratify a party-ſpleen.

But this not being the caſe, what has the attack amounted to, but to expoſe the weakneſs and raſhneſs, the want of judgment as well as juſtice, of thoſe who made it, and to confirm the credit of the bank more ſubſtantially than it was before?

The attack, it is true, has had one effect, which is not in the power of the aſſembly to remedy; it has baniſhed many thouſand hard dollars from the ſtate.—By the means of the bank, Pennſylvania had the uſe of a great deal of hard money belonging to citizens of other ſtates, and that without any intereſt, for it laid here in the nature of a depoſit, the depoſitors taking bank-notes in its ſtead. But the alarm called thoſe notes in, and the owners drew out their caſh.

The baniſhing the ſpecie ſerved to make room for the paper-money of the aſſembly, and we have now paper dollars where we might have had ſilver ones. So that the effect of the paper-money has been to make leſs money in the ſtate than there was before. Paper-money is like dram-drinking, it relieves for the moment by a deceitful ſenſation, but gradually diminiſhes the natural heat, and leaves the body worſe than it found it. Were not this the caſe, and could money be made of paper at pleaſure, every ſovereign in Europe would be as rich as he pleaſed. But the truth is, that it is a bubble and the attempt vanity. Nature has provided the proper materials for money, gold and ſilver, and any attempt of ours to rival her is ridiculous.

But to conclude——If the public will permit the opinion of a friend who is attached to no party, and under obligations to none, nor at variance with any, and who through a long habit of acquaintance with them has never deceived them, that opinion ſhall be freely given.

The bank is an inſtitution capable of being made exceedingly beneficial to the ſtate, not only as the means of extending and facilitating its commerce, but as a means of increaſing the quantity of

hard money in the ſtate. The aſſembly's paper-money ſerves directly to baniſh or croud out the hard, becauſe it is iſſued *as* money and put in the place of hard money. But bank notes are of a very different kind, and produce acontrary effect. They are promiſſory notes payable on demand, and may be taken to the bank and exchanged for gold or ſilver without the leaſt ceremony or difficulty.

The bank, therefore, is obliged to keep a conſtant ſtock of hard money ſufficient for this purpoſe; which is what the aſſembly neither does, nor can do by their paper; becauſe the quantity of hard money collected by taxes into the treaſury is trifling compared with the quantity that circulates in trade and through the bank.

The method, therefore, to encreaſe the quantity of hard money would be to combine the ſecurity of the government and the bank into one. And inſtead of iſſuing paper money that ſerves to baniſh the ſpecie, to borrow the ſum wanted of the bank in bank-notes on the condition of the bank exchanging thoſe notes at ſtated periods and quantities with hard money.

Paper iſſued in this manner, and directed to this end, would, inſtead of baniſhing, work itſelf into, gold and ſilver ; becauſe it will then be both the advantage and duty of the bank, and of all the mercantile intereſt connected with it, to procure and import gold and ſilver from any part of the world it can be got, to exchange the notes with. The Engliſh bank is reſtricted to the dealing in no other articles of importation than gold and ſilver, and we may make the ſame uſe of our bank if we proceed properly with it.

Thoſe notes will then have a double ſecurity, that of the government and that of the bank : and they will not be iſſued *as* money, but as hoſtages to be exchanged for hard money, and will, therefore, work the contrary way to what the paper of the aſſembly, uncombined with the ſecurity of the bank, produces: And the intereſt allowed the bank will be ſaved to government by a ſaving of the expences and charges attending paper-emiſſions.

It is, as I have already obſerved in the courſe of this work, the harmony of all the parts of a republic, that conſtitutes their ſeveral and mutual good. A government, that is conſtructed only to govern, is not a republican government. It is combining authority with uſefulneſs that in a great meaſure diſtinguiſhes the republican ſyſtem from others.

Paper-money appears, at firſt ſight, to be a great ſaving, or rather that it coſts nothing; but it is the deareſt money there is. The eaſe

with which it is emitted by an aſſembly at firſt, ſerves as a trap to catch people in at laſt. It operates as an anticipation of the next year's taxes. If the money depreciates, after it is out, it then, as I have already remarked, has the effect of fluctuating ſtock, and the people become ſtock jobbers to throw the loſs on each other.—If it does not depreciate, it is then to be ſunk by taxes at the price of *hard money;* becauſe the ſame quantity of produce, or goods, that would procure a paper-dollar to pay taxes with, would procure a ſilver one for the ſame purpoſe. Therefore in any caſe of paper-money it is dearer to the country than hard money, by all the expence which the paper, printing, ſigning and other attendant charges come to, and at laſt goes into the fire.

Suppoſe one hundred thouſand dollars in paper-money to be emitted every year by the aſſembly, and the ſame ſum to be ſunk every year by taxes, there will then be no more than one hundred thouſand dollars out at any one time. If the expence of paper and printing, and of perſons to attend the preſs while the ſheets are ſtriking off, ſigners, &c. be five per cent. it is evident that in the courſe of twenty years emiſſions, the one hundred thouſand dollars will coſt the country two hundred thouſand dollars. Becauſe the papermaker's and printer's bills, and the expence of ſupervifors and ſigners, and other attendant charges, will in that time amount to as much as the money amounts to; for the ſucceſſive emiſſions are but a recoinage of the ſame ſum.

But gold and ſilver require to be coined but once, and will laſt a hundred years, better than paper will one year, and at the end of that time be ſtill gold and ſilver. Therefore the ſaving to government, in combining its aid and ſecurity with that of the bank in procuring hard money, will be an advantage to both, and to the whole community.

The caſe to be provided againſt, after this, will be, that the government do not borrow too much of the bank, nor the bank lend more notes than it can redeem; and, therefore, ſhould any thing of this kind be undertaken the beſt way will be to begin with a moderate ſum, and obſerve the effect of it. The intereſt given the bank operates as a bounty on the importation of hard money, and which may not be more than the money expended in making paper-emiſſions.

But nothing of this kind, nor any other public undertaking, that requires ſecurity and duration beyond the year, can be gone upon

under the preſent mode of conducting government. The late aſſembly, by aſſuming a ſovereign power over every act and matter done by the ſtate in former aſſemblies, and thereby ſetting up a precedent of overhauling and overturning, as the accident of elections ſhall happen or party prevail, have rendered government incompetent to all the great objects of the ſtate. They have eventually reduced the public to an annual body like themſelves; whereas the public are a ſtanding permanent body, holding annual elections.

There are ſeveral great improvements and undertakings, ſuch as inland navigation, building bridges, opening roads of communication through the ſtate, and other matters of a public benefit, that might be gone upon, but which now cannot, until this governmental error or defect is remedied. The faith of government, under the preſent mode of conducting it, cannot be relied on. Individuals will not venture their money, in undertakings of this kind, on an act that may be made by one aſſembly and broken by another. When a man can ſay that he cannot truſt the government, the importance and dignity of the public is diminiſhed, ſapped and undermined; and, therefore, it becomes the public to reſtore their own honour, by ſetting theſe matters to rights.

Perhaps this cannot be effectually done until the time of the next convention, when the principles, on which they are to be regulated and fixed, may be made a part of the conſtitution.

In the mean time the public may keep their affairs in ſufficient good order, by ſubſtituting prudence in the place of authority, and electing men into the government, who will at once throw aſide the narrow prejudices of party, and make the good of the whole the ruling object of their conduct.———And with this hope, and a ſincere wiſh for their proſperity, I cloſe my book.

MISCELLANEOUS PIECES,

IN PROSE AND VERSE;

PUBLISHED IN THE PENNSYLVANIA MAGAZINE,

IN THE YEAR 1775.

[*Introduction to the first number of the Pennsylvania Magazine.*]

TO THE PUBLIC.

THE design of this work has been so fully expressed in the printed proposals, that it is unnecessary to trouble the reader *now* with a formal preface; and instead of that vain parade with which publications of this kind are introduced to the public, we shall content ourselves with soliciting their candour, till our more qualified labours shall entitle us to their praise.

The generous and considerate will recollect that imperfection is natural to infancy: and that nothing claims their patronage with a better grace than those undertakings which, beside their infant state, have many formidable disadvantages to oppress them.

We presume it is unnecessary to inform our friends, that we encounter all the inconveniences which a magazine can possibly start with. Unassisted by imported materials, we are destined to create what our predecessors in this walk had only to compile.—And the present perplexities of affairs have rendered it somewhat difficult for us to procure the necessary aids.

Thus encompassed with difficulties this first number of THE PENNSYLVANIA MAGAZINE entreats a favourable reception; of which we shall only say, like the early *snow-drop*, it comes forth in a barren season, and contents itself with foretelling that CHOICER FLOWERS are preparing to appear.

Philadelphia, Jan. 24, 1775.

To the PUBLISHER *of the* PENNSYLVANIA MAGAZINE.

IN a country whose reigning character is the love of science, it is somewhat strange that the channels of communication should continue so narrow and limited. The weekly papers are at present the only vehicles of public information. Convenience and necessity prove that the opportunities of acquiring and communicating knowledge, ought always to enlarge with the circle of population. America has now outgrown the state of infancy: Her strength and commerce make large advances to manhood; and science in all its branches has not only blossomed, but even ripened on the soil. The cottages as it were of yesterday have grown to villages, and the villages to cities; and while proud antiquity, like a skeleton in rags, parades the streets of other nations, their genius, as if sickened and disgusted with the phantom, comes hither for recovery.

The present enlarged and improved state of things gives every encouragement which the editor of a new magazine can reasonably hope for. The failure of former ones cannot be drawn as a parallel now. Change of times adds propriety to new measures. In the early days of colonization, when a whisper was almost sufficient to have negotiated all our internal concerns, the publishing even of a news-paper would have been premature. Those times are past; and population has established both their use and their credit. But their plan being almost wholly devoted to news and commerce, affords but a scanty residence to the muses. Their path lies wide of the field of science, and has left a rich and unexplored region for new adventurers.

It has always been the opinion of the learned and curious, that a magazine when properly conducted, is the nursery of genius; and by constantly accumulating new matter, becomes a kind of market for wit and utility. The opportunities which it affords to men of abilities to communicate their studies, kindle up a spirit of invention and emulation. An unexercised genius soon contracts a kind of moffiness, which not only checks its growth, but abates its natural vigour. Like an untenanted house it falls into decay, and frequently ruins the possessor.

The British magazines at their commencement, were the repositories of ingenuity: They are now the retailers of tale and nonsense. From elegance they sunk to simplicity, from simplicity to folly,

and from folly to voluptuouſneſs. The Gentleman's, the London, and the Univerſal Magazines, bear yet ſome marks of their originality; but the Town and Country, the Covent-Garden, and Weſtminſter, are no better than incentives to profligacy and diſſipation. They have added to the diſſolution of manners, and ſupported Venus againſt the muſes.

America yet inherits a large portion of her firſt-imported virtue. Degeneracy is here almoſt a uſeleſs word. Thoſe who are converſant with Europe would be tempted to believe that even the air of the Atlantic diſagrees with the conſtitution of foreign vices; if they ſurvive the voyage, they either expire on their arrival, or linger away in an incurable conſumption. There is a happy ſomething in the climate of America, which diſarms them of all their power both of infection and attraction.

But while we give no encouragement to the importation of foreign vices, we ought to be equally as careful not to create any. A vice begotten might be worſe than a vice imported. The latter, depending on favour, would be a ſycophant; the other, by pride of birth would be a tyrant: To the one we ſhould be dupes, to the other ſlaves.

There is nothing which obtains ſo general an influence over the manners and morals of a people as the preſs; from *that*, as from a fountain, the ſtreams of vice or virtue are poured forth over a country: And of all publications none are more calculated to improve or infect than a periodical one. All others have their riſe and their exit; but *this* renews the purſuit. If it has an evil tendency, it debauches by the power of repetition; if a good one, it obtains favour by the gracefulneſs of ſoliciting it. Like a lover, it wooes its miſtreſs with unabated ardour, nor gives up the purſuit without a conqueſt.

The two capital ſupports of a magazine are utility and entertainment: The firſt is a boundleſs path, the other an endleſs ſpring. To ſuppoſe that arts and ſciences are exhauſted ſubjects, is doing them a kind of diſhonour. The divine mechaniſm of creation reproves ſuch folly, and ſhews us by compariſon, the imperfection of our moſt refined inventions. I cannot believe that this ſpecies of vanity is peculiar to the preſent age only. I have no doubt but that it exiſted before the flood, and even in the wildeſt ages of antiquity. 'Tis a folly we have inherited, not created; and the diſcoveries which every day produce, have greatly contributed to diſpoſſeſs us of it. Improve-

ment and the world will expire together: And till that period arrives, we may plunder the mine, but can never exhauſt it! That "*We have found out every thing*," has been the motto of every age. Let our ideas travel a little into antiquity, and we ſhall find larger portions of it than now; and ſo unwilling were our anceſtors to deſcend from this mountain of perfection, that when any new diſcovery exceeded the common ſtandard, the diſcoverer was believed to be in alliance with the devil. It was not the ignorance of the age only, but the vanity of it, which rendered it dangerous to be ingenious. The man who firſt planned and erected a tenable hut, with a hole for the ſmoke to paſs, and the light to enter, was perhaps called an able architect, but he who firſt improved it with a chimney, could be no leſs than a prodigy; yet had the ſame man been ſo unfortunate as to have embelliſhed it with glaſs windows, he might probably have been burnt for a magician. Our fancies would be highly diverted could we look back, and behold a circle of original Indians haranguing on the ſublime perfection of the age: Yet 'tis not impoſſible but future times may exceed us almoſt as much as we have exceeded them.

I would wiſh to extirpate the leaſt remains of this impolitic vanity. It has a direct tendency to unbrace the nerves of invention, and is peculiarly hurtful to young colonies. A magazine can never want matter in America, if the inhabitants will do juſtice to their own abilities. Agriculture and manufactures owe much of their improvement in England, to hints firſt thrown out in ſome of their magazines. Gentlemen whoſe abilities enabled them to make experiments, frequently choſe that method of communication, on account of its convenience. And why ſhould not the ſame ſpirit operate in America? I have no doubt of ſeeing, in a little time, an American magazine full of more uſeful matter than ever I ſaw an Engliſh one: Becauſe we are not exceeded in abilities, have a more extenſive field for enquiry, and, whatever may be our political ſtate, *our happineſs will always depend upon ourſelves*.

Something uſeful will always ariſe from exerciſing the invention, though perhaps, like the witch of Endor, we ſhall raiſe up a being we did not expect. We owe many of our nobleſt diſcoveries more to accident than wiſdom. In queſt of a pebble we have found a diamond, and returned enriched with the treaſure. Such happy accidents give additional encouragement to the making experiments; and the convenience which a magazine affords of collecting and conveying them to the public, enhances their utility. Where this op-

portunity is wanting, many little inventions, the forerunners of improvement, are ſuffered to expire on the ſpot that produced them; and as an elegant writer beautifully expreſſes on another occaſion,

"They waſte their ſweetneſs on the deſart air."

GRAY.

In matters of humour and entertainment there can be no reaſon to apprehend a deficiency. Wit is naturally a volunteer, delights in action, and under proper diſcipline is capable of great execution. 'Tis a perfect maſter in the art of buſh-fighting; and though it attacks with more ſubtilty than ſcience, has often defeated a whole regiment of heavy artillery.—Though I have rather exceeded the line of gravity in this deſcription of wit, I am unwilling to diſmiſs it without being a little more ſerious.—'Tis a qualification which, like the paſſions, has a natural wildneſs that requires governing. Left to itſelf it ſoon overflows its banks, mixes with common filth, and brings diſrepute on the fountain. We have many valuable ſprings of it in America, which at preſent run in purer ſtreams, than the generality of it in other countries. In France and Italy, 'tis froth highly fomented: In England it has much of the ſame ſpirit, but rather a browner complexion. European wit is one of the worſt articles we can import. It has an intoxicating power with it, which debauches the very vitals of chaſtity, and gives a falſe colouring to every thing it cenſures or defends. We ſoon grow fatigued with the exceſs, and withdraw like gluttons ſickened with intemperance. On the contrary, how happily are the ſallies of innocent humour calculated to amuſe and ſweeten the vacancy of buſineſs! We enjoy the harmleſs luxury without ſurfeiting, and ſtrengthen the ſpirits by relaxing them.

The preſs has not only a great influence over our manners and morals, but contributes largely to our pleaſures; and a magazine, when properly enriched, is very conveniently calculated for this purpoſe. Voluminous works weary the patience, but here we are invited by conciſeneſs and variety. As I have formerly received much pleaſure from peruſing theſe kind of publications, I wiſh the *preſent* ſucceſs; and have no doubt of ſeeing a proper diverſity blended ſo agreeably together, as to furniſh out an *olio* worthy of the company for whom it is deſigned.

I conſider a magazine as a kind of bee-hive, which both allures the ſwarm, and provides room to ſtore their ſweets. Its diviſion into

cells gives every bee a province of its own; and though they all produce honey, yet perhaps they differ in their taste for flowers, and extract with greater dexterity from one than from another. *Thus* we are not all PHILOSOPHERS, all ARTISTS, nor all POETS.

USEFUL AND ENTERTAINING HINTS.

The real value of a thing,
Is as much money as 'twill bring.

IN the possession of the Philadelphia Library-Company is a cabinet of fossils,* with several specimens of earth, clay, sand, &c. with some account of each, and where brought from.

I have always considered these kind of researches as productive of many advantages, and in a new country they are particularly so. As subjects for speculation, they afford entertainment to the curious; but as objects of utility they merit a closer attention. The same materials which delight the fossilist, enrich the manufacturer and the merchant. While the one is scientifically examining their structure and composition, the others, by industry and commerce, are transmuting them to gold. Possessed of the power of pleasing, they gratify on both sides; the one contemplates their *natural* beauties in the cabinet, the others, their *re-created* ones in the coffer.

'Tis by the researches of the virtuoso that the hidden parts of the earth are brought to light, and from his discoveries of its qualities, the potter, the glass-maker, and numerous other artists, are enabled to furnish us with their productions. Artists, considered *merely* as such, would have made but a slender progress, had they not been led on by the enterprising spirit of the curious. I am unwilling to dismiss this remark without entering my protest against that unkind, ungrateful and impolitic custom of ridiculing unsuccessful experiments; and informing those unwise or overwise pasquinaders, that

* *In the Catalogue it is called a collection of* American *fossils, &c. but a considerable part of them are foreign ones. I presume that the collector, in order to judge the better of such as he might discover here, made first a collection of such foreign ones whose value were known, in order to compare by; as his design seems rather bent towards discovering the treasures of America, than merely to make a collection.*

half the felicities they enjoy, ſprung originally from generous curioſity.

Were a man to propoſe, or ſet out to bore his lands, as a carpenter does a board, he might probably bring on himſelf a ſhower of witticiſms; and though he could not be jeſted at for building caſtles in the air, yet many magnanimous laughs might break forth his expence, and vociferouſly predict the exploſion of a mine in his ſubterraneous purſuits. I am led to this reflection by the preſent domeſtic ſtate of America, becauſe it will unavoidably happen, that before we can arrive at that perfection of things which other nations have acquired, many hopes will fail, many whimſical attempts will become fortunate, and many reaſonable ones end in air and expence. The degree of improvement which America is already arrived at, is unparalleled and aſtoniſhing, but 'tis miniature to what ſhe will one day boaſt of, if heaven continue her happineſs. We have nearly one whole region yet unexplored; I mean the internal region of the earth. By induſtry and tillage we have acquired a conſiderable knowledge of what America will produce, but very little of what it contains. The bowels of the earth have been only ſlightly enquired into: We ſeem to content ourſelves with ſuch parts of it as are abſolutely neceſſary, and cannot well be imported, as brick, ſtone, &c. but have gone very little farther, except in the article of iron. The glaſs and the pottery manufactures are yet very imperfect, and will continue ſo, till ſome curious reſearcher finds out the proper material.

Copper, lead,* and tin, articles valuable both in their ſimple ſtate, and as being the component parts of other metals (viz. braſs and

* *I am quite at a loſs to know what is meant by white lead ore, mentioned in the Catalogue; there being no ſuch thing. White lead does not exiſt in a mineral ſtate, but is prepared from common lead by the following proceſs: A large wood trough, 30 or 40 feet ſquare, is divided by wood partitions into ſquares of about one foot each. Theſe ſquares are filled with vinegar, which is kept moderately hot, by means of large beds of new horſe dung under the troughs. Common ſheet lead is cut into ſquare pieces and put into the vinegar, which acts upon it as a menſtruum, and changes it into white lead. When the pieces of lead appear white and flakey, they are taken out and thrown under a ſtone roller, which goes over them (as a tanner grinds bark) and beats off ſuch parts of the lead as are already changed into white lead, the remainder is again thrown into the vinegar. Fire will reſtore white lead to common lead again.*

pewter) are at preſent but little known throughout the continent in their mineral form: Yet I doubt not, but very valuable mines of them, are daily travelled over in the weſtern parts of America. Perhaps a few feet of ſurface conceal a treaſure ſufficient to enrich a kingdom.

The value of the interior part of the earth, like ourſelves, cannot be judged certainly of by the ſurface; neither do the correſponding ſtrata lie with the unvariable order of the colours of the rainbow,* and if they ever did, which I do not believe, age and misfortune have now broken in upon their union; earthquakes, deluges, and volcanoes have ſo diſunited and re-united them, that in their preſent ſtate they appear like a world in ruins--Yet the ruins are beautiful; the caverns, muſeums of antiquity.

Though nature is gay, polite, and generous abroad, ſhe is ſullen, rude, and niggardly at home: Return the viſit, and ſhe admits you with all the ſuſpicion of a miſer, and all the reluctance of an antiquated beauty retired to repleniſh her charms. Bred up in antediluvian notions, ſhe has not yet acquired the European taſte of receiving viſitants in her dreſſing-room: She locks and bolts up her private receſſes with extraordinary care, as if not only reſolved to preſerve her hoards, but to conceal her age, and hide the remains of a face that was young and lovely in the days of Adam. He that would view nature in her undreſs, and partake of her internal treaſures, muſt proceed with the reſolution of a robber, if not a raviſher. She gives no invitation to follow her to the cavern—The external earth makes no proclamation of the interior ſtores, but leaves to chance and induſtry, the diſcovery of the whole. In ſuch gifts as nature can annually re-create, ſhe is noble and profuſe, and entertains the whole world with the intereſt of her fortunes; but watches over the capital with the care of a miſer. Her gold and jewels lie concealed in the earth in caves of utter darkneſs; and hoards of wealth, heaps upon heaps; mould in the cheſts, like the riches of a necromancer's cell. It muſt be very pleaſant to an adventurous ſpeculiſt to make excurſions into theſe Gothic regions; and in his travels he may poſſibly come to a cabinet locked up in ſome rocky vault, whoſe treaſures ſhall reward his toil, and enable him to ſhine on his return, as ſplendidly as nature herſelf.

By a ſmall degree of attention to the order and origin of things,

* 1. *Red.* 2. *Orange.* 3. *Yellow.* 4. *Green.* 5. *Blue.* 6. *Indigo.* 7. *Violet.*

we ſhall perceive, that though the ſurface of the earth produce us the neceſſaries of life, yet 'tis from the mine we extract the conveniences thereof. Our houſes would diminiſh to wigwams furniſhed in the Indian ſtyle, and ourſelves reſemble the building, were it not for the ores of the earth. Agriculture and manufactures would wither away for want of tools and implements, and commerce ſtand ſtill for want of materials. The beaſts of the field would elude our power, and the birds of the air get beyond our reach. Our dominion would ſhrink to a narrow circle; and our mind itſelf, partaking of the change, would contract its proſpects, and leſſen into almoſt animal inſtinct. Take away but the ſingle article of iron, and half the felicities of life falls with it. Little as we may prize this common ore, the loſs of it would cut deeper than the uſe of it: And by the way of laughing off misfortunes 'tis eaſy to prove, by this method of inveſtigation, that *an iron age is better than a golden one.*

Since ſo great a portion of our enjoyments is drawn from the mine, it is certainly an evidence of our prudence to enquire and know what our poſſeſſions are. Every man's landed property extends to the ſurface of the earth. Why then ſhould he ſit down contented with a part, and practiſe upon his eſtate, thoſe faſhionable follies in life, which prefer the ſuperfice to the ſolid? Curioſity alone, ſhould the thought occur conveniently, would move an active mind to examine (though not to the bottom) at leaſt to a conſiderable depth.

The propriety and reaſonableneſs of theſe internal enquiries are continually pointed out to us by numberleſs occurrences. Accident is almoſt every day turning out ſome new ſecret from the earth. How often has the ploughſhare or the ſpade broken open a treaſure, which for ages, perhaps for ever, had lain but juſt beneath the ſurface? And though every eſtate have not mines of gold or ſilver, yet they may contain ſome ſtrata of valuable earth, proper for manufactures; and if they have not thoſe, there is a great probability of their having chalk, marl, or ſome rich ſoil proper for manure, which only requires to be removed to the ſurface.

I have been informed of ſome land in England being raiſed to four times its former value by the diſcovery of a chalk or marl pit, in digging a hole to fix a poſt in; and in embanking a meadow in the Jerſeys, the labourers threw out with the ſoil, a fine blue powderly earth, reſembling indigo, which, when mixed with oil, was uſed for paint. I imagine the vein is now exhauſted.

Thoſe who are inclined to make reſearches of this kind, will find

their endeavours greatly facilitated by the uſe of the following inſtrument.

Deſcription of a ſet of BORERS, *uſed in boring land, in order to find its internal compoſition.*

A ſet of borers conſiſts of any number of pieces, according to the depth intended to be bored to. Thoſe which I ſaw, and have here deſcribed, had twenty pieces of about two feet long each, and about an inch and half diameter. The firſt piece has a bite like a wood borer, and grooved like a gimblet, on which is to be fixed an iron croſs bar, to turn it by. When the firſt piece has deſcended to its depth, the croſs bar is taken off, and the ſecond piece, grooved like the firſt, is joined to it, much in the ſame manner as a ſoldier's bayonet is fixed to his muſket, but ſo, that the groove of the ſecond, lie in a line with the firſt. The croſs bar is then put on the top of the ſecond piece, and when that has deſcended, the third is fixed on in the ſame manner as the ſecond, with the groove in the ſame line, and ſo for all the reſt.—It is evident that if the whole twenty pieces were to deſcend, and not be drawn up till the laſt, that the different ſoils through which the borer had paſſed, would lie in the grooves in the ſame order, and at the ſame diſtance from the ſurface, and from each other, that they laid in the earth; and that by repeating the operation in different parts of the land, the direction, extent, length, and thickneſs of any, or all the ſtrata would be known. But as it will require an extraordinary force both to bore down and draw up the whole number of pieces, it will be neceſſary to looſen them by frequently drawing them up, and likewiſe to have an additional fore-piece ſomething bigger than the reſt, to enlarge the whole by. A few trials will explain the whole. The two chief things to obſerve are, not to lay the borers faſt, as they cannot be releaſed like a wedge; nor to wrench them the contrary way, leſt you ſeparate them, for by ſo doing the lower parts will be irrecoverably loſt.

Experiments of this kind are not attended with any conſiderable expence, and they give as much knowledge of the internal ſtructure of the earth, as will be obtained by fifty times the ſame expence in digging to any conſiderable depth, and much more expeditiouſly.

Many valuable ores, clays, &c. appear in ſuch rude forms in their natural ſtate, as not even to excite curioſity, much leſs attention. A true knowledge of their different value can only be obtained by experiment: As ſoil proper for manure they may be judged of by the planter; but as matter, they come under the enquiry of the phi-

loſopher—This leads me to reflect with inexpreſſible pleaſure, on the numberleſs beneſits ariſing to a community, by the inſtitution of ſocities for promoting uſeful knowledge.

The American Philoſophical Society, like the Royal Society in England, by having public ſpirit for its ſupport, and public good for its object, is become a treaſure we ought to glory in. Here the defective knowledge of the individual is ſupplied by the common ſtock. Societies, without endangering private fortunes, are enabled to proceed in their enquiries by analyſis and experiment: But individuals are ſeldom furniſhed with conveniences for ſo doing, and generally reſt their opinion on reaſonable conjecture.

I preſume that were ſamples of different ſoils from different parts of America, preſented to the ſociety for their inſpection and examination, it would greatly facilitate our knowledge of the internal earth, and give a new ſpring both to agriculture and manufactures.

Theſe hints are not intended to lament any loſs of time, or remiſſneſs in the purſuit of uſeful knowledge, but to furniſh matter for future ſtudies; that while we glory in what we are, we may not neglect what we are to be.

Of the preſent ſtate we may juſtly ſay, that no nation under heaven ever ſtruck out in ſo ſhort a time, and with ſo much ſpirit and reputation, into the labyrinth of art and ſcience; and that not in the acquiſition of knowledge only, but in the happy advantages flowing from it. The world does not at this day exhibit a parallel, neither can hiſtory produce its equal.

ATLANTICUS.

Philadelphia, Feb. 10.

NEW ANECDOTES OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

IN one of thoſe calm and gloomy days, which have a ſtrange effect in diſpoſing the mind to penſiveneſs, I quitted the buſy town and withdrew into the country. As I paſſed towards the Schuylkill, my ideas enlarged with the proſpect, and ſprung from place to place with an agility for which nature hath not a ſimile. Even the eye is a loiterer, when compared with the rapidity of the thoughts. Before I could reach the ferry, I had made the tour of the creation, and paid a regular viſit to almoſt every country under the ſun; and while I was croſſing the river, I paſſed the Styx and made large ex-

curſions into the ſhadowy regions; but my ideas relanded with my perſon, and taking a new flight inſpected the ſtate of things unborn. This happy wildneſs of imagination makes a man lord of the world, and diſcovers to him the value and the vanity of all its paſſions.

Having diſcharged the two terreſtrial Chārons, who ferried me ever the Schuylkill, I took up my ſtaff, and walked into the woods. Every thing conſpired to huſh me into a pleaſing kind of melancholy, —the trees ſeemed to ſleep—and the air hung round me with ſuch unbreathing ſilence, as if it liſtened to my very thoughts. Perfectly at reſt from care or buſineſs, I ſuffered my ideas to purſue their own unſettered fancies; and in leſs time than what is required to expreſs it in, they had again paſſed the Styx, and toured round many miles into the new country.

As the ſervants of great men always imitate their maſters abroad, ſo my ideas, habiting themſelves in my likeneſs, figured away with all the conſequence of the perſon they belong to; and calling themſelves, when united *I*, and *me*, wherever they went, brought me, on their return, the following anecdotes of Alexander, viz.

Having a mind to ſee in what manner Alexander lived in the Plutonian world, I croſſed the Styx (without the help of Charon, for the dead only are his fare) and enquired of a melancholy looking ſhade, who was ſitting on the banks of the river, if he could give me any account of him, *Yonder he comes*, replied the ſhade, *get out of the way or you'll be run over*. Turning myſelf round I ſaw a grand equipage rolling towards me which filled the whole avenue. Bleſs me! thought I, the gods ſtill continue this man in his inſolence and pomp! The chariot was drawn by eight horſes in golden harneſs, and the whole repreſented his triumphal return, after he had conquered the world. It paſſed me with a ſplendour I had not ſeen before, and ſhined ſo luminouſly up into the country, that I diſcovered innumerable ſhades ſitting under the trees, which before were inviſible. As there were two perſons in the chariot equally ſplendid, I could not diſtinguiſh which was Alexander, and on requiring that information of the ſhade, who ſtill ſtood by, he replied, *Alexander is not there*. Did you not, continued I, tell me that Alexander was coming, and bid me get out of the way? *Yes*, anſwered the ſhade, *becauſe he was the fore horſe on the ſide next to us*. Horſe! I mean Alexander the emperor. *I mean the ſame*, replied the ſhade, *for whatever he was on the other ſide of the water is nothing now, he is a horſe here, and not always that, for when he is apprehenſive that a good licking is intended him, he watches*

his opportunity to roll out of the ſtable in the ſhape of a piece of dung, or in any other diſguiſe he can eſcape. On this information I turned inſtantly away, not being able to bear the thoughts of ſuch aſtoniſhing degradation, notwithſtanding the averſion I have to his character. But curioſity got the better of my compaſſion, and having a mind to ſee what figure the conqueror of the world cut in the ſtable, I directed my flight thither: He was juſt returned with the reſt of the horſes from the journey, and the groom was rubbing him down with a large furze buſh, but turning himſelf round to get a ſtill larger and more prickly one that was newly brought in, Alexander catched the opportunity and inſtantly diſappeared, on which I quitted the place, leſt I ſhould be ſuſpected of ſtealing him: When I had reached the banks of the river, and was preparing to take my flight over, I perceived that I had picked up a *bug* among the Plutonian gentry, and thinking it was needleſs to increaſe the breed on this ſide the water, was going to diſpatch it, when the *little* wretch ſcreamed out, *Spare Alexander the* GREAT. On which I withdrew the violence I was offering to his perſon, and holding up the emperor between my finger and thumb, he exhibited a moſt contemptible figure of the downfal of tyrant greatneſs. Affected with a mixture of concern and compaſſion *(which he was always a ſtranger to)* I ſuffered him to nibble on a pimple that was newly riſen on my hand, in order to refreſh him; after which, I placed him on a tree to hide him, but a tom tit coming by, chopped him up with as little mercy as he put whole kingdoms to the ſword. On which I took my flight, reflecting with pleaſure—that I was not *Alexander the* GREAT. ESOP.

To the PUBLISHER *of the* PENNSYLVANIA MAGAZINE.

SIR,

I have given your *very modeſt* SNOW-DROP* what (I think) Shakeſpeare calls "a local habitation and a name;" that is, I have made a poet of him, and have ſent him to take poſſeſſion of a page in your next magazine. Here he comes diſputing with a critic about the propriety of a prologue.

Enter CRITIC *and* SNOW-DROP.

CRITIC.

PROLOGUES to magazines! the man is mad,
No magazine a prologue ever had.

* *Introduction or Preface to No. I.*—*See page* 371.

H Ham Tom Paine.

But let us hear what new and mighty things
Your wonder-working magic fancy brings.

SNOW-DROP.

Bit by the muſe in an unlucky hour,
I've left myſelf at home, and turn'd a flow'r;
And thus diſguis'd came forth to tell my tale,—
A plain white ſnow-drop gather'd from the vale,—
I come to ſing that ſummer is at hand,
The ſummer time of wit, you'll underſtand:
And that this garden of our magazine
Will ſoon exhibit ſuch a pleaſing ſcene,
That even critics ſhall admire the ſhow,
If their good grace will give us time to grow.
Beneath the ſurface of the parent earth,
We've various ſeeds juſt ſtruggling into birth;
Plants, fruits, and flow'rs, and all the ſmiling race,
That can the orchard or the garden grace:
Our numbers, ſir, ſo vaſt and endleſs are,
That when in full complexion we appear,
Each eye, each hand, ſhall pluck what ſuits its taſte,
And ev'ry palate ſhall enjoy a feaſt.
The roſe and lily ſhall addreſs the fair,
And whiſper ſweetly out—*My dears, take care.*
With ſterling worth the *plant of ſenſe* ſhall riſe,
And teach the curious to philoſophize;
The keen-ey'd wit ſhall claim the ſcented briar,
And ſober cits the ſolid grain admire;
While gen'rous juices ſparkling from the vine,
Shall warm the audience, till they cry—*Divine:*
And when the ſcenes of one gay month are o'er,
Shall clap their hands, and ſhout—*Encore, encore.*

CRITIC.

All this is mighty fine! but prithee when
The froſt returns, how fight ye then your men?

SNOW-DROP.

I'll tell you, ſir—We'll garniſh out the ſcenes
With ſtately rows of hardy ever-greens.
Trees that will bear the froſt; and deck their tops
With everlaſting flow'rs—like diamond drops.

We'll draw, and paint, and carve, with ſo much ſkill,
That wond'ring wits ſhall cry—*Diviner ſtill.*

CRITIC.

Better and better, yet! But now, ſuppoſe
Some critic wight, in mighty verſe or proſe,
Should draw his grey gooſe weapon, dipt in gall,
And mow ye down, plants, flow'rs, trees, and all.

SNOW-DROP.

Why then we'll die like flow'rs of ſweet perfume,
And yield a fragrance even in the tomb.

An account of the burning of BACHELOR'S HALL.

BY THE OLD BACHELOR.

FAIR Venus ſo often was miſs'd from the ſkies,
And Bacchus as frequently abſent likewiſe,
That the ſynod began to enquire out the reaſon,
Suſpecting the culprits were plotting of treaſon.
At length it was found they had open'd a ball,
At a place by the MORTALS call'd Bachelor's Hall;
Where Venus diſclos'd ev'ry fun ſhe could think of,
And Bacchus made nectar for mortals to drink of.
Jove highly diſpleas'd at ſuch riotous doings,
Sent TIME to reduce the whole building to ruins.
But Time was ſo ſlack with his traces and daſhes,
That Jove in a paſſion conſum'd it to aſhes.

LIBERTY TREE. A NEW SONG.

Tune, *The Gods of the Greeks.*

IN a chariot of light from the regions of day,
The goddeſs of liberty came,
Ten thouſand celeſtials directed the way,
And hither conducted the dame.
A fair budding branch from the gardens above,
Where millions with millions agree,
She brought in her hand, as a pledge of her love,
And the plant ſhe nam'd, *Liberty tree.*

II.

The celeſtial exotic ſtruck deep in the ground,
Like a native it flouriſh'd and bore:
The fame of its fruit drew the nations around,
To ſeek out this peaceable ſhore.
Unmindful of names or diſtinctions they came,
For freemen like brothers agree,
With one ſpirit endued, they one friendſhip purſued,
And their temple was *Liberty tree.*

III.

Beneath this fair tree, like the patriarchs of old,
Their bread in contentment they eat,
Unvex'd with the troubles of ſilver or gold,
The cares of the grand and the great.
With timber and tar they Old England ſupply'd,
And ſupported her pow'r on the ſea:
Her battles they fought, without getting a groat,
For the honour of *Liberty tree.*

IV.

But hear, O ye ſwains ('tis a tale moſt profane),
How all the tyrannical pow'rs,
King, commons, and lords, are uniting amain,
To cut down this guardian of ours.
From the eaſt to the weſt, blow the trumpet to arms,
Thro' the land let the ſound of it flee,
Let the far and the near,—all unite with a cheer,
In defence of our *Liberty tree.*

The following ſtory, ridiculous as it is, is a fact. A farmer at New Shoreham, near Brighthelmſtone, in England, having voted at an election for a member of parliament, contrary to the pleaſure of three neighbouring juſtices, they took revenge on his dog, which they cauſed to be hung, for ſtarting a hare upon the road. The piece has been very little ſeen, never publiſhed, nor any copies ever taken.

THREE juſtices (ſo ſays my tale)
Once met upon the public weal.

For learning, law, and parts profound,
Their fame was ſpread the county round;
Each by his wondrous art could tell,
Of things as ſtrange, as Sydrophel;
Or by the help of ſturdy ale,
So cleverly could tell a tale,
That half the gaping ſtanders by
Would laugh aloud. The reſt would cry.
Or by the help of nobler wine,
Would knotty points ſo nice define,
That in an inſtant right was wrong,
Yet did not hold that ſtation long,
For while they talk'd of wrong and right,
You'd *ſee* the queſtion out of *ſight*.
Each knew by practice where to turn
To ev'ry powerful page in Burn,
And could by help of note and book
Talk law like *Littleton* and *Coke*.
Each knew by inſtinct when and where
A farmer caught, or kill'd a hare.
Could tell if any man had got
One hundred pounds, *per ann.* or not,
Or what was greater, could divine
If it was only ninety-nine.
For when the hundred wanted one,
They took away the owner's gun.

Knew by the leering of an eye
If girls had loſt their chaſtity,
And if they had not—would divine
Some way to make their virtue ſhine.

Theſe learned brothers being aſſembled
(At which the country fear'd and trembled),
A warrant ſent to bring before 'em,
One farmer Short, who dwelt at Shorcham.
Upon a great and heavy charge,
Which we've recited here at large,
That thoſe who were not there might read,
In after days the mighty deed:

Viz.

" That he," the 'foreſaid " farmer Short,
" Being by the d—l mov'd, had not,
" One hundred pounds per annum got,
" That having not (in form likewiſe)
" The fear of God before his eyes,
" By force and arms did keep and cheriſh,
" Within the 'foreſaid town and pariſh,
" Againſt the ſtatute ſo provided,
" A dog. And there the dog abided.
" That he, this dog, did then, and there,
" Purſue and take and kill an hare.
" Which treaſon was, or ſome ſuch thing,
" Againſt our SOVEREIGN LORD the KING."

The conſtable was bid to jog,
And bring the farmer—not the dog.

But Fortune, whoſe perpetual wheel
Grinds diſappointment ſharp as ſteel,
On purpoſe to attack the pride
Of thoſe who over others ride,
So nicely brought the matter round,
That farmer Short could not be found,
Which plung'd the bench in ſo much doubt
They knew not what to go about.

But after pond'ring, *pro* and *con*,
And mighty reas'nings thereupon,
They found on op'ning of the laws,
That he, the dog aforeſaid, was
By being privy to the fact,
Within the meaning of the act,
And ſince the maſter had withdrawn,
And was the Lord knows whither gone,
They judg'd it right, and good in law,
That he, *the dog*, ſhould anſwer for
Such crimes as they by proof could ſhow
Were acted by himſelf and *co.*

The conſtable again was ſent,
To bring the dog; or dread th' event.

Poor PORTER, right before the door,
Was guarding of his maſter's ſtore;
And as the conſtable approach'd him,
He caught him by the leg and broach'd him;
Poor Porter thought (if dogs can think)
He came to ſteal his maſter's chink.

The man, by virtue of his ſtaff,
Bid people help; not ſtand and laugh;
On which a mighty rout began,
Some blam'd the dog; and ſome the man.
Some ſaid he had no bus'neſs there,
Some ſaid, he'd buſineſs ev'ry where;
At length the conſtable prevail'd,
And thoſe who would not help were jail'd;
And taking *Porter* by the collar
Commanded all the guards to follow.

The juſtices receiv'd the felon,
With greater form than I can tell on,
And quitting of their wine and punch,
Began upon him.—All at once.

At length a curious quibble roſe,
How far the law could interpoſe,
For it was prov'd, and rightly too,
That he, the dog, did not purſue
The hare, with any ill intent,
But only follow'd by the ſcent;
And ſhe, the hare, by running hard,
Thro' hedge and ditch without regard,
Plung'd in a pond, and there was drown'd,
And by a neighb'ring juſtice found:
Wherefore, tho' he the hare *annoy'd*,
It can't be ſaid that he *deſtroy'd*;
It even can't be prov'd he beat her,
And "to deſtroy," muſt mean, "to eat her."

Did you e'er ſee a gameſter ſtruck,
With all the ſymptoms of ill luck?
Or mark the viſage which appears,
When even Hope herſelf deſpairs?
So look'd the bench, and ev'ry brother,
Sad pictures drew of one another;
Till one more learned than the reſt,
Roſe up, and thus the court addreſs'd:

" Why, gentlemen, I'll tell ye how,
" Ye may clear up this matter now,
" For I am of opinion ſtrong
" The dog deſerves, and ſhall be hung.
" I'll prove it by as plain a caſe,
" As is the noſe upon your face."

" Now if, ſuppoſe, a man, or ſo,
" Should be oblig'd, or not, to go,
" About, or not about a caſe,
" To this, or that, or t'other place;
" And if another man, for fun,
" Should fire a piſtol (viz.), a gun,
" And he, *the firſt*, by knowing not
" That he, *the ſecond* man, had ſhot,
" Should undeſign'dly meet the bullet,
" Againſt his throat *(in Greek)* the gullet,
" And get ſuch miſchief by the hit
" As ſhould unſenſe him of his wit,
" And if that, after that, he dy'd,
" D'ye think the other mayn't be try'd?
" Moſt ſure he muſt, and hang'd, becauſe
" He fir'd his gun againſt the laws:
" For 'tis a caſe moſt clear and plain,
" Had A. not ſhot, B. had not been ſlain.
" So had the dog not chas'd the hare,
" She never had been drown'd—*that's clear.*"

This logic, rhetoric, and wit,
So nicely did the matter hit,

That *Porter*—tho' unheard, was caſt,
And in a halter breath'd his laſt.
The juſtices adjourn'd to dine,
And whet their logic up with wine.

ATLANTICUS.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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